Tag: defense

Encouraging NATO Burden Sharing: What Works?

President Donald Trump has repeatedly complained that the United States carries too much of the economic and military burden in NATO. He has even gone so far as to call the European alliance “obsolete” and to suggest that his administration might not fulfill the treaty’s Article 5 obligation that commits NATO countries to come to the defense of any member that is attacked (Note: administration officials have repeatedly sought to reassure NATO allies that we remain committed to the collective defense of Europe, and Trump has contradicted himself on this score).

Many think this provocative rhetoric is just a ploy to get our NATO allies, who habitually underspend on defense and free-ride on America’s security guarantees, to pay more of their fair share of the burden. At the Washington Post’s Monkey Cage blog, Andrea Gilli argues this approach is unlikely to jolt NATO allies into spending more on defense, though. Among other reasons, most NATO allies “face financial and political constraints to increasing military expenditure” in part because U.S. security assurances “have freed up state funds in Europe for other priorities, including a robust system of social services.” And since cutting welfare benefits is typically a political non-starter, we shouldn’t necessarily expect NATO countries to boost defense spending due to Trump’s abrasive rhetoric.

But the historical record seems to contradict Gilli’s argument. According to the RAND Corporation, Europe has historically spent between 43 percent and 78 percent of U.S. spending on defense. The ratio reached its peak in 1980, and then again in 2000 - years that were at the tail end of periods of defense budget cuts. And according to the RAND report, one of the the most successful techniques in getting NATO allies to share more of the burden was “threats by Congress to withdraw its troops from Europe.”

The only period of signficant real growth in European defense spending was during the 1970s; otherwise European defense expenditure has been remarkably flat in real terms…

Historically, efforts to create incentives or to manage the burden-sharing problem have taken four different approaches. The first approach (1966 to the mid-1980s) was based on the threat of U.S. troop withdrawals. With a series of resolutions and amendments from 1966 to 1975, Senator Mike Mansfield sought to use the threat of U.S. troop withdrawals to force Europe to contribute more and to lessen U.S. costs. As noted, that effort—plus other factors relating to economic growth and the Soviet threat—may have had a positive effect: European defense spending grew by 44 percent between 1970 and 1984.

Certainly other factors contributed to this period of growth in NATO burden sharing - higher rates of economic growth, increased perceptions of the Soviet threat, defense budget cuts as we withdrew from Vietnam, etc. But U.S. threats to pare back its commitment to the region seem to have had a significant impact.

That said, European defense spending may never reach the levels that the Trump administration, or for that matter the Washington foreign policy community generally, would prefer. And while U.S. security guarantees are surely one reason for this, it also may be the case that European countries aren’t boosting defense spending levels because they don’t face any major threats. Increasing defense spending to 2 percent of GDP or higher won’t do much about the terrorism problem European countries face. And the supposed geopolitical threat from Russia, meddling in Georgia and Ukraine aside, is consistently exaggerated

Postdoctoral Fellowship in Foreign Policy

Like the foreign policy commentary you see here on Cato’s blog? If you’re a PhD candidate or recent PhD, you should consider applying for our visiting research fellow position.

The Defense and Foreign Policy department is seeking candidates for a visiting fellow post. This one-year paid fellowship allows candidates to expand upon the policy implications of their dissertation research, and contribute to the work of the Cato defense and foreign policy department.

In order to apply, candidates must be either A.B.D. PhD candidates or a recent PhD graduate in political science, history or a related field, and must have authorization to work in the United States.

Candidates should also share Cato’s commitment to moving U.S. foreign policy towards prudence and restraint, and the policy implications of their work should be broadly compatible with a pragmatic, realist or restrained approach to foreign policy. You can find more information about Cato’s work on defense and foreign policy issues here.

During their time at Cato, the visiting fellow is responsible for:

  • Producing one scholarly paper (8,000-10,000 words) in the Institute’s Policy Analysis series on a foreign policy issue (which may or may not be part of the fellow’s dissertation)
  • Organizing at least two events
  • Authoring op-eds and blog posts
  • Handling media requests on international security issues

Fellows will work from Cato’s Washington, D.C. offices for the 2017-2018 academic year. Predoctoral fellows will receive $40,000, and postdocs will receive $50,000 in addition to health care coverage. Ideally, the fellow’s work at Cato would overlap considerably with his or her dissertation, making the fellowship useful both for policy research and finishing or refining the candidate’s dissertation.

If you are interested in applying, please submit a C.V. and a writing sample via Cato’s online application system no later than February 15, 2017. The application can be found here.

