Tag: Crime

Trump’s Executive Orders on Crime

Yesterday, President Trump’s pick for Attorney General, Jeff Sessions, was sworn into his office. Trump used the occasion to sign three executive orders relating to crime.  In this post, I want to briefly scrutinize these orders and explain what impact they may have on our criminal justice system.

One order calls for the creation of a task force on crime reduction.  The new Attorney General will appoint people to the task force and they will meet and discuss ideas and make recommendations for Trump. A second order is titled “Preventing Violence Against Federal, State, Tribal, and Local Law Enforcement Officers.” This order is also about exploring new ideas and strategies to “enhance the protection and safety” of law enforcement officers.  The third order concerns enforcing federal law against transnational criminal organizations that employ violence and derive revenue “through widespread illegal conduct.”  Working groups will be established to discuss ideas and make recommendations to Attorney General Sessions and President Trump.

Trump Executive Order Reestablishes “Secure Communities”

One of President Trump’s executive orders will reestablish Secure Communities (SCOMM), which was the most effective interior immigration enforcement program in decades. It was started during the Bush administration and rapidly expanded under Obama, eventually covering virtually all counties in the United States. It worked by checking the fingerprints of local and state arrestees against federal immigration and criminal databases. If Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) suspected the arrestee of being an illegal immigrant they would issue a detainer to hold the arrestee until ICE could pick them up. The Obama administration ended SCOMM in 2014 and replaced it with the similar Priority Enforcement Program.

SCOMM was certainly effective at apprehending and deporting illegal immigrants but it did not make communities more secure from actual criminals. SCOMM was not rolled out nationwide all at once, but rather incrementally (by county) over a four year period of time, in a way unrelated to local crime rates. Social scientists were able to exploit this quirk of SCOMM’s implementation to see if it had an effect on local crime rates, which it would if illegal immigrants were more or less likely to commit violent or property crimes. To make communities more secure, SCOMM would have to have lowered local crime rates.

In a paper published in the prestigious Journal of Law and Economics, Thomas J. Miles and Adam B. Cox found that SCOMM had no effect on local crime rates. Elina Treyger, Aaron Chalfin, and Charles Loeffler similarly found that SCOMM had no effect on local crime rates. Their findings suggest several things. One, SCOMM did not make communities more secure from crime. Two, illegal immigrants are less crime-prone than many people think and probably have about the same level of criminality as natives. Three, a community’s cooperation with the federal government in enforcing immigration law doesn’t seem to raise crime rates (some people suggest that such cooperation makes policing less effective).

Secure Communities is an immigration enforcement strategy that was very effective at identifying and removing illegal immigrants. Many states, like California, will not cooperate with the federal government in this reiteration of SCOMM, so it will likely be less effective than before. However, SCOMM supporters cannot claim that the program makes communities more secure by reducing the amount of violent or property crime.

New Research Finds that Immigrant Crime Is Still Low

Last year we published a blog summarizing the research on how immigrants affect the crime rate in the United States. There are two major types of studies that examine this question.

The first uses Census data of the institutionalized population to investigate immigrant versus native incarceration rates. Although the Census evidence isn’t perfect because of potential issues with reporting immigration status and different types of incarceration, these studies show that immigrants are less likely to be incarcerated than similarly-aged natives.  The second type is a macro-level or area study that looks at the crime rates in places that have experienced large waves of immigration.  These generally find that immigration either lowers or has little effect on crime rates.  The research on unauthorized immigrant crime rates is poor.

A few recent papers recently extended these findings.  The first by David Green seeks to determine whether immigrants affect violent and drug-related crime in the United States on the state-level.  It looks at state-level rates of violent crime and drug arrests pooled for the 2012-2014 years against pooled statistics on foreign-born and Mexican nationals by immigration status, specifically legal versus unauthorized immigrants.  Green finds no association between immigrant population size and increased violent crime.  However, he does find a small but statistically significant association between unauthorized immigrant population size and arrests for drug offenses.

Money Laundering Laws: Ineffective and Expensive

Beginning in the 1970s and 1980s, the federal government (as well as other governments around the world) began to adopt policies based on the idea that crime could be reduced if you somehow could make it very difficult for criminals to use the money they illegally obtain. So we now have a bunch of laws and regulations that require financial institutions to spy on their customers in hopes that this will inhibit money laundering.

But while the underlying theory may sound reasonable, such laws in practice have been a failure. There’s no evidence that these laws, which impose heavy costs on business and consumers, have produced a reduction in criminal activity.

