From 1983 to 1999, the CBO issued two-year forecasts that added up to a 2.7% growth rate, which would now be widely dismissed as a “rosy” forecast. Yet actual growth averaged 3.7% from 1983 to 1999 – a full percentage point higher – despite a recession in 1991. Today, the CBO forecasts that even 2.7% economic growth is impossible, and claims only 1.9% is within reach.
The Administration thinks the economy can grow a percentage point faster. The 2019 Budget estimates the economy will grow by 2.9% a year for ten years. The Committee for a Responsible Budget (CFRB) argues that this “strains credulity, especially if interest rates and inflation also remain under control, as the budget predicts they will.” [This appears to suggest higher inflation would be good for growth.]
“Given population aging and other economic fundamentals,” says the CFRB, “the United States is likely to ultimately achieve growth of 2 percent per year or perhaps less – not 3 percent. The Federal Reserve projects long-term sustained growth of 1.8 percent per year [1.7–2.2%], and the Blue Chip average for sustained growth is only slightly higher at 2.1 percent. Prior to the tax deal, CBO projected a long-run growth rate of 1.9 percent.”
Is the OMB unrealistic to estimate the economy can grow by 2.9% a year or is the CBO unrealistic to assume it can’t grow faster than 1.9%?
The real contest here is between current OMB projections after the tax deal, and CBO projections “prior to the tax deal.” Fed and Blue Chip forecasts are unofficial and unpersuasive.
The Federal Reserve does not make official long-term projections. The quarterly FOMC Summary of Economic Projections (SEP) defines “longer-run projections” as rates of growth to which “a policymaker expects the economy to converge over time – maybe in five or six years.” Last December 13, the 19 survey participants thought that after five or six years real GDP would settle down to 1.7% to 2.2%, but that is not a ten-year average since growth in the previous five or six years might be rapid.
Blue Chip Indicators collect monthly forecasts from over 50 business economists (I used to be one of them). It constructs a “consensus” by averaging a possibly wide array of different estimates. All such frequently-revised forecasts are most reliable as lagging indicators – becoming pessimistic after economic news turns bad and optimistic after things pick up. The models and techniques used to make monthly or quarterly forecasts have no predictive power at all beyond two quarters, if that.
What about the CBO? Their projection of 1.9% growth is a full percentage point below that of the Trump administration. Could the CBO possibly be that far off? Sure. They’ve done it before.
From 1983 to 2000, the CBO’s two-year forecasts of real GDP growth were exactly one percentage point too low, on average. A two-year forecast for 1983–84 was made in 1983 and combined estimated growth rates for both years, so the fact that 2-year growth rates kept being underestimated repeatedly in all but two years (1990 and 1991) from 1983 to 2000 was a triumph of theory over experience.
The graph, from “The CBO’s Economic Forecasting Record,” shows the CBO systematically underestimated growth of real GDP after the Reagan tax rate reductions were phased in during 1983–84 and 1988–90 (TRA86), and again after the capital gains tax was slashed from 28% to 20% in 1997. Conversely, the CBO overestimated GDP growth after Bush 41 raised tax rates in 1990, after Obama raised tax rates in 2013, and during the high-tax bracket creep years of 1976–82. The CBO appears to suffer from a pro-tax estimating bias – assuming higher tax rates do no harm, and lower tax rates do no good.
The CBO argues that its “five-year forecasts of output and inflation are more accurate than its two-year forecasts of those variables, in part because long-term forecasts rest more on underlying trends in the economy than on short-term cyclical movements, which are very difficult to predict.” Unfortunately, CBO five-year forecasts also underestimated real GDP growth in all but one 5-year period between 1981-1985 and 1999-2003. The exception was 1987-91, when the CBO estimate proved slightly optimistic (0.28%) thanks to recession on the heels of the ill-fated Bush 41 “tax increase.” A single mild recession (aggravated by higher taxes) can’t explain why the CBO consistently underestimated the 4.4% rate of real GDP growth for seven years from 1983 to 1989, or the same 4.4% pace for four years from 1996 to 2000.
A recent paper, “How CBO Produces Its 10-Year Economic Forecast” explains that “CBO projects potential TFP on the basis of historical trends in TFP growth. However, projecting trends in TFP is particularly challenging because it is, by definition, a measure of unexplained growth in output.” On the contrary, extrapolating “historical trends” is just lazy, not “challenging.”
