Tag: guaranteed renewability

Short-Term Plans Rule Flips the Political Narrative on Health-Insurance Protections

The usual narrative is that Democrats support consumer protections and Republicans oppose them. Today’s short-term plans final rule flips that narrative: Republicans are expanding consumer protections, and Democrats are opposing them.

Today’s rule reverses a 2016 Obama rule. The Obama rule reduced consumer protections in short-term plans by exposing sick patients to medical underwriting. Before that rule, consumers could purchase short-term plans that lasted 12 months. If they developed a serious illness, their plan could cover them until the next ObamaCare open enrollment period, when they could purchase coverage without medical underwriting. The Obama rule restricted short-term plans to 3 months. It prohibited “renewal guarantees” that protect enrollees who fall ill from medical underwriting when they purchased a new short-term plan. As a result, the Obama rule left short-term plan enrollees who got sick with no coverage for up to 9 months: those who purchased a plan in January, and developed a serious illness in February, would lose their coverage at the end of March, and have no coverage until the following January. (Source: NAIC) This was by design: the Obama administration wanted to expose sick people in short-term plans to medical underwriting and lost coverage as a way of forcing consumers to buy ObamaCare coverage instead. That’s at least a little messed up.

Today’s rule allows short-term plans to last 12 months and offer renewal guarantees. It therefore allows short-term plans to protect the sick from medical underwriting for an additional 9 months—indeed, “issuers may offer coverage under a short-term, limited-duration insurance policy for up to a total of 36 months, without any medical underwriting or experience rating beyond that completed upon the initial sale of the policy”—and allows renewal guarantees to protect them from medical underwriting indefinitely. Protecting the sick from medical underwriting has long been a goal of Congress.

So, to recap, Republicans are expanding consumer protections, and Democrats are opposing an expansion of consumer protections.

Weird, isn’t it?

Short-Term Plans Would Increase Coverage, Protect Conscience Rights & Improve ObamaCare Risk Pools

Any day now, the Trump administration will release a final rule allowing greater consumer protections in so-called “short-term, limited duration insurance,” a category of health insurance Congress exempts from federal health insurance regulations, including ObamaCare regulations. In comments I filed on the proposed version of the Trump administration’s rule and an accompanying Wall Street Journal oped, I explained some but not all of the benefits of allowing these consumer protections. What follows is updated and new information about the benefits of allowing those consumer protections.

Introduction

In 2016, the Obama administration arbitrarily prohibited certain consumer protections in short-term plans. First, it exposed sick consumers to underwriting and loss of coverage by shortening the maximum duration of short-term plans from 12 months to 3 months. Second, it prohibited “renewal guarantees” that would protect consumers who develop expensive illnesses from ever facing underwriting or losing their coverage.

Last year, President Trump urged the Department of Health and Human Services to allow short-term plans to last 12 months and to allow consumers to bridge together consecutive short-term plans with “renewal guarantees” that protect them from being re-underwritten after they get sick. With ObamaCare premiums soaring and the consulting firm Avalere warning of “substantial increases” in ObamaCare premiums for 2019, these consumer protections would mean “consumers could purchase health-insurance protection for 90% less than the cost of the average ObamaCare plan.“ Renewal guarantees would keep people with expensive conditions out of ObamaCare plans, thereby improving ObamaCare’s pools and reducing the cost of ObamaCare. Along the way, allowing these consumer protections would “increas[e] transparency in government and provid[e] voters and policymakers with better information about the cost of the ACA.”

HHS Can and Should Allow Short-Term Plans to Protect the Sick from Medical Underwriting

If you aren’t paying attention to the debate over short-term health insurance plans, you should. It’s a mixed-up, muddled-up, shook-up world where Republicans are pushing to expand consumer protections, Democrats are fighting to block them, and the public debate has it exactly backward.

In this morning’s Wall Street Journal, I explain:

ObamaCare premiums keep skyrocketing. Rate hikes as high as 91% will hit many consumers just before Election Day. Maryland insurance commissioner Al Redmer warns ObamaCare is in “a death spiral.”

So-called short-term health plans, exempt from ObamaCare’s extensive regulations, are providing relief. Such plans often cost 70% less, offer a broader choice of providers, and free consumers to enroll anytime and purchase only the coverage they need.

