Tag: immigration

Mexico Is Not Sending Its Murderers: Homicide Rates on the Mexican Border

President Trump tweeted this morning that, “One of the reasons we need Great Border Security is that Mexico’s murder rate in 2017 increased by 27% to 31,174 people killed, a record! The Democrats want Open Borders. I want Maximum Border Security and respect for ICE and our great Law Enforcement Professionals!”  He tweeted this because he’s spent the last few days stating that he would shut down the government if Congress did not adopt his proposed immigration reforms in the upcoming budget debate, especially the funding for the construction of a border wall.

Besides the political motivation for his tweet, President Trump seems to have assumed that crime in Mexico bleeds north into the United States, so more border security is required to prevent that from happening as murder rates begin to rise again in Mexico.  Although illegal immigrant incarceration rates are lower than they are for natives, illegal immigrant conviction rates in the border state of Texas are lower for almost every crime including homicide, and the vast majority of evidence indicates that illegal and legal immigrants are less crime-prone than natives, the President’s specific claim that murder rates spread from Mexico to the United States is different from most of the existing peer-reviewed literature. 

My colleague Andrew Forrester and I ran some simple regressions to test whether higher homicide rates in Mexican states that border the United States spread northward to U.S. states on the other side of the border.  It doesn’t make much sense to compare Mexican crime in the Yucatan Peninsula with that in Maine but, if President Trump’s theory is correct, then we should expect to see it cross from Baja California to California, for instance.  Homicide data for the Mexican border states come from the Mexican National Institute of Statistics and Geography.  American homicide data come from the Uniform Crime Reporting statistics at the FBI (files here).  Homicide rates in states in both countries are per 100,000 state residents which allows an apples-to-apples comparison.  We used data from 1997 through 2016 but were not able to include 2017 because U.S. crime data is still unavaiable for that year.  We decided to look exclusively at U.S. and Mexican border states because those are where we would expect crime to bleed over if such a thing happened. 

Figure 1 shows a negative relationship between homicide rates in U.S. border states and Mexican border states with a negative correlation coefficient of -0.46.  The coefficient is nearly identical when American homicide rates are lagged one year.  Although we did not include other controls, there is a negative relationship between homicides on the American side and the Mexican side.  In other words, when Mexican homicide rates go up then American rates tend to go down and vice versa.     

Homicide Rates in U.S. and Mexican Border States

Figure 2 shows the same data but with years on the X-axis.  Mexican border state homicide rates vary considerably over time, especially when that government decided to try to crack down on drug cartels, but U.S. border state homicide rates trended slowly downward over the entire time.  There is a negative relationship between Mexican homicide rates and homicide rates in U.S. border states. 

Homicide Rates in U.S. and Mexican Border States

Our figures and regressions above might not be capturing the whole picture.  Perhaps crime travels from Mexican border states and goes directly into the U.S. state that it is bordering.  That could be the source of President Trump’s worry.  We tested that in Figures 3-6 where we looked at how homicide rates in Mexican states contiguous to U.S. states are correlated with homicide rates there. 

The White House’s Misleading & Error Ridden Narrative on Immigrants and Crime

President Trump recently held an event with some of the relatives of people killed by illegal immigrants in the United States.  Afterward, the White House sent out a press release with some statistics to back up the President’s claims about the scale of illegal immigrant criminality.  The President’s claims are in quotes and my responses follow.

According to a 2011 government report, the arrests attached to the criminal alien population included an estimated 25,000 people for homicide.

Criminal aliens is defined as non-U.S. citizen foreigners, which includes legal immigrants who have not naturalized and illegal immigrants.  The 25,064 homicide arrests he referred to occurred from August 1955 through April 2010 – a 55-year period.  During that time, there were about 934,000 homicides in the United States.  As a side note, I had to estimate the number of homicides for 1955-1959 by working backward.  Assuming that those 25,064 arrested aliens actually were convicted of 25,064 homicides, then criminal aliens would have been responsible for 2.7 percent of all murders during that time period.  During the same time, the average non-citizen resident population of the United States was about 4.6 percent per year.  According to that simple back of the envelope calculation, non-citizen residents were underrepresented among murderers.

In Texas alone, within the last seven years, more than a quarter million criminal aliens have been arrested and charged with over 600,000 criminal offenses.  