Early Thoughts on Trump’s Peace through Strength

With Republicans retaining control of the House and Senate, President-elect Donald Trump might think it will be easy to push through his plans for “peace through strength” but he’s offered dubious rationales for why we need a much larger military. And his proposals for how he would pay for the additional spending are incomplete and inadequate.

He outlined his plans in a speech in early September. The high points include:

  • Active-duty Army: 540,000, up from 491,365 today, and currently projected to hit 450,000 in 2018, and stay there through 2020;
  • Marine Corps: 36 battalions, up from 23 now;
  • Navy: 350 surface ships and submarines, up from 276 today (the Navy’s current plans call for 308 ships by 2021, peaking at 313 in 2025);
  • Air Force: 1,200+ fighter aircraft; which is close to today’s inventory of 1,113;
  • A “State of the art missile defense system”; and
  • Major investments in cybertechnology, both offensive and defensive.

Estimates for what it would cost to implement these changes vary, but most experts doubt that Trump can make up the difference without raising taxes or adding to the deficit. His call for “common sense reforms that eliminate government waste and budget gimmicks,” is extremely vague, and it seems unlikely that Democrats will agree to relax the Budget Control Act caps on defense spending while leaving non-defense caps in place.

The bigger question is what Trump plans to do with this much-larger military. He is right to be skeptical of nation-building in foreign lands. He scorned Hillary Clinton’s support for the regime-change wars in Iraq and Libya. Those types of missions often require vast forces, especially ground troops, willing to remain in those countries for decades, or longer. But if he doubts that such missions are needed or wise, why does he call for increasing the active duty Army and Marine Corps? What does he expect them to be doing that they aren’t already?

The Reuse of Two Military Bases in the Atlanta Area

ATLANTA - Support may be building in Congress for another round of military base consolidation. Some believe that leaders will reach agreement with the incoming administration early next year. It’s overdue. The Pentagon says it will have 22 percent excess capacity by 2019. But, of course, for many communities, base closure is a frightening prospect.

Some communities in and around former bases have begun the process of repurposing these properties. At the Association of Defense Communities’ Installation Reuse meeting here in Atlanta, attendees had a chance to visit two such examples: former Army bases Fort Gillem and Fort McPherson. Both have a pathway toward a successful transition to non-defense use since winding up on the 2005 BRAC commission’s cut list, but they have opted for quite different approaches.

Fort Gillem, an Army logistics hub opened in 1941, is now Gillem Logistics Center. It is already home to a 1-million square foot distribution center for Kroger, the popular food retailer. Proximity to a major highway, Interstate 285, proved a key selling point, and enabled Kroger to consolidate operations from five buildings into one. The new facility includes freezers and cold storage for everything from ice cream to fresh cut flowers, and employs about 1000 people. Kroger invested $243 million in the project, part of a 30-year commitment to the property, and they have room to expand.

A Visit to Historic Governors Island

In my continuing quest to shine the light on successful cases of defense conversion (i.e. transitioning former military facilities to non-military uses), I traveled to the Big Apple on Wednesday to visit Governors Island, a former U.S. Army and later Coast Guard facility that the federal government sold back to the City of New York in 2003.

The occasion of my visit was a rendezvous with Samer Bagaeen and Celia Clark, co-editors of a new book, Sustainable Regeneration of Former Military Sites. I contributed a chapter on two sites in Philadelphia, and co-authored a second chapter (with Clark) on the Brooklyn Navy Yard. Celia had previously visited Governors Island, and included it as one of many cases where former defense facilities had been converted to venues for art exhibitions.

Governors Island is accessible via ferry from Battery Park, at Slip No. 7, just adjacent to the Staten Island Ferry terminal. The ferries to the island run once every hour during the summer, with a second ferry route coming from Brooklyn on weekends. The trip takes only a few minutes, but along the way you are treated to some terrific view of Lower Manhattan and the Brooklyn Bridge.

There were perhaps one hundred on the boat that I boarded at 2 pm, but one of the friendly deck hands Krishendat (“Call me Kris,” he said) explained that the boats, which can accommodate 1,250 passengers, were packed on weekends.

I was skeptical. There were few others there as I strolled the peaceful grounds on a pleasant weekday. The National Park Service supervises the 22 acres of the Governors Island National Monument, and park rangers and volunteers showed people around and answered questions. A few folks tooled around on two-person bikes, and the lucky ones had golf carts for shuttling between the historic properties, including Fort Jay and Castle Williams (a former prison). For the most part, the walkways were sparsely populated or empty. The view of Lower Manhattan through the talls trees was striking.

The Commanding Officer’s House, constructed in the 1840s, is a nice venue for meetings. A plaque in the entry way boasted of one such meeting: Ronald Reagan’s luncheon with Mikhail Gorbachev and then-Vice President/President-elect George H.W. Bush on December 7, 1988. Other structures were not as well maintained, and the worst of the lot were closed off with gates and warning signs.

