Tag: community rating

Poll: The ACA’s Pre-existing Condition Regulations Lose Support When the Public Learns the Cost

Days before the 2018 midterms, 68% of voters say that health care is very or extremely important to how they plan to vote in this year’s elections, according to a new Cato 2018 Health Care Survey of 2,498 Americans. These numbers are driven primarily by Democratic voters with 86% who say this issue is especially important to them—in fact, 56% say the issue is “extremely important” to them. Independent (33%) and Republican voters (21%) are far less likely to say this is an “extremely” crucial issue for their vote this Tuesday.

 FIND FULL POLL RESULTS HERE

These results are consistent with analysis of 2018 campaign ads, which finds Democrats have made healthcare the centerpiece of their case to voters. About half of Democratic ads have featured health care issues compared to less than a third of Republican ads. At the core of the debate is what to do with pre-existing condition regulations embedded in the Affordable Care Act (ACA) that prevent health insurers from denying coverage or charging higher premiums to people with pre-existing conditions. Much of the public debate centered on pre-existing condition protections assume that these regulations enjoy widespread public support. However, these protections lose public support when voters learn about their costs, finds the Cato 2018 Health Care Survey.

The survey first replicated the results from myriad other surveys finding a majority (65%) of Americans favor regulations that prohibit insurance companies from refusing to cover, or charging higher premiums to, people with pre-existing conditions, while 32% oppose. However, support plummets when Americans are faced with likely consequences of these regulations. 

Support drops 20 points to 44% in favor and 51% opposed if pre-existing condition protections limited people’s access to medical tests and treatments. Similarly, 44% would favor and 50% would oppose if these regulations harmed the delivery of high-quality health care. Support drops 18 points to 47% in favor and 48% opposed if these regulations limited people’s access to top-rated medical facilities and treatment centers. Some may dismiss these potential costs as improbable; however, research finds these are likely consequences from the incentives these regulations create for the health care industry. It is for this reason that we investigate how the public evaluates these costs.

Compared to quality reductions, Americans are more prepared to pay higher taxes or premiums in exchange for keeping regulations that prevent insurers from denying coverage or charger higher premiums to people with pre-existing conditions. About half (51%) would favor and 44% oppose if these regulations raised taxes and 49% would favor and 47% would oppose if they drove up premiums. 

These results follow a familiar pattern identified in the Cato 2017 Health Care Survey that asked about each of these pre-existing condition protections separately. However, in this year’s survey we improve the desirability of these regulations by offering them as a bundle. Even still, when faced with the realistic costs of these mandates, public support plummets. 

Taking a look among partisans, we find that without any mention of costs, 83% of Democrats, 55% of independents, and 52% of Republicans initially support pre-existing condition protections. However, independents and Republicans turn against these regulations if they increase the cost of health insurance (66%, 55%), reduce access to medical tests and treatments (59%, 58%), harm the quality of health care people receive (57%, 55%), reduce access to top-rated medical facilities and treatment centers (57%, 55%), or increase taxes (57%, 57%). Democrats are less swayed by these trade-offs; however, they are least willing to sacrifice the quality of health care in exchange for keeping the pre-existing condition regulations (42%). Instead, majorities of Democrats are willing to have less access to medical tests (57%), or top-rated medical facilities (61%), or pay higher premiums (67%) or taxes (72%). Some differences in how partisans answer these questions may depend, perhaps, on how believable these costs seem to respondents rather than how acceptable they are. For instance, since Democrats are most enthusiastic about these regulations, they may be less likely to believe that they could harm the quality of care.

Higher-income Americans are more willing than low-income Americans to make trade-offs, such as shouldering higher premiums or having less access to top-rated medical facilities, to keep the pre-existing condition regulations. For instance, 61% of Americans earning more than $80,000 a year say they’d pay higher premiums to keep these regulations. In contrast, about a third (38%) of Americans earning less than $40,000 a year agree; instead, 56% oppose paying higher premiums for this reason. Nearly 6 in 10 (57%) of people earning more than $80,000 a year say they’d accept having less access to top-rated medical facilities compared to 35% of Americans earning less than $20,000 a year.

