Max Gulker of the American Institute for Economic Research has a great short paper out summarizing the problems with a federal jobs guarantee. It echoes many of the issues that I raised about such a program on this blog.
One thing that is often underappreciated is just the sheer scale of the programs proposed. For reasons I outlined, the true numbers could potentially be much higher than the Levy Institute and Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (CBPP) worked proposals. But even taking their numbers as given, the estimated 10.7 million participants according to CBPP and 12.7−17.5 million from Levy would make the federal program by far the world’s largest employer, if thought as a single firm or entity.
Consider the striking chart below.
At the Levy report’s upper‐bound estimate, the numbers employed would exceed the world’s nine largest employers combined. Even the CBPP’s lower estimate would only be marginally below the employment level of the world’s five largest employers combined.
When is it appropriate to privatize the work of public prosecutors? And does it make things better or worse when “cause” lawyering is at issue? As Jeff Patch reports at Real Clear Investigations, a project called the State Energy & Environmental Impact Center at New York University supplies seasoned lawyers to the offices of nine state attorney general offices, plus D.C. They serve there in such roles as special assistant attorney general while being paid by the NYU project, which is funded by and closely identified with former New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg. The catch, which explains why the program is not likely to hold appeal for AGs in some other states: “Under terms of the arrangement, the fellows work solely to advance progressive environmental policy at a time when Democratic state attorneys general have investigated and sued ExxonMobil and other energy companies over alleged damages due to climate change.”
Private funding of lawyers inside public prosecutors’ offices is not a new idea. Iowa’s AG office, for example, told Patch that it has employed legal talent from an American Bar Association‐supported program. In another variation, it is not unusual for prosecutors to accept funding from the insurance industry for efforts to combat insurance fraud. Undergirding the political viability of these schemes is the (perhaps wobbly) premise that the state office is not farming out influence over politically or ideologically sensitive policy matters to outside groups that may have their own agenda.
The AG offices participating in the program (Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Washington state, as well as the District of Columbia) might plausibly argue that the projects they’re paying the Bloomberg embeds to work on are mostly ones they’d want to pursue zealously in any case, such as suing the EPA and other federal agencies over alleged lapses. Critics point to the ideologically fraught nature of the work and say the arrangement could violate some states’ ethics rules or generate improper conflicts of interest, as through an obligation to report activities back to the Bloomberg center.
The spotlight on backstage doings at state AG offices arises from reports by Chris Horner of the Competitive Enterprise Institute based on public records requests that were fought tooth and nail by various AGs. (Besides the CEI report on attorneys general, Horner’s written a companion report on governors.) CEI is anything but a disinterested party in all this, of course, having been hit with a AG subpoena (later beaten back in court) over its supposedly wrongful advocacy on climate issues. That was itself part of a subpoena campaign targeting more than 100 research and advocacy groups, scientists, and private figures on the putatively wrong side of climate debates, which we and others decried at the time as a flagrant attack on rights protected by the First Amendment.
Where Brexit negotiations are concerned, we have reached (as they say in Britain) “squeaky bum time.” The triggering of Article 50 on March 29th 2017 started a 2‑year countdown for the UK and EU to negotiate a withdrawal agreement for a binding international treaty. Yet just 5 months from deadline, the EU’s position on Northern Ireland and a lack of domestic support for Prime Minister Theresa May’s desired long‐term trading relationship mean a no deal Brexit in March remains a real possibility (the tweet linked here quotes Britain’s trade minister Liam Fox).
True, much of the withdrawal agreement has been long agreed. A transition period through to 31 December 2020 is planned to essentially keep the UK within the EU’s economic institutions (the single market and customs union), though reports suggest both sides might be willing to extend this for an extra year. Free movement of people would continue for this period, and the UK would pay £39 billion into the EU budget. Importantly, though Article 50 states that a withdrawal agreement must take account of the longer term post‐exit relationship, this is not going to be achieved in time: the agreement would merely be accompanied with a joint, loose‐languaged political declaration on the future framework.
But it’s here where difficulties have arisen, and most center around the Northern Irish border. Both sides have said from the start that, post‐Brexit, they want to keep the border between the Republic of Ireland (an EU state) and Northern Ireland (part of the UK) free of physical infrastructure and associated interventions at politically‐sensitive crossings. But making that commitment self‐evidently necessitates a trade relationship. Given long‐term trade arrangements will not be agreed in the withdrawal agreement, the EU has therefore insisted that the withdrawal deal itself contain backstop provisions to ensure the border remained open should another arrangement or trade deal incorporating not be agreed.
