Tag: defense

DEFENSE DOWNLOAD: Week of 10/25

Welcome to the Defense Download! This new round-up is intended to highlight what we at the Cato Institute are keeping tabs on in the world of defense politics every week. The three-to-five trending stories will vary depending on the news cycle, what policymakers are talking about, and will pull from all sides of the political spectrum. If you would like to recieve more frequent updates on what I’m reading, writing, and listening to—you can follow me on Twitter via @CDDorminey

  1. This week has been all Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), all the time. If you’re wondering about the potential upsides, check out “Trump Is Right to Leave The INF Nuclear Treaty” by Kori Shake. If you’re wondering about the potential downsides, I suggest this overview by the New York Times’ editorial board, “‘Getting Tough’ Over a Missile Pact Could Weaken America.” If you have no idea where to start on this issue, stay tuned for tomorrow’s Cato Daily Podcast featuring Eric Gomez and yours truly. (Or you could always start at Wikipedia.) 
  2. Funding for Overseas Contingency Operations and Its Impact on Defense Spending,” Congressional Budget Office (CBO). Since 2001, a significant portion of the annual defense budget has been hived off to pay for wartime operations. But the CBO found that since 2006, at least $50 billion  of annual wartime funds (70 percent of the total OCO account) actually went to enduring activities (i.e. what it takes to run a military this size during peacetime). That’s a substantial misuse or misallocation of funds. 
  3. What Can 24 Satellites Do for U.S. Missile Defense?,” Thomas Roberts. This is pretty in the weeds, but if you follow missile defense or satellite aquisition then you’ll find this brief interesting. It offers a rebuttal to a 2011 report that claimed space-based missile systems could be incorporated in the existing force structure without incurring large program costs. 
  4. Here’s The Pentagon’s Initial Plan for Creating A Space Force,” Marcus Weisgerber. DefenseOne got ahold of an internal document on how the Pentagon is planning to organize the Space Force. Not many firm details are included—but coupled with Secretary Heather Wilson’s estimate of 13,000 people and $13 billion over the next five years, things seem to be in motion. 
  5. The Ticking Nuclear Budget Time Bomb” Kingston Reif and Mackenzie Eaglen. If you aren’t familiar with the nuclear modernization plan, this is a great place to dive into the issue. The article highlights an issue I’ve personally been working on all year: that the nuclear budget cannot be considered in isolation—it’s going to coincide with modernization plans for the Air Force, Navy, and expansion of the Army. 

DEFENSE DOWNLOAD: Week of 10/18

Welcome to the Defense Download! This new round-up is intended to highlight what we at the Cato Institute are keeping tabs on in the world of defense politics every week. The three-to-five trending stories will vary depending on the news cycle, what policymakers are talking about, and will pull from all sides of the political spectrum. If you would like to recieve more frequent updates on what I’m reading, writing, and listening to—you can follow me on Twitter via @CDDorminey

  1. Trump appears to call for defense spending cut,” Aaron Mehta. This week’s Cabinet meeting went a bit differently than most. The President, apparently due to worry about the country’s rising debts and deficits, issued a call for every federal department to cut it’s spending by five percent in Fiscal Year 2019 (FY19). Reporters understandably rushed to ask President Trump if this initiative would include defense spending; while he doesn’t seem to want the full five percent, Trump commented that the budget next year would be “around $700 billion” (a 2.3 percent cut). 
  2. Air Force B-21 Raider Long Range Strike Bomber,” Jeremiah Gertler. The Congressional Research survey released an update on the still-classified B-21 program. While many details remain unavailable to the public, this report discusses  the status of the program and includes useful information on projected research and development funding. 
  3. Air and Missile Defense at a Crossroads,” Mark Gunzinger and Carl Rehburg. The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Alternative released a new report today on adapting missile defense for protecting overseas bases, and recommendations to move the portfolio in that direction. 
  4. Senior defense committee Democrat wants to stop U.S. weapon sales to Saudi Arabia,” Tony Bertuca. Senator Jack Reed, the ranking Democrat on the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), said publicly that all sales of offensive weapons to Saudi Arabia should be blocked until a thorough investigation into the death of journalist Jamal Khashoggi can be undertaken. 

HASC vs. SASC on BRAC

Neither of the defense bills (National Defense Authorization Acts, NDAAs) wending their way through the House and Senate grant the Pentagon the authority to reduce excess infrastructure. Military leaders have asked for such permission for many years, but Congress has stubbornly refused. An amendment sponsored by Rep. Tom McClintock (R-CA) would have stripped the language from the House NDAA that blocks a new Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round. That amendment failed yesterday by a vote of 175-248.

