Tag: 287(g)

287(g) Does Not Fight Crime, But It Does Increase Assaults against Police Officers

Fear of immigrant criminality is driving many changes to domestic immigration enforcement programs during the Trump administration.  One of the earliest such changes was the reactivation of the 287(g) program that allows state or local law enforcement agencies to enforce federal immigration law after entering into a partnership with Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).  The Obama administration substantially scaled back 287(g) after numerous government reports found serious flaws in the program.  Gaston County, North Carolina sheriff Alan Cloninger said his sheriff’s office enrolled in 287(g), “for the protection of the citizens of Gaston County.”  Sheriff Cloninger’s desire to increase public safety is the primary reason, if not the only reason, why 76 local and state level law enforcement agencies across the country have enrolled in 287(g).

Surprisingly, there is little research on whether 287(g) had any effect on crime.  To test whether 287(g) had its intended effect, Cato research associate Andrew Forrester and I investigated whether 287(g) adoption actually lowered crime rates in North Carolina counties where it was established.  From 2003 through 2013, we find no statistically significant relationship between crime rates in counties that adopted 287(g) agreements relative to those that did not in North Carolina.  Importantly, we look at the number of deportations due to 287(g) enforcement by county, which allows us to examine 287(g)’s specific effects.  This means that 287(g) failed to reduce crime in counties where it was activated prior to 2013 when the Obama administration canceled many 287(g) agreements across the country.

In North Carolina, the crime-prevention justification for 287(g) does not hold but neither does the primary critique that it would raise crime rates by reducing citizen cooperation with the police.  It is possible that immigrants in 287(g) counties reported fewer crimes due to fear of immigration enforcement and, thus, an increase in crime would not be recorded in official statistics.  However, some crimes, like murder, are difficult to hide and tend to be reported regardless of local immigration enforcement policies.  To account for this, we further break down the crime rates by the offense and find no relationship between 287(g) and murder or any other individual crime.  Since crime rates did not increase after 287(g) adoption in North Carolina counties, it did not impact trust between local police and the population enough to affect crime rates.   

The only statistically significant relationship that we did find was an increase in the average number of assaults against police officers in 287(g) counties.  We do not know why 287(g) is causally related to the increase in assaults against police officers and we do not know the identities or characteristics of those who committed them.  Besides otherwise law-abiding illegal immigrants who are deported as a result of 287(g) and their American friends, families, consumers, employers, and landlords, police officers in North Carolina also appear to be victims of this program that fails to reduce crime.

Almost 62 percent of the 287(g) agreements currently in effect, 47 out of 76, were signed after President Trump took office.  In the coming months and years, many more state and local law enforcement agencies could also enroll in 287(g) out of the desire to reduce crime.  Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Chief Kerr Putney recently said:  

The intent [of 287(g)] was to make sure we’re taking felons and gang members, who are violent, out of play … If you apply [the program] specific to those reasons, I think you’d have a totally different outcome.  If you’re asking everybody about their national origin, I think it’s a different application.  And so if it were as it were designed, I think it’s a good tool. I don’t know that it’s being applied that way.

Our research addresses Chief Putney’s concern that 287(g) is not an effective anti-crime tool.  The experience of North Carolina’s counties where 287(g) failed to reduce crime while it increased the number of assaults against police officers should at least be a warning to other counties and police agencies that are considering joining this program: It will not reduce crime.

ICE Deputizes More Cops for Immigration Enforcement

Yesterday Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) announced that eighteen counties in Texas are taking part in the 287(g) program. The program allows police departments to enter into agreements with ICE, thereby permitting their officers to carry out certain federal immigration enforcement functions. The news from Texas is the latest evidence that President Trump’s campaign pledge to “expand and revitalize” 287(g) was a serious commitment, not political bluster. The expansion of 287(g) is a worrying development. The program has been widely criticized for harming police-community relationships and prompting racial profiling. It also grows the power of the federal government, which traditionally has not played a major role in state and local law enforcement.

287(g) was, until a few years ago, a program that had three models: Jail, Task Force, and a Jail/Task Force hybrid model. The Jail agreements allow participating officers to check an individual’s status in a detention facility and issue detainers. Using detainers, officers can hold individuals 48 hours longer than they usually would so that ICE can pick them up. The Task Force model allowed officers to carry out immigration enforcement in the field such as questioning and arresting people suspected of violating immigration law. At the end of 2012 the Obama administration announced that the Task Force 287(g) model would be scrapped, with ICE declaring that other programs “are a more efficient use of resources for focusing on priority cases.”

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) raised concerns related to 287(g) in a 2010 report, which stated:

NGOs critical of the 287(g) program have charged that ICE entered into agreements with LEAs that have checkered civil rights records, and that by doing so, ICE has increased the likelihood of racial profiling and other civil rights violations.

Claims of civil rights violations have surfaced in connection with several LEAs participating in the program. Two LEAs currently enrolled in the program were defendants in past racial profiling lawsuits that they settled by agreeing to collect extensive data on their officers’ contacts with the public during traffic stops, and adopt policies to protect the community against future racial profiling. Another jurisdiction is the subject of (1) an ongoing racial profiling lawsuit related to 287(g) program activities; (2) a lawsuit alleging physical abuse of a detained alien; and (3) a DOJ investigation into alleged discriminatory police practices, unconstitutional searches and seizures, and national origin discrimination.

The DHS OIG report was correct to point out the criticism leveled at 287(g). As I’ve noted before, the American Immigration Council found that “287(g) agreements have resulted in widespread racial profiling.” According to the ACLU of Georgia, “The 287(g) program in Cobb and Gwinnett has encouraged and served as a justification for racial profiling and civil and human rights violations by some police officers acting as immigration agents.”

Trump Looking to Local Police for Immigration Enforcement

Last Friday, President Trump issued a misguided executive order affecting migration from seven majority-Muslim countries. In December 2015 Trump called for a “total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States,” until (as his fans never tire of pointing out) elected officials “can figure out what is going on.” News from last week confirms that Trump’s rhetoric related to Muslims was not just campaign bombast; it was a serious policy proposal. Another immigration proposal touted during the campaign was also codified into policy by executive order last week, with Trump directing the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to expand an interior immigration enforcement program that will grow the federal government’s role in state and local law policing while harming police departments’ relationships with the communities they are tasked to serve. 

Under §287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, local and state police departments can enter into agreements with Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to enforce federal immigration laws. Thirty-four law enforcement agencies in 16 states are now taking part in the 287(g) program. Up until 2013 this program included “task force” agreements, which allowed participating officers to arrest suspected immigration law violators in the field, and “jail enforcement” agreements. Under “jail enforcement” agreements officers at state and local correctional facilities can seek to identify aliens via interviews and checking their biographic details against DHS databases.

Currently, only jail enforcement agreements are in place. The Obama administration abandoned the “task force” agreements at the end of 2012 amid worries about their negative effect on police-community relationships and accusations of racial profiling.

Trump said that he would “expand and revitalize” 287(g) during a speech last August. An executive order signed last week makes it clear that the Trump administration is serious about such a revitalization and expansion, including a reinstatement of “task force” agreements.