Tag: financial crisis

The IMF Is Urging Governments to Impose Regulatory and Tax Cartels to Benefit Politicians

Price fixing is illegal in the private sector, but unfortunately there are no rules against schemes by politicians to create oligopolies in order to prop up bad government policy. The latest example comes from the bureaucrats at the International Monetary Fund, who are conspiring with national governments to impose higher taxes and regulations on the banking sector. The pampered bureaucrats at the IMF (who get tax-free salaries while advocating higher taxes on the rest of us) say these policies are needed because of bailouts, yet such an approach would institutionalize moral hazard by exacerbating the government-created problem of “too big to fail.”

But what is particularly disturbing about the latest IMF scheme is that the international bureaucracy wants to coerce all nations into imposing high taxes and excessive regulation. The bureaucrats realize that if some nations are allowed to have free markets, jobs and investment would flow to those countries and expose the foolishness of the bad policy being advocated elsewhere by the IMF. Here’s a brief excerpt from a report in the Wall Street Journal:

Mr. Strauss-Kahn said there was broad agreement on the need for consensus and coordination in the reform of the global financial sector. “Even if they don’t follow exactly the same rule, they have to follow rules which will not be in conflict,” he said. He said there were still major differences of opinion on how to proceed, saying that countries whose banking systems didn’t need taxpayer bailouts weren’t willing to impose extra taxation on their banks now, to create a cushion against further financial shocks. …Mr. Strauss-Kahn said the overriding goal was to prevent “regulatory arbitrage”—the migration of banks to places where the burden of tax and regulation is lightest. He said countries with tighter regulation of banks might be able to justify not imposing new taxes.

I’ve been annoyingly repetitious on the importance of making governments compete with each other, largely because the evidence showing that jurisdictional rivalry is a very effective force for good policy around the world. I’ve done videos showing the benefits of tax competition, videos making the economic and moral case for tax havens, and videos exposing the myths and demagoguery of those who want to undermine tax competition. I’ve traveled around the world to fight the international bureaucracies, and even been threatened with arrest for helping low-tax nations resist being bullied by high-tax nations. Simply stated, we need jurisdictional competition so that politicians know that taxpayers can escape fiscal oppression. In the absence of external competition, politicians are like fiscal alcoholics who are unable to resist the temptation to over-tax and over-spend.

This is why the IMF’s new scheme should be rejected. It is not the job of international bureaucracies to interfere with the sovereign right of nations to determine their own tax and regulatory policies. If France and Germany want to adopt statist policies, they should have that right. Heck, Obama wants America to make similar mistakes. But Hong Kong, Switzerland, the Cayman Islands, and other market-oriented jurisdictions should not be coerced into adopting the same misguided policies.

SEC vs. Goldman Sachs: Legislation by Demonization

The Obama administration thinks it has discovered the perfect formula to cram legislation through in a hurry:  Demonize some prominent firm within an industry you plan to redesign, and then pass a law that has nothing to do with the accusation against the demonized firm.  They did this with health insurance and now they’re trying it with finance.

With health insurance, the demon was Anthem Blue Cross Blue Shield of California, which Obama accused of raising premiums by “anywhere from 35 to 39 percent.” Why didn’t some curious reporter interview a single person who actually paid 39% more, or quote from a letter announcing such an increase?  Because it didn’t happen.  Insurance premiums are regulated by the states, and California wouldn’t approve such a boost.  Yet the media’s uncritical outrage over that 39% rumor helped to enact an intrusive, redistributive health bill that has nothing to do with health insurance premiums (which remain regulated by the states).

Today, the new demon de jour is Goldman Sachs, a handy scapegoat to promote hasty financial rejiggering schemes  The SEC’s suspiciously-timed civil suit against Goldman looks as flimsy as the last month’s health insurance story.  It also looks unlikely to win in court.

As Washington Post columnist Sebastian Mallaby explains, “This is a non-scandal. The securities in question, so-called synthetic collateralized debt obligations, cannot exist unless somebody is betting that they will lose value.”  In such a zero-sum contest, big investors who went long knew perfectly well that other investors had to be taking the other side of the bet.  Goldman lost $90 million by betting this CDO would go up; John Paulson went short.

Columnists have moralized about the unfairness of the short investor (Paulson) negotiating the terms of this deal with a long investor, ACA Management, which had the last word. This too, notes Mallaby, “is another non-scandal.  An investor who wants to bet against a bundle of mortgages is entitled to suggest what should go into the bundle. The buyer is equally entitled to make counter-suggestions.  As the SEC’s complaint states clearly, the lead buyer in this deal, a boutique called ACA that specialized in mortgage securities, did precisely that.”

Like the earlier fuming about Anthem California, this new SEC publicity stunt is likewise irrelevant to the pending legislation.  Congress hopes to get standardized derivatives traded on an exchange. But synthetic collateralized debt obligations dealing with a customized bundle of securities could not possibly be traded on an exchange, and would therefore be untouched by reform.

Losses sustained by a few financial speculators on one exotic derivative had nothing to do with starting a global recession in December 2007 or the related financial crisis of September 2008. The core of the latter crisis was mortgage-backed securities per se, yet Goldman was only the 12th largest private MBS issuer in 2007.  Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were and are the biggest risk; any reform that excludes them is a fraud.

The SEC’s dubious civil suit against Goldman is a wasteful diversion at best. It has nothing to do with the Obama administration’s suicidal impulse to impose more tough regulations and taxes on banks to encourage them to lend more.

