A New Hampshire high school student who is remarkably knowledgeable about the various harm reduction strategies that are underused to address the overdose crisis engaged Senator Cory Booker (D-NJ) in a discussion of the subject during a campaign stop in Littleton, NH. The video of the exchange is here.
Senator Booker, who is seeking the Democratic nomination for President in 2020, is a former mayor of Newark, NJ, a city with major drug overdose problems. He had a sophisticated conversation with the student and agreed with her on the need for safe syringe programs. At about 1:50 into the video Booker was asked if he would support needle exchange programs and safe injection sites. He responded that as mayor of Newark he established the needle exchange program in that city and “fully supports” establishing safe injection sites.
As I detail in my Policy Analysis on harm reduction, both needle exchange programs and safe injection sites have been shown for decades to reduce the spread of HIV and hepatitis, reduce overdoses, and increase the number of addicts obtaining rehab.
While needle exchange programs are legal in the US, and are even promoted by the Surgeon General, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and the American Medical Association, many states have anti-paraphernalia laws that inhibit their creation.
Safe injection sites exist in over 120 cities in Europe, Canada, and Australia, and have been in use for over 30 years. One even operates in the US clandestinely, because federal law prohibits safe injection sites in this country. Several cities are attempting to establish safe injection sites in the US, including Seattle, San Francisco, Boston, and New York. In Philadelphia, a nonprofit that includes former Pennsylvania Governor Edward Rendell on its board is attempting to establish a “Safehouse” in that city, funded entirely with private money, but is being thwarted by the Department of Justice.
While the Senator seemed to wrongly accept the mistaken narrative that the opioid manufacturers are to blame for much of the problem, it is gratifying to learn that Senator Booker has an appreciation for harm reduction in general, and needle exchange and safe injection sites in particular. And, to his credit, he has also expressed enlightened views regarding cannabis legalization.
As more members of Congress join the growing ranks of mayors of major US cities in endorsing safe syringe programs, momentum will hopefully build for states to remove any remaining obstacles to needle exchange programs and for Congress to remove the federal obstacles to safe injection sites.
Imagine life in isolation, waking every morning before sunrise to make your own clothes, build and repair your meager shelter, hunt and harvest your own food, concoct rudimentary salves for what physically ails you, and attend to the upkeep of your brutish existence engaging in other difficult and tedious tasks. Forget leisure or luxuries; all of your time would be consumed trying to produce basic necessities merely to subsist.
Fortunately, that’s no longer the way most of humanity organizes its economic activities. We don’t attempt to make everything we need or want to consume, but instead specialize in a few, or a couple, or just one value-added endeavor – one profession. This specialization is possible because we accept and embrace the concept of cooperation in the form of exchange. We realize that by specializing, we can focus our efforts on what we do best, and produce more value than would be possible if we had to attend to the production of all of our needs and wants. Because we can exchange our output (monetized in the forms of wages and salaries) for the output of others, we don’t even have to know the first thing about hammering a nail, mixing mortar, making thread, yarn, and cloth, threading a needle, whittling an arrow to kill a deer, or any of the details of the incredibly complex processes and supply chains that generate the products and services we consume daily. Fortunately (but sadly, too), most of us never give it a second thought.
If two people focusing their efforts on the tasks they do best and exchanging their daily surpluses enables both to consume more or better quality output, then it should readily follow that four people or eight or eighty or eight million participating in this cooperative economic relationship can lead to much higher volumes of output (wealth) and much greater consumption and savings (higher living standards). This is the purpose of exchange. It enables us to specialize. And when there are more participants in the market (more with whom to exchange) there is greater scope for more refined levels of specialization. That means greater opportunities to match individuals’ precise skills and faculties (or to cultivate then match those precise skills and faculties) with increasingly specialized tasks and professions created in response to the increasingly refined demands of societies as they produce even greater wealth and higher living standards.
