Tag: illegal immigrants

The Age and Sex of Criminal Immigrants

In our recent brief on immigrant crime, we focused on the 18 to 54 age range when looking at the incarcerated and non-incarcerated populations. This was necessary because the American Community Survey data for weighted responses does not distinguish between the type of group quarters – which are prisons, universities and colleges, mental health facilities, nursing homes, and others.

By narrowing our focus to those in the 18 to 54 age range we were able to cut out about 1.4 million folks in elderly care facilities but only excluded about 206,000 prisoners or about 9.2 percent of the total. Excluding those under the age of 18 also removed most respondents in mental health facilities but only decreased the adult criminal population by 0.2 percent.

Figure 1 did not make it into our final brief but it shows a big difference in the distribution of ages between the three groups we examined. The median age of illegal immigrants and natives is 35 – almost exactly in the middle of the 18 to 54 age range. Interestingly, there is a dip in the age distribution for natives in their late thirties and early forties while the age distribution of illegal immigrants is shaped like a bell. In contrast, the median for legal immigrants was 41 which is on the older side of the distribution.

Figure 1
Age (18-54) Distribution of Illegal Immigrants, Legal Immigrants, and Natives

Source: ACS and authors’ calculations.

Criminals are disproportionately young so it would be reasonable to expect natives to be more crime-prone before the age of 27 and illegal immigrants to have a higher crime rate than legal immigrants. That could explain part of the difference in crime rates between natives and illegal immigrants. The surprising result is that illegal immigrants are so much less crime prone when immigration-only offenders are excluded even though they are younger than legal immigrants and have a median age that is the same as natives.  The young age and low education of illegal immigrants are consistent with more criminality in other populations.

The most surprising finding from our brief is that illegal immigrant women are less than half as likely to be incarcerated as women who are legal immigrants or natives (Figure 2). Illegal immigrants are slightly less likely to be women in this age range, only 48.5 percent compared to 51 percent for legal immigrants and 50 percent for natives, but that doesn’t explain the difference in rates. It could be related to low female illegal immigrant labor force participation rates (LFPR) or caused by the same mechanism that induces those lower LFPRs.

Figure 2
Characteristics of Prisoners by Sex and Nativity, Ages 18-54

 

Natives

Legal Immigrants

lllegal Immigrants

All

Female

11.47%

10.73%

4.58%

11.06%

Male

88.53%

89.27%

95.42%

88.94%

 Source: ACS and authors’ calculations.

 

 

Trump Executive Order Reestablishes “Secure Communities”

One of President Trump’s executive orders will reestablish Secure Communities (SCOMM), which was the most effective interior immigration enforcement program in decades. It was started during the Bush administration and rapidly expanded under Obama, eventually covering virtually all counties in the United States. It worked by checking the fingerprints of local and state arrestees against federal immigration and criminal databases. If Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) suspected the arrestee of being an illegal immigrant they would issue a detainer to hold the arrestee until ICE could pick them up. The Obama administration ended SCOMM in 2014 and replaced it with the similar Priority Enforcement Program.

SCOMM was certainly effective at apprehending and deporting illegal immigrants but it did not make communities more secure from actual criminals. SCOMM was not rolled out nationwide all at once, but rather incrementally (by county) over a four year period of time, in a way unrelated to local crime rates. Social scientists were able to exploit this quirk of SCOMM’s implementation to see if it had an effect on local crime rates, which it would if illegal immigrants were more or less likely to commit violent or property crimes. To make communities more secure, SCOMM would have to have lowered local crime rates.

In a paper published in the prestigious Journal of Law and Economics, Thomas J. Miles and Adam B. Cox found that SCOMM had no effect on local crime rates. Elina Treyger, Aaron Chalfin, and Charles Loeffler similarly found that SCOMM had no effect on local crime rates. Their findings suggest several things. One, SCOMM did not make communities more secure from crime. Two, illegal immigrants are less crime-prone than many people think and probably have about the same level of criminality as natives. Three, a community’s cooperation with the federal government in enforcing immigration law doesn’t seem to raise crime rates (some people suggest that such cooperation makes policing less effective).

