Tag: G20

Can the United States, China and Russia Cooperate on Trade?

The 2016 G20 summit in Hangzhou is fast approaching and, similar to the pre-summit meetings hosted by China throughout the year, the focus will be the state of the global economy. Still contending with sluggish global economic growth, the summit’s theme of “Towards an Innovative, Invigorated, Interconnected and Inclusive World Economy” is especially timely. Under the umbrella of global economic growth, cultivating opportunities for trade and investment will become a major priority for G20 states, and three global powers—the United States, China, and Russia—are each developing their own multinational trade route projects. These major trade projects could serve as opportunities for cross-country cooperation and growth, but they could also become sources for future conflict.

China’s management of domestic markets, currency, and commitment to structural reforms was a cause for global concern at the first meeting of G20 Finance and Central Bank Governors in February. At next week’s summit, China’s President Xi Jinping will undoubtedly point out China’s efforts towards realizing supply-side structural reforms in the face of China’s “new normal” of slower economic growth. As part of these reforms aimed at rebalancing China’s economy, Beijing plans to cut industrial overcapacity, tackle overhanging debt, reform state-owned enterprises, and seek out new consumer markets. On the last point, Beijing is championing its New Silk Road Initiative (also known as “One Belt, One Road”), a major state project focused on opening up new markets. To accomplish this, Beijing is building vast trade networks spanning several countries and continents, by land and by sea. However, many countries are wary. The project, billed as purely an economic one, may evolve to include a political and/or military dimension as well.

Too Top-Down…Even for the Chinese Government!

It’s not surprising that Treasury Secretary Geithner’s recent G-20 proposal that governments agree to keep their current-account balances (either surplus or deficit) within 4 percent of GDP has met with resistance. After all, it assumes governments can and should manage the buying, selling, and investment decisions of hundreds of millions of Americans and billions of people worldwide. But I marvel at how deeply Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Cui Tiankai’s tongue must have been planted in cheek when he uttered this rich rejection of Geithner’s idea: “The artificial setting of a numerical target cannot but remind us of the days of a planned economy.” If the shoe fits….

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Currency Wars Also Have Unintended Consequences and Collateral Damage

The Fed’s planned purchases of $600 billion of long-term Treasury bonds were targeted for domestic problems, but are having international consequences. The expansion of the Fed’s balance sheet drives down the foreign-exchange value of the U.S. dollar, and (same thing) forces other currencies to appreciate in value.

Emerging markets with high short-term interest rates will attract “hot money” flows. These flows are not stable sources of funding, and disrupt the small capital markets in these countries. Long-term, the appreciation of their currencies harms their competitiveness in global goods’ markets.

Brazil has already imposed capital controls and other emerging markets may follow. The Chinese in particular have reacted sharply.  According to a Reuters dispatch, Xia Bin, adviser to China’s central bank, said another financial crisis is “inevitable.” He added that China will act in its own interests.

In short, the Fed’s actions have undone whatever good came out of the G20 meetings. Any hope for cooperation on currency values and financial stability is out the window. There are potential spillovers in other areas of global cooperation.

Currency wars, like other wars, have unintended consequences and collateral damage.  Some countries will predictably react by imposing capital controls.  Moves to curb imports can follow. Monetary protectionism leads to trade protectionism.

However it might like matters to be, the Fed cannot simply act domestically.  It has reached the useful limits of further easing.