We’ve come a long way from exchanging cloth and wine. No longer are people’s choices restricted to being sober and clothed or naked and drunk. Today, we can almost have it all. Whereas once there were witchdoctors serving as generalist medical practitioners, today (in Washington, DC, I am told) there is burgeoning demand for the services of psychiatrists who specialize in treating the emotional and psychological adjustment costs associated with being an expat spouse of a foreign diplomat from Western Europe. It’s become that specialized. Imagine hearing: “Sorry, my specialty is in talking spouses of diplomats through their neuroses brought on by resettling in Washington from places like Stockholm, Amsterdam, Paris, or London. Since you’re from Warsaw, let me recommend a different specialist who focuses on treating Polish ex-pats with similar conditions."
The purpose of exchange is to enable each of us to focus our productive efforts on what we do best. By specializing in an occupation — instead of allocating small portions of our time to the impossible task of producing each of the necessities and luxuries we wish to consume — and exchanging the monetized output we produce most efficiently for the goods and services we produce less efficiently, we are able to produce and consume more output than would be the case in the absence of specialization and trade. The larger the size of the market, the greater is the scope for specialization, exchange, and economic growth.
Free trade is the extension of free markets across political borders. Enlarging markets in this manner – to integrate more buyers, sellers, investors and workers – enables more refined specialization and economies of scales, which lead to greater wealth and higher living standards. When goods, services, capital, and labor flow freely across borders, Americans can take full advantage of the opportunities of the international marketplace.
The purpose of trade is to enable us to specialize; the purpose of specialization is to enable us to produce more; the purpose of producing more is to enable us to consume more. More and better consumption is the purpose of trade. Thus, the benefits of trade come from imports, which deliver more competition, greater variety, lower prices, better quality, and innovation. The real benefits of trade are measured by the value of imports that can be purchased with a unit of exports — the so-called terms of trade. When we transact at the local supermarket, we seek to maximize the value we obtain by getting the most for our dollars.
But when it comes to trading across borders or when our individual transactions are aggregated at the national level, we seem to forget these basic principles and assume the goal of exchange is to achieve a trade surplus. We forget that trade barriers at home raise the costs and reduce the amount of imports that can be purchased with a unit of exports. U.S. trade barriers hurt U.S. citizens, as consumers, taxpayers, workers, producers, and investors. Americans would be better off if we simply undertook our own reforms – on tariffs, regulations, and other artificial impediments to commerce – without regard for what other government’s do. Yet we don't.
Although tariffs and other trade barriers have been reduced considerably since the end of the Second World War, U.S. policy continues to accommodate egregious amounts of protectionism. We have “Buy American” rules that restrict most government procurement spending to U.S. suppliers, ensuring that taxpayers get the smallest bang for their buck; heavily protected services industries, such as air transportation and shipping, that drive up the cost of everything; apparently interminable farm subsidies; quotas and high tariffs on imported sugar; high tariffs on basic consumer products, such as clothing and footwear; energy export restrictions; the market-distorting cronyism of the Export-Import bank; antidumping duties that strangle downstream industries and tax consumers; regulatory protectionism masquerading as public health and safety precautions; protectionist rules of origin and local content requirements that limit trade’s benefits; restrictions on foreign investment, and so on.
It is sad, but true, that Congress seems to have forgotten why we trade.
Steven Pearlstein’s ready for the nuclear option. With the conviction of a man who knows he won’t be held accountable for the consequences of his prescriptions, Pearlstein says the time has come for action against China. Hopefully, those whose fingers are actually near the button will recognize Pearlstein’s suggestion for what it is: an outburst of frustration over what he considers China’s insubordination.
In his Washington Post business column yesterday, Pearlstein criticizes U.S. policymakers for blindly adhering to the view that China will inevitably transition to democratic capitalism, while they’ve excused market-distorting protectionism, mercantilism, and state dominance over the economy in China. Pearlstein writes:
Up to now, a succession of administrations has argued against directly challenging China over its mercantilist policies, figuring it would be more effective in the long run to let the economic relationship grow deeper and give the Chinese the time and respect their culture demands to make the inevitable transition to democratic capitalism.
What we have discovered, however, is that the Chinese don't view the transition as inevitable and that, in any case, they really aren't much interested in relationships. If anything, they've proven to be relentlessly transactional. And their view of business and economics remains so thoroughly mercantilist that they not only can't imagine any other way, but assume that everyone else thinks the way they do. To try to convince them otherwise is folly.
