Tag: Center for Immigration Studies

45,000 “Special Interest Aliens” Caught Since 2007, But No U.S. Terrorist Attacks from Illegal Border Crossers

President Trump claimed last week that “people are pouring into our country, including terrorists.” This came after his unsubstantiated claim that Middle Easterners are traveling in the caravan. Center for Immigration Studies (CIS) fellow Todd Bensman has repeatedly defended these types of claims by equating immigrants from “countries of interest” with “terrorists.” This conflation is common and rarely challenged as Homeland Security officials and members of Congress frequently describe immigrants from these countries as a terrorist threat. Despite Border Patrol apprehending tens of thousands of foreign nationals from these countries of interest and many thousands more who have undoubtedly entered illegally, not a single person has been killed by a terrorist who entered as an illegal border crosser from any of the countries of interest.

Special Interest Alien Apprehensions

The terminology used to describe these immigrants varies considerably between sources. In 2011, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Inspector General defined the term “specially designated countries” to mean countries “that have shown a tendency to promote, produce, or protect terrorist organizations or their members.” Border Patrol Chief David Aguilar described “Special interest countries” as “basically countries designated by our intelligence community as countries that could export individuals that could bring harm to our country in the way of terrorism.”

These definitions could apply to nearly every country in the world, as just about every major country has “produced” or “exported” at least one terrorist. With several exceptions, the lists have consisted primarily of countries with large Muslim populations. The designated countries have changed repeatedly over the years:

In 2003, DHS released a list of 52 countries. In 2004, the list included 35 countries, two of which were new. In 2007, the list was referenced in a news article, and though the full list was not quoted, it included another country (Tanzania) that was not on either of the prior two lists. In 2018, DHS released yet another list of countries where CBP “had Enforcement Actions against aliens from the following ‘Special Interest Aliens’ countries for FY18.” This partial list included yet five more countries that were not on the prior lists. Altogether, these lists have contained 63 countries. Only 14 have shown up on all the lists.

From 2007 to 2017, Border Patrol apprehended 45,006 immigrants from any of the countries ever designated as a “country of interest” (See Table 1). During the same period, it apprehended 4,109 from countries that made it onto all three lists. Given the inconsistency in these lists and for sake of completeness, Figure 1 shows the annual number of special interest aliens apprehended by Border Patrol separated by the different lists and those apprehended from countries that appeared at least once on a single list.  Fiscal Year 2007 is the earliest year that Border Patrol has made the number of apprehensions by citizenship publicly available.

Figure 1: Special Interest Alien Border Patrol Apprehensions

Center for Immigration Studies Overstates Immigrant, Non-Citizen, and Native Welfare Use

The Center for Immigration Studies (CIS) just released a new report that purports to show that 63 percent of non-citizen households are on welfare compared to 35 percent of native-born households in 2014.  The purpose of this report was to justify the president’s new public charge rule.  For years, CIS and I have debated this topic and this blog is yet another installment.  Please follow these links to read the previous installments.

There are a few issues with the CIS report and an unsound methodological choice that they made that results in inflating the welfare use rates for immigrants and natives.  I’m just going to make two points below.

First, the welfare use rate reported by CIS is much higher than the welfare use rates estimated by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) even though they both relied on the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP).  DHS did look at 2013 and CIS looked at 2014, but one year shouldn’t make much of a difference as no new big welfare laws were passed then.  The biggest difference between the DHS and CIS analysis is that CIS used households as a unit of analysis and DHS used individuals (more on this below).  Table 1 shows the differences.  CIS reports much higher welfare use for natives, the foreign-born, and non-citizens for every program.  Table 2 shows just how much higher CIS’ estimates are for every welfare program relative to DHS’ estimates.  Relative to DHS’ estimates, CIS estimates that native-born welfare use rates are an average of 95 percent higher, foreign-born use rates are an average of 173 percent higher, and non-citizen use rates are an average of 208 percent higher. 