Instead, the only tangible result seems to be more power for government and reduced access to financial services for poor people.

And now we have even more evidence that these laws don’t make sense. In a thorough study for the Heritage Foundation, David Burton and Norbert Michel put a price tag on the ridiculous laws, regulations, and mandates that are ostensibly designed to make it hard for crooks to launder cash, but in practice simply undermine legitimate commerce and make it hard for poor people to use banks.

Oh, and these rules also are inconsistent with a free society. Here are the principles they say should guide the discussion.

The United States Constitution’s Bill of Rights, particularly the Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments, together with structural federalism and separation of powers protections, is designed to…protect…individual rights. The current financial regulatory framework is inconsistent with these principles. …Financial privacy can allow people to protect their life savings when a government tries to confiscate its citizens’ wealth, whether for political, ethnic, religious, or “merely” economic reasons. Businesses need to protect their private financial information, intellectual property, and trade secrets from competitors in order to remain profitable. Financial privacy is of deep and abiding importance to freedom, and many governments have shown themselves willing to routinely abuse private financial information.

And here are the key findings about America’s current regulatory morass, which violates the above principles.

The current U.S. framework is overly complex and burdensome… Reform efforts also need to focus on costs versus benefits. The current framework, particularly the anti-money laundering (AML) rules, is clearly not cost-effective. As demonstrated below, the AML regime costs an estimated $4.8 billion to $8 billion annually. Yet, this AML system results in fewer than 700 convictions annually, a proportion of which are simply additional counts against persons charged with other predicate crimes. Thus, each conviction costs approximately $7 million, potentially much more.

By the way, the authors note that their calculations represent “a significant underestimate of the actual burden” because they didn’t include foregone economic activity, higher consumer prices for financial services, lower returns for shareholders of financial institutions, higher financial expenses for unbanked individuals, and other direct and indirect costs.

And what are the offsetting benefits? Can all these costs be justified?

On Baltimore’s Economic Plunge

After Monday’s acquittal of Lt. Brian Rice in the ongoing Freddie Gray saga, lead prosecutor Marilyn Mosby is batting a perfect 0-4. The three previous defendants were similarly acquitted, with two (and perhaps three) more officers to take the stand in the future. 

It appears that Marilyn Mosby’s prosecutions have been politically motivated and without foundation. The big problem, however, is that Freddie Gray has taken the focus off of Baltimore’s long and painful economic plunge – a plunge that can be laid squarely at the feet of Charm City’s long embrace of anti-market economic policies.

My colleague, Prof. Stephen J.K. Walters, and I wrote about this in the Investor’s Business Daily on April 22, 2016: “One Year After: Freddie Gray and ‘Structural Statism’.”

Here is some of what we wrote about how the path of structural statism has contributed to Baltimore’s poverty and associated problems.

“When Freddie Gray was born in 1989, Baltimore hosted 787,000 residents and 445,000 jobs. By the time his fatal injuries in police custody provoked riots last April, the city’s population had fallen by one fifth, to 623,000, and its job base had shrunk by one quarter, to 334,000.

Little wonder that throughout his life, Mr. Gray had never been legally employed. Nevertheless, friends and family considered him “a good provider,” according to The Baltimore Sun.

This was because he worked in the drug trade, which filled his city’s economic vacuum. An average day on the corner can yield take-home pay ten times that available in the low-skill warehousing or service jobs sometimes available to high-school dropouts like Gray.

The catch, of course, is that such rewards carry two great risks. The lesser of these is regular involvement with the justice system. Gray was arrested 18 times and served three years behind bars in his tragically brief life.

Far more dangerous is how competition works in illegal markets. When selling contraband, one does not pursue market share by advertising high quality or low prices. Sales are increased by acquiring territory from rivals, often violently.

For Baltimore’s drug cartels, the post-riot disequilibrium provided an opportunity for market expansion. Inevitably, each strategic assassination produced reprisals and collateral damage.

As a result, 2015 saw the highest homicide rate in Baltimore’s history, at 55 per 100,000 residents — over 13 times New York’s rate. This horrific suffering was concentrated in the African-American community: 93% of victims were black, of which 95% were male and 65% aged 18 to 34.

In Freddie Gray’s demographic, then, the homicide rate was 450 per 100,000 — higher than the peak U.S. combat death rates recorded in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The prevailing narrative is that all this is a by-product of structural racism and exemplifies a society “built on plunder” (according to the celebrated black radical Ta-Nehisi Coates). This is a myth.