The so-called “economic fundamentals” the CFRB mentioned essentially consist of projecting recent trends into the future. That means assuming output per hour (productivity) keeps growing at the anemic 1.3% pace of 2006 to 2015, and that hours worked grow at half that rate because labor force participation is assumed (“projected”) to remain extremely depressed and most part-timers are assumed to reject longer hours.
If you add 1.3% projected growth of productivity to 0.6% projected growth of the labor force, you end up with a 1.9% limit on potential economic growth (slower than 2010–2017 when the economy grew at a 2.2%). But productivity and labor force participation depend on incentives, not past trends. And incentives to invest and work just changed dramatically.
We know that the CBO is perfectly capable of underestimating economic growth by a full percentage point over a 10-year period since it already managed to do that over a 17-year period. If history is any guide, the CBO’s 1.9% long-term forecast is once again much too low, as it has been whenever the highest tax rates on income and/or capital gains were reduced.
I recently questioned two connected remarks by Wall Street Journal reporter Richard Rubin that (1) “Each percentage-point reduction in the 35% corporate tax rate cuts federal revenue by about $100 billion over a decade” and that (2) “independent analyses show economic growth can’t cover all the costs of rate cuts.”
That first remark--about each percentage-point reduction in the rate losing $100 billion over a decade--is an interpretation of pages 178-79 from a Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report on “Options for Reducing the Deficit.”
But the CBO was just talking about raising the corporate rate by one point, not cutting it 10-20 points. That can't be converted into a rule of thumb because each percentage point reduction in the top corporate tax rate can’t lose the exact same amount of dollars. A percentage point reduction in a 35% rate loses more static revenue than a percentage point reduction in a 30% rate, which loses more than a percentage point reduction in a 25% rate, and so on.
Yet even for a single percentage point, I called the $100 billion 10-year projection a “bad estimate” because it assumes zero change in the economy and zero change in tax avoidance (“elasticity”).
The Table compares the CBO/JCT static estimates of what might happen with a percentage-point increase in the corporate tax rate to their baseline “projections” of what corporate revenues might look like under current tax law, assuming 1.9% GDP growth. The line below the baseline adds static estimates (“from the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation” or JCT) of the revenue gain from raising four graduated corporate tax rates from 15-35% to 16-36%.
The average tax rate is below the top marginal rate because of reduced 15-25% rates on small profits, credits for foreign taxes, deferral of taxes on unrepatriated foreign profits, and deductions for interest and business expenses. Goldman Sachs estimates the average tax as 28% under current law and 24% (not 20%) under the Ryan-Brady tax.
If the average tax is 28% then a 1 percentage point increase in all four marginal rates might be expected to raise static revenue by about 2.8%. Sure enough, JCT claims a 1 percentage point increase in corporate rates would eventually raise revenues by roughly 2.8%, suggesting those estimates entirely static. That is, they assume zero impact on GDP and zero elasticity of taxable income.
Despite publishing these static revenue estimates, the CBO analysis does a good job of explaining why they are seriously flawed. Bad bookkeeping is no substitute for good economics.
What follows is the CBO analysis of the economics of a higher corporate tax rate, with emphasis added in bold:
Increasing corporate income tax rates would make it even more advantageous for firms to organize in a manner that allows them to be treated as an S corporation or partnership. . .. Raising corporate tax rates would also encourage companies to increase their reliance on debt financing because interest payments. . . can be deducted. . .. Moreover, the option [of raising the tax rate] would discourage businesses from investing, hindering the growth of the economy.
Higher rates in the United States influence businesses’ choices about how and where to invest; to the extent that firms respond by shifting investment to countries with low taxes as a way to reduce their tax liability at home, economic efficiency declines. . .. The current U.S. system also creates incentives to shift reported income to low-tax countries without changing actual investment decisions. Such profit shifting erodes the corporate tax base and requires tax planning that wastes resources. Increasing the top corporate rate to 36 percent (40 percent when combined with state and local corporate taxes) would further accentuate those incentives to shift investment and reported income abroad.
How could all of those changes possibly fail to affect the amount of revenue collected?
Hindering growth of the economy by discouraging business investment reduces revenue. Shifting reported income into other countries and into pass-through entities erodes the tax base and reduces revenue. Increasing debt and other deductible expenses (fancier offices and lunches) reduces revenue. Yet the static revenue estimates in the Table obviously take none of this into account--ignoring both macroeconomic effects of higher tax rates on investment and GDP growth and microeconomic “elasticity” effects on tax avoidance.