Before the vote, the House Armed Services Committee issued a “BRAC Facts” one pager to preempt the McClintock amendment and other attempts to resolve the impasse between Congress and military leaders over BRAC.

The one pager includes a few facts, but is selective to the point of misleading. For example, it states that Secretary of Defense James Mattis “does not have confidence in DOD BRAC assessments.” And quotes Mattis as saying “I am not comfortable right now that we have a full 20 some percent excess.” 

But the SecDef also said that a new BRAC round could save the Pentagon $2 billion a year. In written testimony last month, Mattis called BRAC “a cornerstone of our efficiencies program” and necessary to “ensure we do not waste taxpayer dollars.” Granting the Pentagon authority to reduce overhead, Mattis continued, “is essential to improving our readiness by minimizing wasted resources and accommodating force adjustments.” He observed, “Of all the efficiency measures the Department has undertaken over the years, BRAC is one of the most successful and significant.”

Meanwhile, deputy defense secretary Robert Work has also called for BRAC. “Spending resources on excess infrastructure does not make sense,” he wrote last year. In short, it simply isn’t accurate to imply that current Pentagon leaders doubt whether the military has more bases than it needs. And that is true even if the military were to grow in the next few years, as the HASC claims it must.

Encouraging NATO Burden Sharing: What Works?

President Donald Trump has repeatedly complained that the United States carries too much of the economic and military burden in NATO. He has even gone so far as to call the European alliance “obsolete” and to suggest that his administration might not fulfill the treaty’s Article 5 obligation that commits NATO countries to come to the defense of any member that is attacked (Note: administration officials have repeatedly sought to reassure NATO allies that we remain committed to the collective defense of Europe, and Trump has contradicted himself on this score).

Many think this provocative rhetoric is just a ploy to get our NATO allies, who habitually underspend on defense and free-ride on America’s security guarantees, to pay more of their fair share of the burden. At the Washington Post’s Monkey Cage blog, Andrea Gilli argues this approach is unlikely to jolt NATO allies into spending more on defense, though. Among other reasons, most NATO allies “face financial and political constraints to increasing military expenditure” in part because U.S. security assurances “have freed up state funds in Europe for other priorities, including a robust system of social services.” And since cutting welfare benefits is typically a political non-starter, we shouldn’t necessarily expect NATO countries to boost defense spending due to Trump’s abrasive rhetoric.

But the historical record seems to contradict Gilli’s argument. According to the RAND Corporation, Europe has historically spent between 43 percent and 78 percent of U.S. spending on defense. The ratio reached its peak in 1980, and then again in 2000 - years that were at the tail end of periods of defense budget cuts. And according to the RAND report, one of the the most successful techniques in getting NATO allies to share more of the burden was “threats by Congress to withdraw its troops from Europe.”

The only period of signficant real growth in European defense spending was during the 1970s; otherwise European defense expenditure has been remarkably flat in real terms…

Historically, efforts to create incentives or to manage the burden-sharing problem have taken four different approaches. The first approach (1966 to the mid-1980s) was based on the threat of U.S. troop withdrawals. With a series of resolutions and amendments from 1966 to 1975, Senator Mike Mansfield sought to use the threat of U.S. troop withdrawals to force Europe to contribute more and to lessen U.S. costs. As noted, that effort—plus other factors relating to economic growth and the Soviet threat—may have had a positive effect: European defense spending grew by 44 percent between 1970 and 1984.

Certainly other factors contributed to this period of growth in NATO burden sharing - higher rates of economic growth, increased perceptions of the Soviet threat, defense budget cuts as we withdrew from Vietnam, etc. But U.S. threats to pare back its commitment to the region seem to have had a significant impact.

That said, European defense spending may never reach the levels that the Trump administration, or for that matter the Washington foreign policy community generally, would prefer. And while U.S. security guarantees are surely one reason for this, it also may be the case that European countries aren’t boosting defense spending levels because they don’t face any major threats. Increasing defense spending to 2 percent of GDP or higher won’t do much about the terrorism problem European countries face. And the supposed geopolitical threat from Russia, meddling in Georgia and Ukraine aside, is consistently exaggerated

Postdoctoral Fellowship in Foreign Policy

Like the foreign policy commentary you see here on Cato’s blog? If you’re a PhD candidate or recent PhD, you should consider applying for our visiting research fellow position.