It is not that racism doesn’t exist but rather that it is relatively constant. When explaining variations in economic and social outcomes, constants have little power.

It’s the application of destructive public policies that explain why neighborhoods like Gray’s Sandtown-Winchester are deprived. If one had to put a label on this malignant force, it might be structural statism: an addiction to market-unfriendly governmental approaches to every problem.”

Stay tuned: with several trials still to come, we’re bound to hear more about the Freddie Gray Sideshow, even as Baltimore’s plunge into poverty – and its causes – goes unnoticed.

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The Luckiest Crop in History

Recently, the New York Times ran an opinion piece by Gregg Easterbrook, which draws attention to the disconnect between the gloomy public on the one hand and the real state of America on the other hand. The prevailing mood in the United States is one of pessimism. For prominent politicians on both sides of the aisle, to use Easterbrook’s words, “the impending apocalypse has been issue number one.” Yet in almost every measurable way, this is the best time in history to be alive. The evidence goes on and on [links added]:   

Pollutiondiscriminationcrime and most diseases are in an extended decline; living standardslongevity and education levels continue to rise … A century ago, most Americans worked in agriculture: Today hardly any do, and we’re all better off, including farmers. That manual labor, farm or factory, has given way to 60 percent of Americans employed in white-collar circumstances … In 1990, 37 percent of humanity lived in what the World Bank defines as extreme poverty; today it’s 10 percent.  

Where did all this progress come from? Easterbrook rightly credits, “interconnected global economics.” Through an intricate symphony of competition and exchange, humanity has driven technology forward and achieved heights of prosperity that would be unimaginable to our ancestors.   

Unfortunately, Easterbrook also gives credit to top-down government planning where none is due. He cites the Affordable Care Act as an example of a successful reform, but rising life expectancy and improved health outcomes are long-term trends that both predate Obamacare and extend far beyond U.S. borders. It is far too soon to attribute any part of those trends to that highly problematic policy.   

Easterbrook even claims that, “In almost every case, reform has made America a better place, with fewer unintended consequences and lower transaction costs than expected. This is the strongest argument for the next round of reforms.” That is a sweeping overgeneralization, as it obviously hinges on the specific nature of reforms. Plenty of reforms throughout American history are now universally recognized as horrible mistakes – just look at alcohol prohibition.   

Despite some confusion about the drivers of progress, Easterbrook’s opinion piece is a refreshing reminder of the incredible progress humanity has made and well worth a read. It ends with this heartening quote that the data backs up:   

Recently Warren Buffett said that because of the “negative drumbeat” of politics, “many Americans now believe their children will not live as well as they themselves do. That view is dead wrong: The babies being born in America today are the luckiest crop in history.” 

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Arizona’s SB1070 and Crime

Arizona state representative Sonny Borrelli (R) remarked that crime rates in his state dropped 78 percent since the passage of that state’s infamous SB1070 in 2010. His remark was thoroughly debunked. Below are a few charts to put Arizona’s crime rates in context. 

It is very difficult to show causality between a law and its effect on crime in later years. Crime rates have trended downward in the United States for over 20 years now. It is difficult to credit any decline after 2010 to a specific Arizona immigration law.  Also, Arizona’s crime rate cannot be considered in isolation. Comparing it to neighboring states and the country as a whole which did not pass an SB1070-type bill is necessary to even get a slight hint of how that law on crime.  Furthermore, there is a vast empirical literature on the effect of immigration on crime. At worst, immigration has almost no effect on crime. At best, immigration decreases crime rates.   

All of the figures are presented as a rate of crime per 100,000. The violent crime rate in Arizona was declining before SB 1070 and continued to decline afterward (Figure 1). From 2009 to 2014, the Arizona violent crime rate declined by 6.3 percent while it dropped 13 percent nationally. There was a decline of 16.3 percent in California, 9.9 percent  in Nevada, and 5.5 percent in New Mexico. 

Figure 1

Violent Crime Rate

 

Source: FBI.

Like the violent crime rate, the property crime rate in Arizona was also declining before SB 1070 and continued to decline afterward (Figure 2). From 2009 to 2014, the Arizona property crime rate decline by 10.9 percent while it dropped 14.6 percent nationally. It declined in every other state: 10.6 percent in California, 14.3 percent in Nevada, and 4.6 percent in New Mexico.

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