November 19, 2026 5:12PM 

# National Popular Vote Compact: A 2028 Train Wreck? 

By [Walter Olson](https://www.cato.org/people/walter-olson) 

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With the election results, the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact (NPVIC) is back and big. Under the compact, meant to bypass the Electoral College provided for by the Constitution, participating states and the District of Columbia agree to award all their electoral votes to the presidential ticket with the highest popular vote, whether or not it carried their own state. The compact is supposed to take effect if enough states sign on to reach the 270 electoral votes needed to elect a president. The total presently stands at 222. Now five additional states have been brought under Democratic Party “trifectas,” a power arrangement that often results in NPVIC adoption. The pact will cross 270 if all five states adopt it and might do so with only four of the five.

As a presidential election cycle gets underway, it would leave the nation in all sorts of uncertainty about whether the courts would uphold the compact and on what terms. Who would have standing to challenge it? What if a state’s leadership decided not to carry out its side of the deal when results turn out the “wrong” way, that is, if the national popular vote favored a candidate that it loathed and that its own voters had rejected? As the *New York Times* [put it the other day](https://www.nytimes.com/2026/11/08/upshot/democrats-electoral-college.html), would Democratic officials be willing to pick Republican electors if “there were concerns, legitimate or not, that the vote had been suppressed in other states”? And could courts work through all the requisite issues in a matter of weeks before Inauguration Day?  

Questions like these are belatedly beginning to get the attention they deserve.

The legal hurdles begin with [the Constitution’s Compact Clause](https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/artI-S10-C3-3-1/ALDE_00013531/), which provides that “No State shall, without the Consent of Congress … enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State,” with enumerated exceptions unlikely to apply in this instance. To obtain the necessary consent, Congress would probably have to enact a law that would itself be subject to presidential veto.

That’s just the start. The language of state constitutions does not necessarily permit casting electoral votes in a manner determined by residents of other states, even if the state legislature agrees to it. Federal equal protection challenges are likely to be brought against a device that throws into a common pot votes cast under procedures and qualification rules that vary materially from state to state. The Constitution also directs that states “appoint” electors, and it is not immediately clear whether they are free to delegate this power to a formula. On all this, I recommend [Derek Muller’s piece](https://electionlawblog.org/2026/impending-legal-challenges-facing-the-national-popular-vote-compact/) at Election Law Blog, in which he links to writings and resources on both sides. In Cato’s *Regulation* magazine, litigation consultant Paul E. Godek recently presented a case for [why the compact would not](https://www.cato.org/regulation/fall-2026/unconstitutional-compact-nullify-electoral-college) survive court review.

[Last spring I explored](https://www.cato.org/blog/virginia-goes-woods-popular-vote-compact) some of the ways the compact could run into practical difficulty even if courts do not strike it down. This includes uncertainty about which set of numbers should count as the popular vote*—*a trickier question than might appear, given complications like ranked-choice voting with its multiple rounds—how, if at all, a national recount is supposed to proceed, given that it can’t be forced on nonparticipating states, and what might happen in the absence of a clearly specified mechanism for dispute resolution. I noted that the ECRA (Electoral Count Reform Act) had reduced, but not eliminated, some of these uncertainties and went on to summarize decades of Cato work on the Electoral College itself, its well-known demerits and sometimes less obvious benefits, and why it [has proved such a durable institution](https://www.cato.org/blog/why-electoral-college-such-durable-institution) since the American founding.

If you read only one article, consider making it Vox’s [interview with Yale law professor Akhll Amar,](https://www.vox.com/politics/510438/electoral-college-national-popular-vote-interstate-compact-akhil-amar) who has the best claim to be the parent of the idea that grew into the compact but has grown increasingly concerned that the absence of determinate rules for implementation and dispute resolution could set us on a path to constitutional crisis. Amar also points out that if a federal agency were set up to tabulate a national popular vote, as would almost have to happen although it is not specified in the scheme, it would inevitably be run by appointees of Donald Trump, who’ve been known to succumb to [the temptation to meddle](https://www.cato.org/blog/it-was-failed-election-meddling-not-absence-election-meddling). (I’ve argued such themes [myself a lot lately](https://www.cato.org/commentary/we-would-be-so-cooked-federalism-prevented-trumps-election-takeover).)

Now—not when the trains are actually hurtling down the track toward a 2028 collision—is the time for sober rethinking.

##### Related Tags 

[Constitutional Law](https://www.cato.org/constitutional-law), [Public Opinion](https://www.cato.org/public-opinion) 

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