This is what led last December to the UK and EU agreeing in principle to a fudged “backstop” position on Northern Ireland. In vintage legalese, the text stated: “In the absence of agreed solutions, the United Kingdom will maintain full alignment with those rules of the Internal Market and the Customs Union which, now or in the future, support North‐South cooperation, the all‐island economy and the protection of the 1998 Agreement.”
Given the UK government has said repeatedly that the UK would be leaving the EU customs union and single market, this text raised Brexiteer eyebrows. Yes, the UK government agreed this to kick forward future trade relationship talks, and in the hope it would not be ultimately necessary. But talk of full alignment left ambiguity, and the potential for the backstop itself to keep the UK locked into Brussels’ regulatory and customs orbit. However much the UK government insisted that this language did not mean regulatory harmonization, but instead merely achieving shared regulatory goals via detailed sanitary rules, customs procedures, and the Single Energy Market, the backstop left an uncomfortable feeling that the UK had fallen into a trap.
This was not helped when the EU then rejected proposed “technological solutions” and “away from the border checks” that the UK insisted could have avoided the backstop. The unease intensified when, from February, the EU and Ireland began proposing a backstop arrangement where Northern Ireland alone would remain within the EU single market and customs union to ensure a soft border. This was something out of kilter not only with the text but with the wishes of the Northern Irish Democratic Unionist party which props up the Conservative minority government.
This is all significant because Brexiteers fear now that the Northern Irish border has become the tail wagging the dog not just on the backstop, but on the potential future long‐term trade relationship between the EU and UK. They fear the UK is being hoodwinked into a Brexit‐in‐name‐only by threats of breaking up the UK through saying that only a soft Brexit can keep the Northern Irish border without physical infrastructure.
The Prime Minister Theresa May’s proposals for a longer‐term trade relationship (known as the Chequers Plan) is Exhibit A. Rather than aiming for the best trade arrangements and then seeking to minimize disruption at the Irish border, the plan seems explicitly designed to keep the border as frictionless as possible, at the cost of an extraordinary loss of policy freedom. Chequers proposes a common rulebook between the UK and the EU on goods and agri‐goods trade but not services, where fears of Brussels regulating the City of London alone without a UK vote were reason enough alone for exclusion. Non‐regression‐like clauses on environmental and labor laws would be included. A complex facilitated customs arrangement would see the UK collect the EU’s tariffs on its behalf.
This deal has proven anathema to most Conservative Brexiteers, binding as it does the UK to EU goods regulation without voting power over it and stripping away the bargaining chip of goods regulation in making liberalising trade deals with third parties. They see Chequers as an unnecessary loss of sovereignty, and want Theresa May to “Chuck Chequers” and instead negotiate with the aim of a whole of UK FTA and practical solutions at the border.
Incidentally, the EU doesn’t like Chequers either. They rightly see it as cherry‐picking parts of the single market, are suspicious of a foreign government collecting its duties and would prefer even tighter integration of lots of regulations (including commitments for full harmonization on labor and environmental laws), such that the UK cannot secure a competitive advantage. Political commentators in the know say Chequers is dead as far as the EU is concerned.
In the EU’s eyes, the preferred long‐term options have always been a Canada‐style free trade agreement, or maintained UK membership of the single market and a customs union (in essence, a political Brexit but not an economic Brexit). Most Brexiteers very much prefer the former, which comes with more regulatory and trade policy freedoms.
This brings us to the crux of the current political crisis. May’s government have thus far lined up with the EU (and against Brexiteer insistence otherwise) in stating that it’s impossible to solve the border problem satisfactorily through an ordinary UK-EU free trade deal and other practical solutions. They imply that with a Canada‐style FTA, Northern Ireland alone would have to remain tied to EU economic institutions to avoid a hard border, effectively creating an economic border down the Irish Sea. Conveniently, May claims that only something like her Chequers plan can avoid this.