Since the CBO explains how and why a higher corporate tax rate has numerous adverse effects on revenues, it follows that a lower corporate tax rate has numerous beneficial effects on revenues. In fact, the CBO analysis explains quite well why CBO/JCT estimates of the effects of a lower corporate tax rate on revenues are worthless.
Richard Rubin wrote that “independent analyses show economic growth can’t cover all the costs of rate cuts.” But the estimates in the Table, which he cites, pretend economic growth can’t cover a single dollar of those badly estimated costs. Besides, as the CBO explains, the effect of tax rates on revenues involves much more than just economic growth.
Tax Foundation economist Alan Sloan figures that “for a corporate income tax cut to 15 percent to be self-financing [over 10 years], it would have to raise the level of growth to 2.8 percent on average,” or 0.9% faster than the 1.9% the CBO projects. A 2.8% growth rate doesn’t seem ambitious compared to the 1947-2006 average of 3.6%. Yet the Tax Foundation “model predicts something more like 0.4 percent over the budget window: a sustained period of 2.3 percent growth instead of 1.9 percent growth.”
This is an example of what Mr. Rubin meant by independent analysts predicting that “economic growth can’t cover all the costs.” Yet faster economic growth would cover nearly half the cost, in Sloan’s estimation. CBO/JCT static revenue estimates, by contrast, always assume no effect at all. Whether tax rates are doubled or cut in half, JCT revenue estimates will pretend GDP growth remains unchanged.
Tax Foundation estimates of the revenue feedback from faster GDP growth are a huge improvement over static JCT estimates, yet they too remain incomplete. They do not account for microeconomic “elasticity of taxable income” of the sort the CBO wrote about--such as shifting income and/or investment abroad, setting up pass-through entities, and maximizing deductions for interest and office expenses.
My previous blog noted that Treasury Department economists find the elasticity of corporate taxable income is 0.5 for smaller corporations, so when the tax rate goes down reported taxable income goes up. A paper for the Center for European Economic Research finds a higher 0.8 elasticity for multinationals: “Hence, reported profits decrease by about 0.8% if the international tax differential [e.g., between U.S. and foreign rates] increases by 1 percentage point.”
Lowering the super-high U.S. corporate tax rate will not reduce revenues from corporate and other taxes by nearly as much as crude rules of thumb may suggest, if revenues decline at all. And the reason is not entirely the result of greater investment, entrepreneurship, and economic growth, but also a reduction in myriad wasteful ways of avoiding this country’s uniquely dispiriting business tax.
I sometimes feel like a broken record about entitlement programs. How many times, after all, can I point out that America is on a path to become a decrepit European-style welfare state because of a combination of demographic changes and poorly designed entitlement programs?
But I can't help myself. I feel like I'm watching a surreal version of Titanic where the captain and crew know in advance that the ship will hit the iceberg,
yet they're still allowing passengers to board and still planning the same route. And in this dystopian version of the movie, the tickets actually warn the passengers that tragedy will strike, but most of them don't bother to read the fine print because they are distracted by the promise of fancy buffets and free drinks.
We now have the book version of this grim movie. It's called The 2017 Long-Term Budget Outlook and it was just released today by the Congressional Budget Office.
If you're a fiscal policy wonk, it's an exciting publication. If you're a normal human being, it's a turgid collection of depressing data.
But maybe, just maybe, the data is so depressing that both the electorate and politicians will wake up and realize something needs to change.
I've selected six charts and images from the new CBO report, all of which highlight America's grim fiscal future.
The first chart simply shows where we are right now and where we will be in 30 years if policy is left on autopilot. The most important takeaway is that the burden of government spending is going to increase significantly.
And it's also worth noting that revenues are going up, even without any additional tax increases.
The bottom part of this chart shows that revenues from the income tax will climb by about 2 percent of GDP. In other words, more than 100 percent of our long-run fiscal mess is due to higher levels of government spending. So it's absurd to think the solution should involve higher taxes.
This next image digs into the details. We can see that the spending burden is rising because of Social Security and the health entitlements. By the way, the top middle column on "other noninterest spending" shows one thing that is real, which is that defense spending has fallen as a share of GDP since the mid-1960s, and one thing that may not be real, which is that politicians somehow will limit domestic discretionary spending over the next three decades.
