Tag: foreign policy

Conflicted Public Reaction to Trump’s Immigration Executive Order

Last Friday, President Trump issued an executive order temporarily barring entry of refugees, visitors, and immigrants—including those with green cards—from Syria, Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen. During this delay, the government is tasked with making its screening process more extensive. The order indefinitely bans refugees from Syria.

As Henry Enten notes, we’ll have to wait until we have more polling data to ascertain how the public will judge the action, but polling over the past year gives us some clues.

Slim but Shy Support Most polls throughout 2015-2016 found about 56% of Americans opposed Trump’s call to temporarily ban Muslim immigrants from entering the United States. However, these polls tended to be conducted by live telephone interviewers. In contrast, polls conducted online by reputable firms like YouGov and Morning consult, find a plurality of Americans in support.

Aggregating over 40 telephone and online polls conducted over the past two years finds Americans opposed to the ban 56% to 39% in surveys conducted by phone, but a plurality in support 49% to 39% in surveys conducted online. This suggests that people taking surveys by phone feel uncomfortable sharing their true feelings and thus fib to the live interviewers. But, privately taking a survey online encourages people to share what they really think. In the polling world, this is called “social desirability bias” evoked by social pressure to not appear prejudiced to the live interviewer.

Of course, the difference cannot be entirely attributed to survey mode since the questions weren’t worded the exact same way. Nonetheless, it’s suggestive that there is a “shy immigration restrictionist” effect going on. (Remember the shy Trump voter?)

Americans Don’t Support an Outright Ban on Refugees Existing data suggest Americans do not support a permanent ban on refugees. Most telephone and online surveys found that Americans oppose not taking any refugees at all and a plurality (46%) say the “US should open our borders to refugees of foreign conflicts” according to an Ipsos/Reuters Jan 2017 online survey. At the same time, Americans tend to support taking fewer refugees rather than more, when given the option. For instance, both an Ipsos/Reuters Jan 2017 online survey and a Marist Apr 2016 telephone survey found 53% of Americans want the US to take in fewer refugees.

Wording Impacts Support Strength As you can imagine, survey question wording impacts responses. Support for immigration restriction increases when refugees and immigrants are described as coming from “terror prone regions” or when respondents are told that government needs time to enhance security measures. For instance, Rasmussen, measures the highest degree of support (57%) when it asked if respondents support or oppose a “temporary ban on refugees from Syria, Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen until the federal government improves its ability to screen out potential terrorists from coming here.” This question presupposes the government screening system is already poor and the new administration could meaningfully improve it. If these are the assumptions going in, support will be higher. When national security concerns are invoked and at the top of people’s minds they are more supportive of immigration restrictions.

Support for immigration restriction decreases, however, when the described policy implies a religious test. Surveys register lower support (48%) if the policy is described as a “temporary ban on all Muslims traveling to the United States” (from Morning Consult).

Postdoctoral Fellowship in Foreign Policy

Like the foreign policy commentary you see here on Cato’s blog? If you’re a PhD candidate or recent PhD, you should consider applying for our visiting research fellow position.

The Defense and Foreign Policy department is seeking candidates for a visiting fellow post. This one-year paid fellowship allows candidates to expand upon the policy implications of their dissertation research, and contribute to the work of the Cato defense and foreign policy department.

In order to apply, candidates must be either A.B.D. PhD candidates or a recent PhD graduate in political science, history or a related field, and must have authorization to work in the United States.

Candidates should also share Cato’s commitment to moving U.S. foreign policy towards prudence and restraint, and the policy implications of their work should be broadly compatible with a pragmatic, realist or restrained approach to foreign policy. You can find more information about Cato’s work on defense and foreign policy issues here.

During their time at Cato, the visiting fellow is responsible for:

  • Producing one scholarly paper (8,000-10,000 words) in the Institute’s Policy Analysis series on a foreign policy issue (which may or may not be part of the fellow’s dissertation)
  • Organizing at least two events
  • Authoring op-eds and blog posts
  • Handling media requests on international security issues

Fellows will work from Cato’s Washington, D.C. offices for the 2017-2018 academic year. Predoctoral fellows will receive $40,000, and postdocs will receive $50,000 in addition to health care coverage. Ideally, the fellow’s work at Cato would overlap considerably with his or her dissertation, making the fellowship useful both for policy research and finishing or refining the candidate’s dissertation.

If you are interested in applying, please submit a C.V. and a writing sample via Cato’s online application system no later than February 15, 2017. The application can be found here.

Is 2016 Over Yet?

By the end of the year, 2016 had accrued a list of international crises, celebrity deaths and electoral shenanigans so long that a spate of articles appeared questioning whether it was the worst year ever, while social media appeared to be primarily filled with people asking “Is 2016 over yet?” But at least in the realm of foreign policy, there’s little hope that 2017 will bring much respite.  

