Tag: DACA

USCIS Report Shows that DACA Arrest Rate Is Below that of Other U.S. Residents

The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) released a report showing that 59,789 people who applied for DACA, about 6.7 percent of all 888,875 applicants, were arrested for either a criminal or civil violation.  Of those, 53,792 were approved for DACA after they had been arrested.  Of the 770,628 people approved for DACA, 7,814 were later arrested and reapproved while 1,010 were later arrested and denied DACA.

The USCIS report does not identify convictions, only arrests.  It also does not provide the comparable arrest rates for other populations, giving the false impression that that is a high number of arrests for such a small population.  However, some data released in the report does allow for a back of the envelope comparison between the arrest rate for DACA applicants and the arrest rate for the non-DACA population.  The annual arrest rate of those who applied for DACA is 86 percent below the annual arrest rate for the non-DACA resident population.  The results are similar when controlling for age.

USCIS’ report states that 6.7 percent of people who applied for DACA were arrested at some point.  Some social scientists estimate that about 30 percent of adults in the United States have an arrest record, so by that measure that have an arrest rate 78 percent below the average.  Unfortunately, the government does not record the number of people arrested elsewhere so I cannot compare the arrest rate of the population at large with the arrest rate of DACA-recipients.  The Bureau of Justice Statistics does record the number of arrests made per year and the USCIS report also lists the number of arrests (there is a major difference between the number of arrests and the number of people arrested).

The 888,875 DACA-applicants were arrested 149,712 times during their lives (I start counting in 1981 as that is the earliest year when a DACA recipient could have been born and running through 2017).  During the same time, there were about 485 million arrests of people who were not in DACA.  The number of arrests of DACA-recipients over the entire period is equal to about 16.9 percent of the entire population who applied for DACA.  However, the number of arrests nationwide of non-DACA recipients is equal to about 110 percent of the non-DACA resident population who had lived during the time.  By this measure, there are about 85 percent fewer arrests per DACA applicant than for non-DACA applicants.

There are many ways to slice and dice these numbers.  USCIS points to even better results than our research on DACA criminality.  This might not be what they intended but the USCIS report shows that DACA-applicants are much less likely to be arrested than the rest of the resident U.S. population.   

Note:  This blog was updated by the author on 8/2/2018 due to an error in a previous version that vastly overcounted the DACA arrest rate.

Diversity Visa Program Fixes that Should Satisfy Republicans and Democrats

Legalizing the DREAMers, building the wall, boosting border security, and reforming the diversity immigrant visa program are the components of a successful legislative deal to reopen the federal government.  Reforming the diversity visa presents some unique challenges because Congress does not want to cut the number of green cards, but many Democrats–especially members of the Black and Hispanic Congressional Caucuses–worry that any substantial change to the program would diminish the number of immigrants from the nations that are favored under the current system. 

Fortunately, there is a policy solution that should satisfy both sides: convert the diversity visa into a merit-based system that still favors immigrants from the regions of the world that qualify for the diversity visa.

Before explaining this reform idea and how it would satisfy both political parties, some background on the diversity immigrant visa program is necessary.  This immigration category allocates 50,000 green cards annually to foreign nationals, distributed by lottery. These green cards go only to applicants from low-admission countries that sent fewer than 50,000 immigrants to the United States in the last five yearsLottery winners must have at least a high school education or demonstrate two years of work experience within the past five years in an occupation that requires at least two years of training or experience.  Applicants must also pass the required health, crime, and national security checks.  No more than 7 percent of all winners can come from any one country in a given year.

The first portion of this reform idea would make many Republicans happy by canceling the diversity visa program and shifting those 50,000 green cards to a new merit-based green card category that would allocate the visas via a points system.  The assignment of points under this immigration category is up to Congress, but copying the system outlined by Senators Tom Cotton (R-AR) and David Perdue (R-GA) in the RAISE Act would take a lot of ire out of their opposition.  However, Congress should make some changes to the RAISE Act’s points scheme to prevent absurd outcomes.  The diversity visa requirement that only 7 percent of the new green cards can go to applicants from any one country should also be removed to make it more meritorious.  The green cards under this new category would then be allocated to applicants who get the most points, assuming they are eligible and meet some minimum point threshold.        