But there’s a downside. When enrollees fall ill, either their premiums spike or they lose coverage, leaving an expensive ObamaCare plan as the only alternative. Markets solved that problem decades ago via “renewal guarantees,” which allow enrollees who get sick to keep paying the same premiums as healthy enrollees.

For more than two decades, Congress has consistently tried to prevent sick patients from being to medical underwriting. Yet in 2016, the Obama administration did exactly the opposite. It issued a regulation that exposed enrollees in short-term plans to medical underwriting after they got sick:

In 2016, in an effort to force people into ObamaCare plans, the Obama HHS shortened the maximum duration for short-term plans from a year to three months and banned renewal guarantees. The National Association of Insurance Commissioners complained this reduced consumer protections and exposed the sick to greater risk, including the risk of having no coverage.

The Trump administration has proposed reversing the Obama rule and allowing short-term plans to offer both 12-month terms and renewal guarantees that allow enrollees who get sick to keep paying the same premiums as healthy enrollees (i.e., no more underwriting). Both of these proposals are consumer protections that would protect the sick from medical underwriting and in some cases protect the sick from losing coverage entirely. 

Believe it or not, Democrats are opposing these consumer protections! I am tempted to say their opposition is inexplicable, but it’s all-too explicable. Democrats want to prevent short-term plans from offering these consumer protections because they fear consumers will find short-term plans more attractive than ObamaCare. Democrats are literally trying to stop Republicans from expanding consumer protections because they would rather protect ObamaCare. 

Democrats Ask Trump Administration to Block Consumer Protections

In a recent letter to the Trump administration, leading congressional Democrats ask the administration not to allow protections for enrollees in short-term health plans.

Yes, you read that right. Dated April 12, the letter comes from Sens. Patty Murray (WA) and Ron Wyden (OR), as well as Reps. Frank Pallone (NJ), Bobby Scott (VA), and Richard Neal (MA), each the top Democrat on a different congressional committee with jurisdiction over health care. They ask the administration to withdraw in its entirety a proposed rule that, if implemented, would offer significant protections to enrollees in so-called “short-term limited duration plans.”

The administration has proposed lengthening the maximum term for such plans from 3 months to 12 months, which had been the limit for nearly two decades before the Obama administration shortened it. The administration has also asked for public comments (due April 23) on whether it should allow insurers to offer short-term plans with “renewal guarantees”—a consumer protection that allows enrollees who develop expensive illnesses to continue paying low, healthy-person premiums.

The letter asks the administration to “withdraw the proposed rule in its entirety,” which would block those consumer protections. These Democrats literally want to prevent short-term plans from giving consumers the peace of mind from knowing they will be covered for an entire year. Worse, these Democrats want to prohibit short-term plans from offering a consumer protection that protects the sick from premium spikes. 

The reason for this animosity toward short-term plans is rather clear: ObamaCare supporters don’t want the competition. Federal law exempts “short-term limited duration plans” from ObamaCare and other federal health-insurance regulations. Short-term plans free consumers to purchase only the coverage they want, rather than have ObamaCare force them to buy coverage they don’t want, including coverage for things they may find morally repugnant. ObamaCare supporters do not want consumers to have that freedom, because when consumers leave ObamaCare coverage for short-term plans, ObamaCare premiums will reflect more and more of the cost of that law.

The Emerging Graham-Cassidy 2.0 Proposal

Conservative groups including the Heritage Foundation are circulating a proposal that builds on legislation by Sens. Lindsay Graham (R-SC) and Bill Cassidy (R-LA) to overhaul ObamaCare. Even though I don’t know whether Graham and Cassidy have endorsed these updates, I will go ahead and call this proposal Graham-Cassidy 2.0. The proposal seems ill-advised, particularly since there is an alternative that is not only far superior in terms of policy, but also an easier political lift that would deliver more political benefit.

The key to evaluating any proposal to overhaul ObamaCare is to understand the law’s centerpiece is its pre-existing conditions provisions. Those provisions are actually a bundle of regulations, including a requirement that insurers offer coverage to all comers, restrictions on underwriting on the basis of age, an outright prohibition on underwriting on the basis of health, and a requirement that insurers treat different market segments as being part of a single risk pool. ObamaCare’s preexisting-conditions provisions have the unintended and harmful effect of penalizing high-quality coverage and rewarding low-quality coverage. ObamaCare contains other harmful regulations, but its preexisting-conditions provisions are by far the worst. Unless a proposal would repeal or completely free consumers from ObamaCare’s preexisting-conditions provisions, it is simply nibbling around the edges.