This bottom left part of the image also gives the details on built-in growth in revenues from the income tax, further underscoring that we don't have a problem of inadequate revenue.
Last but not least, here's a graphic that shows the amount of fiscal policy changes that would be needed to either reduce or stabilize government debt.
I think that's the wrong goal, and that instead the focus should be on reducing or stabilizing the burden of government spending,
but I'm sharing this chart because it shows that spending would have to be lowered by 3.1 percent of GDP to put the nation on a good fiscal path.
Some folks think that might be impossible, but I'll simply point out that the five-year de facto spending freeze that we achieved from 2009-2014 actually reduced the burden of government spending by a greater amount. In other words, the payoff from genuine spending restraint is enormous.
The bottom line is very simple.
We need to invoke my Golden Rule so that government grows slower than the private sector. In the long run, that will require genuine entitlement reform.
Or we can let America become Greece.
It's not a big day for normal people, but today is exciting for fiscal policy wonks because the Congressional Budget Office has released its new 10-year forecast of how much revenue Uncle Sam will collect based on
current law and how much the burden of government spending will expand if policy is left on auto-pilot.
Most observers will probably focus on the fact that budget deficits are projected to grow rapidly in future years, reaching $1 trillion in 2024.
That's not welcome news, though I think it's far more important to focus on the disease of too much spending rather than the symptom of red ink.
But let's temporarily set that issue aside because the really big news from the CBO report is that we have new evidence that it's actually very simple to balance the budget without tax increases.
According to CBO's new forecast, federal tax revenue is projected to grow by an average of 4.3 percent each year, which means receipts will jump from 3.28 trillion this year to $4.99 trillion in 2026.
And since federal spending this year is estimated to be $3.87 trillion, we can make some simple calculation about the amount of fiscal discipline needed to balance the budget.
A spending freeze would balance the budget by 2020. But for those who want to let government grow at 2 percent annually (equal to CBO's projection for inflation), the budget is balanced by 2024.
So here's the choice in front of the American people. Either allow spending to grow on autopilot, which would mean a return to trillion dollar-plus deficits within eight years. Or limit spending so it grows at the rate of inflation, which would balance the budget in eight years.
Seems like an obvious choice.
By the way, when I crunched the CBO numbers back in 2010, they showed that it would take 10 years to balance the budget if federal spending grew 2 percent per year.
So why, today, can we balance the budget faster if spending grows 2 percent annually?
For the simple reason that all those fights earlier this decade about debt limits, government shutdowns, spending caps, and sequestration actually produced a meaningful victory for advocates of spending restraint. The net result of those budget battles was a five-year nominal spending freeze.
In other words, Congress actually out-performed my hopes and expectations (probably the only time in my life I will write that sentence).*
Here's a video I narrated on this topic of spending restraint and fiscal balance back in 2010.
Everything I said back then is still true, other than simply adjusting the numbers to reflect a new forecast.
The bottom line is that modest spending restraint is all that's needed to balance the budget.
That being said, I can't resist pointing out that eliminating the deficit should not be our primary goal. It's not good to have red ink, to be sure, but the more important goal should be to reduce the burden of federal spending.
That's why I keep promoting my Golden Rule. If government grows slower than the private sector, that means the burden of spending (measured as a share of GDP) will decline over time.
And it's why I'm a monomaniacal advocate of spending caps rather than a conventional balanced budget amendment. If you directly address the underlying disease of excessive government,
you'll automatically eliminate the symptom of government borrowing.
Which is why I very much enjoy sharing this chart whenever I'm debating one of my statist friends. It shows all the nations that have enjoyed great success with multi-year periods of spending restraint.
During these periods of fiscal responsibility, the burden of government falls as a share of economic output and deficits also decline as a share of GDP.
I then ask my leftist pals to show a similar table of countries that have gotten good results by raising taxes.
As you can imagine, that's when there's an uncomfortable silence in the room, perhaps because the European evidence very clearly shows that higher taxes lead to bigger government and more red ink (I also get a response of silence when I issue my challenge for statists to identify a single success story of big government).
*Congress has reverted to (bad) form, voting last year to weaken spending caps.
The Congressional Budget Office has just released the 2016 version of its Long-Term Budget Outlook.
It's filled with all sorts of interesting data
if you're a budget wonk (and a bit of sloppy analysis if you're an economist).
If you're a normal person and don't want to wade through 118 pages, you'll be happy to know I've taken on that task.
And I've grabbed the six most important images from the report.