Pearlstein’s suggestion that the Chinese “aren’t much interested in relationships” strikes me as frustration over the fact that China is no longer a U.S. supplicant. Perhaps the truth is that China isn’t much interested in a one-way relationship, where it is expected to meet all U.S. demands, while seeing its own wishes ignored. Calling them “relentlessly transactional” is accusing them of naivety for missing the bigger picture, which, for Pearlstein, is that the U.S. is still top dog and China ignores that at its peril.
Pearlstein is not the first columnist to criticize the Chinese government for putting its interests ahead of America’s (or, more accurately, putting what it believes to be its best interests ahead of what U.S. policymakers believe to be in their own interests). In a recent Cato policy paper titled Manufacturing Discord: Growing Tensions Threaten the U.S.-China Economic Relationship, I was addressing opinion leaders who have staked out positions similar to Pearlstein’s when I wrote:
Lately, the media have spilled lots of ink over the proposition that China has thrived at U.S. expense for too long, and that China’s growing assertiveness signals an urgent need for aggressive U.S. policy changes….
One explanation for the change in tenor is that media pundits, policymakers, and other analysts are viewing the relationship through a prism that has been altered by the fact of a rapidly rising China. That China emerged from the financial meltdown and subsequent global recession wealthier and on a virtually unchanged high-growth trajectory, while the United States faces slow growth, high unemployment, and a large debt (much of it owned by the Chinese), is breeding anxiety and changing perceptions of the relationship in both countries….
Of course, the U. S. is the larger economy and the chief designer of the still-prevailing global economic architecture. But the implication that that distinction immunizes the U. S. from costly repercussions if U.S. sanctions were imposed against China is foolish. But that’s exactly where Pearlstein’s going when he writes:
Getting this economic relationship back into balance is the single biggest challenge to the global economy, not just because of its direct effects on China and the United States, but the indirect effects it has on the rest of the world. The alternative is a return to living beyond our means, a further erosion of our industrial and technological base and a continued loss of ownership of business and financial assets.
By balancing the economic relationship, presumably Pearlstein is speaking about the need to reduce the bilateral trade deficit, which spurs a net outflow of dollars to China, some of which the Chinese lend back to Americans, who in turn can then buy more imports from China, and the cycle continues. But to tip the scales in favor of the blunt force action he recommends later, Pearlstein characterizes Chinese investment in the United States as living beyond our means, losing ownership of “our” assets, and eroding our industrial and technological base. That is a paternalistic and inaccurate characterization of the dynamics of capital inflows from China.
First, let’s remember that the Chinese aren’t holding a gun to the heads of the chairs of our congressional appropriations committees demanding that politicians borrow and spend more on senseless programs. It’s absolutely priceless when spendthrift members of Congress, oblivious to the irony, blame the Chinese for having caused the U.S. financial crisis for providing cheap credit to fuel asset bubbles when it was their own profligacy that brought the Chinese to U.S. debt markets in the first place. Stop deficit spending and the need to borrow from China (or anywhere else) goes away.
Likewise, it is a sad commentary on the state of individual responsibility in the U.S. when a prominent business writer thinks the only way to keep consumers from living beyond their means is to deprive their would-be-creditors of capital. It sounds a bit like the same tactics deployed in the U.S. War on Drugs. Blame the suppliers. The fact that U.S. savings rates have been rising for two years suggests that responsible Americans are interested in rebuilding their assets without need of such measures.
There are other destinations for capital inflows from China, which (despite Pearlstein’s disparaging allusions) should be entirely unobjectionable. Chinese investment in U.S. corporate debt, equities markets, real estate markets, and direct investment in U.S. manufacturing and services industries does not erode our industrial and technological base. It enhances it. It does not constitute a loss of ownership of business and financial assets, but rather a mutual exchange of assets at an agreed price. When Chinese investors compete as buyers in U.S. markets, the value of the assets in those markets rises, which benefits the owners of those assets when there is an exchange. Chinese purchases of anything American, with the exception of debt, do not constitute claims on the future. Accordingly, the economic relationship can achieve the much vaunted need for rebalancing without need of attempting to forcefully reduce the trade deficit by restraining imports.