 

Table 1

Estimated Welfare Use Rates by the Organization that Conducted the Analysis

 

Department of Homeland Security (2013)

Center for Immigration Studies (2014)

Benefit Program

Natives

Foreign Born

Non-Citizens

Natives

Foreign Born

Non-Citizens

Cash or non-cash

20.9

20.9

22.6

30.4

49.5

57.7

Cash benefits

3.4

3.7

1.8

7.7

9.6

6.3

SSI

2.4

3.2

1.3

6.3

8.2

4.5

TANF

0.8

0.3

0.4

1.3

1.1

1.4

GA

0.3

0.2

0.2

NA

NA

NA

Non-cash benefits

20.4

20.4

22.3

NA

NA

NA

Medicaid

16.1

15.1

15.5

23.3

41.9

49.9

SNAP

11.6

8.7

9.1

15.2

18.4

23

Housing Vouchers

1.6

1.7

1.4

4.7

5.1

3.9

Rent subsidy

3.9

4.8

4.3

NA

NA

NA

Sources: Center for Immigration Studies, Table 1; Department of Homeland Security, Table 11.

 

Table 2

Percentage Difference Between CIS and DHS Welfare Use Rate Estimates

Benefit Program

Natives

Foreign Born

Non-Citizens

Cash or non-cash

45%

137%

155%

Cash benefits

126%

159%

250%

SSI

163%

156%

246%

TANF

63%

267%

250%

GA

NA

NA

NA

Non-cash benefits

NA

NA

NA

Medicaid

45%

177%

222%

SNAP

31%

111%

153%

Housing Vouchers

194%

200%

179%

Rent subsidy

NA

NA

NA

 Sources: Center for Immigration Studies, Table 1; Department of Homeland Security, Table 11; author’s calculations.

 

Second, CIS chose to use a head of household unit of analysis rather than an individual unit of analysis.  This means that they designated some households as headed by non-citizens and others as headed by natives based on SIPP responses.  Thus, CIS’ analysis counts many native-born American children, American citizen spouses in immigrant households, and doesn’t control for the size of the households.  CIS does show welfare household use rates without non-citizens in them, but the entire household unit of analysis is a flawed way to look at welfare use rates.  The DHS sided with Cato on this long-standing issue as it measured individual welfare use rates and didn’t bother with an antiquated head of household measure.  The only close approximations to a household or family-level analysis that DHS conducted were in Tables 16 and 17 of its report, but it only compared citizens to non-citizens.  Tables 16 and 17 unsurprisingly find that people with more children have higher welfare use rates.

DHS isn’t the only organization to agree that the individual is the proper unit of analysis.  According to the massive report on the economic and fiscal consequences of immigration published National Academy of Sciences (NAS), the individual is the proper unit of analysis for fiscal cost analysis.  Since welfare use rates are a subset of fiscal cost analyses, it makes sense to use the individual rather than the household.  The NAS authors wrote:

 

households are not stable over time and because the costs and benefits originating in mixed households often need to be divided between native-born and foreign-born members—as opposed to having to ascribe them exclusively to one group or the other—the individual unit of analysis is more flexible and empirically feasible for dynamic analyses (338).

 

Even in static analyses, the NAS argues that the problem of how “to define an immigrant household (339)” breaks in favor of an individual unit of analysis to at least maintain consistency between the dynamic and static methods.  This is a big change from the NAS’ previous study in 1997 that argued for households as the unit of analysis.

The DHS and NAS both agree with Cato scholars that the individual is the proper unit of analysis in a welfare cost analysis by nativity.  CIS is on the other side of that issue.  I am not making an appeal to authority, but CIS should have to make a better case for why it persists in using the household level of analysis.

CIS’ analysis is not compelling.  A competing analysis of the same data by DHS, using the individual unit of analysis that Cato scholars have recommended, found that all immigrants have a welfare use rate identical to natives and that non-citizens only have a slightly higher usage rate. 

Cato scholars are very concerned with immigrant welfare use, which is why we’ve authored a study on how to eliminate non-citizen welfare use that is now in the form of legislation introduced by Representative Grothman (R-WI).  His bill would do more to save taxpayer dollars and reduce welfare use among immigrants than any refined public charge rule.  Although CIS and I do not agree on many of the facts regarding immigrant welfare use, we should be able to agree that approaches like those of Representative Grothman are better than a revised public charge rule. 

 

Center for Immigration Studies Shows a Very Small Threat from Terrorists Crossing the Mexican Border

Todd Bensman, the Senior National Security Fellow at the Center for Immigration Studies (CIS), wrote a recent report entitled “Have Terrorists Crossed Our Border?” in which he presents a list of  “15 suspected terrorists have been apprehended at the U.S.-Mexico border, or en route, since 2001.”  Bensman lists these 15 individuals, some of which don’t have names, and describes their actions.  He writes that his research is based on publicly available information, so it is likely a “significant under-count” of the actual terrorists who entered.  Bensman also writes that “several reports that strongly indicated the crossing of additional migrant terrorism suspects were excluded from this list due to insufficient detail.” 