Secure Communities is an immigration enforcement strategy that was very effective at identifying and removing illegal immigrants. Many states, like California, will not cooperate with the federal government in this reiteration of SCOMM, so it will likely be less effective than before. However, SCOMM supporters cannot claim that the program makes communities more secure by reducing the amount of violent or property crime.

The Myth of Border Insecurity

Many Americans feel that the United States government is not in control of the border and that the lack of control is a deliberate government policy. Nothing could be further from the truth. The government has greatly expanded the scale and scope of immigration enforcement on the southern border in recent decades. 

The government built fencing on the southwest border and increased the mileage from zero in 1990 to 653 today (Figure 1). Some of that fencing is porous and much of it is made to deter vehicles, but it is located in some of the previously most heavily trafficked areas. The effect was that unlawful immigrants were forced to cross in new, more dangerous areas. President-elect Donald Trump said he wants a 1,000-mile wall at the border, which means he’s already most of the way there.

Figure 1

Border Fencing

 

Source: Congressional Research Service.

Trump’s Real Immigration Policy

All of my political predictions about Donald Trump were wrong.  I predicted that he wouldn’t get the Republican Party nomination despite all of the polls to the contrary.  I followed the polls closely during the election and thought Trump would lose.  I was wrong again.  While certainly no mandate, Trump won the election.  Now the policies his administration will implement and push for are what matters.  We have very little to go on when it comes to predicting his actions.  Trump has no voting record on this and other issues.  His statements, actions, a policy paper, and his staff picks are the best indicators of this actions.

My prediction is that Trump will increase the scale and scope of immigration enforcement, rescind President Obama’s executive actions or at a minimum not allow Dreamers renew their status, massively curtail or end the refugee program, and try to convince Congress to cut legal immigration.  I’ve been wrong about Trump in the past and I hope I’m wrong here too.  Let me lay out evidence that I think supports my pessimism and evidence that supports a more optimistic interpretation.

Optimistic Take: Why Trump Could Not be THAT Bad

Trump is not ideologically grounded except that he is a nationalist and a populist.  Those political instincts usually manifest an anti-foreign bias in trade and immigration but they don’t have to.  Trump has portrayed himself as a deal maker so it’s possible he’s staked out a harsh immigration position as a bargaining tactic to get concessions elsewhere.

Legal Migration Can Control the Border

I recently wrote a piece about the increase in guest workers and the remarkably consistent level of entries, legal and illegal, of workers and new lawful permanent residents. The main choice the U.S. government faces is whether the migrants who come here are legal or unlawful.  Excluded from my previous blog were J-1 visas for researchers, au pairs, and the like. 

About a third of unauthorized immigrants worked in service jobs in 2012, as well as 28 percent of foreign-born residents who are not naturalized, compared to just 16.7 percent of natives. Au pairs and child care are an important component of these economic sectors so including them is important to understand the shift from unlawful to lawful immigration (Figure 1).  

Figure 1: Guest Worker Visas Issued, Green Cards for New Arrivals, and Gross Illegal Immigrant Inflows

 

Sources: State Department, Department of Homeland Security, Bureau of Labor Statistics, and Pew.

The biggest decline in unlawful immigration has come from Mexico but the surge in Mexican J-1s by itself cannot possibly explain that. In 1997, 3,633 Mexicans were issued J-1 visas while only 9,044 were issued the same visa in 2015. Regardless, the change in the number of Mexican apprehensions since 1997 explains virtually all of the change in the total number of apprehensions with a correlation coefficient of 0.994. The inclusion of J-1s does not change the conclusion from my previous post. 