First, and most important, we have a very important admission from CBO that the long-run issue of ever-rising red ink is completely the result of spending growing too fast. I've helpfully underlined that portion of Figure 1-2.
And if you want to know the underlying details, here's Figure 1-4 from the report.
Once again, I've highlighted the most important portions. On the left side of Figure 1-4, you'll see that the health entitlements are the main problem, growing so fast that they outpace even the rapid growth of income taxation. And on the right side, you'll see confirmation that our fiscal challenge is the growing burden of federal spending, exacerbated by a rising tax burden.
And if you want more detail on health spending, Figure 3-3 confirms what every sensible person suspected, which is that Obamacare did not flatten the cost curve of health spending.
Medicare, Medicaid, Obamacare, and other government health entitlements are projected to consume ever-larger chunks of economic output.
Now let's turn to the revenue side of the budget.
Figure 5-1 is important because it shows that the tax burden will automatically climb, even without any of the class-warfare tax hikes advocated by Hillary Clinton.
And what this also means is that more than 100 percent of our long-run fiscal challenge is caused by excessive government spending (and the Obama White House also has confessed this is true).
Let's close with two additional charts.
We'll start with Figure 8-1, which shows that things are getting worse rather than better. This year's forecast shows a big jump in long-run red ink.
There are several reasons for this deterioration, including sub-par economic performance, failure to comply with spending caps, and adoption of new fiscal burdens.
The bottom line is that we're becoming more like Greece at a faster pace.
Last but not least, here's a chart that underscores why our healthcare system is such a mess.
Figure 3-1 shows that consumers directly finance only 11 percent of their health care, which is rather compelling evidence that we have a massive government-created third-party payer problem in that sector of our economy.
Yes, this is primarily a healthcare issue, especially if you look at the economic consequences, but it's also a fiscal issue since nearly half of all health spending is by the government.
P.S. If these charts aren't sufficiently depressing, just imagine what they will look like in four years.
The Congressional Budget Office has just released its new 10-year fiscal forecast and the numbers are getting worse.
Most people are focusing on the fact that the deficit is rising rather than falling and that annual government borrowing will again climb above $1 trillion by 2022.
This isn't good news, of course, but it's a mistake to focus on the symptom of red ink rather than the underlying disease of excessive spending.
So here's the really bad news in the report.
- The burden of government spending has jumped from 20.3 percent of GDP in 2014 to 21.2 percent this year.
- By the end of the 10-year forecast, the federal government will consume 23.1 percent of the economy's output.
In other words, the progress that was achieved between 2010 and 2014 is evaporating and America is on the path to becoming a Greek-style welfare state.
There are two obvious reasons for this dismal trend.
- Notwithstanding laughable claims from the White House, Obamacare is contributing to rising spending on healthcare entitlements.
- Republicans keep capitulating on the BCA spending caps, enabling more wasteful outlays for so-called discretionary programs.
Here's a chart that shows what's been happening. It shows the rolling average of annual changes in revenue and spending. With responsible fiscal policy, the red line (spending) will be close to 0% and have no upward trend.
Unfortunately, federal outlays have been moving in the wrong direction since 2014 and government spending is now growing twice as fast as inflation.
By the way, don't forget that we're at the very start of the looming tsunami of retiring baby boomers, so this should be the time when spending restraint is relatively easy.
Yet if you'll allow me to mix metaphors, bipartisan profligacy is digging a deeper hole as we get closer to an entitlement cliff.
Now let's shift to the good news. It's actually relatively simple to solve the problem.
Here's a chart that shows projected revenues (blue line) and various measures of how quickly the budget can be balanced with a modest bit of spending restraint.
Regular readers know I don't fixate on fiscal balance. I'm far more concerned with reducing the burden of government spending relative to the private sector.
That being said, when you impose some restraint on the spending side of the fiscal ledger, you automatically solve the symptom of deficits.
With a spending freeze, the budget is balanced in 2020. If spending is allowed to climb 1 percent annually, the deficit disappears in 2022. And if outlays climb 2 percent annually (about the rate of inflation), the budget is balanced in 2024. And if you want to give the politicians a 10-year window, you get to balance by 2026 if spending is "only" allowed to grow 2.5 percent per year.
In other words, the solution is a spending cap.
Here's my video on spending restraint and fiscal balance from 2010. The numbers obviously have changed, but the message is still the same because good policy never goes out of style.