Leslie Koch, the long-time president and chief executive of the Trust for Governors Island, confirmed that 10,000 or more come to the island each day on summer weekends. Many will come for the grand opening of a new park, The Hills, constructed from the remnants of the old seawall. Leslie, who is stepping down next month, gave us a sneak peak.

The 10-acre area, once completely flat, now features several undulating hills of grass, small trees, and rock walkways (scrambleways) for climbing. The Statue of Liberty rose up from behind the hills as the golf cart wound its way up the freshly paved road. The new park is sure to be a big hit for all ages, but the young ones will like the slides.

We had sped past a number of brick buildings on the way there. Most of the structures are unoccupied. Per the terms of the sale from the federal government to the City of New York, residential housing is forbidden on Governors Island. This could be a lucrative source of revenue to offset more than $16 million per year in operating expenses; by way of comparison, the Presidio Trust in San Francisco collects more than 50 percent of its revenue from residential rents. Residences can also draw businesses to former base properties, one of the reasons why the former Philadelphia Navy Yard decided to develop a few thousand apartment units. The restaurants and shops that cater to these residents also make the place more attractive to businesses, whose employees otherwise would have to travel off site for lunch or to run errands.

But while there are untapped opportunities on the island, it is a terrific space just a few minutes away from the heart of New York’s financial district. If you haven’t been, you should. And, when you go, remember: this former defense site was once closed off to nearly everyone. Now it is open for all to use and enjoy. We can and should do the same with other defense facilities around the country.

Teaching Congress about the Benefits of Base Closures

I spent the latter part of last week on a too-short trip to Alicante, Spain, to present some of my latest work on the reuse of former defense facilities in the United States. The occasion was a conference on “Defence Heritage” – the third since 2012 – hosted by the Wessex Institute (.pdf) in which scholars from more than a dozen countries shared their findings about how various defense installations around the world have been repurposed for everything from recreational parks to educational institutions to centers of business and enterprise.

This sort of research is sorely needed as Congress appears poised to deny the Pentagon’s request to close unneeded or excess bases. It is the fifth time that Congress has told the military that it must carry surplus infrastructure, and continue to misallocate resources where they aren’t needed, in order to protect narrow parochial interests in a handful of congressional districts that might house an endangered facility.

In a cover letter to a new Pentagon report that provides ample justification for the need to close bases, Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work explained:

Under current fiscal restraints, local communities will experience economic impacts regardless of a congressional decision regarding BRAC authorization. This has the harmful and unintended consequence of forcing the Military Departments to consider cuts at all installations, without regard to military value. A better alternative is to close or realign installations with the lowest military value. Without BRAC, local communities’ ability to plan and adapt to these changes is less robust and offers fewer protections than under BRAC law.

Work is almost certainly correct. But in my latest post at The National Interest’s The Skeptics, I urge him “and other advocates for another BRAC round” not to “limit themselves to green-eyeshade talk of cost savings and greater efficiency. They must also show how former defense sites don’t all become vast, barren wastelands devoid of jobs and people.”

It obviously isn’t enough to stress the potential savings, even though the savings are substantial. The DoD report estimates that the five BRAC rounds, plus the consolidation of bases in Europe, have generated annual recurring savings of $12.5 billion, and that a new BRAC round would save an additional $2 billion per year, after a six-year implementation period. A GAO study conducted in 2002 concluded that “BRAC savings are real and substantial and are related to cost reduction in key operational areas.”

Members of Congress who are uninterested in such facts, and who remain adamantly opposed to any base closures, anywhere, should consider what has actually happened to many of the bases dealt with during the five BRAC rounds, and the hundreds of other bases closed in the 1950s and 60s, before there was a BRAC. 

They don’t have to go far. They could start by speaking with the Association of Defense Communities and the Pentagon’s Office of Economic Adjustment, who keep track of these stories.

House Armed Services Committee Chairman Mac Thornberry (R-TX) could visit Austin-Bergstrom International Airport in Austin, Texas. He probably has, many times. The closure of Bergstrom Air Force Base was a thinly disguised blessing for a city that had struggled for years to find an alternative for its inadequate regional airport. Austin-Bergstrom today services millions of passengers, and has won awards for its design and customer service.

Sen. Kelly Ayotte (R-NH), Chair of the Senate Armed Services Readiness Subcommittee, might stop by the former Pease Air Force Base in Portsmouth, New Hampshire, during one of her trips home. One of the very first bases closed under the BRAC process, the sprawling site still hosts several massive runways, and the 157th Air Refueling Wing of the Air National Guard. But the base has chiefly been reborn as the Pease International Tradeport, which is now home to over 250 businesses that employ more than 10,000 people.