If the goal of this CIS report was to show how small the terrorist threat along the Mexican border is, then it succeeded marvelously.  None of the terrorists identified committed an attack on U.S. soil, were convicted of planning an attack on U.S. soil, or even charged with doing so.  They killed or injured zero people on U.S. soil in terrorist attacks.  The only actual terrorism conviction for this group is of conspiracy to materially aid a foreign terrorist organization.  However, one person who entered the United States on his way to Canada did commit an attack in Alberta where he injured five people. 

Six of the 15 people that Bensman identifies are unnamed, thus we cannot independently verify or check whether they belong on this list (Table 1).  Interestingly, much of the evidence for those six unnamed individuals comes from passing comments in news stories or a Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS) report whose evidence is “deemed credible,” but that “could not be independently corroborated.”  Who deemed that evidence to be credible?  If people can’t independently corroborate the evidence, how can we know that it is credible?  We should take such claims with a large grain of salt, especially after frequent government terrorism exaggerations

Table 1 organizes the names that Bensman provides.  None committed or attempted to commit an attack on U.S. soil.  Two of the individuals were charged with terrorism offenses.  Mahmoud Kourani was charged and convicted of conspiracy to materially support a foreign terrorist organization (MSFT), Hezbollah, and sentenced to 54 months.  His actions are certainly troubling and should be illegal, but there is no evidence that he was a threat to American lives or property.  The Muhammad Kourani case is more nuanced and odd. He was a member of Hezbollah who became an informant for the United States.  After giving the FBI information on Hezbollah, the government used that information to charge Kourani with MSFT and conspiracy to do so.  There’s no evidence that he had any intention to every commit an attack on U.S. soil.  His trial will occur in 2019, so it’s premature to count him as a terrorist although he seems to have deep “ties” with Hezbollah.

Table 1
Terrorists, Suspected Terrorists, and Those with Suspected Terrorism Ties

Name Committed an Attack on US Soil Attempted or Planned an Attack on US Soil Terrorism Charges in the United States Terrorism Convictions in the United States Notes
Abdulahi Sharif No No No No Sharif committed an attack in Canada, injuring 5.
Ibrahim Qoordheen No No No No  
Unidentified Afghan national No No No No  
Muhammad Azeem No No No No  
Mukhtar Ahmad No No No No  
Unnamed Somali national No No No No  
Unnamed Sri Lankan national No No No No  
Unnamed Somali national No No No No  
Unnamed Bangladeshi National No No No No  
Abdullahi Omar Fidse No No No No 18 USC 1505 is not a terrorism statute, but there is an extra penalty if it involves a terrorism investigation. 
Mohammad Ahmad Dhakane No No No No  
Farida Goolam Ahmed No No No No  
Muhammad Kourani No No MSFT and MSFT Conspiracy No A court case is scheduled for 2019.
Al-Manar Television employee No No No No  
Mahmoud Kourani No No MSFT Conspiracy Yes  

 

Source: “Have Terrorists Crossed Our Border?” by Todd Bensman. 

Another interesting example is Ibrahim Qoordheen (sometimes spelled Qoordheer), who was arrested in Costa Rica while supposedly on his way to the U.S. border.  There is almost no publicly available research on him after his arrest in March 2017.  Gustavo Mata, the Costa Rican Minister of Public Security, said they would extradite Qoordheen to the United States if the U.S. government provided any evidence of his terrorism ties beyond a hit in a government database.  There is no government press release announcing his extradition to the United States and no other evidence online of what happened to Qoordheen, but he certainly wasn’t charged or convicted with any terrorism offenses in the United States. 

The only example of a real terrorist who crossed the border with Mexico during this time was Abdulahi Sharif.  He injured five people in an attack in Canada in 2017 and is currently awaiting trial there.  The evidence is sketchy, but Sharif apparently tried to enter the United States through a port of entry in 2011 and was detained – as he should have been.  There’s no indication that he made an asylum claim.  Regardless, the U.S. government let him go because it could not deport him to Somalia and lost track of him as he applied for refugee or asylum status in Canada in early 2012.  Five years later, Sharif tried to murder five people in Alberta, Canada.  Six years passed from Sharif’s attempted entry to the United States in 2011 to his attack in Canada in 2017.  His weapons were a knife and a car.  It’s hard to believe that he was planning to commit an attack before going to Canada, but a perfect system that could predict the future would have stopped him.  It bears repeating that Sharif did not commit an attack on U.S. soil and did not plan to commit an attack here.

