Tag: department of justice

DOJ Still Fighting School Choice in Louisiana

Last week I noted that it was “long past time for the U.S. Department of Justice to drop its embarrassing lawsuit which would keep black kids in failing schools.” The Louisiana Department of Education released a study that completely undermined the DOJ’s case against the state’s school voucher program, showing that the program increased racial integration in most of the schools under federal desegregation orders and had a miniscule impact in the remainder.

Today, Michael Warren of the Weekly Standard reports that the DOJ has dropped part of its fight against school choice in Louisiana:

The Obama administration’s Justice Department has dropped a lawsuit aiming to stop a school voucher program in the state of Louisiana. A ruling Friday by a United States district court judge revealed that the federal government has “abandoned” its pursuit of an injunction against the Louisiana Scholarship Program, a state-funded voucher program designed to give students in failing public schools the opportunity to attend better performing public or private schools. 

“We are pleased that the Obama Administration has given up its attempt to end the Louisiana Scholarship Program with this absurd lawsuit,” said Louisiana governor Bobby Jindal, a Republican, in a statement. “It is great the Department of Justice has realized, at least for the time being, it has no authority to end equal opportunity of education for Louisiana children.”

The move may have resulted from the bad press or a sudden acceptance of common sense, but more likely it was a simply legal maneuver to prevent the Black Alliance for Educational Options and the Goldwater Institute, representing parents of voucher recipients, from intervening in the lawsuit as defendants. As Warren reports:

On Friday, Judge Ivan Lemelle of the U.S. district court of the Eastern District of Louisiana ruled the parents could not intervene in the case because the feds are “no longer seeking injunctive relief at this time.” Lemelle explained that in the intervening months since the Justice Department filed suit, it had made clear both in a supplemental filing and in its opposition to the parent group’s motion to intervene that it was not seeking in its suit to end the voucher program or take away vouchers from students.

Lemelle continued: “The Court reads these two statements as the United States abandoning its previous request that the Court ‘permanently enjoin the State from issuing any future voucher awards to students unless and until it obtains authorization from the federal court overseeing the applicable desegregation case.’”

Lemelle will hold an oral hearing on Friday, November 22, during which Justice will make its case for the federal review process of the voucher program. In his statement on Friday’s ruling, Jindal criticized the federal government’s efforts.

“The centerpiece of the Department of Justice’s ‘process’ is a requirement that the state may not tell parents, for 45 days, that their child has been awarded a scholarship while the department decides whether to object to the scholarship award. The obvious purpose of this gag order would be to prevent parents from learning that the Department of Justice might try to take their child’s scholarship away if it decides that the child is the wrong race,” said Jindal. “The updated Department of Justice request reeks of federal government intrusion that would put a tremendous burden on the state, along with parents and teachers who want to participate in school choice.”

In other words, the DOJ is still seeking the legal authority to prevent low-income kids from escaping failing public schools if the feds say they have the wrong skin color.

New Study Completely Undermines DOJ’s Anti-School Choice Lawsuit

It’s long past time for the U.S. Department of Justice to drop its embarrassing lawsuit which would keep black kids in failing schools.

The DOJ sued Louisiana earlier this year, claiming that its school voucher program may be negatively impacting desegregation efforts. When it became apparent that the DOJ’s evidence amounted to the thinnest of gruel, everyone from Gov. Bobby Jindal and Rep. Eric Cantor to the Washington Post called on the Obama administration to drop its frivolous lawsuit. Even after two PhD students at the University of Arkansas released a study estimating that Louisiana’s school voucher program had a positive impact on racial integration, the DOJ refused to back down. I wrote then:

If the DOJ’s case was already like a house of cards resting atop a rickety stool, then the new University of Arkansas study kicked out the stool. The study, “The Louisiana Scholarship Program,” by Anna J. Egalite and Jonathan N. Mills, finds that the transfers resulting from the LSP vouchers statewide “overwhelmingly improve integration in the public schools students leave (the sending schools), bringing the racial composition of the schools closer to that of the broader communities in which they are located.” Moreover, in the districts that are the focus of the DOJ litigation, the “LSP transfers improve integration in both the sending schools and the private schools participating students attend (receiving schools).”

Now a study sponsored by the state of Louisiana finds that the voucher program improves racial integration in 16 of the 34 districts under federal desegregation orders while having little to no impact on the remainder. Whereas the University of Arkansas study produced estimates based on publicly available data, the Louisiana study reflects the actual effect of the program during the 2012-13 school year. Politicoreports:

Louisiana hired Boston University political science Professor Christine Rossell to analyze the effect of vouchers in 34 districts in the state under desegregation orders. Rossell found that in all but four of the districts – some of which are majority white, some majority black and some more evenly split – vouchers improved or had no effect on racial imbalance. And in the districts where racial imbalance worsened, the effects were “miniscule.”

