Tag: fdi

The Carrier Approach Will Fail to Attract or Retain Investment and Production in the United States

Media and social media have been percolating – mostly with invective – over President-elect Trump’s “deal” to keep Carrier and its 1,000 jobs from moving to Mexico.  I am among the many critics of this ad hoc, interventionist approach to retaining or attracting companies to perform value-added, job-creating activities in the United States.
But there is a broader lesson in all of this, which seems to be getting overlooked: The United States (and the 50 states, individually) is competing with the rest of the world to attract and retain investment in value-added activities – factories, research centers, laboratories, etc. And, in that competition, public policies are on trial.
The revolutions in communications and transportation have made global capital mobile. The proliferation of transnational supply chains and cross-border investment means that businesses – entrepreneurs and other value-creators – have options like never before. Investment and production location decisions are determined by a variety of factors, including: the size of the market, access to transportation networks, wages and skills of the workforce, whether there is healthy respect for the rule of law, stability of the political and economic climates, perceptions of corruption, the magnitude and impact of regulations and taxes, trade policies, immigration policies, energy policies, and whether the general policy environment is conducive to running a successful business.

TTIP Could Rein in the Abuse of Tax Incentives to Attract Foreign Investment

I’ve written often about the global competition to attract foreign investment, and have made the point that investment flows to jurisdictions with good policies in place. Globalization of production and the mobility of capital mean that national policies (regulations, tax policy, immigration, trade, energy, education, etc.) are on trial, with net investment inflows rendering the verdicts.

But some countries (and some U.S. states) use tax holidays and other forms of tax forgiveness, in lieu of adopting good policies, to attract investment, which burdens taxpayers and subverts the process of matching investment to its optimal location. These are subsidies – like so many other programs – that distort markets and should be discouraged.

In today’s Cato Online Forum essay, which is associated with the TTIP conference taking place on October 12, Ted Alden from the Council on Foreign Relations puts forward a strong proposal to end this madness via the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership negotiations.

Read it.  Provide feedback.  And please register to attend the conference.


When a Hamburger Becomes a Doughnut and Other Lessons About Tax Inversions and Globalization

So Burger King plans to purchase Canadian doughnut icon Tim Hortons and move company headquarters north of the border, where corporate tax rates are as much as 15 percentage points lower than in the United States.  Expect politicians at both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue to accuse Burger King of treachery, while spewing campaign-season pledges to penalize these greedy, “Benedict Arnold” companies.
If the acquisition comes to fruition and ultimately involves a corporate “inversion,” consider it not a problem, but a symptom of a problem. The real problem is that U.S. policymakers inadequately grasp that we live in a globalized economy, where capital is mobile and products and services can be produced and delivered almost anywhere in the world, and where value is created by efficiently combining inputs and processes from multiple countries.  Globalization means that public policies are on trial and that policymakers have to get off their duffs and compete with most every other country in the world to attract investment, which flows to the jurisdictions where it is most productive and, crucially, most welcome to be put to productive use.
Too many policymakers still believe that since the United States is the world’s largest market, U.S.-headquartered companies are tethered to the U.S. economy and committed to investing, hiring, and producing in the United States, regardless of the quality of the business and policy environments. They fail to appreciate how quickly the demographics are changing or that a growing number of currently U.S.-based companies do not share their view. Perhaps too many are unaware of how the United States continues to slide in the various global rankings of attributes that attract business and investment. The leverage politicians have over America’s corporate wealth creators has diminished.

Damning Trade with Faint Praise

A Washington Post editorial today pushes back against the argument that a Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement would exacerbate income inequality. Amen, I suppose. But in making its case, the editorial burns the village to save it by conceding as fact certain destructive myths that undergird broad skepticism about trade and unify its opponents.

“All else being equal,” the editorial reads, “firms move where labor is cheapest.”  Presumably, by “all else being equal,” the editorial board means: if the quality of the factors of production were the same; if skill sets were identical; if workers were endowed with the same capital; if all production locations had equal access to ports and rail; if the proximity of large markets and other nodes in the supply chain were the same; if institutions supporting the rule of law were comparably rigorous or lax; if the risks of asset expropriation were the same; if regulations and taxes were identical; and so on, the final determinant in the production location decision would be the cost of labor. Fair enough. That untestable premise may be correct.

But back in reality, none of those conditions is equal. And what do we see? We see investment flowing (sometimes in the form of “firms mov[ing],” but more often in the form of firms supplementing domestic activities) to rich countries, not poor. In this recent study, I reported statistics from the Bureau of Economic Analysis revealing that:

Nearly three quarters of the $5.2 trillion stock of U.S.-owned direct investment abroad is concentrated in Europe, Canada, Japan, Australia, and Singapore. Contrary to persistent rumors, only 1.3 percent of the value of U.S.-outward FDI [foreign direct investment] was in China at the end of 2011.


U.S. Policies Deter Inward and Encourage Outward Business Investment

This morning, Cato published a new study of mine titled, “Reversing Worrisome Trends: How to Attract and Retain Investment in a Competitive Global Economy.” The thrust of the paper is that, despite still being the world’s premiere destination for foreign direct investment, the U.S. share of the global stock of direct investment fell from 39% in 1999 to 17% today.

This downward trend is attributable to two broad factors. First, developing economies – many of which have achieved greater political stability, sustained economic growth, improved infrastructure and higher-quality worker skill sets – are now viable options for pulling in the kinds of FDI that was once untenable in those locales. Second, a deteriorating business and investment climate in the United States – owing to burgeoning, burdensome, and uncertain regulations; an antiquated, punitive corporate tax system; incoherent immigration, energy, and trade policies; a wayward tort system; cronyism and perceptions thereof; and other perverse incentives and disincentives of policy have pushed investment away.