The Defense and Foreign Policy department is seeking candidates for a visiting fellow post. This one-year paid fellowship allows candidates to expand upon the policy implications of their dissertation research, and contribute to the work of the Cato defense and foreign policy department.

In order to apply, candidates must be either A.B.D. PhD candidates or a recent PhD graduate in political science, history or a related field, and must have authorization to work in the United States.

Candidates should also share Cato’s commitment to moving U.S. foreign policy towards prudence and restraint, and the policy implications of their work should be broadly compatible with a pragmatic, realist or restrained approach to foreign policy. You can find more information about Cato’s work on defense and foreign policy issues here.

During their time at Cato, the visiting fellow is responsible for:

  • Producing one scholarly paper (8,000-10,000 words) in the Institute’s Policy Analysis series on a foreign policy issue (which may or may not be part of the fellow’s dissertation)
  • Organizing at least two events
  • Authoring op-eds and blog posts
  • Handling media requests on international security issues

Fellows will work from Cato’s Washington, D.C. offices for the 2017-2018 academic year. Predoctoral fellows will receive $40,000, and postdocs will receive $50,000 in addition to health care coverage. Ideally, the fellow’s work at Cato would overlap considerably with his or her dissertation, making the fellowship useful both for policy research and finishing or refining the candidate’s dissertation.

If you are interested in applying, please submit a C.V. and a writing sample via Cato’s online application system no later than February 15, 2017. The application can be found here.

Early Thoughts on Trump’s Peace through Strength

With Republicans retaining control of the House and Senate, President-elect Donald Trump might think it will be easy to push through his plans for “peace through strength” but he’s offered dubious rationales for why we need a much larger military. And his proposals for how he would pay for the additional spending are incomplete and inadequate.

He outlined his plans in a speech in early September. The high points include:

  • Active-duty Army: 540,000, up from 491,365 today, and currently projected to hit 450,000 in 2018, and stay there through 2020;
  • Marine Corps: 36 battalions, up from 23 now;
  • Navy: 350 surface ships and submarines, up from 276 today (the Navy’s current plans call for 308 ships by 2021, peaking at 313 in 2025);
  • Air Force: 1,200+ fighter aircraft; which is close to today’s inventory of 1,113;
  • A “State of the art missile defense system”; and
  • Major investments in cybertechnology, both offensive and defensive.

Estimates for what it would cost to implement these changes vary, but most experts doubt that Trump can make up the difference without raising taxes or adding to the deficit. His call for “common sense reforms that eliminate government waste and budget gimmicks,” is extremely vague, and it seems unlikely that Democrats will agree to relax the Budget Control Act caps on defense spending while leaving non-defense caps in place.

The bigger question is what Trump plans to do with this much-larger military. He is right to be skeptical of nation-building in foreign lands. He scorned Hillary Clinton’s support for the regime-change wars in Iraq and Libya. Those types of missions often require vast forces, especially ground troops, willing to remain in those countries for decades, or longer. But if he doubts that such missions are needed or wise, why does he call for increasing the active duty Army and Marine Corps? What does he expect them to be doing that they aren’t already?

The Reuse of Two Military Bases in the Atlanta Area

ATLANTA - Support may be building in Congress for another round of military base consolidation. Some believe that leaders will reach agreement with the incoming administration early next year. It’s overdue. The Pentagon says it will have 22 percent excess capacity by 2019. But, of course, for many communities, base closure is a frightening prospect.

Some communities in and around former bases have begun the process of repurposing these properties. At the Association of Defense Communities’ Installation Reuse meeting here in Atlanta, attendees had a chance to visit two such examples: former Army bases Fort Gillem and Fort McPherson. Both have a pathway toward a successful transition to non-defense use since winding up on the 2005 BRAC commission’s cut list, but they have opted for quite different approaches.

Fort Gillem, an Army logistics hub opened in 1941, is now Gillem Logistics Center. It is already home to a 1-million square foot distribution center for Kroger, the popular food retailer. Proximity to a major highway, Interstate 285, proved a key selling point, and enabled Kroger to consolidate operations from five buildings into one. The new facility includes freezers and cold storage for everything from ice cream to fresh cut flowers, and employs about 1000 people. Kroger invested $243 million in the project, part of a 30-year commitment to the property, and they have room to expand.