Louisiana’s voucher program allows students to transfer out of failing public schools into private schools using public funds. The majority of the students participating in the 2012-13 school year — almost 76 percent — were non-white. A total of 551 students used the vouchers.

In the 2013-14 school year, more than 85 percent of the nearly 6,800 voucher students were black. So long as the DOJ refuses to drop its lawsuit — which would have opposite of its supposedly intended effect — the Obama administration’s message to these students is: “If you don’t like your school, you can’t leave your school.”

School Choice Lawsuit Roundup

School choice advocates have been winning in the halls of state legislatures and in the court of public opinion, so opponents have taken to the courts of law. Since the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris (2002) that school vouchers are consistent with the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause, opponents of choice have been scrambling to find novel reasons to challenge school choice programs. Here’s a brief summary of school choice lawsuits around the nation:

1) In Louisiana, the U.S. Department of Justice has sued to halt the state’s school voucher program, arguing that it hurts the desegregation effort. The DOJ’s already weak case was further undermined by a new study released today showing that school choice actually improves integration. Since 90 percent of the voucher recipients are black, the DOJ’s lawsuit would have the effect of keeping low-income blacks from attending the schools of their choice.

Earlier this year, Louisiana’s state supreme court ruled that the voucher program was unconstitutionally funded, but otherwise left the program intact. The governor and state legislators adjusted the funding mechanism in response.

2) Two days ago, a group of activists in Oklahoma sued the state over its special needs voucher program, arguing that it violates the state constitution’s ban on using public funds at religious schools. Last year, the state supreme court tossed out a challenge to the program by public school districts, ruling that they did not have standing since they are not taxpayers.

3) On the same day, the Arizona Court of Appeals ruled unanimously that the state’s education savings account program, the first in the nation, is constitutional. Anti-school choice activists had argued that it violates the state constitution’s ban on publicly funding religious schools. The court held that students are the primary beneficiaries and that any “aid to religious schools would be a result of the genuine and independent private choices of the parents.” The decision will likely be appealed to the state supreme court.

DOJ Backpedals on School Choice Lawsuit

In response to withering criticism and political pressure, the U.S. Department of Justice is backpedaling on its lawsuit against Louisiana’s school choice program, which provides school vouchers to low-income students assigned to government-run schools receiving a D or F rating for performance. The lawsuit sought to “permanently enjoin the State of Louisiana from awarding any school vouchers to students attending schools in districts operating under federal desegregation orders” unless the state receives permission from the federal government. Now the DOJ is claiming in a carefully-worded letter to Congress that they were just looking for information:

To be clear, we are neither opposing Louisiana’s school voucher program nor seeking to revoke vouchers from any student. […] Our goal in filing a motion for further relief […] was straightforward: The United States is seeking the court’s assistance in ensuring that the information Louisiana collects in connection with its school voucher program is provided to the United States in a timely fashion and that Louisiana implements its program in full compliance with federal law, including the desegregation order in this case.

Unfortunately, the DOJ is being disingenuous. While their lawsuit would not have revoked vouchers that the state had already distributed, it would have blocked all future vouchers to students in districts under desegregation orders without federal permission. In other words, rather than leaving the choice of school in the hands of parents, parents would have to beg the federal government to allow their children to escape from failing government schools. This is problematic since the DOJ’s absurd definition of segregation would prevent black students from leaving a school that the DOJ deems “insufficiently black” because there are a greater percentage of black students than black people living in the district. For example:

DOJ Lawsuit Would Keep Blacks in Failing Schools

In the name of civil rights, the Department of Justice is trying to prevent black families from exercising school choice.

On the heels of the Southern Poverty Law Center’s ridiculous lawsuit against Alabama’s new school choice law, which contends that if a law doesn’t help everyone it can’t help anyone, the U.S. Department of Justice is suing to block the state of Louisiana’s school voucher program for low-income students and students assigned to failing public schools:

The Justice Department’s primary argument is that letting students leave for vouchered private schools can disrupt the racial balance in public school systems that desegregation orders are meant to protect. Those orders almost always set rules for student transfers with the school system.

Federal analysis found that last year’s Louisiana vouchers increased racial imbalance in 34 historically segregated public schools in 13 systems. The Justice Department goes so far as to charge that in some of those schools, “the loss of students through the voucher program reversed much of the progress made toward integration.”

Segregation! That’s a serious charge. What evidence does the Department of Justice cite?

In Tangipahoa Parish, for instance, Independence Elementary School lost five white students to voucher schools, the petition states. The consequent change in the percent of enrolled white students “reinforc(ed) the racial identity of the school as a black school.”