But with Chequers seemingly without much support at home or in the EU, the future relationship talks have effectively stalled. With so much uncertainty about it, the backstop agreement has taken center‐stage, because de facto that could become the default relationship. And here Brexiteer fears have heightened. Since May insists no UK government would countenance Northern Ireland having different customs arrangements from Britain, she has proposed the whole of the UK remaining in a customs union‐like arrangement as a backstop.
Earlier this year she suggested this would last for an extra year beyond transition (to December 2021) and Brexiteers are still keen on this kind of time limit. But the EU says that a backstop cannot be time‐limited, because otherwise it’s not a backstop. Brexiteers winced this week when the PM’s position seemingly “evolved” in the EU’s direction, with her suggesting remaining in a customs arrangement as a backstop on a “temporary” but indefinite basis. These fears heightened with news that the EU believed there was not enough time to discuss a UK‐wide backstop proposal, and insisting that the withdrawal agreement incorporate a “backstop to a backstop,” with a Northern Ireland‐only customs arrangement should a full UK‐wide agreement fail to be agreed.
For many Brexiteers, the major economic benefit of Brexit is the ability to conduct independent trade policy, cutting deals and setting tariffs. An indefinite customs arrangement threatens this. Given the EU would seemingly prefer the whole of the UK to remain within its economic institutions, a non‐time‐limited customs backstop provides little incentive for the EU to agree to a future comprehensive free trade deal the Brexiteers desire.
Combined with Chequers then, Brexiteers fear a huge sell out is on the cards. The UK government’s official position has always been that the country will leave the EU single market and customs union. But now both Chequers and the backstop risk are seen to keep the UK within these arrangements to varying degrees.
The result is a political crisis. The PM this week updated the house on the negotiations but could not provide assurances any customs arrangement backstop would be time‐limited. She has since floated and then rowed back on extending the transition period, something that would see UK taxpayers pay for at least another year of EU funding, without settling the backstop issue.
As a result, everyone is unhappy. There is talk of Brexiteers dethroning May as a last gasp attempt to push for the Canada FTA‐type deal the EU has offered. The DUP are threatening to derail the government’s domestic legislative agenda should the PM allow Northern Ireland to be treated differently. The hardline Remainers, meanwhile, are pressing for a second referendum on any withdrawal agreement May brings back.
With the clock ticking, and stakes rising, the prospect of no deal is therefore heightening. The EU has engineered a situation where in the long‐term it insists either the UK must sign up to a backstop where Northern Ireland must be effectively economically annexed, or the UK must remain locked in the EU’s regulatory and customs embrace itself.
The Brexiteers (to my mind rightly) consider this unacceptable. Ignoring whether a change of Prime Minister or strategy is perceived as bad faith negotiating by the UK, it does not seem an extreme position to say that the EU should not have the right to dictate the economic breakup of a sovereign country, nor determine its domestic economic regulations. But at such a late stage and in such a febrile political environment, who knows where this multi‐actor game of chicken ends?
Management practices in firms differ widely between countries according to research summarized by economists Nicholas Bloom and John Van Reenen. The differences between well‐managed firms and those that are poorly managed are significant and could help explain differences in Total Factor Productivity (TFP) between countries. In the field of economic history, economists Louis Putterman and David N. Weil (henceforth P&W) found that the length of time that a population of a country has lived with a centralized state and with settled agriculture (henceforth, Deep Roots) are powerful predictors of their GDP per capita today. Perhaps there is a relationship between firm management practices by country and that country’s Deep Roots?
P&W tested their Deep Root’s hypothesis by creating a matrix of contemporary populations of each country based on their population’s ancestral origin in the year 1500. They use a variable called state history that measures how long a country has lived under a supra‐tribal government, the geographic scope of that government, and whether that government was controlled by locals or by a foreign power. Their second variable is agricultural history and it measures the number of millennia that have passed since a country transitioned from hunting and gathering to agriculture. P&W then combined the matrices of ancestry with the Deep Roots variables to show how long each national origin group was governed by a centralized state and how long they had settled agriculture. The Deep Roots score varies dramatically between peoples and locations. P&W’s findings stand in contrast to those that explain economic development and GDP per capita as the ultimate result of geography, institutions, or other conventional explanations.
Ryan Murphy and Alex Nowrasteh tested whether the Deep Roots variables can explain differing GDP per capita by U.S. state in a paper published in the Journal of Bioeconomics (working paper available here). They found that P&W’s core result of a statistically significant and positive relationship between Deep Roots variables and GDP per capita does not hold at the subnational level in the United States. This argument is related to immigration because new immigrants bring different state history and agricultural history scores with them, eventually affecting the Deep Roots of their new country. Whether that matters for economic growth is up for debate.
