Tag: hyperinflation

Venezuela’s Bolivar Redenomination Will Fail

Venezuela – ravaged by socialist policies, corruption, and incompetence – is currently embroiled in the world’s 57th episode of hyperinflation. Since the beginning of November, the bolivar has lost 55.2 percent of its value on the black market (read: free market), worsening the situation in a country in which wheelbarrows have already replaced wallets. So, on November 30th, Venezuelan officials announced a misguided and foolhardy plan to issue larger bills in an attempt to mitigate the damaging effects of its hyperinflation.

But why is the Banco Central de Venezuela (BCV) redenominating? Because if it doesn’t, then the people are stuck. If you go to a market in Caracas today, you either need a wheelbarrow of cash or bigger bills – much bigger. So, President Maduro and the BCV hope that, by printing 20,000-bolivar notes, they can skirt around the hyperinflation problem until it goes away. And that’s a mug’s game.

In the early 1990s, Yugoslavia tried to combat its own hyperinflation by printing larger bills, and it failed horribly. Yugoslavia’s heavy inflation continued throughout the ‘90s, and the dinar was devalued 18 times between 1991 and 1999, losing 22 decimal places of value along the way. Yugoslavia’s monetary orgy finally came to an end when the Topcider mint ran out of capacity. Yugoslavia’s 313,000,000 percent monthly inflation transformed 500-billion-dinar bills into small change before the ink had dried.

Redenomination does nothing if elevated inflation levels persist – as Zimbabwe’s infamous 100-trillion-dollar note demonstrates – and Venezuela will be no different. When inflation goes to the moon, you physically cannot redenominate bills fast enough – you can only add zeroes to notes so quickly. In consequence, you are ultimately left with valueless notes with many zeroes and a “wheelbarrow problem.” The issuance of higher-denomination bolivar notes isn’t the end of this episode, and it’s not the solution.

In fact, the only surefire solution is either to dump the bolivar and replace it with the U.S. dollar or make the bolivar a clone of the dollar via an orthodox currency board, in which the bolivar trades at a fixed rate with the U.S. dollar, is totally convertible with the U.S. dollar, and is completely backed by U.S. reserves.

Zimbabwe’s Hyperinflation: The Correct Number Is 89 Sextillion Percent

Most press reports about Zimbabwe’s fantastic hyperinflation are off the mark – way off the mark. Even our most trusted news sources fail to get the facts right. This confirms the “95 Percent Rule”: 95 percent of what you read in the financial press is either wrong or irrelevant.

When it comes to the reportage about hyperinflation, there are no excuses. All 56 of the world’s hyperinflations have been carefully documented in “World Hyperinflations”. This record is available in the Routledge Handbook of Major Economic Events in Economic History (2013) and has been available online since 2012 at the Cato Institute.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is the main culprit, a prominent source of the faulty data. EvenThe Economist magazine has fallen into the trap of uncritically accepting figures pumped out by the IMF and further propagating them. It’s no wonder that there is a massive gap between the public’s perception and economic reality. A gap that, ironically, The Economist reports on this week

The Economist’s most recent infraction on Zimbabwe’s hyperinflation appeared in the May 2016 issue. The magazine claimed that the hyperinflation peaked at an annual rate of 500 billion percent. Where did this figure originate? You guessed it. That figure is buried in the IMF’s 2009 Article IV Consultation Staff Report on Zimbabwe.

Venezuela: Not Hyperinflating—Yet

Although Venezuela’s inflation has soared (see: Up, Up, and Away), Venezuela is not experiencing a hyperinflationary episode–yet. Since the publication of Prof. Phillip Cagan’s famous 1956 study The Monetary Dynamics of Hyperinflation, the convention has been to define hyperinflation as when the monthly inflation rate exceeds 50%.

I regularly estimate the monthly inflation rates for Venezuela. To calculate those inflation rates, I use dynamic purchasing power parity (PPP) theory. While Venezuela’s monthly inflation rate has not advanced beyond the 50% per month mark on a sustained basis, it is dangerously close. Indeed, Venezuela’s inflation rate is currently 45% per month (see the accompanying chart).

If inflation moves much higher, the legacy of Hugo Chavez’s Bolivarian Revolution will be that Venezuela joins the rather select hyperinflation club as the 57th member. Yes, there have only been 56 documented hyperinflations

Venezuela's Monthly Inflation Rates

Ukraine Hyperinflates

Since the New Year, Ukraine’s currency – the hryvnia – has collapsed, losing 51 percent of its value against the U.S. dollar. To put this rout into perspective, consider that the Russian ruble has only lost 8 percent against the greenback during the same period.

Like night follows day, the hryvnia’s meltdown has resulted in a surge of inflation. The last official Ukrainian year-over-year inflation rate is 28.5 percent. This rate was reported for January and is out of date. That said, the official inflation rate has consistently and massively understated Ukraine’s brutal inflation. At present, Ukraine’s implied annual inflation rate is 272 percent. This is the world’s highest inflation rate, well above Venezuela’s 127 percent rate (see the accompanying chart).

When inflation rates are elevated, standard economic theory and reliable empirical techniques allow us to produce accurate inflation estimates. With free market exchange-rate data (usually black-market data), the inflation rate can be calculated. Indeed, the principle of purchasing power parity (PPP), which links changes in exchange rates and changes in prices, allows for a reliable inflation estimate.