The second portion of this reform idea would make many Democrats happy by continuing to allocate these green cards to applicants from low-admission countries as defined under the law currently governing the diversity visa.  By copying the diversity visa’s definition of low-admission countries, only foreign nationals from countries that sent fewer than 50,000 immigrants to the United States in the previous five years would be eligible for the new merit-based green card.  This would guarantee that, at least initially, new immigrants under this merit-based points scheme would come from broadly similar countries as those who qualify for the current diversity immigrant visa program. 

Depending on the actual points system created by Congress, the specific immigrants from these countries would likely be more educated and fluent in English, but their countries of origin would be similar to those under the diversity visa program. 

Canceling the diversity immigrant visa program, transferring its green cards into a new merit-based points category, and only allowing applicants from low-admission countries to apply for those visas should satisfy most Republicans and Democrats who want a middle-ground solution that would reopen the federal government.

What to Do with Diversity Green Cards in the DACA Deal

A surprising Politico story this morning laid out the contours of a rough deal to legalize the DACA recipients.  There are several welcome developments.  First, it would be a wider DREAM Act that goes beyond the DACA recipients.  In exchange, it would restrict the legalized DREAMers from sponsoring their parents (essentially duplicating current law), but it does allow the parents 3-year renewable legal status.  This is a fine compromise.  Second, it would not eliminate any of the family-sponsored green card categories, a wonderful development.  Third, it would use the 50,000 annual diversity green cards, also known as the visa lottery, to legalize Salvadorans here on Temporary Protected Status (TPS) who just had their status canceled (this status will expire in 18 months).  This third point is the most potentially troubling depending on what happens to those green card numbers after the 200,000 or so Salvadorans are legalized.

If the green cards from the diversity visa that are allocated to legalize those on TPS are canceled after the Salvadorans are legalized, then this would be a bad move.  Green cards are rare and valuable commodities that are beneficial to the United States and to the immigrants themselves.  The Salvadorans should be legalized, but not at the cost of reducing legal immigrants by substantially more.

Two Problems with the CBO’s Score of the DREAM Act and One Solution

The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) recently released a fiscal impact score for the DREAM Act.  It found that the DREAM Act would increase deficits by about $25.9 billion over the next decade.  There are at least two problems with this CBO score and a solution that should make fiscal conservatives and DREAM Act supporters happy.    

What is the Baseline?

The CBO’s black box fiscal estimates are frequently frustrating and this one is no exception.  The biggest difficulty is telling what their baseline is.  Their baseline could be that 700,000 DACA recipients continue to work legally, which is roughly the current situation but will continue to decline rapidly over the next few years as DACA disintegrates.  The baseline could also assume zero government costs incurred while identifying and deporting immigrants who would otherwise have been legalized, an unrealistic assumption given that this administration is building up an internal deportation apparatus. 

The American Action Forum (AAF) has estimated the federal government’s cost of deportation and indirect costs on GDP.  The AAF findings suggest that removing DACA recipients and DREAMers over the next decade will increase government expenditures by $70 billion to $103 billion and lower GDP growth by about $260 billion.  Both of those swamp and fiscal effects from the DREAM Act.  If the AAF estimates are the baseline, the DREAM Act would actually save hundreds of billions of dollars over the next decade.   

It is difficult to estimate what immigration enforcement will be like over the next decade but at least some of those large costs should be included as part of the baseline in any CBO fiscal cost analysis.  The choice of baseline matters in whether the DREAM Act will be scored as fiscally positive, negative, or neutral.

