When economic journalists speculate about looming inflation risks in the U.S. or any other country, they implicitly assume that each country’s inflation depends on that country’s fiscal or monetary policies, and perhaps the unemployment rate. Yet The Economist for March 3rd–9th shows approximately 1–2 percent inflation in the consumer prices index (CPI) for virtually all major economies.
Inflation rates were surprisingly similar regardless of whether countries had budget deficits larger than ours (Japan and China) or big surpluses (Norway and Hong Kong), regardless of whether central banks experimented with “quantitative easing” or not, and regardless of whether a country’s unemployment rate was 16.9 percent (Spain) or 1.3 percent (Thailand).
The latest year‐to‐year rise in the CPI was below 1 percent in Japan and Switzerland, 1.5 percent in Hong Kong and the Euro area, 1.6 percent in Canada and China, 1.8 percent in Sweden, 1.9 percent in Norway and Australia, 2 percent in South Koreas and 2.1 percent in the U.S. Among major countries, U.K. was on high side with inflation of 2.7 percent. Three economies with super‐fast economic growth above 6 percent (India, Malaysia and the Philippines) do have slightly higher inflation—above 3 percent—but the CPI is up just 1.6 percent in one of them, namely China.
The remarkable similarity of CPI inflation rates is surprising since countries measure inflation differently and consume different mixes of goods and services. The fact that inflation rates are nonetheless so similar, and move up and down together, suggests that inflation is largely a global phenomenon. The U.S. may well have a disproportionate influence on global inflation, since it accounts for about 24 percent of global GDP and key commodities are priced in U.S. dollars. Yet U.S. inflation nonetheless goes up and down in synch with other major economies, as the graph shows.Read the rest of this post »
It was reported last week that a Republican working group is considering a proposal to link spending caps to the growth of actual or potential GDP. This is encouraging, and much more economically sensible than rigid balanced budget legislation.
I’ll write about other countries’ experiences with backward-looking rules in the future. But one country which uses forward-looking estimates of potential GDP to determine overall government spending is Chile. Indeed, economists such as Jeffrey Frankel have previously written glowingly about Chile’s fiscal rule, which Frankel concluded had constrained government debt whilst being flexible enough to allow automatic stabilizers to operate.
First, some background: in 2000 the Chilean government voluntarily adopted a structural budget surplus rule of one percent of GDP each year. This was lowered to half a percent of GDP in 2007, and then to a simple balanced structural budget rule in 2009 once government debt had essentially been paid off.
What does this mean in practice? A committee of independent experts meets once a year to provide the government with estimates of potential GDP. A separate committee assesses whether copper prices (a key driver of revenues) are higher or lower than trend. These two opinions are put together to determine an estimate of government revenues for the year if the economy was operating at its potential with copper prices at their long-term level. This determines the total maximum spending level allowed in the budget plan for the year. In other words, spending is capped based upon an estimate of tax revenues if the economy was at potential.
To be blunt, Republicans are heading in the wrong direction on fiscal policy. They have full control of the executive and legislative branches, but instead of using their power to promote Reaganomics, it looks like we're getting a reincarnation of the big-government Bush years.
As Yogi Berra might have said, "it's déjà vu all over again."
Let's look at the evidence. According to The Hill, the Keynesian virus has infected GOP thinking on tax cuts.
Republicans are debating whether parts of their tax-reform package should be retroactive in order to boost the economy by quickly putting more money in people’s wallets.
That is nonsense. Just as giving people a check and calling it "stimulus" didn't help the economy under Obama, giving people a check and calling it a tax cut won't help the economy under Trump.
Tax cuts boost growth when they reduce the marginal tax rate on productive behavior such as work, saving, investment, or entrepreneurship. When that happens, people have an incentive to generate more income. And that leads to more national income, a.k.a., economic growth.
Borrowing money from the economy's left pocket and then stuffing checks (oops, I mean retroactive tax cuts) in the economy's right pocket, by contrast, simply reallocates national income.
Back in April, I shared a new video from the Center for Freedom and Prosperity that explained how poor nations can become rich nations by following the recipe of small government and free markets.
Now CF&P has released another video. Narrated by Yamila Feccia from Argentina, it succinctly explains — using both theory and evidence — why spending caps are the most prudent and effective way of achieving good fiscal results.
Ms. Feccia covers all the important issues, but here are five points that are worth emphasizing.
- Demographics — Almost all developed nations have major long‐run fiscal problems because welfare states will implode because of aging populations and falling birthrates (Ponzi schemes need an ever‐growing number of new people to stay afloat).
- Golden Rule — If government spending grows slower than the private sector, that reduces the relative burden of government spending (the underlying disease) and also reduces red ink (the symptom of the underlying disease).
Success Stories — Simply stated, spending caps work. She lists the nations that have achieved very good results with multi‐year periods of spending restraint. She points out that the U.S. made a lot of fiscal progress when GOPers aggressively fought Obama. And she shares the details about the very successful constitutional spending caps in Hong Kong and Switzerland.
- Better than Balanced Budget Amendments or Anti‐Deficit Rules — The video explains why policies that try to target red ink are not very effective, mostly because tax revenues are very volatile.
- Even International Bureaucracies Agree — Remarkably, the International Monetary Fund (twice!), the European Central Bank, and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (twice!) have acknowledged that spending caps are the most, if not only, effective fiscal rule.
