Tag: Establishment Clause

Montana Can’t Use a 150-Year-Old Anti-Catholic Law to Discriminate Against Religious Schools

Blaine Amendments—adopted by many states starting in the late 1800s as an anti-Catholic measure—prevent states from using public funding for religious education. Thirty-seven states currently have the amendments, and some courts have interpreted them excluding religious options from state school-choice programs—that is, preventing access to otherwise publicly available benefits purely on the basis of religion. In other words, Blaine Amendments let some states practice religious discrimination.

Montana created a program where people who donated to private-school funding organizations received tax credits. The program both encouraged school choice and allowed people to spend their own money how they saw fit. However, the Montana Department of Revenue used the state’s Blaine Amendment to exclude those donors whose money found its way to religious private schools, and, at the same time, it allowed non-religious private-school donors to benefit. During the ensuing legal challenge, the Montana Supreme Court not only ruled against the religious families that challenged the discrimination, it struck down the entire program, meaning both religious and non-religious donors wouldn’t receive tax credits.

Our friends at the Institute for Justice have petitioned the United States Supreme Court to hear the case, and Cato has filed a brief in support. Both Cato’s Center for Educational Freedom and the Robert A. Levy Center for Constitutional Studies have an interest in this case, so we teamed up to cover both the constitutional and policy angles of the issue. We argue that the Court should correct the Montana Supreme Court’s flawed reading of the First Amendment’s religion clauses and reaffirm that states cannot erode the Free Exercise Clause in the guise of strengthening the Establishment Clause. The Religion Clauses work together to help protect the freedom of conscience, not to prohibit school-choice programs that help both religious and non-religious schools.

The First Amendment’s Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses prohibit laws “respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” As Cato explained in a recent brief, the two clauses work together to protect individual freedom of conscience. However, states like Montana often use the Establishment Clause to justify the existence of Blaine Amendments. They argue that Blaine Amendments are necessary to prevent “an establishment of religion” by strengthening the wall of separation between church and state. But in the modern world, where government is so involved in giving public benefits like tax credits, it is impossible to maintain a complete wall of separation without discriminating against religion (as Blaine Amendments do), which is not what the Framers intended. Instead, the government must remain neutral toward religion and not disfavor religious people or organizations. In this sense, the Establishment Clause is a shield protecting the people from state religion, not a sword enabling government to discriminate against religious faith.

At the same time, school-choice programs help prevent the forced ideological conformity that is inevitable in public schools. Tax-credit programs like Montana’s allow parents to select schools that share their values, reducing the need to impose those values on others. In so doing, they improve our nation’s social and political cohesion and reduce conflict. Cato’s Public Schooling Battle Map tracks how public schools create conflict by forcing uniformity onto ideological diversity. Blaine Amendments merely fan the flames of the ideological conflicts that currently engulf public education.

Despite all these considerations, the Montana Supreme Court declined to properly consider the First Amendment implications of the state’s Blaine Amendment. Instead, it gave the Montana Department of Revenue a slap on the wrist for exceeding its procedural authority and destroyed the entire tax credit program rather than contend with the unconstitutional discrimination inherent in Montana’s Blaine Amendment. As school choice becomes more popular around the country, the question of religious discrimination and Blaine Amendments will become more salient. The Montana decision was just the latest in a series of federal and state courts decisions that are divided on the issue. That divide will continue without guidance from the Supreme Court. The Court should take this case to clarify that the Constitution requires religious neutrality, not discrimination.

The Christmas Tree Tax Is a Microcosm of What’s Wrong with Constitutional Law

Jim Harper beat me to the punch on the new Christmas tree tax – probably because I initially thought it was a joke – but there’s actually much more to say here beyond the USDA’s claim that it’s not a tax and the general absurdity of the situation.  Three quick things:

First, there are obvious Free Exercise and Equal Protection issues here.  That is, unless we consider Christmas trees to be wholly secular, this is an obvious burden on the free exercise of Christianity, and one that no other religion faces.  Even if it might be reasonable to see Christmas trees as not particularly religious – pine trees played no role in The Greatest Story Ever Told and, e.g., my secular Jewish family always had a traditional Russian New Year’s Tree (which has no ties to Russian Orthodox Christianity) – but do we want courts drawing lines between, say, creches/crucifixes and trees/Santa?

Second, and probably even more important given the times in which we live, where in the Constitution does the federal government get the power to tax the sale of a local agricultural product?  Setting aside trees trucked in from out-of-state, there’s no interstate commerce here to regulate.  And if it’s a tax (which, again, Ag officials deny) – presumably an excise, which is specified in the Constitution and which courts have construed to be a tax on transactions or privileges – how does assessing it to promote the general welfare or common defense?  The administration cites the Commodity Promotion, Research and Information Act of 1996, under which the tax mandatory fee funds a new program to ”enhance the image of Christmas trees and the Christmas tree industry in the United States.”  That’s what passes for the general welfare? 

Third, even if the tax is a lawful use of federal power, shouldn’t Congress be the body levying it, rather than an agency of the USDA?

