Tag: defense spending

How Much Defense is Enough? The Outlier’s Take

A new study from the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, “How Much is Enough? Alternative Defense Strategies,” reports on military spending plans produced by teams from five think tanks, including Cato. CSBA asked each team to use its “Strategic Choices” software to make hundreds of choices amounting to a ten-year budget plan for the Pentagon and to provide a brief statement of their strategic rationale. The report includes those rationales, summaries of each budget, and comparative analysis of them.

As you can tell from the chart below, the Cato team’s answer was that way less is enough. We cut $1.1 trillion over the period. We’d have cut even more had the software allowed us to target all the spending going to “Overseas Contingency Operations,” intelligence programs and nuclear weapons. You can also see that our plan was the outlier. The others all raised spending—in AEI’s case, massively, by $1.3 trillion.

Some Context on Pentagon Spending

General David Petraeus and Brookings Fellow Michael O’Hanlon recently took to the Wall Street Journal to assure the American people that, despite sequestration, there is no military readiness crisis. A few days later, Thomas Donnelly and Roger Zakheim published a rebuttal in the National Review claiming that the challenges of too few personnel and aging, overextended equipment induced a “wasting disease.” They alleged that the size of the defense budget was a misleading statistic without context.

So, here’s some context. After a rapid demobilization following World War II, the United States slowly rebuilt its forces to balance against the Soviet Union. Spending remained far above pre-World War II levels for the remainder of the decades-long conflict, and ever since. The Pentagon budget averaged $462 billion from 1948–1990 (in FY2017 dollars), with notable spikes for the Korean War, Vietnam War, and the Reagan build up in the 1980’s (See Figure 1). With the end of the Cold War, we see a fairly steep decline in military spending during the H.W. Bush and Clinton years. In the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the reductions of the 90s gave way to much larger Pentagon budgets, as the George W. Bush administration embarked on the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Defense spending during the early years of the Obama administration remained above $750 billion as the president ramped up the war in Afghanistan while working to end the war in Iraq. In constant, 2017 dollars, annual Pentagon spending during Bush 43’s eight years in office averaged $612 billion; under Obama, the average is $675 billion (See Figure 2).

One side-note regarding the grouping by presidential administration: Taken alone, the picture can be misleading, in that Reagan inherited Carter’s final budget, Clinton inherited H.W. Bush’s, etc. And, besides, Congress, not any single president, makes the final decision on what the government spends. It is also true, however, that Congress has typically deferred to presidential preferences, particularly when it comes to military spending. Had Clinton wanted more, he likely would have gotten it (and did, starting in 1999); Obama, meanwhile, could have requested less (and, eventually, did). Those variations within four- or eight-year terms get lost in a graph that lumps all the years together in one fat bar for each president.

With respect to whether current spending levels are far too low, far too high, or somewhere in between, the Budget Control Act (BCA) of 2011 and its threat of sequestration tried to rein in spending on both defense and non-defense discretionary spending, but has been only partly successful. Congress has found ways around the defense caps, in part by funneling extra money to the base budget through the Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) account, which is exempted under the BCA. And, under the BCA caps revised late last year, estimated military spending would average at least $551 billion from 2017 to 2021 (.pdf, see page 15) – and likely more than that if Congress doesn’t kick its OCO addiction. That’s 28 percent higher than in 2000, and 19 percent higher than the Cold War average.

In short, if there is a readiness gap, it’s not due to lack of funding. The BCA, by itself, has not resulted in significant cuts in military spending. In inflation-adjusted dollars, we spend more today than during the average Cold War year, and more than we spent at the start of the War on Terror. It would appear that we are mostly getting less “bang for our buck” than during previous generations.

Talking about the Reuse of Former Military Facilities

I’ve written a few things here and elsewhere about the need to close military bases, about how we should go about closing them, and about the possible civilian reuses for these sites. Later this month, I’ll be discussing some examples around the world, drawing from cases in a new book, Sustainable Regeneration of Former Military Sites published by Routledge.

I wrote a chapter covering two cases in Philadelphia – the Frankford Arsenal and the Philadelphia Navy Yard – and co-wrote another on the Brooklyn Navy Yard. Other places featured in the book include the Brunswick Naval Air Station in Maine, and an arts community in Marfa, Texas, once home to Fort Russell, a German POW camp in World War II. My friend and former colleague Connor Ryan wrote about the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process. But the volume mostly addresses non-U.S. cases, including former defense sites in the UK, Croatia, the Netherlands, Finland, Sweden, China, and Taiwan. The experiences are as varied as the sites themselves, but common challenges include environmental cleanup, jurisdictional disputes (i.e. who controls the process, and who benefits), and local resistance to change. Eventually, these former military facilities do find other uses that provide clear benefits for their surrounding communities. And some recover quite quickly.

I’ll be speaking at the Association of Defense Communities’ National Summit here in DC, in the morning on Tuesday, June 21st. Then, on the afternoon of Wednesday, June 22nd, I’m traveling to New York City for an official book launch with the co-editors Celia Clark and Samer Bagaeen at historic Governors Island. A flyer with more details about that event, and the book, is featured below.