It would, of course, take an extraordinarily narrow view of history to argue that 2016 was really the worst year on record. That would require one to overlook 1942-3, the height of Second World War barbarity, or 1914, the year when the “war to end all wars” began. 1968 wasn’t that great, either, bringing us the assassination of Martin Luther King Jr, the crushing of the Prague Spring, Vietnam War massacres, and a plane accident involving four nuclear bombs.  Or if you want to go back further in history, it’s pretty hard to ignore 1347, the year the Black Death reached Europe.

But 2016 did present an impressive series of foreign policy and political disasters, ranging from a coup in Turkey to Russian meddling in the U.S. electoral process to terror attacks in France, Belgium, and Germany. In the ongoing Syrian civil war, Russian and Syrian government troops finally succeeded in crushing opposition in Aleppo at massive humanitarian cost. And crises that in any other year would have been front page news – like North Korean missile tests or worsening relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia – were sidelined in favor of more urgent crises.

2016 also saw a global surge in populism, with the election of bluntly anti-establishment politicians like Donald Trump and Rodrigo Duterte, and the surprising victory of pro-Brexit campaigners in the United Kingdom’s referendum on the European Union.  Indeed, one of the few positive foreign policy events of the year – Colombia’s peace deal with the FARC, ending a 50-year conflict – was almost derailed when voters rejected the deal at the ballot box.

Unfortunately, it’s not clear that 2017 will substantially improve matters. Many of this year’s crises will in fact carry over into next year: the war in Syria continues apace, Brexit negotiations are ongoing, and North Korea is likely to continue its saber rattling. Worse, some of this year’s less visible crises have the potential to deteriorate further, like the war in Yemen or Venezuela’s economic and social collapse.

More broadly, the overarching trends that defined much of the foreign policy landscape in 2016 look set to continue for the foreseeable future. Populism is likely to impact next year’s key European elections. In France, Marine Le Pen’s National Front looks likely to do well, as does Germany’s Alternative for Deutschland. In the Netherlands, anti-EU sentiment has some speculating that March’s election could precipitate a ‘Nexit’ from the EU.    

The complexity of this year’s crises – and the broader shift towards a more multipolar international system – also looks set to continue. This will create challenges for U.S. policymakers, who may have to seek cooperation with states like Russia or China on key issues at the same time as opposing them on others. And authoritarian backsliding by countries within U.S. alliances, most notably Turkey, raises key questions about what U.S. security guarantees in some areas actually achieve.

Still, as one cliché points out: “Prediction is hard, especially the future.” This pessimistic view of foreign policy in 2017 may well turn out be inaccurate. It simply seems unlikely given the growing global trends which precipitated many of this year’s big foreign policy surprises. Pretty soon, we may be asking if 2017 is over yet. 

Understanding When China Can (and Can’t) Wield Economic Influence

China Flag SmokestacksAs China grows more economically powerful there is growing concern about how it will convert its economic power into strategic influence. In its 2016 annual report, the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission recommends closer scrutiny of Chinese economic practices and advocates creating a panel to prevent China’s state-owned enterprises from gaining “effective control” over U.S. companies. Fear of China’s commercial influence has recently spread to Hollywood as well, with recent purchases of film studios and theater chains by China’s Dalian Wanda leading to a torrent of commentary warning against Beijing’s nefarious long-term intentions.

The idea that China can easily convert its economic clout into influence is attractive and intuitive given the government’s important role in the economy. In Chinese Economic Statecraft: Commercial Actors, Grand Strategy, and State Control, William J. Norris, a professor at Texas A&M University’s Bush School of Government and Public Service, casts a skeptical eye on this assumption. Norris came to the Cato Institute recently to discuss his theory of economic statecraft and shed light on the complex domestic factors that help or hinder China from using commercial actors to achieve strategic goals. (Full disclosure, as a student at Texas A&M I spent several months as Norris’s research assistant while he worked on the book.) Using a theoretical model rooted in principal-agent theory applied to several case studies, Norris is able to show that China’s political leadership and commercial actors are not always on the same page.  

Economic statecraft is the intentional manipulation of economic interaction to produce or affect some sort of strategic end. Norris finds that effective economic statecraft requires state control over commercial actors and state unity across different sectors of government. While the Chinese government may have nominal control over its state-owned enterprises, it can be very difficult to get local officials in sync with provincial or national-level officials, which impedes the effective execution of economic statecraft. In some of Norris’s case studies Chinese commercial actors made decisions with little direction or oversight from state officials that had unintended strategic effects down the road.

The most important take-away from Norris’s book is, “economic statecraft is not an easy lever of national power for [China] to wield. To be effective, many factors need to align.” China’s economy makes it easier for the government to use its companies in strategic ways, but even in the Chinese system there are numerous factors that make it difficult to use commercial actors to achieve strategic goals. While Beijing has used commercial actors to achieve strategic goals, not every move by a Chinese state-owned enterprise is a strategic master stroke designed to maximize China’s power or undermine the United States. In order to better identify the real cases of Chinese economic statecraft, it would be prudent for analysts to apply the model in Norris’s book. 