To calculate the inflation rate in Ukraine, all that is required is a rather straightforward application of a standard, time-tested economic theory (read: PPP). At present, the black-market UAH/USD exchange rate sits at 33.78. Using this figure and black-market exchange rate data that the Johns Hopkins-Cato Institute for Troubled Currencies Project has collected over the past year, I estimate Ukraine’s current annual inflation rate to be 272 percent – and its monthly inflation rate to be 64.5 percent. This rate exceeds the 50 percent per month threshold required to qualify for hyperinflation. So, if Ukraine sustains its current monthly rate of inflation for several more months, it will enter the record books as the world’s 57th hyperinflation episode. 

Iran, Stable but Miserable

Since Hassan Rouhani assumed the presidency of the Islamic Republic of Iran in August of last year, the economic outlook for Iran has improved. When Rouhani took office, he promised three things: to curb the inflation which had become rampant under Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, to stabilize Iran’s currency (the Rial), and to start talks to potentially end the sanctions which have battered Iran since 2010. Rouhani has delivered on each of these promises. From this, one might assume that the Iranian economy, and the Iranian people, are headed towards better times.

Unfortunately, the Misery Index paints a different picture. The Misery Index is the sum of the inflation, interest, and unemployment rates, minus the annual percentage change in per capita GDP. It provides a clear picture of the economic conditions facing Iranians.

Iran: From Hyperinflation to Stability?

With the announcement on Saturday night that Iran and the P5+1 group reached a tentative deal over the Iranian nuclear program, the Iranian rial appreciated 3.45% against the dollar on the black market. The rial jumped from 30000 IRR/USD on Saturday November 23rd to 29000 IRR/USD on Sunday November 24th. A daily appreciation of this magnitude is rare. In fact, it has occurred fewer than ten times since the beginning of 2013. Indeed, this indicates that the diplomatic breakthrough is having a positive effect on Iranian expectations.

Over a year ago, I uncovered the fact that Iran experienced a period of hyperinflation (in early October 2012), when its monthly inflation rate peaked at 62%. Since then, I have been actively monitoring and reporting on the IRR/USD black market exchange rates and calculating implied inflation rates for the country.

Since Hassan Rouhani took office, on August 3rd, Iranian expectations about the economy have turned less negative. Thus far, it appears Rouhani has been successful in ending the long period of economic volatility that has plagued Iran, since the US imposed sanctions in 2010. This has been reflected in the black-market IRR/USD exchange rate, which

There are three main factors at work here. The first is a concerted effort by the Rouhani administration and the central bank to curb Iran’s inflation. This stands in stark contrast to the previous regime, whose strategy was to simply deny that inflation was a problem.

The second is that that Iran’s economy has proved remarkably “elastic” – meaning that the country has ultimately adapted to the sanctions regime and has found ways to keep its economy afloat in spite of them.

The third factor in the rial’s recent stability is an improvement in Iranian economic expectations. This is where the P5+1 talks come into play. Iranians recognized that easing of the sanctions regime would be a bargaining chip in any nuclear negotiations. In consequence, their economic expectations improved as the talks progressed. Indeed, Saturday’s announcement gave these expectations a shot in the arm.

In light of the rial’s recent stability, I have delisted the rial from my list of “Troubled Currencies,” as tracked by the Troubled Currencies Project. For starters, the rial no longer appears to be in trouble. And, on a technical note, implied inflation calculations are less reliable during sustained periods of exchange rate stability.

That said, we must continue to pay the most careful and anxious attention to the black-market IRR/USD exchange rate in the coming months. Like the P5+1 agreement, Rouhani’s economic progress in Iran is tentative and likely quite fragile. Since the black-market IRR/USD is one of the only objective prices in the Iranian economy – and perhaps the most important one of all – it will continue to serve as an important weather vane, as the diplomatic process continues, and as Iran’s economy gradually moves into a post-sanctions era. 

Value of the Syrian Pound Hits an All-Time Low

As I have documented previously, the economic devastation and international sanctions that have accompanied Syria’s civil war have wreaked havoc on the country’s currency, the Syrian pound (SYP). In a desperate, wrong-headed attempt to save its troubled currency, the Assad regime has imposed harsh penalties for currency trading on the black-market. This strategy proved wildly unsuccessful when it was utilized by the Iran in October of 2012.

Indeed, as was the case in Iran, attempts to suppress currency exchange have sparked a panic – a run on the Syrian pound. As of 10 July 2013, the value of the Syrian pound on the black market has hit an all time low, with the current black-market exchange rate now sitting at 295.00 SYP/USD.

As the accompanying chart shows, this has sent the implied monthly inflation rate in Syria skyrocketing.

Yes, Syria’s implied monthly inflation rate is now 91.9%. This means that Syria has exceeded the threshold for hyperinflation (an inflation rate of 50% per month).  Only time will tell if this run on the Syrian pound will continue. But, for the time being, we can be sure that the Syrian pound will remain a troubled currency.

I have established a page to track current black-market exchange-rate and implied inflation data for the Syrian pound, as well as for troubled currencies in Iran, Argentina, North Korea, and Venezuela. For more, see: The Troubled Currencies Project.

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