Since Deep Roots are correlated with GDP per capita globally and some economists think that they can explain economic development, firm management practices should probably also be correlated with Deep Roots. To test this, we ran simple linear OLS regressions testing the relationship between firm management practices and a country’s state and agricultural history. Our standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. We controlled for the same variables that P&W did as well as the economic freedom score. We downloaded the firm management practices dataset for 34 countries here.
We found precisely nothing interesting related to the Deep Roots (Table 1). Neither state history nor agricultural history is correlated with better management practices. However, economic freedom and absolute latitude are positively correlated with state history and agricultural history. On the positive side, our R‑squared is 0.72, so the variables that we included can explain 72 percent of the variation.
There are a lot of reasons why this could be. We only had management score data for 34 countries, collinearity was rampant, cross sections are limited, or other explanations that we haven’t considered. Regardless, there is no evidence here that there is a link between Deep Roots and firm management practices.
Firm Management Practices, State History, and Agricultural History
Millions of Americans move between states each year. These migration flows are influenced by numerous factors including job opportunities, climate, and housing costs. Interstate migration is also influenced by state and local taxes, as discussed in this recent study.
Internal Revenue Service data show that 2.8 percent of households moved to another state in 2016. The map below shows the net patterns of movement. People are leaving the red and purple states for the blue states.
The ratio of domestic gross in-migration to gross out-migration is shown for each state. In 2016, New York gained 142,722 households and lost 218,937 for a ratio of 0.65. Florida gained 307,022 households and lost 211,950 for a ratio of 1.45.
States losing population to other states have ratios of less than 1.0 and states gaining population have ratios of more than 1.0. People are generally moving out of the Northeast and Midwest to the South and West, but they are also leaving California, on net.
Here are some of the regional patterns:
- The Northeast. New Hampshire enjoys net in-migration. It is a low-tax state with no individual income tax. Higher-tax Connecticut, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Vermont suffer net out-migration.
- The Midwest. South Dakota enjoys modest net in-migration, while its higher-tax neighbors Iowa, Minnesota, and Nebraska suffer net out-migration. South Dakota is a low-tax state with no income tax. Neighbor Wyoming has net out-migration overall but has substantial net in-migration among high-earning households. Wyoming has no income tax.
- The Southeast. Kentucky has suffered net out-migration for years, while its neighbor Tennessee has enjoyed net in-migration. Kentucky is a relatively high-tax state, while Tennessee is a low-tax state with no individual income tax.
- The West. The largest destinations for out-migration from high-tax California are Texas, Washington, and Nevada—all low-tax states with no income taxes.
In this study, I divide the states between the 25 highest tax and 25 lowest tax, with taxes measured as state and local individual income, sales, and property taxes as a percent of personal income. In 2016, 286,431 households (with almost 600,000 people) moved, on net, from the 25 highest-tax states to the 25 lowest-tax states. Of the 25 highest-tax states, 24 of them had net out-migration in 2016. (Maine was the exception).
The 2017 federal tax reform law will likely intensify the patterns shown in the map of people moving from high-tax states to low-tax states. The law doubled standard deductions and capped state and local tax deductions. Those changes will reduce the number of households deducting state and local taxes from 42 million in 2017 to about 17 million in 2018. Those households will feel a larger bite from state and local taxes and become more sensitive to tax differences between the states.
Welcome to the Defense Download! This new round‐up is intended to highlight what we at the Cato Institute are keeping tabs on in the world of defense politics every week. The three‐to‐five trending stories will vary depending on the news cycle, what policymakers are talking about, and will pull from all sides of the political spectrum. If you would like to recieve more frequent updates on what I’m reading, writing, and listening to — you can follow me on Twitter via @CDDorminey.
- “Trump appears to call for defense spending cut,” Aaron Mehta. This week’s Cabinet meeting went a bit differently than most. The President, apparently due to worry about the country’s rising debts and deficits, issued a call for every federal department to cut it’s spending by five percent in Fiscal Year 2019 (FY19). Reporters understandably rushed to ask President Trump if this initiative would include defense spending; while he doesn’t seem to want the full five percent, Trump commented that the budget next year would be “around $700 billion” (a 2.3 percent cut).