Sustainable Regeneration of Former Military Sites

America Has Dependents, Not Allies

America’s international position is distinguished by its alliance networks. Presidential candidates fear today’s dangerous world, but the United States is allied with every major industrialized power, save China and Russia. It is a position that Washington’s few potential adversaries must envy.

Yet as I pointed out in National Interest: “littering the globe with security commitments is costly. The U.S. must create a much bigger military to project force abroad to protect countries that often matter little for this nation’s security. Moreover, while policymakers hope to prevent war with treaty guarantees, the resulting tripwires ensure involvement if deterrence fails.”

Equally important, America’s involvement tends to turn friends and allies into dependents. The principle is the same as domestic welfare: Why should they do for themselves if they can get someone else to do so?

America Should Stop Paying to Defend the World

Donald Trump is a genius for gaining media attention. Sometimes his opinions also reflect basic common sense.

Consider his complaint that Washington’s prosperous allies in Asia and Europe don’t pay enough in return. Defenders of the status quo contend that it is in America’s interest to subsidize its allies, as if they were defending the United States.

Advocates of the status quo also argue that U.S. allies contribute to U.S. basing costs. That’s true but irrelevant. The fact that countries defended by America help cover Washington’s cost of stationing U.S. troops is notable only because allied free- (or cheap-) riding has been so shameless for so long.

As I pointed out in CNN online: “The most important cost for America is that of creating the forces deployed, wherever they are stationed. Every security commitment requires additional personnel and equipment. America’s oversized military budget reflects America’s many formal and possible security guarantees: 27 NATO members, alliance wannabes Georgia and Ukraine, various East Asian allies and friends, several Middle Eastern and Central Asian nations.”

Washington accounts for roughly 40 percent of the globe’s military outlays in order to project power on behalf of other states. Providing a defense shield for war-ravaged nations originally made sense. But that world has passed away.

Washington should stop defending its prosperous, populous allies. They should pay for their own defense and confront future security threats as equals.

 

Closing America’s Security Deficit

The RAND Corporation has published the second report in its “Strategic Rethink” series, this one entitled “America’s Security Deficit: Addressing the Imbalance between Strategy and Resources in a Turbulent World.” It is a noble undertaking, conducted by well-respected scholars and analysts. But I’m not particularly optimistic that conditions are ripe for the strategic rethink that they seek, and that the country desperately needs.

The strategy-resources gap should be corrected by adopting a new strategy, one that pares down the United States’ permanent overseas presence, and compels other countries to take on more responsibilities for their own defense (as Japan shows signs of doing). Instead, U.S. policymakers seem willing to undertake merely incremental changes at the margins, retaining U.S. primacy, and trying to cover the strategy-resources gap with wishful thinking and unrealistic assumptions.

RAND’s summary of the report explains “currently projected levels of defense spending are insufficient to meet the demands of an ambitious national security strategy.” And its Key Finding reads as follows:

Limitations on defense spending in the context of emerging threats are creating a “security deficit.”

  • Fielding military capabilities sufficient, in conjunction with those of our allies and partners, to deal with the disparate challenges faced by the United States will require substantial and sustained investments in a wide range of programs and initiatives well beyond what would be feasible under the terms of the Budget Control Act.

Advocates for higher military spending have been saying this since the BCA was first passed. Those who also claim to care about the nation’s persistent fiscal imbalance typically note that the Pentagon’s budget is not the primary driver of the nation’s debt, and they would focus, first, on so-called mandatory spending (Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid) which accounts for a far higher share of total federal expenditures, in order to find the additional money needed to close the security gap.

They are correct on the first point, the need to reform entitlements, but not on the need for more military spending.

Ted Cruz’s Defense Spending Plan: Lots of Debt, Not Much Strategy

Ted Cruz says the defense plan he unveiled Tuesday in South Carolina would give the U.S. military “more tooth, less tail.” Actually Cruz’s plan would produce more of everything, especially debt.

Cruz says that as President he’ll spend 4.1 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) on defense for two years, and 4 percent thereafter. As the chart below shows, under standard growth predictions, Cruz’s plan produces a massive increase in military spending: about $1.2 trillion over what would be Cruz’s first term and $2.6 trillion over eight years. Details on the chart are at the end of this post.

The chart also shows how much Cruz’s plan exceeds the Budget Control Act’s caps on defense spending, which remain in force through 2021. Spending bills exceeding those caps trigger sequestration: across-the-board cuts that keep spending at the cap. So Cruz’s plan depends on Congress repealing the law. Experience suggests that Congress will instead trade on dodgy future savings to raise caps by twenty or thirty billion a year—about a tenth of what Cruz needs.

Cruz is relatively clear on the tooth—force structure—he hopes to buy. He’d grow the Army’s end strength to 1.4 million, with at least 525,000 in the active force. Those numbers are scheduled to fall to 980,000 and 450,000 in 2018. Cruz would “reverse the cuts to the manpower of the Marines,” which presumably means going from the current 182,000 active to the 202,000 peak size reached in 2011 for the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. The Navy would grow from 287 to at least 350 ships, and the Air Force would add 1,000 aircraft to reach 6,000. The plan would also modernize each leg of the nuclear triad of intercontinental ballistic missiles, bombers and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. It asserts that the triad is “on the verge of slipping away,” ignoring current plans to modernize each leg, needlessly.

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