Furthermore, Bensman’s rhetoric is unreasonably alarming relative to the scale of the terrorist threat along the Mexican border.  The title of Bensman’s report is “Have Terrorists Crossed Our Border?”  Surely, that means he must be talking about only terrorists, right?  Nope.  The subtitle walks back the title: “An initial count of suspected terrorists encountered en route and at the U.S. Southwest Border Since 2001 [emphasis added].”  So, his report only covers suspected terrorists?  Nope.  Elsewhere in the document, Bensman writes that his report:

[P]rovides an initial accounting of publicly documented instances, between 2001 and November 2018, of some 15 migrants with credibly suspected or confirmed terrorism ties who were encountered at the southern border after smuggling through Latin America, or who were encountered while presumably en route [emphasis added].

Those with “credibly suspected or confirmed terrorism ties,” are quite a bit different from suspected terrorists and even more distantly related to real terrorists.  Lots of people have “ties” to terrorists that are not significant in any way.  For instance, those related to terrorists have “terrorism ties,” but that does not mean that the family members of terrorists are themselves, terrorists.  In other words, he’s counting just about everyone apprehended who has “terrorism ties” according to “credible” evidence that “could not be independently corroborated” in many cases.  To see how ludicrous this standard is, which is common in much of the terrorism literature, substitute in another crime such as robbery for “terrorism” and see how unremarkable these statements are.   

This is a common rhetorical trick in terrorism publications.  For instance, a government list of “627 terrorism-related” prosecutions revealed that 45 percent of them were only convicted of non-terrorism offenses.  The three Abuali brothers are my favorites.  They are included in the government’s list of “terrorism-related” convictions even though their crime was stealing boxes of breakfast cereal, Kellogg’s specifically.  Stealing boxes of Raisin Bran is a crime, but depriving people of their breakfast doesn’t count as terrorism and neither are the cases that Bensman provides below. 

A count of real terrorists who have crossed the Mexican border since 2001 and wanted to harm Americans would be very short: it would contain zero names.  Three people entered the U.S. illegally through the Mexican border in 1984 and grew up to be terrorists who were convicted of planning an incompetent plot in 2008.  When Americans think of terrorists, they think of people attacking Americans on U.S. soil.  Sending information to Hezbollah is a terrorist offense and it should be illegal, but it is not as dangerous or severe as setting off a bomb or shooting people in pursuit of Jihad.  The only possible exception to this is Abdulahi Sharif who entered the United States on his way to Canada where he then committed an attack five years later. 

Bensman claims that he left out many names because of “insufficient detail,” but one can only imagine how thin the evidence against them is based on how little of it exists to condemn men with names as terrifying as “Al-Manar Television employee” and “Unnamed Bangladeshi national.”  Except for Abdulahi Sharif, who tried to enter through a port of entry and then went to Canada several years before committing his attack where he injured five people, there is little evidence of a terrorist threat from the Mexican border.  If this is the best evidence available of a terrorist threat across the Mexican border, then we should all feel a lot more secure.  

The Border Wall Cannot Pay for Itself

Recent budget talks between the White House and Congress shows that President Trump puts a high value on funding the construction of a border wall. Crucial to this debate is how much a border wall will cost to construct and maintain. Center for Immigration Studies (CIS) published a brief report purporting to show that building a wall along the southern border would pay for itself if it keeps out only 160,000 to 200,000 border crossers over the next decade. That means the border wall would only have to deter about 9 to 12 percent of all illegal border crossers who would have successfully made it into the United States during that period. The report uses a variety of assumptions that unrealistically lower the cost of the wall as well as inflate the fiscal cost of border crossers.

We used more recent and precise data to update CIS’s analysis without altering its methodology. Simply using newer numbers—with no changes to the report’s unrealistic underlying assumptions—proves that the border wall cannot pay for itself. Despite fanciful promises to the contrary, a border wall is too expensive and will deter too few illegal immigrants to pay for itself—even under assumptions that are extremely generous to those who support a wall.

Updating CIS’ Analysis

The first update was to factor in a more recent estimate of the cost of a border wall. The CIS study chose to rely on a statement made by Senator Majority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-KY) rather than any actual cost estimate. We used an official estimate from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued after the majority leader’s comment. This placed the cost of building a 1,250-mile border wall at $21.6 billion, or $17,280,000 per mile, that includes all costs such as the condemnation of private property through eminent domain. We also include the yearly maintenance costs. 