Short Term Plans

The survey also asked Americans about new federal rules that allow consumers to purchase alternative health insurance plans that don’t comply with ACA-mandates. The survey finds that majorities support new federal rules that allow consumers to purchase alternative plans, like short-term plans, even when confronted with likely trade-offs.

First, the survey presented respondents with only the anticipated benefits of the new federal rules. Doing so finds that 77% of Americans support new federal rules that allow consumers to purchase health insurance plans that cost 50% less and offer greater choices of hospitals and doctors than current plans and would cover 2 million more uninsured people. 

Support drops to 64% in favor and 31% opposed if these rules meant that some people would purchase insurance policies that cover fewer services than current plans. For instance, these new plans would not be required to cover services like mental health and prescription drugs. 

One reason why such plans have lower premiums is they do not have to comply with ACA pre-existing condition regulations and thus may exclude people, or offer limited services to people, with expensive medical conditions. These lower premiums could draw people who use fewer medical services out of the ACA-compliant plans and thus increase premiums for those who remain in those plans and are not eligible for subsidies. Nevertheless, the survey finds that 59% would continue to favor while 35% would oppose these new rules if they caused premiums to rise for some people who purchase insurance plans in the individual market.

These rule changes are popular among partisans with 77% of Democrats and 86% of Republicans in support. Majorities of Democrats and Republicans continue to favor allowing people to purchase non-ACA compliant plans even if doing so means people would not have as many services covered (58% and 71%) or if doing so increased premiums for unsubsidized people in the individual market (63% and 65%).

The Path Forward

The survey also asked Americans how they felt policymakers should approach health care reform going forward. A majority (55%) of Americans believe that the “better way” to sustainably provide high-quality affordable health care is through expanding free-market competition among insurance companies, doctors, and hospitals. Thirty-nine percent (39%) think that more government regulation of insurance companies, doctors, and hospitals is more likely to provide affordable coverage. These numbers are virtually unchanged from last year’s health care survey.

Independents (54%) and Republicans (79%) agree that more free-market competition rather than more government management of health care is more likely to lead to affordable coverage. However, a majority (60%) of Democrats think more government management is the key. Despite these partisan differences, majorities or slim majorities of whites (58%), African Americans (53%) and Hispanics (51%) believe more free market competition can better provide affordable health care than more government control.

Implications

These results do not support the widespread misperception among the political punditry that pre-existing condition regulations are necessarily and universally supported by voters across the political spectrum. Voters like benefits but not costs. And some costs are more acceptable to voters than others. Democratic accountability demands that we understand if voters are willing to bear the necessary trade-offs and costs in exchange for establishing a new policy, regulatory protection, or social program. But first, pollsters have to ask.

 
 
The Cato Institute 2018 Health Care Survey was designed and conducted by the Cato Institute in collaboration with YouGov. YouGov collected responses online October 26-30, 2018 from a representative national sample of 2,498 Americans 18 years of age and older. The margin of error for the survey is +/- 2.66 percentage points at the 95% level of confidence.

 

The Emerging Graham-Cassidy 2.0 Proposal

Conservative groups including the Heritage Foundation are circulating a proposal that builds on legislation by Sens. Lindsay Graham (R-SC) and Bill Cassidy (R-LA) to overhaul ObamaCare. Even though I don’t know whether Graham and Cassidy have endorsed these updates, I will go ahead and call this proposal Graham-Cassidy 2.0. The proposal seems ill-advised, particularly since there is an alternative that is not only far superior in terms of policy, but also an easier political lift that would deliver more political benefit.