- “Air Force B‑21 Raider Long Range Strike Bomber,” Jeremiah Gertler. The Congressional Research survey released an update on the still‐classified B‑21 program. While many details remain unavailable to the public, this report discusses the status of the program and includes useful information on projected research and development funding.
- “Air and Missile Defense at a Crossroads,” Mark Gunzinger and Carl Rehburg. The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Alternative released a new report today on adapting missile defense for protecting overseas bases, and recommendations to move the portfolio in that direction.
- “Senior defense committee Democrat wants to stop U.S. weapon sales to Saudi Arabia,” Tony Bertuca. Senator Jack Reed, the ranking Democrat on the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), said publicly that all sales of offensive weapons to Saudi Arabia should be blocked until a thorough investigation into the death of journalist Jamal Khashoggi can be undertaken.
The U.S. Treasury reports that the federal budget deficit was $779 billion in fiscal 2018. The deficit is caused by spending in excess of tax revenues and is financed by borrowing from foreign and domestic creditors.
Federal spending in 2018 was $4,108 billion and tax revenues were $3,329 billion, so Congress financed 19 percent of its spending with borrowing. Did taxpayers — who will ultimately bear the burden — really consent to that extra debt‐financed spending? It is like Dad leaving the kids some cash to buy pizza, and then coming home to find that they also used his credit card to rack up charges on the Internet.
Unless the politicians grow up and start making reforms, the deficit will likely grow from $1 trillion in 2019 to more than $2 trillion a year a decade from now.
Annual deficits are piling onto accumulated federal debt held by the public of $16 trillion. That is $127,000 for every household in the nation. Compared to the size of the economy, today’s federal debt is, by far, the highest in our peacetime history.
Why is soaring government debt so worrying?
- Spending Induced. Most federal spending is for subsidy and benefit programs, not for activities that increase productivity. Subsidy and benefit programs distort the economy and generally reduce overall output and incomes. Those distortions occur whether spending is financed by debt or current taxes. But the availability of debt financing induces policymakers to increase overall spending, which at the margin goes toward lower‐valued activities.
- Tax Damage Compounded. When taxes are extracted to pay for government spending, it induces people to change their working and investing activities, which distorts the economy and reduces growth. When spending is financed by borrowing, the tax damage is pushed to the future and compounded with interest costs.
- Investment Reduced. Government borrowing may “crowd out” private investment, and thus reduce future output and incomes. Economist James Buchanan said, “By financing current public outlay by debt, we are, in effect, chopping up the apple trees for firewood, thereby reducing the yield of the orchard forever.” The crowd out will be reduced if private saving rises to offset government deficits. But the CBO says, “the rise in private saving is generally a good deal smaller than the increase in federal borrowing.” Government debt may also deter investment through expectations — businesses will hesitate to invest if rising debt creates fears of tax increases down the road.
- Borrowing from Abroad. A decline in private investment due to government borrowing may be avoided if capital is attracted from abroad. Indeed, huge federal borrowing has been facilitated by global capital markets, and today more than 40 percent of federal debt is held by foreigners. Borrowing from abroad may prevent a fall in domestic investment but does not prevent the shifting of costs to future taxpayers. As government debt rises, more of our future earnings will be taxed to pay interest and principal on the government’s debt to foreigners.
- Macroeconomic Instability. CBO warns that a “large and continuously growing federal debt would … increase the likelihood of a fiscal crisis in the United States.” Experience shows that high levels of government debt tend to reduce growth and increase financial fragility. In their study of financial crises through history, Carmen Reinhart and Ken Rogoff concluded, “again and again, countries, banks, individuals, and firms take on excessive debt in good times without enough awareness of the risks that will follow when the inevitable recession hits.” Government debt, they found, “is certainly the most problematic, for it can accumulate massively and for long periods without being put in check by markets.”
Sadly, with regard to the federal budget, policymakers seem to be in la‐la land, a “euphoric dreamlike mental state detached from the harsher realities of life.” They dream about spending on their favorite programs and act as if there won’t be harsh consequences to their profligacy. But there will be. Future living standards are being eroded as huge costs are being pushed forward, and the rising debt will eventually spark a damaging financial and economic crisis.