From what I have seen, Graham-Cassidy 2.0 nibbles around the edges.

To its credit, Graham-Cassidy 2.0 would zero-out funding for and repeal the entitlements to both ObamaCare’s premium-assistance tax credits (read: Exchange subsidies) and benefits under the Medicaid expansion. Unfortunately, it would not repeal that spending. Instead, it would take that money and send it to states in the form of block grants. The aggregate spending level for those block grants would grow more slowly over time than Exchange subsidies and federal Medicaid-expansion grants would under current law.

Limiting the growth of those spending streams seems like a better idea than letting them grow without limit, as current law allows. However, there is more downside than upside here.

First, Graham-Cassidy 2.0 would transform a purely federal spending stream into a intergovernmental transfer. At present, Exchange subsidies are payments the federal government makes to private insurance companies. Under Graham-Cassidy 2.0 (and 1.0), the feds would send those funds to states, which would use them to subsidize health insurance in various ways. Roping in a second layer of government diffuses responsibility and reduces accountability, regardless of whether the feds send those funds to states in the form of a block grant. Voters who don’t like how those funds are being spent would have difficulty knowing which level of government to blame, and whichever level of government is actually responsible could avoid accountability by blaming the other. Intergovernmental transfers are so inherently corrupting, there should be a constitutional amendment prohibiting them. And yet Graham-Cassidy 2.0 would substitute an intergovernmental transfer for spending with clearer lines of accountability.

Second, Graham-Cassidy 2.0 also diffuses accountability for ObamaCare’s preexisting-conditions provisions. Those provisions would continue to operate (with slight modifications). As a result, they would continue to destabilize the individual market, punish high-quality coverage, and reward low-quality coverage. The purpose of the Exchange subsidies is to mitigate that instability. Today, it is clear that Congress is responsible for any harm those provisions inflict, and the success or failure of the Exchange subsidies to mitigate those harms. Graham-Cassidy 2.0 would give that money to states and task them with mitigating those harms. When states fail to do so, as at least some states inevitably will, whom should voters blame? Congress, which started the fire? Or states, to whom Congress handed the fire extinguisher?

Third, while Graham-Cassidy 2.0 would eliminate two federal entitlements, eliminating entitlements is desirable only to the extent it limits government control over economic resources—in this case, spending. And while Graham-Cassidy 2.0 proposes to hold the growth of this repurposed ObamaCare spending below what it would be under current law, there is reason to doubt such a spending limitation would hold.

When examining the merits of any policy proposal, one must also consider the political dynamics the proposal would unleash. Generally speaking, states are a more politically powerful and sympathetic constituency than the current recipients of Exchange subsidies (private insurance companies). States have been able to use that political clout to get Congress to disregard the spending limits it imposed on SCHIP, for example, when so-called emergencies led states to blow through their initial allotments. Moreover, since Graham-Cassidy 2.0 would preserve ObamaCare’s preexisting-conditions provisions, it would come with its own built-in emergencies. As sure as the sun rises in the East, states will come to Congress and claim their block-grant allocations were insufficient to mitigate the resulting harms. Congress would be unlikely to say no—members rely on state officials for political support, after all—which means the spending restraints in Graham-Cassidy 2.0 are less than guaranteed.

Fourth, also pushing the direction of bigger government, Graham-Cassidy 2.0 would expand the constituency for ObamaCare spending. At present, the money the federal government spends on ObamaCare’s Medicaid expansion does not enjoy the support of the 19 states that have not implemented the expansion. The block grants in Graham-Cassidy 2.0, by contrast, would go to all states. As a result, non-expansion states like Texas would go from not caring about whether that federal spending continues to insisting that it does. At the same time, Graham-Cassidy 2.0 would expand the constituency of voters who want to preserve that spending. At present, able-bodied, childless adults in non-expansion states receive no benefit from ObamaCare’s Medicaid expansion or its Exchange subsidies. Graham-Cassidy 2.0 would allow (and in some cases require) states to provide subsidies to such adults below the poverty level, thereby creating another constituency that will reliably vote to expand those subsidies.