Needless to say, a simple solution isn't the same as an easy solution. The various interest groups in Washington will team up with bureaucrats, politicians, and lobbyists to resist spending restraint.
I never watched That '70s Show, but according to Wikipedia, the comedy program "addressed social issues of the 1970s."
Assuming that's true, they need a sequel that addresses economic issues of the 1970s. And the star of the program could be the Congressional Budget Office, a Capitol Hill bureaucracy that apparently still believes - notwithstanding all the evidence of recent decades -
in the primitive Keynesian view that a larger burden of government spending is somehow good for economic growth and job creation.
I've previously written about CBO's fairy-tale views on fiscal policy, but wondered whether a new GOP-appointed director would make a difference. And I thought there were signs of progress in CBO's recent analysis of the economic impact of Obamacare.
But the bureaucracy just released its estimates of what would happen if the spending caps in the Budget Control Act (BCA) were eviscerated to enable more federal spending. And CBO's analysis was such a throwback to the 1970s that it should have been released by a guy in a leisure suit driving a Ford Pinto blaring disco music.
Here's what the bureaucrats said would happen to spending if the BCA spending caps for 2016 and 2017 were eliminated.
According to CBO’s estimates, such an increase would raise total outlays above what is projected under current law by $53 billion in fiscal year 2016, $76 billion in fiscal year 2017, $30 billion in fiscal year 2018, and a cumulative $19 billion in later years.
And here's CBO's estimate of the economic impact of more Washington spending.
Over the course of calendar year 2016,...the spending changes would make real (inflation-adjusted) gross domestic product (GDP) 0.4 percent larger than projected under current law. They would also increase full-time-equivalent employment by 0.5 million. ...the increase in federal spending would lead to more aggregate demand than under current law. ...Over the course of calendar year 2017...CBO estimates that the spending changes would make real GDP 0.2 percent larger than projected under current law. They would also increase full-time-equivalent employment by 0.3 million.
If Keynesian spending is so powerful and effective in theory, then why does it never work in reality? It didn’t work for Hoover and Roosevelt in the 1930s. It didn’t work for Nixon, Ford, and Carter in the 1970s.
It didn’t work for Japan in the 1990s. And it hasn’t worked this century for either Bush or Obama. Or Russia and China.
And if Keynesianism is right, then why did the economy do better after the sequester when the Obama Administration said that automatic spending cuts would dampen growth?
To be fair, maybe CBO wasn't actually embracing Keynesian primitivism. Perhaps the bureaucrats were simply making the point that there might be an adjustment period in the economy as labor and capital get reallocated to more productive uses.
I'm open to this type of analysis, as I wrote back in 2012.
...there are cases where the economy does hit a short-run speed bump when the public sector is pruned. Simply stated, there will be transitional costs when the burden of public spending is reduced. Only in economics textbooks is it possible to seamlessly and immediately reallocate resources.
But CBO doesn't base its estimates on short-run readjustment costs. The references to "aggregate demand" show the bureaucracy's work is based on unalloyed Keynesianism.
But only in the short run.
CBO's anti-empirical faith in the magical powers of Keynesianism in the short run is matched by a knee-jerk belief that government borrowing is the main threat to the economy's long-run performance.
...the resulting increases in federal deficits would, in the longer term, make the nation’s output and income lower than they would be otherwise.
Sigh. Red ink isn't a good thing, but CBO is very misguided about the importance of deficits compared to other variables.
After all, if deficits really drive the economy, that implies we could maximize growth with 100 percent tax rates (or, if the Joint Committee on Taxation has learned from its mistakes, by setting tax rates at the revenue-maximizing level).
This obviously isn't true. What really matters for long-run prosperity is limiting the size and scope of government.
Once the growth-maximizing size of government is determined, then lawmakers should seek to finance that public sector with a tax system that minimizes penalties on work, saving, investment, risk-taking, and entrepreneurship.
Remarkably, even international bureaucracies such as the World Bank and European Central Bank seem to understand that big government stifles prosperity. But I won't hold my breath waiting for the 1970s-oriented CBO to catch up with 21st-century research.
P.S. Here's some humor about Keynesian economics.
P.P.S. If you want to be informed and entertained, here’s the famous video showing the Keynes vs. Hayek rap contest, followed by the equally clever sequel, which features a boxing match between Keynes and Hayek. And even though it’s not the right time of year, here’s the satirical commercial for Keynesian Christmas carols.