Rising wages in Mexican states that sent migrants to the United States, lackluster U.S. economic growth, and increased border security all played a role in shrinking Mexican unauthorized immigration. The increase in border patrol from 1997 to 2015 is closely correlated with the number of new guest worker visas issued to Mexicans and the unemployment rate. The numbers of Mexicans apprehended is negatively correlated with all three—with the number of border patrol agents coming in on top at -0.95, Mexican guest workers at -0.78, and the U.S. unemployment rate at -0.68. The adjusted R-squared for all the variables is 0.86. 

There is an impressive trade-off between the number of Mexican guest workers and apprehensions of them attempting to enter unlawfully (Figure 2). Figure 3 shows the same figures in a more dramatic, less technical graph. Increasing the number of guest workers for Mexicans is also much cheaper than hiring new border patrol agents. 

Figure 2: Guest Worker Visas for Mexicans and Mexican Apprehensions

Sources: State Department and Department of Homeland Security.

Figure 3: Guest Worker Visas for Mexicans and Mexican Apprehensions

Sources: State Department and Department of Homeland Security.

The number of guest worker visas issued to Hondurans, Salvadorans, and Guatemalans has flattened since 2005 while the number of apprehensions of them at the border has more than doubled. Expanding the number of guest worker visas and making more of them available to Central Americans would be a cheap, effective, and economically beneficial way to diminish the flow of unlawful immigrants from those countries and to expand control over the border.  

Guest worker programs do not have to replace every would-be unlawful entrant with a legal work visa. Each visa issued during the Bracero program of the 1950s and 1960s replaced about 3.4 Mexican unauthorized immigrants, on average. Legal migrant workers are preferred by American employers, the migrants themselves, and should be favored by policy makers too. 

DACA Did Not Cause the Surge in Unaccompanied Children

In June, 2012 the Obama Administration announced that it had authored a memo deferring the deportation of unauthorized immigrant childhood arrivals in the United States, a program known as deferred action for childhood arrivals (DACA).  The memo directed then Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security to practice prosecutorial discretion toward a small number of unauthorized immigrants who fulfilled a specific set of characteristics.  In essence, some unauthorized immigrants who had come to the United States as children were able to legally stay and work–at least temporarily. 

Did DACA Cause the UAC Surge?

Some politicians contend that DACA is primarily responsible for the surge in unaccompanied child (UAC) migrants across the border in recent years.  A recent House Appropriations Committee one-pager stated that, “The dire situation on our Southern border has been exacerbated by the President’s current immigration policies.”  Proponents of this theory argue that DACA sent a message to Central Americans that if they came as children then the U.S. government would legalize them, thus giving a large incentive for them to come in the first place.  Few facts of the unaccompanied children (UAC) surge are consistent with the theory that DACA caused the surge.

First, the surge in UAC began long before the June 15, 2012 announcement of DACA.  It is true that DACA had been discussed in late May 2012 but the surge was underway by that time.  From October 2011 through March 2012, there was a 93 percent increase in UAC apprehensions over the same period in Fiscal Year 2011.  Texas Governor Rick Perry warned President Obama about the rapid increase in UAC at the border in early May 2012 – more than a full month before DACA was announced.  In early June 2012, Mexico was detaining twice as many Central American children as in 2011.  The surge in unaccompanied children (UAC) began before DACA was announced.

Second, the children coming now are not legally able to apply for DACA.  A recipient of DACA has to have resided in the United States continuously from June 15, 2007 to June 15, 2012, a requirement that excludes the unaccompanied children coming now.   

Third, if DACA was such an incentive for UAC to come from Central America, why are so few Nicaraguan children coming?  They would benefit in the same way as unaccompanied children from El Salvdaor, Honduras, and Guatemala.  The lack of Nicaraguans points to other causes of the surge.

The timing, legal exclusion of the UAC from DACA, and lack of Nicaraguans indicate that DACA was not a primary cause of the surge.  Of the 404 UAC interviewed by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees since 2011, only 9 mentioned that U.S. laws influenced their decision to come to the United States.  Other American laws could have influenced the unaccompanied children to come but DACA is not the main culprit.           