I could go on, but this little 15-cent tree tax is a microcosm of what’s wrong with constitutional law, evermore divorced from the Constitution as it is.  Yes, under modern doctrine, the Christmas tree tax can be probably justified under either the Commerce Clause or the General Welfare Clause – and Congress can delegate to bureaucrats the power to levy certain “assessments” – but is that the kind of government we signed up for?

h/t Cato legal associate Chaim Gordon

Government Can Tax Your Income, But It Doesn’t Own It in the First Place

As Andrew and Adam have already explained, today’s decision in ACSTO v. Winn, though grounded in the technical legal doctrine of “standing,” is a big win for school choice and state flexibility in education reform.  Even more importantly, it makes clear that there is a difference between tax credits and government spending; to find that tax money was used for unconstitutional ends here would have assumed that all income is government property until the state allows taxpayers to keep a portion of it.  That is not, to put it mildly, how we think of private property.

Of course, even had the Court found that Arizona’s scholarship scheme involved the use of state funds, the program would have been insulated from Establishment Clause challenge because it offered the “genuine and independent choice” that the Court has long required in such cases (most notably the 2002 school voucher case of Zelman v. Simmons-Harris). Many layers of private, individual decisionmaking separate the alleged entanglement of taxpayer funds with religious activities: the choice to set up a scholarship tuition organization (STO), the choice by an STO to provide scholarships for use at religious schools, the choice to donate to such an STO, the choice to apply for a scholarship, and the choice to award a scholarship to a particular student.  

Far from being an impediment to parental control over their children’s education or an endorsement of religious schooling, the autonomy Arizona grants taxpayers and STOs ultimately expands freedom for all concerned.  For more on that, see Cato’s amicus brief.

Also interesting about the case is that it offers us Justice Elena Kagan’s first significant opinion, for the dissenting four justices.  While not surprising that she would be in dissent here, in a “conventional” 5-4 split – although the “conservatives” adopted the position advocated by the Obama administration – there do appear to be some eyebrow-raising turns of phrase.  I won’t comment until I finish reading the opinion, but Ed Whelan offers an initial reaction at NRO’s Bench Memos blog.

Another New Supreme Court Term, Another New Justice

Today is the first Monday in October, the traditional start of the Supreme Court term.  While we have yet to see as many blockbuster constitutional cases on the docket as we did last term—which, despite the high profile 5-4 splits in McDonald v. Chicago and Citizens United actually produced fewer dissents than any in recent memory—we do look forward to:

  • Two big free speech challenges, one over a statute prohibiting the sale of violent video games to minors, another the offensive protesting of a fallen soldier’s funeral;
  • An Establishment Clause lawsuit against Arizona’s tax credit for private tuition funds (an alternative to educational voucher programs);
  • Regulatory federalism (or “preemption”) cases involving:
    • safety standards for seatbelts;
    • an Arizona statute regarding the hiring of illegal aliens; and
    • the forbidding of class-arbitration waivers as unconscionable components of arbitration agreements;
  • Important ERISA and copyright cases;
  • A case examining privacy concerns attending the federal government’s background checks for contractors; and
  • A criminal procedure dispute regarding access to DNA testing that may support a claim of innocence.

Cato has filed amicus briefs in several of these cases—and in various others which the Court may decide to review later this year—so I will be paying extra-close attention.

Perhaps more importantly, we again have a new justice—and, as Justice White often said, a new justice makes a new Court.  While her confirmation was never in any serious doubt, Elena Kagan faced strong criticism (including from me) on a variety of issues—most importantly on her refusal to “grade” past Court decisions or identify any specific limits to government power.  The 37 votes against Kagan were the most ever for a successful Democratic nominee, which is emblematic of a turbulent political environment in which the Constitution and the basic question of where government derives its power figure prominently.  

Given Kagan’s political and professional background, it is safe to assume that she’s not the second coming of Clarence Thomas.  And because she replaces the “liberal lion” Justice Stevens, her elevation from “tenth justice” (as the solicitor general is known) to ninth is unlikely to cause an immediate change in issues that most divide the Court—particularly because she is recused from nearly half the cases this term.  She could, however, add an interesting and nuanced perspective on a variety of lower-profile issues.  Only time will tell what kind of justice Kagan will be now that she is, seemingly for the first time in her ambitious life, unconstrained to speak her mind.

Here’s to another interesting, varied, and (hopefully) liberty-enhancing year!

Taxpayer Choice + Parental Choice = Good, Constitutional Education Reform

Arizona grants income tax credits for contributions made to school tuition organizations (“STOs”).  STOs must use these donations for scholarships that allow students to attend private schools.  This statutory scheme broadens the educational opportunities for thousands of students by enabling them to attend schools they would otherwise lack the means to attend.  Still, several taxpayers filed a lawsuit challenging the program as creating a state establishment of religion.