The CBO versus the National Academy of Sciences

The findings of the CBO report are inconsistent with the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) fiscal cost projection for first-generation immigrants.  The age and education of the immigrants are the two biggest factors that influence their net fiscal impact.  The greater the education and younger the age at arrivals (with some caveats), the more fiscally positive the immigration is.  In contrast, the less educated and older the age at arrival (same caveats), the less fiscally positive the immigrants is.  

Applying the age and education profiles of DACA recipients to NAS findings by age and education in table 8-21 reveals startlingly different results from that of the CBO (Figure 1).  Figure 1 shows the average net fiscal impact by DREAMers by year after legalization.  Just counting the 700,000 DACA recipients should produce a fiscally positive result over the next decade of about $1.6 billion using the NAS methods.  Expanding this to the roughly 2 million or so eligible DREAMers, assuming they have about the same education and age profiles, should produce about $4.6 billion in net positive tax revenues over the next decade.      

Figure 1: Average Fiscal Impact per DREAMers by Year

 

Sources: National Academy of Sciences, Migration Policy Institute, Pew Research, and Author’s Calculations.

This result comes from the age profile of DACA recipients and DREAMers, not from assuming that they will be highly educated.  For the CBO to find that legalization will turn a $1.6 to $4.6 billion dollar surplus into a $25.9 billion deficit requires an enormous increase in benefit usage or a tremendous drop in taxable income or both at exactly the age when benefit receipts drop and taxable income rises for immigrants (Figure 2). 

Figure 2: Taxes minus Benefits for Immigrants, by Age

 

Source: National Academy of Sciences.

Either the NAS is tremendously wrong in its widely praised fiscal cost analysis or the CBO made unrealistic projections and assumptions, perhaps having to do with a possible uptick in family-sponsored immigration after the DREAM Act.  Regardless, one cannot praise the NAS findings and believe the CBO’s.     

Hedging Our Fiscal Bets

Even if you assume that the CBO’s findings are closer to reality than those of the NAS’, there is an easy solution that Republicans should leap for: welfare reform.  As Cato scholars have written about in detail, it is easy, popular, and fiscally prudent to limit non-citizen access to means-tested welfare benefits.  As part of a DREAM Act, Congress could include stricter welfare rules denying all non-citizens access to means-tested welfare, tax credits, and health insurance subsidies.  Congress could then create a special green card for DACA recipients and DREAMers, call it the DLPR, which they cannot use to naturalize for 10 years.  In such a case, they work legally and pay taxes without access to benefits for a decade when they will then have a choice.  Permanently protecting a large population from deportation while also making this fiscal cost argument moot is a good deal and should be taken regardless of CBO findings.       

The Economic and Fiscal Impact of Repealing DACA

Executive Summary

Donald Trump has proposed eliminating or severely modifying the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program. Many Americans believe that the presence of unauthorized immigrants is harmful to the economy and would like to see steps taken to reduce their presence. However, a repeal or roll-back of DACA would harm the economy and cost the U.S. government a significant amount of lost tax revenue. We estimate that the fiscal cost of immediately deporting the approximately 750,000 people currently in the DACA program would be over $60 billion to the federal government along with a $280 billion reduction in economic growth over the next decade.

We arrived at our estimates by comparing and adjusting the characteristics of DACA recipients to similarly well-educated immigrants admitted through the H-1B visa program, a cohort that not only resembles the population of DACA recipients but whose own economic impact has been well-studied. We use the estimated budgetary and economic impact of H-1B visa workers and adjust it to reflect the age and earnings differences between the two groups to calculate our figures.

Background

President Obama created the DACA program in 2012 via executive action. DACA’s objective was to allow American residents who entered the country illegally as children to receive temporary protection from deportation, work permits, and an incentive to invest in their own human capital. The program only applies to those who have lived in the United States for five years or longer and do not have a criminal record. Essentially, these are people who never knowingly broke any law and have been productive and peaceful members of society since their arrival. The logic of the Obama Administration in creating DACA is that it makes little sense to expend time and resources trying to track down, arrest, and deport these people when they have not committed any crime save for being unwittingly brought across the border by others.