Details on DACA

The DACA beneficiaries, at the time of the memo, would have to fulfill all of these requirements to have their deportations deferred:

  • Under the age of 31,
  • Arrived to the United States before reaching their 16th birthday,
  • Entered the United States without inspection or overstayed a visa prior to June 15, 2012,
  • Continuously resided in the United States from June 15, 2007 to the time of the memo,
  • Physically present in the United States on June 15, 2012, as well as at the time of requesting deferred action from United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS),
  • Been in school at the time of application, or have already graduated or obtained a certificate of completion from high school, or have obtained a general education development (GED) certificate, or are an honorably discharged veteran of the U.S. Coast Guard or the U.S. Armed Forces
  • Not been convicted of a felony, significant misdemeanor, or three or more other misdemeanors, and do not otherwise pose a threat to national security or public safety.

Beneficiaries of DACA were also allowed to apply for employment authorization according to the Code of Federal Regulations.  There is a debate amongst legal scholars over whether the administration’s grant of deferred action was legal.  Those who argue that DACA was illegal contend that the President overstepped his constitutional authority to defer the deportation of some unauthorized immigrants.  Those who argue that DACA was legal point to the general power of the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security to defer enforcement action.  They argue that the Supreme Court has ruled that decisions to initiate or terminate enforcement proceedings fall within the authority of the Executive – an enforcement power used since the early 1970s.  Here is more of their argument.  This disagreement has not been settled.     

By the end of September, 2013, 580,000 requests for DACA were accepted by the U.S. government and 514,800, or 89 percent, were approved.  Seventy-six percent of the requests came from Mexicans.  Twenty-nine percent of the requests were filed from California, 16 percent from Texas, and 6 percent from Illinois.

Family Reunification and Other Explanations for the Border Surge of Unaccompanied Children

There are two main issues surrounding the increase in the migration of unaccompanied children (UAC) and asylum seekers in recent years that have recently reached crisis proportions.  The first is the treatment of those children who are apprehended by Border Patrol and how American policy is reacting to the surge. 

The second is explaining why UACs are coming.  Below I will lay out three different theories that attempt to explain the surge in UACs.  Each theory has some merit and I present evidence in support and opposition to each one.  

First Explanation: Family Reunification

Immigration by stages and family reunification could explain part of the UAC border surge.  Stage migration works like this:  First, the single breadwinner of the family immigrates to find work in the United States.  After getting established, finding employment, and figuring out how to function in his new country, the initial immigrant then sends for the rest of his family.  Sometimes the initial immigrant’s spouse will come alone while leaving the children in the care of extended family.  Often times, after the second parent is working, they will then have the funds to send for the children to join them in the United States. 

This pattern of family separation through stage immigration and eventual reunification is a desperate strategy undertaken by poor people who don’t have any other options.  Regardless, it explains part of the surge in unaccompanied children who are joining their unlawful immigrant parents and families who previously arrived in the United States.

Smuggling prices for unauthorized immigrants from Central America are higher than for unauthorized Mexican immigrants.  Mexicans pay about $4000 to be smuggled to the United States by land and $9000 to be smuggled in by sea.  Guatemalans pay about $7000.  But since Guatemalans are so much poorer than Mexicans, on average, it can take many more years for them to save for the trip, often meaning that both parents are more likely to come to the United States first to work and send money back to Guatemala to finance the sending of their children.  As a result, many of the children would come alone. 

The price of human smuggling has risen substantially due to increased U.S. border enforcement.  The higher price of migrating and the relative poverty of Central American migrants mean that families are more likely to be separated during the migration process, explaining part of the surge in UACs from Central America.  Ironically, increased border enforcement and crackdowns on human smugglers have probably caused more family separation and eventual reunification – partly explaining the scale of the current UAC migration.

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