The key to evaluating any proposal to overhaul ObamaCare is to understand the law’s centerpiece is its pre-existing conditions provisions. Those provisions are actually a bundle of regulations, including a requirement that insurers offer coverage to all comers, restrictions on underwriting on the basis of age, an outright prohibition on underwriting on the basis of health, and a requirement that insurers treat different market segments as being part of a single risk pool. ObamaCare’s preexisting-conditions provisions have the unintended and harmful effect of penalizing high-quality coverage and rewarding low-quality coverage. ObamaCare contains other harmful regulations, but its preexisting-conditions provisions are by far the worst. Unless a proposal would repeal or completely free consumers from ObamaCare’s preexisting-conditions provisions, it is simply nibbling around the edges.

From what I have seen, Graham-Cassidy 2.0 nibbles around the edges.

To its credit, Graham-Cassidy 2.0 would zero-out funding for and repeal the entitlements to both ObamaCare’s premium-assistance tax credits (read: Exchange subsidies) and benefits under the Medicaid expansion. Unfortunately, it would not repeal that spending. Instead, it would take that money and send it to states in the form of block grants. The aggregate spending level for those block grants would grow more slowly over time than Exchange subsidies and federal Medicaid-expansion grants would under current law.

Limiting the growth of those spending streams seems like a better idea than letting them grow without limit, as current law allows. However, there is more downside than upside here.

First, Graham-Cassidy 2.0 would transform a purely federal spending stream into a intergovernmental transfer. At present, Exchange subsidies are payments the federal government makes to private insurance companies. Under Graham-Cassidy 2.0 (and 1.0), the feds would send those funds to states, which would use them to subsidize health insurance in various ways. Roping in a second layer of government diffuses responsibility and reduces accountability, regardless of whether the feds send those funds to states in the form of a block grant. Voters who don’t like how those funds are being spent would have difficulty knowing which level of government to blame, and whichever level of government is actually responsible could avoid accountability by blaming the other. Intergovernmental transfers are so inherently corrupting, there should be a constitutional amendment prohibiting them. And yet Graham-Cassidy 2.0 would substitute an intergovernmental transfer for spending with clearer lines of accountability.

Second, Graham-Cassidy 2.0 also diffuses accountability for ObamaCare’s preexisting-conditions provisions. Those provisions would continue to operate (with slight modifications). As a result, they would continue to destabilize the individual market, punish high-quality coverage, and reward low-quality coverage. The purpose of the Exchange subsidies is to mitigate that instability. Today, it is clear that Congress is responsible for any harm those provisions inflict, and the success or failure of the Exchange subsidies to mitigate those harms. Graham-Cassidy 2.0 would give that money to states and task them with mitigating those harms. When states fail to do so, as at least some states inevitably will, whom should voters blame? Congress, which started the fire? Or states, to whom Congress handed the fire extinguisher?

Third, while Graham-Cassidy 2.0 would eliminate two federal entitlements, eliminating entitlements is desirable only to the extent it limits government control over economic resources—in this case, spending. And while Graham-Cassidy 2.0 proposes to hold the growth of this repurposed ObamaCare spending below what it would be under current law, there is reason to doubt such a spending limitation would hold.

When examining the merits of any policy proposal, one must also consider the political dynamics the proposal would unleash. Generally speaking, states are a more politically powerful and sympathetic constituency than the current recipients of Exchange subsidies (private insurance companies). States have been able to use that political clout to get Congress to disregard the spending limits it imposed on SCHIP, for example, when so-called emergencies led states to blow through their initial allotments. Moreover, since Graham-Cassidy 2.0 would preserve ObamaCare’s preexisting-conditions provisions, it would come with its own built-in emergencies. As sure as the sun rises in the East, states will come to Congress and claim their block-grant allocations were insufficient to mitigate the resulting harms. Congress would be unlikely to say no—members rely on state officials for political support, after all—which means the spending restraints in Graham-Cassidy 2.0 are less than guaranteed.