There is much legitimate debate in the United States over the role that immigration—both legal and illegal—plays in the economy, and what should be done about border security. Inseparable from this problem is the question of what to do with the undocumented immigrants already in the country, a sizeable population that is estimated to number 11 to 12 million.[1]

President-Elect Donald Trump has taken an absolutist position on the issue, vowing not only to build a wall with the intent of greatly reducing illegal entry from the Mexican border, but also to unilaterally nullify President Obama’s executive actions dealing with immigration, including the action which spawned DACA.

As with any sudden and dramatic shift in any policy, there are bound to be costs associated with implementation, as well as after-effects of the policy, not all of which are immediately intuitive. It is the goal of this paper to examine the costs that the wholesale repeal of DACA would impose on the American economy, both in terms of enforcement as well as the sudden loss of a large number of residents and their contributions to the domestic economy.

How DACA Will End: A Timeline of Expiration

Donald Trump has said he wants to cancel President Obama’s Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program and has implied he would do it on his first day in office. DACA allows young immigrants—known as Dreamers—who were brought to the U.S. illegally as children to live and work here temporarily

Trump recently softened his tone, saying he would try to “work something out” with Dreamers. But DACA probably won’t disappear overnight when Trump assumes office on January 20th in any case. Rather, it will slowly wind down as the immigrants’ temporary work permits expire. Here’s why and how that will happen.

How DACA operates

There are essentially three parts of DACA, which are detailed in a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) memorandum from Secretary Janet Napolitano. The first part is the deprioritization of removal of non-criminal unauthorized immigrants. Currently, the department relies on detailed priorities when deciding whether to remove a specific person. The DACA memo tells DHS agents to prevent Dreamers that they encounter “from being placed into removal proceedings or removed from the United States.”

The second part of DACA essentially formalizes that decision not remove them. DACA recipients apply for and are issued a Notice of Action I-797 form (below) stating that removal action against them has been “deferred” for two years. Their information is entered into a database, and if it is checked against immigration databases, they are shown as lawfully present in the United States during that time. More than 800,000 young immigrants have enrolled in DACA and received such a letter.

Figure 1: DACA Form I-797 Notice of Action

Source: Imgur

Finally, this receipt of deferred action authorizes the immigrants to request an employment authorization document (EAD) similar to the one below, which is also valid for two years. Under current law, any person in the United States—legally or illegally—can legally seek employment, but it is illegal for an employer to employ a noncitizen who is not authorized to work. Thus, an EAD is really about authorizing employers to make a hire, not about authorizing the DACA recipient to seek a job.*

Injunction against Obama’s Immigration Action: Policy and Political Consequences

U.S. District Court Judge Andrew Hanen granted a preliminary injunction to block the implementation of President Obama’s executive actions on immigration – specifically the DAPA program and his expansion of DACA - until he decides on their legality.  Constitutional scholars are going to be writing about this for the near future (I recommend reading Josh Blackman’s comments here and our Cato brief here) and the appeals will come quickly.  In the midst of this lively debate, the political and policy consequences of Judge Hanen’s ruling should not be ignored. 

The political consequences could be immediate.  Speaker Boehner could use this moment of GOP “victory” to pass a clean DHS funding bill as he hides behind the preliminary injunction.  It could tone down the intensity of the political debate on Capitol Hill now that the courts will decide DACA/DAPA’s future.  The GOP does not have the votes to force the Democrats to accept defunding either of those programs.  This preliminary injunction allows Speaker Boehner to stop the DACA/DAPA defund fight while claiming some victory and avoiding the defeat he seems to be preparing for.  Now he can leave it to the courts with some confidence, more than he is likely to be feeling right in the DHS defunding fight, that they will rule in the GOP’s favor in a few weeks.  Regardless, this provides an opportunity for Boehner to skip the bruising DHS funding fight without suffering a political rout.