We recently published a research brief examining the Texas data on criminal convictions and arrests by immigration status and crime.  In 2015, Texas police made 815,689 arrests of native-born Americans, 37,776 arrests of illegal immigrants, and 20,323 arrests of legal immigrants. For every 100,000 people in each subgroup, there were 3,578 arrests of natives, 2,149 arrests of illegal immigrants, and 698 arrests of legal immigrants.  The arrest rate for illegal immigrants was 40 percent below that of native-born Americans. The arrest rate for all immigrants and legal immigrants was 65 percent and 81 percent below that of native-born Americans, respectively.  The homicide arrest rate for native-born Americans was about 5.4 per 100,000 natives, about 46 percent higher than the illegal immigrant homicide arrest rate of 3.7 per 100,000.  Related to this, the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services recently released data that showed the arrest rate for DACA recipients about 46 percent below that of the resident non-DACA population.

More important than arrests are convictions.  Native-born Americans were convicted of 409,063 crimes, illegal immigrants were convicted of 13,753 crimes, and legal immigrants were convicted of 7,643 crimes in Texas in 2015. Thus, there were 1,749 criminal convictions of natives for every 100,000 natives, 782 criminal convictions of illegal immigrants for every 100,000 illegal immigrants, and 262 criminal convictions of legal immigrants for every 100,000 legal immigrants. As a percentage of their respective populations, there were 56 percent fewer criminal convictions of illegal immigrants than of native-born Americans in Texas in 2015. The criminal conviction rate for legal immigrants was about 85 percent below the native-born rate.

Criminal Conviction Rates by Immigration Status in Texas, 2015

Murder understandably garners the most attention.  There were 951 total homicide convictions in Texas in 2015. Of those, native-born Americans were convicted of 885 homicides, illegal immigrants were convicted of 51 homicides, and legal immigrants were convicted of 15 homicides. The homicide conviction rate for native-born Americans was 3.88 per 100,000, 2.9 per 100,000 for illegal immigrants, and 0.51 per 100,000 for legal immigrants.  In 2015, homicide conviction rates for illegal and legal immigrants were 25 percent and 87 percent below those of natives, respectively.

Homicide Conviction Rates by Immigration Status in Texas, 2015

Murderers should be punished severely no matter where they are from or what their immigration status is.  There are murderers and criminals in any large population, including illegal immigrants.  But we should not tolerate the peddling of misleading statistics without context.  What matters is how dangerous these subpopulations are relative to each other so the government can allocate resources to prevent the greatest number of murders possible.  Thus, enforcing immigration law more harshly is a very inefficient way to punish a population that is less likely to murder or commit crimes than native-born Americans.  Illegal immigrants, non-citizens, and legal immigrants are less likely to be incarcerated, convicted, or arrested for crimes than native-born Americans are. 

The Rising Popularity of Increasing Immigration

The most fascinating phenomena of American politics is the increasingly anti-immigration opinions of politicians like Donald Trump that contrasts with an increasingly pro-immigrant public opinion.  Gallup has asked the same poll question on immigration since 1965: “In your view, should immigration be kept at its present level, increased, or decreased?”  Gallup’s question does not separate legal from illegal immigration, likely meaning that answers to this question undercount support for increasing legal immigration.  They recently released their 2018 poll results.  The support for increasing legal immigration is at 28 percent – the highest point ever (Figure 1).  Support for increasing immigration is just one point below support for decreasing immigration – well within the 3-point margin of error (95% CI). 

Figure 1

Gallup: Should Immigration Be Kept at Its Present Level, Increased, or Decreased?

Gallup

Sources: Gallup.

The Gallup trend is the clearest and best for those of us who support increasing immigration but the General Social Survey shows a similar directional trend – although not nearly so dramatic (Figure 2).

Figure 2

GSS: Should Immigration Be Kept at Its Present Level, Increased, or Decreased?

GSS

Source: General Social Survey.

If the public is increasingly pro-immigration, why is the GOP so opposed to immigration?  It can’t be radically divergent opinions across partisan lines. According to the Gallup poll, 65 percent of Republicans think immigration is good for the country compared to 85 percent of Democrats.