[Cross-posted at NRO’s The Corner]

Now Is the Time to End the Mortgage Interest Deduction

If there is one, almost universal, point of agreement on drivers of the financial crisis, it is that our financial system simply had way too much leverage.  Much of that discussion has focused on financial institutions, leading many to suggest increased capital standards, so that banks have more equity and less debt.  Often lost in the mix is the excessive leverage on the part of home owners.

We know, for instance, that the number one predictor of mortgage default is whether the borrower has equity or not.  And while that should lead us to debate appropriate downpayment requirements, at least when the government backs the mortgage, we should not forget that our tax code encourages excessive leverage on the part of home buyers.  And there’s no bigger incentive to get a bigger mortgage than the mortgage interest deduction.

Some might say we can’t risk removing any props from the housing market.  My friends at the National Association of Realtors, for instance, have in the past argued that full removal would decrease home prices by up to 15 percent.  Such an estimate depends on the level of interest rates (the higher are mortgage rates, the higher the value of the deduction and the greater the impact on house prices).  With the current low level of mortgage rates, the negative price impact should be around 5 percent.

Given the already close to 30% national decline in prices, a further 5% would be less noticeable now than at a time when prices start to rise again.  In addition, a 5% decline would attract more buyers into the market.  Housing is just like any other good – when there’s too much, the best way to clear the market, perhaps the only way, is to drop prices.  Getting rid of the deduction would make housing all the more affordable.  And given current low mortgage rates,there would be far less distortions to do so now.  Of course, all of this should be done in a budget neutral manner, lowering marginal tax rates across the board, which would have its own benefits to the economy.

Obama Proposes Further Delay on Fannie & Freddie

President Obama seems to be slowly waking up to the fact that the American public has grown tired of the endless bailout of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.  The public has also rejected the talking point that Fannie and Freddie were simply victims of a 100 year storm in the housing market.  So what’s Obama’s response?  To ask for public comment and have public forums.

This strategy is clearly one of delaying and avoiding any reform of Fannie and Freddie while pretending to care about the issue.  Where was the public comment and forums on the Volcker rule?  Seemingly the standard is that fixing the real causes of the financial crisis should be delayed and debated while efforts like the Dodd bill, which do nothing to avoid future financial crises, should be rushed without debate or comment.

Even more disingenious is couching reform of Fannie and Freddie under the rubic of “fixing mortgage finance”.  This is no more than an attempt to take the focus away from Fannie and Freddie and shift it to “abusive lending” and other non-causes of the crisis.

This isn’t rocket science.  The role of Fannie and Freddie in the financial crisis is well understood.  The only thing missing is the willingness of Obama and Congress to stand up to the special interests and protect the taxpayer against future bailouts.

A Perfect Storm of Regulatory Ignorance

Does the government know what it’s doing, can it know what it’s doing, in financial regulation? In the latest issue of Cato Policy Report, Jeffrey Friedman doubts it:

You are familiar by now with the role of the Federal Reserve in stimulating the housing boom; the role of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in encouraging low equity mortgages; and the role of the Community Reinvestment Act in mandating loans to “subprime” borrowers, meaning those who were poor credit risks. So you may think that the government caused the financial crisis. But you don’t know the half of it. And neither does the government….

Omniscience cannot be expected of human beings. One really would have had to be a god to master the millions of pages in the Federal Register — not to mention the pages of the Register’s state, local, and now international counterparts — so one could pick out the specific group of regulations, issued in different fields over the course of decades, that would end up conspiring to create the greatest banking crisis since the Great Depression. This storm may have been perfect, therefore, but it may not prove to be rare. New regulations are bound to interact unexpectedly with old ones if the regulators, being human, are ignorant of the old ones and of their effects….

This premise would be questionable enough even if we started with a blank legal slate. But we don’t. And there is no conceivable way that we, the people — or our agents in government — can know how to solve the problems of modern societies when our efforts have, in fact, been preceded by generations of previous efforts that have littered the ground with a tangle of rules so thick that we can’t possibly know what they all say, let alone how they might interact to create another perfect storm.

Read the whole thing – about moral hazard, banking regulations, and the “perfect storm of ignorance” that happened and will happen again – here in PDF. Less attractive HTML version here. Jeffrey Friedman is editor of Critical Review and of Causes of the Financial Crisis, forthcoming from the University of Pennsylvania Press.

Wednesday Links

  • David Boaz debates at The Economist: Is Obama failing? “In many ways, Obama has just doubled down on George W. Bush’s policies of bailouts, takeovers, expanded Fed powers and nationalizations. In a recession he is adding debt, taxes and regulation to the burdens already felt by business.” Readers can vote and join the debate.

Five Decades of Federal Spending

The chart below shows federal spending in three component parts over the last five decades. It includes Obama’s proposed spending in 2011. Here are a few thoughts on the recent spending trends:

Defense: In the post-9/11 years, defense spending bumped up to a higher plateau of around 4 percent of GDP. But now we have jumped to an even higher level of around 4.9 percent of GDP.

Interest: The Federal Reserve’s easy money policies reduced federal interest payments in recent years. That is coming to an end. Obama’s budget shows that interest payments will start rising rapidly next year and hit 3 percent of GDP by 2015. And that’s an optimistic projection.

Nondefense: This category includes all other federal spending. After a steady decline during the Clinton years to 12.9 percent of GDP, President Bush pushed up nondefense spending to a higher plateau of around 14.5 percent. Then came the recession and financial crisis, and the Bush-Obama tag team hiked spending to an even higher level of around 19 percent of GDP. That level of nondefense spending is almost double the level in 1970 measured as a share of the economy.