Fourth, also pushing the direction of bigger government, Graham-Cassidy 2.0 would expand the constituency for ObamaCare spending. At present, the money the federal government spends on ObamaCare’s Medicaid expansion does not enjoy the support of the 19 states that have not implemented the expansion. The block grants in Graham-Cassidy 2.0, by contrast, would go to all states. As a result, non-expansion states like Texas would go from not caring about whether that federal spending continues to insisting that it does. At the same time, Graham-Cassidy 2.0 would expand the constituency of voters who want to preserve that spending. At present, able-bodied, childless adults in non-expansion states receive no benefit from ObamaCare’s Medicaid expansion or its Exchange subsidies. Graham-Cassidy 2.0 would allow (and in some cases require) states to provide subsidies to such adults below the poverty level, thereby creating another constituency that will reliably vote to expand those subsidies.

Fifth, a provision of Graham-Cassidy 2.0 that supporters consider a selling point would expand the constituency for more spending yet again. The proposal would require all states to allow all able-bodied, non-elderly Medicaid enrollees to use their Medicaid subsidy to purchase private insurance. Since greater choice would make Medicaid enrollment more valuable, and since roughly one third of people who are eligible for Medicaid are not enrolled, this would perversely lead to a large “woodwork effect,” where people who were previously eligible for Medicaid but not enrolled begin to enroll in the program. When Medicaid enrollment increases, so will Medicaid spending, and so will the population of voters who are willing to vote for higher Medicaid spending and the higher taxes required to finance it.

Since Graham-Cassidy 2.0 would preserve ObamaCare’s preexisting-conditions provisions, it is hard to see what would justify taking these one or two uncertain steps forward and multiple steps backward.

This is particularly true since there is a much better alternative on the table: strongly encouraging the Trump administration to allow insurers to offer short-term health insurance plans with renewal guarantees that protect enrollees from having their premiums increase because they got sick. Doing so would allow consumers to avoid all of ObamaCare’s unwanted regulatory costs, particularly those imposed by its preexisting-conditions provisions. The Trump administration can create this “freedom option” by administrative rulemaking—comments on the administrations proposed rule are due April 23—which is a much easier political lift than garnering 217 votes in the House and 51 votes in the Senate. Expanding short-term plans would also create salutary political dynamics that would force Democrats begin negotiating a permanent overhaul of ObamaCare.

As of today, Graham-Cassidy 2.0 just can’t compete with that cost-benefit ratio. Every ounce of energy spent on it, rather than on expanding short-term plans, is a waste.

ObamaCare’s Greatest Political Vulnerability

In two new posts at the Health Affairs blog, I lift the fog of economic jargon to show ObamaCare’s preexisting-conditions provisions are reducing quality, are wildly unpopular with voters, and are indeed the law’s greatest political vulnerability:

Public opinion surveys show voters support ObamaCare’s preexisting conditions provisions by a two-to-one margin. If those provisions have the effect of reducing quality, however, that initial support flips to two-to-one opposition. The biggest shift is among Democrats, who swing from 82 percent in favor to 55 percent opposed. Voters turn against those provisions whether the erosion in quality comes in the form of less access to medical tests and treatments, longer waits for care, more surprise medical bills, or less access to top-rated treatment centers…

In “Is ObamaCare Harming Quality? (Part 1),” I explain that new research shows that ObamaCare is not working how it is supposed to work in theory: the law’s preexisting conditions provisions create perverse incentives for insurers to reduce the quality of coverage; those provisions are reducing the quality of coverage relative to employer plans; and the erosion in quality is likely to accelerate in the future.

In “How To Ensure Quality Health Coverage (Part 2),” I explain why regulators cannot fix this problem, and why providing sick patients secure access to quality health care requires allowing consumers to purchase health plans not subject to ObamaCare’s preexisting conditions provisions.

Part 2 also explains how expanding the definition of “short-term” health insurance to include policies that include guaranteed-renewability riders, a change the Trump administration can make on its own via regulation, would free consumers from ObamaCare and pressure Democrats to come to the negotiating table.