The first trend should be welcomed and embraced; the second must be reversed. From the study:

Unlike ever before, the world’s producers have a wealth of options when it comes to where and how they organize product development, production, assembly, distribution, and other functions on the continuum from product conception to consumption. As businesses look to the most productive combinations of labor and capital, to the most efficient production processes, and to the best ways of getting products and services to market, perceptions about the business environment can be determinative. In a global economy, “offshoring” is an inevitable consequence of competition. And policy improvement should be the broad, beneficial result.

The capacity of the United States to continue to be a magnet for both foreign and domestic investment is largely a function of its advantages, many of which are shaped by public policy. Considerations of taxes, regulations, trade openness, access to skilled workers, infrastructure, energy policy, and dozens of other policy matters factor into decisions about whether, where, and how much to invest. It should be of major concern that inward FDI has been erratic and relatively downward trending in recent years, but why that is the case should not be a mystery. U.S. scores on a variety of renowned business surveys and investment indices measuring policy and perceptions of policy suggest that the U.S. business environment is becoming increasingly less hospitable.

Although some policymakers recognize the need for reform, others seem to be impervious to the investment-repelling effects of some of the laws and regulations they create. Some see the shale gas and oil booms as more than sufficient for overcoming policy shortcomings and attracting the necessary investment. The most naive consider “American” companies to be tethered to the U.S. economy and obligated to invest and hire in the United States, regardless of the quality of the business and policy environments. They fail to appreciate that increasingly transnational U.S.-based businesses are not obligated to invest, produce, or hire in the United States.

It is the responsibility of policymakers, however, to create an environment that is more attractive to prospective investors. Current laws, regulations, and other conditions affecting the U.S. business environment are conspiring to deter inward investment and to encourage companies to offshore operations that could otherwise be performed competitively in the United States.

A proper accounting of these policies, followed by implementation of reforms to remedy shortcomings, will be necessary if the United States is going to compete effectively for the investment required to fuel economic growth and higher living standards.

Details, charts, and analysis, and citations are all included here.

Anemic Business Investment Indicts U.S. Policies

Since the beginning of the Great Uncertainty – the period that began with the “stimulus,” the auto bailout, the push for another major entitlement program, Dodd-Frank, the regulatory dam burst, the subsidies for favored industries, and the proliferation of distinctly anti-business rhetoric from the White House – President Obama has appeared puzzled by the dearth of business investment and hiring. Go figure.

Nonresidential fixed investment fell off a cliff in 2009, and has yet to recover even in nominal terms. As a share of GDP and relative to the trend in investment growth prior to the 2008 recession, the picture is more troubling still. If tomorrow’s wealth and living standards are functions of today’s investment – and they are – reversing the decline in investment should be the economic priority of U.S. policymakers. 

Instead, the administration has been cavalier about the problem and aloof to real solutions, choosing to view investment as a casualty of partisan politics, as though business is intentionally holding back to sully the economy on this president’s watch. Such narcissism has obscured the White House’s capacity to grasp the power of incentives.

It’s not just domestic investment that is lagging. Foreign direct investment in real U.S. assets is also on the decline. The United States is part of a global economy, which means that U.S. and foreign based businesses can invest, hire, develop, produce, assemble and service almost anywhere they choose. And that means the United States is competing with the rest of the world to attract and retain investment. Of course, the implication of this – whether policymakers know it or not and whether they like it or not – is that globalization is serving to discipline bad public policy. Policies that are hostile to wealth creators chase them away, while smart policies attract them and harvest their fruits.

Business investment is ultimately a judgment about a jurisdiction’s institutions, policies, human capital, and prospects. As the world’s largest economy featuring a highly productive work force, world-class research universities, a relatively stable political climate, strong legal institutions, accessible capital markets, and countless other advantages, the United States has been able to attract the investment needed to produce the innovative ideas, revolutionary technologies, and new products and industries that have continued to undergird its position atop the global economic value chain. 

The good news is that the $3.5 trillion of foreign direct investment parked in the United States accounted for 17 percent of the world’s direct investment stock in 2011 – more than triple the share of the next largest single-country destination. The troubling news is that in 1999 the United States accounted for 39 percent of the world’s investment stock.

The Myth of a Manufacturing Renaissance

Have you heard all the banter about a U.S. manufacturing renaissance? Numerous media reports in recent months have breathlessly described a return of manufacturing investment from foreign shores, mostly attributing the trend to rising wages in China and the natural gas boom in the United States, both of which have rendered manufacturing state-side more competitive. Today’s Washington Post includes a whole feature section titled “U.S. Manufacturing: A Special Report,” devoted entirely to the proposition that the manufacturing sector is back!

The myth of manufacturing decline begets the myth of manufacturing renaissance. This new mantra raises a question: How can there be a manufacturing renaissance if there was never a manufacturing “Dark Ages”?

Contrary to countless tales of its demise, U.S. manufacturing has always been strong relative to its own past and relative to other countries’ manufacturing sectors. With the exception of a handful of post-WWII recession years, U.S. manufacturing has achieved new records, year after year, with respect to output, value-added, revenues, return on investment, exports, imports, profits (usually), and numerous other metrics appropriate for evaluating the performance of the sector. The notion of U.S. manufacturing decline is simply one of the most pervasive economic myths of our time, sold to you by those who might benefit from manufacturing-friendly industrial policies with the abiding assistance of a media that sometimes struggles to distill fact from K Street speak.