Five students! According to the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES), there were 143 white students out of 482 students at Independence Elementary School in 2010-11 (the most recent year for which data is available). Assuming that recent enrollment and racial composition is the same and that no black students received vouchers as well, that’s a 0.7 percentage point shift from 29.6 percent white to 28.9 percent white. Though the students at Independence almost certainly would not have noticed a difference, the racial bean counters at the DOJ see worsening segregation.

But the DOJ is not content merely to prevent white students from exercising school choice. The petition also cites Cecilia Primary School, which in 2012-13 “lost six black students as a result of the voucher program,” thereby “reinforcing the school’s racial identity as a white school in a predominantly black school district.” In the previous school year, the school’s racial composition was 30.1 percent black, which the DOJ notes was 16.4 percentage points lower than the black composition of the district as a whole. According to the NCES, in 2010-11 there were 205 black students out of a total enrollment of 758, so the school was 27 percent black. Assuming a constant total enrollment, the DOJ’s numbers suggest that there were 228 black students in 2011-12. The loss of six black students would mean the school’s racial composition shifted from 30.1 percent black to 29.2 percent black as a result of the voucher program. Again, imperceptible to the untrained eye but a grave threat to racial harmony according to the Obama administration’s Department of Justice.

DOJ vs. School Choice

Claiming that private schools in Milwaukee are discriminating against students with disabilities, the Department of Justice (DOJ) sent a letter to the Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction (DPI) demanding that private schools participating in the Milwaukee school choice program comply with Title II of the Americans With Disabilities Act. As Professor Patrick Wolf explains over at Education Next, the DOJ is wrong on the facts and wrong on the law.

Wolf is part of a team of researchers that has studied the Milwaukee school choice program over five years. Their statistical analysis “confirmed that no measure of student disadvantage—not disability status, not test scores, not income, not race—was statistically associated with whether or not an 8th grade voucher student was or was not admitted to a 9th grade voucher-receiving private school.” This is exactly what the law requires. Wisconsin law forbids discrimination on the basis of disability and requires schools participating in the voucher program to accept students on a random basis. 

Moreover, the DOJ is wrong on the law in treating private schools participating in the program as though they were government contractors. As Wolf explains:

Private organizations normally are exempt from Title II of ADA but the DOJ argues that the law applies to private schools in the MPCP because the government is contracting with them to provide a public service (the education of K-12 students). This claim flies in the face of the facts and case-law surrounding the program. The voucher program does not involve any contracts, of any kind, between any government organization and the participating private schools. Students need to meet certain eligibility restrictions to participate in the program, as do interested private schools. Once both are deemed eligible by the state, students choose schools and government funds flow to the private schools based on the choices families have made and consistent with the laws governing the program, not based on any “contract.” In fact, the Wisconsin State Statute that governs the MPCP, §119.23, is entirely separate from Wisconsin State Statute §119.235 entitled “Contracts with Private Schools and Agencies.” Nothing could make the point clearer that the MPCP is not a case of government contracting for education services.

Wolf suspects that the DOJ’s letter came as a result of the Wisconsin DPI’s report that 1.6 percent of choice students have a disability. Since the DPI is not authorized to collect that information, they estimated the number of students with disabilities using the number of choice students given accommodations on the state accountability exam. However, as Wolf explains, that is a highly flawed proxy since only a minority of students with disabilities are given such accommodations. Wolf’s team of researchers estimated that the number of choice students with disabilities between 7.5 and 14.6 percent, with their best estimate being 11.4 percent.

The DOJ’s overreach may be unsurprising in light of other recent scandals, but it also sets a terrible precedent. Parents choosing to use their vouchers at private educational institutions do not render those institutions “government contractors” any more than grocery stores become “government contractors” when citizens use their EBT cards to purchase food there. The Obama administration’s unlawful and misguided attempt to hamper school choice programs with additional red tape should be vigorously resisted.

What the Manual by DOJ’s Top Intelligence Lawyer Says About the FISA Amendments Act

To a casual observer, debates about national security spying can seem like a hopeless game of he-said/she-said. Government officials and congressional surveillance hawks characterize the authorities provided by measures like the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 in one way, while paranoid civil libertarians like me tell a more unsettling story. Who can say who’s right?