The Trump Administration Isn’t Sabotaging ObamaCare—That Was Democrats

To the relief of many Democrats and the consternation of many Republicans, Congress will not be repealing ObamaCare this month. But that doesn’t mean Democrats are riding high or that ObamaCare is doing well. Premiums are still rising rapidly (Miami Herald: ”Obamacare Premiums in Florida to Rise 45 Percent on Average Next Year”), insurers are still leaving the Exchanges (Healthcare Marketplace: “Nearly Half of the Country Left with One Carrier Option in 2018”), and ObamaCare coverage is still becoming a worse and worse deal for the sick (Wall Street Journal/yours truly: “How ObamaCare Punishes the Sick”). 

Now that repeal is no longer an immediate threat, the conversation has naturally turned to who’s to blame for ObamaCare’s failings. Democrats claim everything was going swimmingly until the Trump administration came along and began sabotaging the law. The funny thing about that line of attack is that’s if it were true, then Democrats’ real complaint would be that voters are sabotaging ObamaCare.

But it’s not true—and reporters should stop repeating this partisan line of attack as if it were. Here are five crucial points:

  • The Trump administration is not causing the instability we are seeing in the Exchanges—ObamaCare is. Specifically, ObamaCare’s community rating price controls have both unleashed adverse selection (sick people enroll, healthy people don’t) and are making coverage worse for the sick (as insurers use plan design to deter the sickest from choosing their plans). There are only two ways to deal with that instability: eliminate community rating, or subsidize the heck out of insurers (either explicitly, or implicitly by encouraging healthy people to enroll).
  • The Trump administration is not stoking the instability ObamaCare is creating in the Exchanges. Democrats claim that by not ending the uncertainty surrounding cost-sharing subsidies to insurers, and by not investing in enrollment activities as much as the Obama administration did, it is in fact the Trump administration that is creating or exacerbating that instability. That is false. As noted above, it is ObamaCare’s community-rating price controls that are creating this instability, not the Trump administration’s actions. The administration is not even adding to the instability. To do so, it would have to make ObamaCare’s community-rating price controls even more binding, which would exacerbate adverse selection. The worst you can say about those actions is that the Trump administration is failing to mitigate the instability ObamaCare creates, which brings us to our next point. 
  • The Trump administration does not have a duty to reduce the instability ObamaCare creates, or to reduce the uncertainty ObamaCare creates, or to make ObamaCare “work.” The Trump administration’s only duty is to execute the law faithfully. So long as it does, it has the prerogative to pursue its political goals however it wants. I’m not aware of anyone accusing the Trump administration of not following the law in its handling of ObamaCare. 
  • Reporters who say the Trump administration is causing or stoking instability in the Exchanges are simply regurgitating partisan talking points. Embedded in that claim is the normative, disputed, and ultimately false premise that the Trump administration somehow has an obligation not just to follow the law, but to make ObamaCare “work.” That is a pretty radical notion, because it implies ObamaCare opponents don’t have a right to use lawful means to press their views through the political process. 

Is The ACA Helping to Fuel the Opioid Overdose Rate?

Leaders at all levels of government and civil society are alarmed at the continued rise, year after year, in the death rate from opioid overdose. The latest numbers for 2015 report a record 33,000 deaths, the majority of which are now from heroin. Health insurers are not a disinterested party in this matter.

Cigna, America’s fifth largest insurer, recently announced it has made good progress towards its goal of reducing opioid use by its patients by 25% by mid-2019. To that end, Cigna is limiting the quantities of opioids dispensed to patients and requiring authorizations for most long acting opioid prescriptions. Cigna is encouraging its participating providers to curtail their use of opioid prescriptions for pain patients and is providing them with data from monitoring the opioid use patterns of their patients with an aim towards reducing abuse.

In a Washington Post report on this announcement Cigna CEO David Cordani said, “We determined that despite no profit rationale—in fact it’s contrary to that—that societally we needed to step into the void and we stepped in pretty aggressively.”

No profit rationale?