I touch on some of these issues in one of my chapters in the Cato Handbook for Policymakers. The entire chapter is worth reading, in my humble opinion, but I want to share an excerpt echoing Point #4 that I just shared from Ms. Feccia’s video.
There’s a very practical reason to focus on capping long‐run spending rather than trying to balance the budget every year. Simply stated, the “business cycle” makes the latter very difficult. …when a recession occurs and revenues drop, a balanced‐budget mandate requires politicians to make dramatic changes at a time when they are especially reluctant to either raise taxes or impose spending restraint. Then, when the economy is enjoying strong growth and producing lots of tax revenue, a balanced‐budget requirement doesn’t impose much restraint on spending. All of which creates an unfortunate cycle. Politicians spend a lot of money during the good years, creating expectations of more and more money for various interest groups. When a recession occurs, the politicians suddenly have to slam on the brakes. But even if they actually cut spending, it is rarely reduced to the level it was when the economy began its upswing. Moreover, politicians often raise taxes as part of these efforts to comply with anti‐deficit rules. When the recession ends and revenues begin to rise again, the process starts over—this time from a higher base of spending and with a bigger tax burden. Over the long run, these cycles create a ratchet effect, with the burden of government spending always reaching new plateaus.
It’s not that I want to belabor this point, but the bottom line is that it is very difficult to amend a country’s constitution (at least in the United States, but presumably in other nations as well).
So if there’s going to be a major campaign to put a fiscal rule in a constitution, then I think it should be one that actually achieves the goal. And whether people want to address the economically important goal of spending restraint or the symbolically important goal of fiscal balance, what should matter is that a spending cap is the effective way of getting there.
Leftists don't have many reasons to be cheerful.
Global economic developments keep demonstrating (over and over again) that big government and high taxes are not a recipe for prosperity. That can't be very encouraging for them.
They also can't be very happy about the Obama presidency. Yes, he was one of them, and he was able to impose a lot of his agenda in his first two years. But that experiment with bigger government produced very dismal results. And it also was a political disaster for the left since Republicans won landslide elections in 2010 and 2014 (you could also argue that Trump's election in 2016 was a repudiation of Obama and the left, though I think it was more a rejection of the status quo).
But there is one piece of good news for my statist friends. The tax cuts in Kansas have been partially repealed. The New York Times is overjoyed by this development.
The Republican Legislature and much of Kansas has finally turned on Gov. Sam Brownback in his disastrous five-year experiment to prove the Republicans’ “trickle down” fantasy can work in real life — that huge tax cuts magically result in economic growth and more, not less, revenue. ...state lawmakers who once abetted the Brownback budgeting folly passed a two-year, $1.2 billion tax increase this week to begin repairing the damage. ...It will take years for Kansas to recover.
And you won't be surprised to learn that Paul Krugman also is pleased.
It's both amusing and frustrating to observe the reaction to President Trump's budget.
I'm amused that it is generating wild-eyed hysterics from interest groups who want us to believe the world is about to end.
But I'm frustrated because I'm reminded of the terribly dishonest way that budgets are debated and discussed in Washington. Simply stated, almost everyone starts with a "baseline" of big, pre-determined annual spending increases and they whine and wail about "cuts" if spending doesn't climb as fast as previously assumed.
Here are the three most important things to understand about what the President has proposed.
First, the budget isn't being cut. Indeed, Trump is proposing that federal spending increase from $4.06 trillion this year to $5.71 trillion in 2027.
New York Times columnist Paul Krugman recently chided President Trump for imagining he invented the metaphor of “priming the pump” during an Economist interview. Yet Krugman, like Trump, buys into the premise that budget deficits really do “stimulate” total spending or “aggregate demand” which is commonly measured by growth of Nominal GDP (NGDP).
Economic booms and busts clearly have huge effects on budget deficits, but where is the evidence that deficits and surpluses have their own separate (“exogenous”) effect on NGDP?
To isolate cause and effect, we have to take out the “endogenous” effects that ups and downs in the economy have on taxes and spending. That is why the Congressional Budget Office (CBO)estimates budget deficits or surpluses (divided by GDP) without automatic stabilizers, which has traditionally been called the “cyclically‐adjusted” budget. I will label it the “C‑A Deficit” for short.
The red line in the graph shows the CBO’s Cyclically‐Adjusted (C‑A) deficit or surplus as a share of GDP. The blue line shows the percentage growth in Nominal GDP (NGDP).
From 1965 to 2016, the C‑A Deficit averaged -2.7% of GDP, and growth of nominal GDP averaged 6.6%.
Contrary to 1960s Keynesian orthodoxy, the graph and table reveal no connection between the size of cyclically‐adjusted deficits or surpluses and the rate of growth of aggregate demand (NGDP). From 1991 to 2001, for example, the C‑A Budget swings from an average deficit to a sizable surplus with essentially no change in the pace of NGDP growth.
There is no measurable or even visible connection between larger CA‐Deficits and faster NGDP growth in 2009–2012, nor between budget surpluses and slower NGDP growth in 1998–2000. For more than 50 years, our experience has frequently been the opposite of what demand‐side fiscalism predicts. This is not just a short‐term phenomenon.