Another possibility is that anti-immigration voters care a lot more about the issue than pro-immigration voters and are willing to change their votes based on it.  For pro-immigration voters, immigration just isn’t their biggest issue.  The Gallup poll hints at this as 55 percent of those who are dissatisfied with the current immigration levels want to cut the numbers while only 22 percent who are dissatisfied want to increase the numbers.

Another issue is causality as anti-immigration politicians could be pushing moderate Americans into a more pro-immigration position.  The crude language used by nativists, such as President Trump’s description of illegal immigrants as an infestation, can turn off a lot of voters in the same way that the Prop 187 campaign in California in the mid-1990s convinced a lot of white voters to not support the GOP.  This is the exact worry that Reihan Salam, a moderate restrictionist, voiced. The spokesman for political issues matters and Trump is not a very good one.

Another potential explanation is the “locus of brutality,” a riff on the locus of control literature that says voters are more supportive of liberalized immigration when they perceive it to be controlled.  Under that theory, border chaos, illegal immigration, refugee surges, and the perception of immigrant-induced chaos increases support for restriction.  Thus, countries with open immigration are mostly able to maintain those policies so long as it appears orderly.  Since disorder usually arises from poor government laws, this means that more regulation can make it more chaotic and create demand for more legislation in an endless cycle.  That locus of control pattern could be countered by the brutality of immigration enforcement such that voters become more pro-immigration when they are confronted with the government’s brutal enforcement of immigration laws.  Prison camps for immigrant children thus create support for liberalization.

My final theory is that this is the last gasp of nativism.  Lots of dying political movements that are terminally ill due to shifting public opinion go all out as it is their last chance to get elected.  Think George Wallace and segregation.  During the 2016 campaign, then-Senator Jeff Sessions said that that was the “last chance for Americans to get control of their government.”  When it comes to changes in the public trends and support for cutting immigration, he is probably correct.

The public is becoming increasingly pro-immigration.  The Democratic Party is increasingly reflecting that changing public opinion while the Republican Party is getting an increasing percentage of that shrinking but sizable anti-immigration minority.  There will come a point, should public opinion continue to support increasing immigration, where both parties will adopt this position.

Alternatives to Detention Are Cheaper than Universal Detention

President Donald Trump recently modified his policy of separating children from their families.  His new executive order requires the children of border crossers to be detained with their family members. Although a slight improvement over family separation, Trump’s decision raises different questions of whether detaining families together violates the 1997 Flores Settlement, whereby children have to be released after 20 days, which would necessitate family separation. The potential Flores problem could be mitigated entirely by Trump if he relied on alternatives to detention (ATD) programs instead of uniform detention of all border crossers. This would allow President Trump to claim that he ended catch and release without detaining migrant families at taxpayer cost.

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) manages ATDs to explore cost-effective means for asylum seekers and illegal immigrants to reside outside of detention facilities if they are not public safety threats. The ATDs help guarantee that the migrants show up at their hearings and ensure that they comply with court rulings. The 2017 budget allocated $114 million to ICE to run these programs and the Trump administration requested about $180 million for them for 2018.  

ATDs usually take at least one of three forms. The first is electronic monitoring devices whereby migrants have to wear a tracking device like an ankle bracelet. The second is assigning caseworkers to periodically check up on the migrants. The third is monetary incentives, such as bonds.  Many ATD programs mix these three. ICE runs the ATD program because they are responsible for apprehending, removing, and detaining immigrants inside of the United States. Detention costs about $170 per day for long stays and about $30 for short stays.  The proposed tent cities to house migrant children would have cost about $775 per person per night. As far as I can tell, about 100 percent of them comply with court orders as they are in government detention and therefore have no choice. The tradeoff for this extra effectiveness are the various costs of detention.

ATDs would have to be modified to accommodate recent border crossers, but that would not be difficult as the vast majority of them are not public safety threats. Asylum seekers, for example, have taken part in ATDs for over a decade. This post will explain the major ATDs, how they work, their costs, and effectiveness.

Another Confusing Federal Report on Immigrant Incarceration

The Departments of Justice and Homeland Security (DOJ/DHS) will be publishing a quarterly report on immigrant incarceration in federal prisons because of an Executive Order issued by President Trump last year.  The most recent report found that 20 percent of all inmates in federal prison are foreign-born and about 93 percent of them are likely illegal immigrants.  Since immigrants are only about 13.5 percent of the population and illegal immigrants are only about a quarter of all immigrants, many are misreading it and coming away with the impression that foreign-born people are more crime-prone than natives. 