Although the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that increasing educational opportunities is a valid secular purpose for a legislative act, it found that the tax credit program nonetheless violates the Establishment Clause because many of the STOs—as it happens, a decreasing majority—provide scholarships for students to attend parochial schools.  Earlier this year, Cato filed a brief supporting the request for Supreme Court review filed by the various parties defending the program.  The Court granted cert.

Now Cato (led by Andrew Coulson and myself) has filed another brief, joined by four education reform groups, urging the Supreme Court to overturn the Ninth Circuit’s decision because it was based on faulty reasoning:  It equated the private and voluntary choices of individuals who donate to religious STOs with state sponsorship of religion.  The lower court also made the dubious assertion that Arizona parents feel pressured to accept scholarships to religious schools, in spite of the fact that the share of STO scholarships available for use at secular schools is almost twice as large as the share of families actually choosing secular schools. Moreover, the tax credit scheme is indistinguishable from similar charitable tax deduction programs that the Court has previously held to pass constitutional muster.

We urge the Court to reaffirm its longstanding jurisprudence—especially the 2002 school-choice case, Zelman v. Simmons-Harris—whereby instances of “genuine and independent choice” are insulated from Establishment Clause challenge. Far from being an impediment to parental freedom, the autonomy Arizona grants to taxpayers and STOs is ultimately essential to it.  More generally, should the lower court’s opinion be allowed to stand, the progress made to broaden the educational opportunities of students across the country will be stifled.

The case of Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn will be heard by the Court this fall, probably in November.

Supreme Court Should Call Out Ninth Circuit in Education Case

Friend-of-Cato and 2010 Milton Friedman Prize Dinner keynote speaker George Will published an excellent column today about a case under review at the Supreme Court, Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn:

The case concerns an Arizona school choice program that has been serving low- and middle-income families for 13 years. The state grants a tax credit to individuals who donate to nonprofit entities that award scholarships for children to attend private schools – including religious schools. Yes, here we go again.

The question – if a question that has been redundantly answered remains a real question – is whether this violates the First Amendment proscription of any measure amounting to government “establishment of religion.” The incorrigible 9th Circuit has declared Arizona’s program unconstitutional, even though there is no government involvement in any parent’s decision to use a scholarship at a religious school.

If this case hadn’t originated in a state within the Ninth Circuit’s jurisdiction, nobody would have heard about it because any other federal appellate court would probably have decided it correctly. Will correctly and convincingly argues for summary reversal – as our friends at the Institute for Justice, who represent the petitioners, request – because the Ninth Circuit’s decision ignores clear Supreme Court precedent allowing parents to choose how to direct state funds for their children’s education (to a sectarian school or otherwise):

So, [Chief Justice William] Rehnquist wrote [in 2002], public money “reaches religious schools only as a result of the genuine and independent choices of private individuals.” Therefore any “advancement of a religious mission” is merely “incidental” and confers “no imprimatur of state approval … on any particular religion, or on religion generally.” These standards had been developed in various prior cases.  

Cato filed a brief in this case that I previously blogged about.  And you can listen to Will’s Friedman Dinner address here.  (Unrelatedly, if you still haven’t read his masterful Men at Work: The Craft of Baseball – which has sold many more copies than any of his political books – pick up the re-issued twentieth anniversary edition.)

Taxpayer Choice + Parental Choice = Education Reform That’s Constitutional

Arizona grants income tax credits for contributions made to school tuition organizations (“STO”).  These STOs must these donations for scholarships that allow students to attend private schools.  This statutory scheme broadens the educational opportunities for thousands of students by enabling them to attend schools they would otherwise lack the means to attend. 

The Ninth Circuit held that the tax credit program violated the Establishment Clause because many of the STOs – as it happens, a decreasing majority – provide scholarships for students to attend parochial schools.  Counsel for the defendants, including the Institute for Justice, asked the Supreme Court to review the case – and indeed to summarily reverse the Ninth Circuit, based in part on a 2002 case (Zelman v. Simmons-Harris) rejecting a similar challenge to a school voucher program.  Cato filed a brief, joined by the Foundation for Educational Choice and the American Federation for Children, supporting this request. 

Our brief argues that the funds received by STOs are the product of individual taxpayers’ “genuine and independent choice” – the touchstone by which the Court judges the religious neutrality of statutes allowing for taxpayer money to fund religious education.  Moreover, the tax credit scheme is indistinguishable from similar charitable tax deduction programs that the Court has previously held to pass constitutional muster.  While the Ninth Circuit reasoned that Arizona parents feel pressured to send their kids to parochial schools due to limited scholarships available for secular schools, it failed to consider that the share of STO money available to secular schools was nearly twice as large as the share of families choosing to send their children to secular schools. 

Far from being an impediment to parental freedom, the autonomy Arizona grants to taxpayers and STOs is ultimately essential to it.  More generally, should the lower court’s opinion be allowed to stand, the progress made to broaden the educational opportunities of students across the country will be stifled. 

The name of the case is Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn.  The Court will likely decide before it breaks for the summer whether to take it up – and, indeed, whether to summarily reverse the Ninth Circuit.