Fifth, a provision of Graham-Cassidy 2.0 that supporters consider a selling point would expand the constituency for more spending yet again. The proposal would require all states to allow all able-bodied, non-elderly Medicaid enrollees to use their Medicaid subsidy to purchase private insurance. Since greater choice would make Medicaid enrollment more valuable, and since roughly one third of people who are eligible for Medicaid are not enrolled, this would perversely lead to a large “woodwork effect,” where people who were previously eligible for Medicaid but not enrolled begin to enroll in the program. When Medicaid enrollment increases, so will Medicaid spending, and so will the population of voters who are willing to vote for higher Medicaid spending and the higher taxes required to finance it.

Since Graham-Cassidy 2.0 would preserve ObamaCare’s preexisting-conditions provisions, it is hard to see what would justify taking these one or two uncertain steps forward and multiple steps backward.

This is particularly true since there is a much better alternative on the table: strongly encouraging the Trump administration to allow insurers to offer short-term health insurance plans with renewal guarantees that protect enrollees from having their premiums increase because they got sick. Doing so would allow consumers to avoid all of ObamaCare’s unwanted regulatory costs, particularly those imposed by its preexisting-conditions provisions. The Trump administration can create this “freedom option” by administrative rulemaking—comments on the administrations proposed rule are due April 23—which is a much easier political lift than garnering 217 votes in the House and 51 votes in the Senate. Expanding short-term plans would also create salutary political dynamics that would force Democrats begin negotiating a permanent overhaul of ObamaCare.

As of today, Graham-Cassidy 2.0 just can’t compete with that cost-benefit ratio. Every ounce of energy spent on it, rather than on expanding short-term plans, is a waste.

States & HHS Can Provide Relief from ObamaCare while Congress Dithers

Congress appears unwilling to provide any sort of ObamaCare relief. 

But did you know states can exempt their residents from ObamaCare’s costliest regulations simply by letting them purchase insurance licensed by U.S. territories—i.e., across state lines? 

Or that the Trump administration has the authority to provide even more relief from ObamaCare than last year’s Cruz Compromise would have, just by reversing HHS’ administrative ban on renewal guarantees in short-term plans? 

Well, now you do. From my latest oped in The Hill:

States and the Trump administration each have the power to deliver relief from ObamaCare while Congress dithers.

In 2014, the Obama administration reversed its interpretation of ObamaCare and found the law’s costliest regulations do not apply in U.S. territories. As a result, states can provide relief from ObamaCare by freeing individuals and employers to purchase health insurance licensed by American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, or the U.S. Virgin Islands.

The Obama administration’s reversal also provides a model for the Trump administration. HHS has the authority to and should reverse its administrative ban on short-term health plans offering “renewal guarantees.” Ending that ban would dramatically reduce premiums for the vast majority of consumers in the individual market, even as ObamaCare premiums continue to skyrocket. Conservative states and states with vulnerable GOP members like Florida, Illinois, and Pennsylvania would see the largest premium reductions. 

Read the whole thing.

ObamaCare’s Greatest Political Vulnerability

In two new posts at the Health Affairs blog, I lift the fog of economic jargon to show ObamaCare’s preexisting-conditions provisions are reducing quality, are wildly unpopular with voters, and are indeed the law’s greatest political vulnerability:

Public opinion surveys show voters support ObamaCare’s preexisting conditions provisions by a two-to-one margin. If those provisions have the effect of reducing quality, however, that initial support flips to two-to-one opposition. The biggest shift is among Democrats, who swing from 82 percent in favor to 55 percent opposed. Voters turn against those provisions whether the erosion in quality comes in the form of less access to medical tests and treatments, longer waits for care, more surprise medical bills, or less access to top-rated treatment centers…

In “Is ObamaCare Harming Quality? (Part 1),” I explain that new research shows that ObamaCare is not working how it is supposed to work in theory: the law’s preexisting conditions provisions create perverse incentives for insurers to reduce the quality of coverage; those provisions are reducing the quality of coverage relative to employer plans; and the erosion in quality is likely to accelerate in the future.

In “How To Ensure Quality Health Coverage (Part 2),” I explain why regulators cannot fix this problem, and why providing sick patients secure access to quality health care requires allowing consumers to purchase health plans not subject to ObamaCare’s preexisting conditions provisions.

Part 2 also explains how expanding the definition of “short-term” health insurance to include policies that include guaranteed-renewability riders, a change the Trump administration can make on its own via regulation, would free consumers from ObamaCare and pressure Democrats to come to the negotiating table.