That is simply not true.

This new DOJ/DHS report only includes those incarcerated in federal prisons, which is not a representative sample of all incarcerated persons in the United States.  Federal prisons include a higher percentage of foreign-born prisoners than state and local correctional facilities because violations of immigration and smuggling laws are federal offenses and violators of those laws are incarcerated in federal prisons.        

The report itself almost admits as much with this important disclaimer: 

This report does not include data on the alien populations in state prisons and local jails because state and local facilities do not routinely provide DHS or DOJ with comprehensive information about their inmates and detainees—which account for approximately 90 percent of the total U.S. incarcerated population.

Immigrants and Their Children Use Less Welfare than Third-and-Higher Generation Americans

A consistent criticism of Cato’s immigration-welfare research is that we compare the welfare consumption of all immigrants to all natives. Our method means that we consider the U.S.-born children of immigrants as natives, even when they reside in a household with foreign-born parents. Our critics contend that this undercounts immigrant welfare consumption because those children would not exist here without the immigrants coming in the first place. Thus, they claim, the welfare consumption of the U.S.-born children of immigrants should be combined with that of their immigrant parents in order to produce an accurate total assessment of immigrant welfare costs.

However, other researchers who combine first and second generation welfare-use do not combine these generations correctly. They use the Current Population Survey (CPS) data to measure immigrant household welfare use rates and benefit levels that includes the U.S.-born children of immigrants who live in the household, but they exclude tens of millions of U.S.-born children of immigrants who do not live in their parent’s households. Thus, counting only the children in the immigrant households produces a limited and biased estimate of first and second-generation welfare costs because the vast bulk of means-tested welfare targets households with children. If the second-generation must be included at all, a better approach would be to include second-generation adults as well.

Robert VerBruggen at National Review convinced us to estimate the welfare consumption levels and use rates for immigrants and their children of all ages (the first and second generations) relative to Americans in the third-and-higher generations in 2016. We initially intended to look only at immigrants who arrived in 1968 or later, which is the year that the Immigration Act of 1965 went into effect, but we were unable to limit the CPS sample and their children so precisely. We were also unable to estimate the welfare use rates or benefit levels for Medicaid or Medicare because of myriad data limitations. Figure 1 shows the result of the welfare use rates multiplied by the benefit levels for each generational group for four welfare and entitlement programs. This produces an average per capita welfare cost for each group for each program that combines adults and children.

Immigrant Welfare Consumption: A Response to Richwine

Jason Richwine recently published a short criticism of a new brief that Robert Orr and I wrote about immigrant and native benefit levels and use rates for means-tested welfare and entitlement programs.  This is another in a long series of blog post responses between those who support different methods for measuring native and immigrant welfare consumption so the response is wonky and does not revolve around a central question.  The title of Richwine’s criticism is “Obfuscating the Immigrant-Welfare Debate.”  Below, Richwine’s comments will be in quotes and my responses will follow.

“A few years ago I noted that ‘the amnesty movement has turned the political numbers game into an art form, systematically obscuring the trade-offs inherent in immigration policy.’ The movement has reached new heights of obfuscation with Alex Nowrasteh and Robert Orr’s Cato Institute study, ‘Immigration and the Welfare State.’”

Richwine hid half of our title: “Immigration and the Welfare State: Immigrant and Native Use Rates and Benefit Levels for Means-Tested Welfare and Entitlement Programs.”  Our entire title is important to defusing many of Richwine’s other complaints later in his piece.  The charge of obfuscation is serious but cutting off three-quarters of the words in our title does not enhance clarity.

“The Nowrasteh-Orr study says that’s all wrong. In fact, immigrants receive 39 percent less in welfare benefits than natives on a per capita basis. How is this possible? By including Social Security and Medicare as ‘welfare,’ for starters.”

As the title of our brief states, we included entitlement programs as part of the welfare state.  As we further explained in the first two sentences in our brief, we included them because they accounted for about 65 percent of all federal benefits outlays in 2016.  It is impossible to discuss the welfare state or the impact that immigrants have on it without including entitlement programs because they comprise its largest share.

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