The second is that we adjust CIS’ fiscal cost estimate by controlling for the age of the border crossers. The National Academy of Sciences (NAS) fiscal cost estimates show that the immigrant age of arrival is vital for estimating their fiscal impact. CIS used the 2010 education level of Mexican illegal immigrants as a proxy for the education level of all future border crossers. We used the March CPS to adjust for this by assuming that the education of future illegal immigrants will be more similar to those arriving in 2015 than 2010. We further divided up the illegal border crossers by age and education to get a more accurate view of their potential fiscal impact. 

The Public Is Increasingly Pro-Immigration

James G. Gimpel’s new report for the Center for Immigration Studies (CIS) has a good summary of voter opinion on immigration and how the issue influenced the rise of Donald Trump.  Undoubtedly, that issue key to his success in the GOP primary, although it’s unclear why equally nativist but more polite candidates like Mike Huckabee, Rick Santorum, and Scott Walker failed to gain traction.        

My only problem with this report is its selective display of Gallup’s immigration polling data.  The CIS starts reporting the results in 1999 and omits whether Americans support more immigration (Figure 1).  By starting the data in 1999, the report is able to argue that opposition to legal immigration and those supporting the same number of immigrants have been roughly constant since 1999. 

Figure 1

CIS Graph   

 

Source: Immigration Opinion and the Rise of Donald Trump.

If the CIS report had included the “Increased” immigration option in the poll and the years going back to 1965, you would have seen this (Figure 2).  I highlighted the years 1993 and 2015 to show how far public opinion has shifted toward the pro-immigration side over the last 22 years. 

CIS Exaggerates the Cost of Immigrant Welfare Use

Yesterday the Center for Immigration Studies (CIS) published a report authored by Jason Richwine on the welfare cost of immigration. The CIS headline result, that immigrant-headed households consume more welfare than natives, lacks any kind of reasonable statistical controls.  To CIS’s credit, they do include tables with proper controls buried in their report and its appendix.  Those tables with proper controls undermine many of their headline findings.  In the first section, I will discuss how CIS’ buried results undermine their own headline findings.  In the next section, I will explain some of the other problems with their results and headline findings. 

CIS’s Other Results

The extended tables in the CIS report paint a far more nuanced picture of immigrant welfare use than they advertised.  To sum up the more detailed findings:

“In the no-control scenario, immigrant households cost $1,803 more than native households, which is consistent with Table 2 above. The second row shows that the immigrant-native difference becomes larger — up to $2,323 — when we control for the presence of a worker in the household. The difference then becomes gradually smaller as controls are added for education and number of children. The fourth row shows that immigrant households with the same worker status, education, and number of children as native households cost just $309 more, which is a statistically insignificant difference. The fifth row shows that immigrants use fewer welfare dollars when they are compared to natives of the same race as well as worker status, education, and number of children.” [emphasis added]

All of the tables I reference below are located in CIS’s report.   

Center for Immigration Studies Report Exaggerates Immigrant Welfare Use

The Center for Immigration Studies (CIS) released a new report this morning on immigrant welfare use. CIS found that immigrants use far more welfare than natives do. CIS’ methodology, parts of which are suspect, is what produced this result – as we’ve pointed out to CIS multiple times. They also omitted a lot of information that would make for a better comparison between immigrants and natives. Simply put, the CIS study does not compare apples to apples but rather apples to elephants.

The first issue is that CIS counts the welfare use of households, which includes many native-born American citizens, rather than individuals. There might be some good reasons to do this but the immigrant-headed household variable CIS uses is ambiguous, poorly defined, and less used in modern research for those reasons. To CIS’ credit they try to separate out households with children but didn’t separate out American-born spouses. There is debate largely over whether to count the American born children of immigrants as a welfare cost of immigration. If we should count them, shouldn’t we also count the welfare use of grandchildren, great-grandchildren, and great-great-grandchildren of immigrants?  Such a way of counting would obviously produce a negative result but it would also not be informative.

Another problem with counting households rather than individuals is that immigrants and natives have different sized households. According to the American Community Survey, immigrant households have on average 3.37 people in them compared to 2.5 people in native-born households. All else remaining equal, we should expect higher welfare use in immigrant households just because they’re larger. CIS should have corrected for household size by focusing on individual welfare use – which is included in the SIPP.