And both would benefit from a visit to the former Brunswick Naval Air Station in my home state of Maine. They used to launch P-3 submarine-hunting airplanes (pictured), now they host dozens of businesses, including 28 start-ups in a new business incubator, TechPlace, that opened 14 months ago. 

It’s particularly lovely in the summer time, if you don’t mind all the tourists. If they go, Thornberry and Ayotte should talk to some of the people who are responsible for its rapid turnaround, including Steve Levesque, the Executive Director of the Midcoast Regional Redevelopment Authority (MRRA), who contributed a chapter in this forthcoming volume on the renovation and reuse of former military sites, and Jeffrey Jordan, the MRRA’s Deputy Director, who I interviewed in 2014. I’m sure they’d be happy to show HASC and SASC members around Brunswick Landing.

DoD Now Responsible for Guns and Butter

Of the many enduring tenets shaping America’s state-building project in Afghanistan, the belief that expanded economic opportunities can promote long-term stability has long been received as gospel. Past 2014, that principle will continue to animate U.S.strategy in Afghanistan.

Jim Bullion, the director of the Pentagon’s Task Force for Business and Stability Operations (TFBSO), said in a recent interview with Foreign Policy’s Situation Report that America’s long-term presence could be robust. TFBSO itself hopes to strengthen existing industries in Afghanistan by luring private sector investment. Its broader mission is to promote “economic stabilization in order to reduce violence, enhance stability, and restore economic normalcy in areas where unrest and insurgency have created a synchronous downward spiral of economic hardship and violence.”

That thinking is consistent with the U.S. Army’s Stability Operations Field Manual [3-07], which states that the “long term and costly” effort to reintegrate former combatants includes vocational training, relocation and resettlement support, and assistance in finding employment. Indeed, a couple years back, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton articulated a similar vision when she made clear that for those militants who turned away from the Taliban, “we need incentives in order to both protect them and provide alternatives to them to replace the payment they received as Taliban fighters.”

So much is wrong with this way of thinking it’s difficult to know where to start. First, part of the coalition’s problem has been attempting to secure and stabilize an active war zone while simultaneously spending staggering sums of money to develop it. As a result, numerous audits, reports, and investigations have found that a number of projects and programs funded by DOD, State, and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) have been ineffective, unsustainable, produced unnecessary redundancy, wasted resources, and fraud.

In addition, as Congresswoman Betty McCollum (D-MN) asked last year in a statement on the TFBSO and a defense bill appropriating $150 million to operate it:

When in the course of this long war did it become the Department of Defense’s role to facilitate business opportunities for Afghan and foreign companies?

Is it really within the Pentagon’s expertise or mission to excel at business development, farming, or mineral exploration?

[…]

Every House member needs to ask why the Pentagon is supporting the development of the Afghan carpet industry while U.S.soldiers are under attack.

McCollum makes some astute points. That said, she also argues that the role of promoting economic development belongs to civilian agencies like USAID, State, and Commerce. On that point, we diverge.

The underlying assumption of economic development programs in Afghanistan is that locals will gravitate toward the Taliban if they lack an alternative livelihood. Certainly, the promise of money and jobs has lured some militant foot soldiers off the battlefield, but to adopt this position as the crux of an overarching strategy does more to trivialize the complex blend of intangible motives that spur many locals to fight.

Some Afghans (and Pakistanis) take up arms for reasons other than economic impoverishment. They do so for reasons such as factional infighting, traditional/local/tribal vendettas, the promotion of jihad, or group exclusion from power. In this respect, the causal link between economic development and conflict alleviation is not so robust, especially if other more pervasive forces are underlying the conflict.

Moreover, a few of Afghanistan’s most insecure provinces have received the most development aid. Matt Waldman, Oxfam International’s former head of policy in Afghanistan, wrote years ago, “if it were a state,Helmand [province] alone would be the world’s fifth largest recipient of funds from USAID, the US Agency for International Development.”

Part of the problem is that money that’s pumped into unstable environments becomes unaccountable. That often creates a feedback loop in which foreign aid breeds corruption and generates more instability. In fact, that was the finding of a June 2011 Senate Foreign Relations Committee report:

Foreign aid, when misspent, can fuel corruption, distort labor and goods markets, undermine the host government’s ability to exert control over resources, and contribute to insecurity.

Ironically, the “economic opportunity = long-term stability” strategy achieves neither. In certain areas, continuing such policies beyond 2014 may not only do more harm than good, but also perpetuate the dysfunction and underdevelopment that has plagued Afghanistan for centuries.

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