The Enemy Gets a Vote

Resolute Desk

In the week since election night, foreign policy watchers (myself included) have rushed to speculate about the effects that President Trump’s administration will have on the world. The most dramatic effect is the potential upending of the international order that the United States built after World War II. Of course, at this point it is impossible to determine whether or not such a consequence will come to pass, but it deserves consideration.

Baked into the idea that Trump will tear down the international order is the assumption that Hillary Clinton would have maintained the order if she was president. Jeffrey A. Stacey argued as much in Foreign Affairs when he wrote, “The world’s challenges require a determined use of U.S. leadership, not isolationism. And in the areas where Obama’s restraint has failed, the more activist Hillary Clinton Doctrine…could likely prevail.” However, the idea that the United States can influence events through “leadership” ignores the fact that in foreign policy the enemy gets a vote. In other words, the growing relative power of America’s adversaries will still pose a challenge to the international order, regardless of what actions the United States takes or who sits in the Oval Office.

America’s ability to rein in the bad behavior of other states has diminished, not because the United States is in decline, but rather because the power of our adversaries has grown. In East Asia, for example, the two most important challenges to the security status quo are North Korea’s nuclear weapons program and China’s improving conventional military capabilities. Both developments threaten the regional order in East Asia, and resist American attempts to stop them. Multilateral and bilateral sanctions efforts have failed to stop North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, which has come a long way with minimal external assistance.

China’s growing military power enables more assertive behavior in the South and East China Seas, despite displays of resolve by the United States and its allies. While many have criticized the Obama administration for not doing more against China, the simple fact is that as its military grows strong it becomes harder to deter China from using it. Beyond East Asia, after years of neglect following the Cold War, the Russian military is fielding new capabilities and pushing back against NATO expansion to countries along its border.

The growing relative power of America’s adversaries does not make the president obsolete, but the individual behind the Resolute desk is not omnipotent. They cannot always prevent changes in the balance of power or maintain the international order by dialing up the “leadership” they demonstrate. We don’t know what impact Donald Trump will have on the world, but the threats America faces would exist regardless of who won the election. The assumption that Hillary Clinton would be able to prevent negative outcomes through greater leadership on the international stage disregards the growing power and agency of America’s challengers. 

Isolationist or Imperialist?

In the hit musical Hamilton, King George, newly estranged from the revolutionary American colonies, challenges his former subjects to justify their choice. “What comes next?” he asks, “You’ve been freed. Do you know how hard it is to lead? You’re on your own. Awesome, wow! Do you have a clue what happens now?”

We might well ask the same question.

The unexpected elevation of Donald Trump to the Presidency presents a failure for pollsters, a reorientation of American politics, and raises the fundamental question of what kind of policies a Trump administration is likely to pursue. On foreign policy, Trump’s statements throughout the campaign have been profoundly incoherent, ranging from more traditional hawkish Republican views on issues like the Iran deal, to more unorthodox, restrained views on Syria and other Middle Eastern conflicts, to his more conciliatory approach to Russia and truly bizarre fixation with Russian strongman Vladimir Putin.

So what comes next? How will the Trump administration approach foreign policy? As Elizabeth Saunders notes over at the Monkey Cage, advisors wield substantially more power under an inexperienced president. So to a large extent, Trump’s foreign policy choices will depend on who he chooses, not just to be his key foreign policy advisors, but to staff his administration’s foreign policy positions more generally. There are two potential scenarios that we can imagine:

Trump’s Victory Is a Mixed Bag for China

Xi Jinping FlagDonald Trump’s upset victory over Hillary Clinton last night is bound to stir up fears of instability and uncertainty in East Asia, a region that was almost entirely ignored during the campaign. Commentators have rushed to predict that Trump’s campaign rhetoric will turn into reality: the United States will pull back from East Asia, and China will take advantage of the ensuing chaos to seize geopolitical dominance of the region. This morning James Palmer at Foreign Policy writes, “Chinese leaders near me in the palatial complex of Zhongnanhai are surely cracking open the drinks.” This is a pretty scary vision of the future. However, such assessments, which focus solely on Chinese benefits, don’t take into account the complex nature of U.S.-China relations.

President Trump is by no means a clear victory for China. The uncertainty created by his victory could easily produce an economic and geopolitical climate that damages Chinese interests. For example, three of the seven points in Trump’s Plan to Rebuild the American Economy mention policies that would hurt the U.S.-China economic relationship: labeling China a currency manipulator; bringing trade cases against China in the World Trade Organization; and imposing tariffs in response to “illegal activities.” Igniting a trade war with China would pose a severe risk to China’s economy, which is already slowing down. Trump’s stated policies would likely deepen China’s economic woes, thereby increasing the domestic instability that Beijing is obsessed with avoiding, especially in the lead-up to the 19th Party Congress in late 2017.