Paying for fewer opioids saves the insurer money in the short run. And opioids have become costlier as “tamper-resistant” reformulations, encouraged by the FDA, have led to new patents allowing manufacturers to demand higher prices.

There is growing evidence that, as doctors curtail their opioid prescriptions for genuine pain patients, many in desperation seek relief in the illegal market, exposing them to adulterated opioids as well as heroin. For the same reason, recent studies on the effect of state-based Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs (PDMPs) suggest they have not led to reductions in opioid overdose rates and may actually be contributing to the increase. It is reasonable to be skeptical that Cigna’s internal prescription drug monitoring program will work any differently.

Further research suggests the community rating regulations of the Affordable Care Act may be contributing to the problem. The ACA requires insurance companies to sell their policies to people who have very expensive health conditions for the same premiums they charge healthy people. At the same time, the ACA’s “risk-adjustment” programs systematically underpay insurers for many of their sickest enrollees. The overall effect is that the ACA penalizes insurers whose networks and drug formularies are desirable to those who are sick. Insurers respond to this disincentive by designing their health plans to have with provider networks, drug formularies, and prescription co-payment schedules that are unattractive to such patients, hoping they will seek their coverage elsewhere. This “race to the bottom” between the health plans results in decreased access and suboptimal health care for many of the sickest patients.

Topics:

Are ObamaCare’s Community-Rating Regulations a System of Price Controls?

ObamaCare’s community-rating regulations generally bar insurance companies from using any factor other than age to determine premiums, and prevent insurers from charging 64-year-olds more than three times what they charge 18-year-olds. I have long maintained community rating is nothing more than a system of government price controls, and should meet with the usual scorn economists universally heap on such boneheaded policies.

An esteemed colleague challenges my claim that ObamaCare’s community-rating is a system of price controls, because “the government doesn’t set a price.” Here is how I responded:

Price controls don’t always take the form of a fixed integer. Sometimes government sets prices using ratios.

Premium caps control prices by limiting this year’s premium to a ratio of last year’s premium. Medicaid’s prescription-drug price controls set prices as a ratio of the average wholesale price. Medicare’s price controls involve all sorts of complex ratios.

ObamaCare’s community-rating regulations control prices by (a) setting the ratio of premiums for healthy vs. sick people within each age category to 1:1, and (b) setting the ratio of premiums for young vs. old to 1:3. Insurers would not voluntarily follow those ratios, with good reason. But community rating forces insurers to set prices according to those ratios. Thus it is a price-control scheme.

Survey: What Turns Democrats against the Affordable Care Act’s Core Regulations?

The 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, also known as Obamacare, may perhaps be the most contentious and polarizing law we’ve seen enacted in the past several decades. For seven years, Democrats have remained convinced they like it and Republicans confident that they don’t.

But once we get past the partisanship and polarization, what do Democrats and Republicans think about the fundamental regulations that constitute the core of Obamacare? These core regulations include pre-existing conditions rules that require insurance companies cover anyone who applies (guaranteed issue) and charge people the same rates regardless of pre-existing conditions (community rating).

All government policies and their ostensible benefits come with a price. What are Americans willing to pay?

As I’ve previously written, the Cato Institute 2017 Health Care Survey found that while Americans initially support core Obamacare regulations of community rating and guaranteed issue, support plummets if such regulations harm access to high quality medical services, require higher premiums or higher taxes. That being said, Americans appear to care more about their access to high quality medical services than they care about higher taxes, higher premiums, or universal coverage for those with pre-existing conditions.

Democrats are unique, however. They are the only group who says they’d be willing to pay more if it guaranteed coverage to those with pre-existing conditions. Six in 10 Democrats say they’d be willing to personally pay higher taxes and 58% say they’d pay higher premiums so that insurance companies wouldn’t charge people higher rates based on pre-existing conditions (community rating). Similar shares say they’d pay higher taxes (60%) and premiums (51%) so that insurance companies would cover anyone who applies (guaranteed issue).