Fortunately, there is an authoritative unclassified source that explains what the law means: the revised 2012 edition of National Security Investigations and Prosecutions by David S. Kris (who headed the Justice Department’s National Security Division from 2009–2011) and J. Douglas Wilson. As the definitive (unclassified) treatise on what foreign intelligence surveillance law says, means, and permits, it’s the same resource you’d expect the government attorneys who apply for surveillance authority to consult for guidance on what the law does and doesn’t allow spy agencies to do. Let’s see what it says about the scope of surveillance authorized by the FAA:

[The FAA’s] certification provision states that the government under Section 1881a is “not required to identify the specific facilities, places premises, or property at which an acquisition … will be directed or conducted.” This is a significant grant of authority, because it allows for authorized acquisition—surveillance or a search—directed at any facility or location. For example, an authorization targeting “al Qaeda”—which is a non-U.S. person located abroad—could allow the government to wiretap any telephone that it believes will yield information from or about al Qaeda, either because the telephone is registered to a person whom the government believes is affiliated with al Qaeda, or because the government believes that the person communicates with others who are affiliated with al Qaeda, regardless of the location of the telephone. Unless the FISC attempts to address the issue under the rubric of minimization, no judge will contemporaneously review the government’s choice of facilities or places at which to direct acquisition. [….] Review of the certification is limited to the question “whether [it] contains all the required elements”; the FISC does not look behind the government’s assertion’s. Thus, for example, the FISC could not second-guess the government’s foreign intelligence purpose of conducting the acquisition, as long as the certification in fact asserts such a purpose.

Got that? The requirement that surveillance have a foreign “target” is satisfied if the general purpose of a wiretap program is to gather information about a foreign group like al Qaeda, and it employs procedures designed for that purpose. It does not mean that the particular phone numbers or e-mail accounts or other “facilities” targeted for surveillance have to belong to a foreigner: those could very well belong to an American citizen located within the United States, and no court or judge is required to approve or review the choice of which individuals to tap.

Kris and Wilson elaborate in a discussion of surveillance under the Protect America Act, the stopgap legislation that preceded the FAA, explaining how the language of the law could be exploited to conduct what most of us would think of as domestic surveillance despite the nominal requirement of a “foreign” target:

The concern was that the government could be said to “direct” surveillance at the entity abroad, but still monitor communications on a facility used (or used exclusively) by an individual U.S. person in this country. Indeed, the government in the recent past had taken the position that surveillance of a U.S. person’s home and mobile telephones was “directed at” al Qaeda, not at the U.S. person himself. Applied to the PAA, this logic seemed to allow surveillance of Americans’ telephones and e-mail accounts, inside the United States, without adherence to traditional FISA, as long as the government could persuade itself that the surveillance was indeed “directed” at al Qaeda or another foreign power that was reasonably believed to be abroad. When confronted with these concerns the government explicitly equated the PAA’s “directed at” standard with FISA’s “targeting” standard, meaning that acquisition was “directed” at an entity when the government was trying to acquire information from or about that entity.

More importantly for present purposes, the government’s equation of the “targeting” and “directed at” standards meant that concerns raised about the PAA applied equally to the FAA, which (as discussed above) authorizes acquisition “targeting” a “person” reasonably believed to be abroad, and explicitly adopts traditional FISA’s broad definition of the term “person.” The concern was that the government could use Section 1881a for an acquisition “targeting” al Qaeda, but “directed” at a facility or place used (or used exclusively) by John Smith, a U.S. person located in the United States, for Smith’s domestic communications. [Emphasis added.]

As Kris and Wilson note, Congress ultimately added a further limitation designed to allay such concerns, but it did not do so by prohibiting any flagging of Americans’ e-mail accounts or phone lines for interception and recording without a warrant. That is still allowed—though “minimization procedures” are then supposed to limit the retention and use of such information.

What Congress prohibited instead was the use of FAA surveillance to “intentionally acquire any communication as to which the sender and all intended recipients are known at the time of acquisition to be located in the United States.” But as Kris and Wilson point out, this restriction  “is imperfect because location is difficult to determine in the modern world of communications, and the restriction applies only when the government ‘knows’ that the communication is domestic.”

So to review: under the FAA, a court approves general procedures for surveillance “targeting” a foreign group. But the court does not approve or (necessarily) review any intelligence agency’s own discretionary determination about which specific people’s e-mail addresses, phone lines, or online accounts should be flagged for interception in order to gather information about that foreign group. The government’s past arguments indicate that it believes it may spy on the accounts or phones of individual American citizens located in the United States under an authorization to gather information about a foreign “target.” All the law requires is that they not intentionally record the American’s calls and e-mails when they are are known in advance to be to or from another American.

Remember: this isn’t my interpretation of the law. This isn’t speculation from someone at the American Civil Liberties Union or the Electronic Frontier Foundation about how the government might try to read the statute. This a legal reference text written by the lawyer who, until quite recently, ran the show at DOJ when it came to FISA surveillance. The next time you hear a member of Congress declare that the FAA has nothing to do with eavesdropping on Americans, ask yourself who is more likely to have  an accurate understanding of what the law really says.