February 24, 2020 1:38PM 

# Reading the Tea Leaves from Supreme Court’s Refusal to Review Baldwin v. United States 

By [William Yeatman](https://www.cato.org/people/william-yeatman) 

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This morning, alas, the Supreme Court [denied](https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/022420zor_mjo1.pdf) review of the Ninth Circuit’s February order in *Baldwin v. United States*. As I’ve [explained](https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/baldwin-v-united-states-is-ideal-vehicle-to-revisit-reflexive-deference-by-william-yeatman/) before, *Baldwin* reflected a rare combination of worst‐​practices that would have caught the eye of any Justice intent on revisiting “reflexive” judicial deference to regulatory agencies. Cato had [filed a brief](https://www.cato.org/publications/legal-briefs/baldwin-v-united-states) urging the Court to take the case.

At issue in *Baldwin* was the “*Brand X*” doctrine. Under this principle, courts defer to an agency’s reading of the law, even if the court had an existing and long-settled interpretation. *Brand X* is basically a juiced-up version of the famous *Chevron* doctrine.

I have three quick reactions to the Court’s decision this morning.

First, I want to draw attention to Justice Thomas’s [notable dissent](https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/022420zor_mjo1.pdf) to the Court’s refusal to review *Baldwin.* Thomas had authored *Brand X*; today, however, he disavowed his prior work. He now believes that *Brand X* is “inconsistent with the Constitution, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and traditional tools of statutory interpretation.” Hear, hear!

Second, it’s equally notable that Justice Gorsuch did not join Thomas’s dissent. In [a 2016 opinion](https://www.ca10.uscourts.gov/opinions/14/14-9585.pdf), then-judge Gorsuch made a big splash by repudiating *Brand X*. Thomas’s dissent raises many of the same arguments as did Gorsuch. The upshot is that it doesn’t make much sense that today’s dissent in *Baldwin* didn’t have at least one other cosignatory.

Third—and most important—today’s decision suggests the Court doesn’t have the appetite to take on judicial deference on statutory questions. *Baldwin* had been the ***perfect*** vehicle to revisit *Chevron* and its corollary doctrines (like *Brand X*). By passing on this case, the Court appears to signal that *Chevron* reform is on the backburner.

##### Related Tags 

[Constitutional Law](https://www.cato.org/constitutional-law), [Robert A. Levy Center for Constitutional Studies](https://www.cato.org/robert-levy-center-constitutional-studies) 

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