So if the urgent need is to rebalance the global economy by rebalancing the U.S.-China economic relationship, we are probably going to have to begin this process on our own. And that means establishing some sort of tariff regime that will increase the cost of imports not just from China, but other countries that keep their currencies artificially low, restrict the flow of capital or maintain significant barriers to imports of goods and services. The proceeds of those tariffs should be used to encourage exports in some fashion…
This relationship, however, is one that must be actively managed by the two governments. It should be obvious by now that their government is rather effective at managing their end of things. It should be equally obvious that we cannot continue to rely on free markets to manage our end.
So Pearlstein comes full circle. He wants the U. S. to impose tariffs on Chinese imports, subsidize U.S. exports, and institute top-down industrial policy. In other words, he wants the U.S. to be more like China.
Of course, I would argue, we already have something that encourages exports. They’re called imports. Over half of the value of U.S. imports are intermediate goods—capital equipment, components, raw materials—that are used by American-based producers to make goods for their customers in the U. S. and abroad. Furthermore, foreigners need to be able to sell to Americans if they are going to have the dollars to buy products from Americans. And finally, if the U.S. implements trade restrictions on China to compel currency revaluation or anything else, retaliation against U.S. exports is a given.
In short, imports are a determinant of exports. If you impede imports, you impede exports. So Pearlstein’s idea that we can somehow subsidize exports by taxing and reducing imports is not particularly well-considered. And though it may be tempting to look at China’s economic success as an endorsement or vindication of industrial policy, it is difficult to discern how much of China's growth can be attributed to central planning, and how much has happened despite it. But in the U.S., where one of our unique and core strengths has been the relative dynamism that has produced more inventions, more patents, more actionable industrial ideas, more freeedom, and more wealth than at any other time in any other nation-state in the world, it would be imprudent bordering on reckless to suppress those synergies in the name of industrial policy.
In the end, I rather doubt that Pearlstein is truly on board with the course of action he suggests. In response to a question presented to him on the Washington Post live web chat yesterday about how the Chinese would react if his proposal were implemented, Pearlstein wrote:
They'd make a huge stink. They'd cancel some contracts. They'd slap on some tariffs of their own. They'd launch an appeal with the World Trade Organization. It would not be costless to us -- getting into fights never is. But after a year, once they saw we were serious, they would find a way to begin accomodating [sic] us in significant ways, and if we respond with a positive tit for tat, things could finally improve. They've been testing us for years and what they discovered was that we were easy to push around. So guess what -- they pushed us around.
I’m willing to chalk up Pearlstein’s diatribe to pent-up frustration. But let me end with this admonition from that May Cato paper:
[I]ndignation among media and politicians over China’s aversion to saying “How high?” when the U.S. government says “Jump!” is not a persuasive argument for a more provocative posture. China is a sovereign nation. Its government, like the U.S. government, pursues policies that it believes to be in its own interests (although those policies—with respect to both governments—are not always in the best interests of their people). Realists understand that objectives of the U.S. and Chinese governments will not always be the same, thus U.S. and Chinese policies will not always be congruous. Accentuating and cultivating the areas of agreement, while resolving or minimizing the differences, is the essence of diplomacy and statecraft. These tactics must continue to underpin a U.S. policy of engagement with China.
The professionally ignorant (and I'm thinking here of Lou Dobbs, among others) never "get it" about trade. They think it's some complex swindle, in which we deny ourselves "jobs," or that it should be about being "fair" or "balanced." They don't see how free trade creates prosperity and peace. I was inspired by the outstanding trade economist Doug Irwin of Dartmouth to explain what goes on when people trade. The challenge was to explain international trade in under 3 minutes. So here's the result in 2:57: The Great Prosperity Machine.
Share it with your favorite protectionist, or with professors and teachers. (There's more information at AtlasNetwork.org/BastiatLegacy.)
Watch and share: