Archives: 10/2018

Unified by Public High?

If someone told you that public high schools have taken people with political and social power and brought them together, to the exclusion of other people, would you celebrate those schools? Probably not. But that is essentially what a new Atlantic article does in extolling public high schools and attacking school choice.

The piece, by English professor Amy Lueck, asserts that public schools—particularly high schools—have been crucial, unifying institutions. After criticizing U.S. Secretary of Education Betsy DeVos for calling public schools a “dead end” (DeVos actually said monopolistic public schooling is a dead end for innovation) Lueck offers the following:

Far from being a “dead end,” for a long time the public school—particularly the public high school—served an important civic purpose: not only as an academic training ground, but also as a center for community and activity in American cities.

The public high school’s unifying importance, especially compared to private schooling, is very much wanting for proof. Lueck talks a lot about public high school football games, dances, yearbooks, and supporting the country in World War II to back her thesis, but says nothing about whether private schools did the same things. Of course, they did. She also says nothing about whether public high schools were especially effective in forming good citizens, while the research suggests that private schools and other schools of choice actually do better jobs than traditional public schools inculcating civic values such as voting, political tolerance, and volunteering in one’s community.  

More important than ignoring what private schools have done, though, is what Lueck concedes in a few welcome but quick admissions: public high schools have a highly discriminatory history. This is not just with egregious segregation of African Americans, which Lueck mentions, but also in some places Mexican Americans and Asian Americans. Public schools have also been demeaning places for immigrants, and from early on in the history of public schooling numerous Roman Catholics felt that they had no choice but to stay out of the often de facto Protestant—and sometimes openly hostile—public schools. Indeed, by 1970 more than 1 million students attended Catholic high schools. But Lueck somehow doesn’t mention Catholics at all, including the recent evidence that Catholic schools are powerful forces for community cohesion. And Catholics have hardly been the only religious dissenters to the coerced uniformity of public schooling.

It is easy to say that public schools are essential unifiers, and that choice threatens cohesion. But what one says, and reality, are not always the same.

Does the Migrant Caravan Pose a Serious Terrorism Risk?

Yesterday, President Trump tweeted that “unknown Middle Easterners are mixed in” with the migrant caravan approaching the U.S. border. Vice President Pence later tried to justify President Trump’s comment by arguing that, “It is inconvincible that there are not people of Middle Eastern descent in a crowd of more than 7,000 people advancing toward our border.” Todd Bensman of the Center for Immigration Studies wrote that “the president was obviously referencing … ‘special interest aliens’ … U.S.-bound migrants moving along well-established Latin America smuggling routes from [Muslim] countries.” Perhaps President Trump was referencing special interest aliens but the clear implication is that they are potential terrorists who are using the caravan to sneak into the United States and murder Americans.  

The members of the migrant caravan will either apply for asylum at the U.S. border or try to enter illegally. From 1975 through the end of 2017, 9 Americans have been murdered in attacks committed on U.S. soil by 20 foreign-born terrorists who entered illegally or as asylees. During that time, the annual chance of being murdered in a terrorist attack committed by an asylum seeker or an illegal immigrant was about 1 in 1.3 billion per year. Those estimates are based on this methodology with updated numbers. 

During that time, about 31.3 million illegal immigrants entered the U.S. illegally (most have since emigrated, legalized, or passed away) and about 732 thousand asylum seekers have been admitted. Nine of the 20 terrorists who entered did so as illegal immigrants, meaning that about 1 terrorist entered hidden amongst every 3.48 million illegal immigrants. They killed zero people in domestic terror attacks. The 11 terrorists who entered as asylum seekers murdered 9 people in terrorist attacks or about 1 murder for every 81,000 asylum seekers let in.    

Of those 9 terrorists who entered illegally, only 3 did so along the border with Mexico: Shain Duka, Britan Duka, and Eljvir Duka crossed as children with their parents in 1984. They are ethnic Albanians from Macedonia. They were 3 conspirators in the incompetently planned Fort Dix plot that the FBI foiled in 2007, long after they became adults and more than two decades after they entered illegally. There is no evidence that the Fort Dix plot was more than 23 years in the making. 

As far as we can tell, virtually all the members of the migrant caravan come from Central America while the asylum-seeker and illegal immigrant terrorists who committed or attempted to commit attacks on U.S. soil came from Cuba, Lebanon, Pakistan, Palestine, Canada, Algeria, Somalia, Macedonia, Kyrgyzstan, and Afghanistan. Not a single terrorist in any visa category came from Mexico or Central America during the 43-year period.

None of the above estimates are meant to imply that those asylum seekers or illegal immigrants who committed or attempted to commit attacks were terrorists when they entered. Some, like Ramzi Yousef, obviously did enter as terrorists but the Boston Bombers Dzhokhar Tsarnaev and Tamerlan Tsarnaev entered as children too young to be plotting a terrorist attack years later. My colleague David Bier has shown just how rare it is that a foreign-born terrorist intends to come to the United States and how infrequently the government fails to stop him or her. 

This issue is complicated by the recent statements of Guatemalan president Jimmy Morales, who announced that his government “apprehended close to 100 persons completely involved with terrorists, with ISIS and we have not only detained them within our territory, but they have been deported to their country of origin.” Morales then stated that information about these supposed terrorists (like their names or countries of origin) was classified, which should raise a red flag as governments love to brag about their anti-terrorism actions with specifics even when such bragging is unjustified.

Even if we assume that some members of the migrant caravan are Middle Easterners who might pose a higher terrorism risk, that is still no good reason to bar the Central American migrants from applying for asylum. If some Middle Easterners are in this caravan, they too will be able to apply and face the same terrorism vetting procedures that work so well. There is little evidence that there are Middle Easterners in this caravan, even less that there are actual terrorists, and the risk from terrorists crossing the border has been tiny historically. This time could be different, but there is no real evidence to suggest that it is. Whatever problems may arise due to this caravan, the actual threat of terrorism from its members is very small.

Police Clearance Rates Are Not Lower in States with Many Illegal Immigrants

Immigrant criminality and its impact on the United States is one of the most important issues in the public debate over immigration. In order to provide new insight into this topic, my coauthor Michelangelo Landgrave and I have attempted to estimate the illegal immigrant incarceration rate. I have also written a short paper on Texas criminal conviction rates by immigration status and crime based on data provided by the state of Texas. All three papers found that illegal immigrants were less likely to be convicted or incarcerated for crimes than native-born Americans.

My paper on illegal immigrant crime rates in Texas is based on data from the Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS) that I obtained through a Public Information Act request. The Texas DPS data separately show the number of convictions and arrests of illegal immigrants, legal immigrants, and native-born Americans for 44 and 46 different crimes, respectively, in the state of Texas by year from January 1, 2011, to November 15, 2017.

One of the persistent criticisms of my paper on Texas criminal conviction rates is that the DPS data do not record the number of illegal immigrants who commit crimes but are not convicted. Given data limitations, that is probably an impossible question to answer in a satisfactory way for immigrants and for natives.  However, I try to address this criticism in my Texas paper by showing that the gap between the arrest rates and conviction rates for illegal immigrants and the gap between the arrest rates and conviction rates for native-born Americans are similar, indicating that there are few illegal immigrants who are arrested for offenses who then disappear or are deported before their convictions relative to natives who are arrested and then not convicted.

A related criticism is that illegal immigrants flee Texas and then go back to their home countries after they commit crimes, which means that the Texas state conviction data would not count them. Thus, the criminal conviction rate for illegal immigrants is so low because they commit their crimes and flee – an option that few native-born American criminals possess. This argument makes a certain amount of sense in Texas as it shares a long border with Mexico, the source of a majority of illegal immigrants in Texas.

To answer that second criticism, we decided to investigate whether police clearance rates are correlated with the number of illegal immigrants on the state level. According to the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program, law enforcement agencies can clear offenses by one of two means. The first is called “cleared by arrest” whereby a person must be arrested, charged with an offense, and turned over to a court for prosecution.  The second is called “cleared by exceptional means,” whereby the police must identify the offender, gather enough evidence for an arrest and to charge them with a crime, identify the offender’s exact location, and have encountered a circumstance out of law enforcement’s control that prevents an arrest. The death of the offender or the lack of an extradition treaty with the country harboring a suspected criminal are common causes of clearances by “exceptional means.” Mexico and the United States have an extradition treaty. An offense is cleared when the police have taken certain actions to solve the underlying crime short of a criminal conviction.

Landgrave ran many regressions between clearance rates (logged) and the proportion of the population of each state who were illegal immigrants (logged) with state-year and region-year fixed effects. The regressions control for demographic characteristics, the number of police officers for every 100,000 residents, education, and population density. He ran regressions for clearance rates by major crime and the entire crime index. All he found is that motor vehicle theft and burglary clearance rates are positively correlated with the proportion of the population who are illegal immigrants, but only at the 10 percent level for the state-year fixed effects (Table 1, click for larger version). There were no other statistically significant results.

Table 1: Correlation between State Police Clearance Rates and Illegal Immigrant Population

As a quick exercise to test this persistent criticism, these results reveal that there is no nationwide link between clearance rates and the proportion of the population who are illegal immigrants. The only exception is that police clear more motor vehicle and burglary offenses in states with more illegal immigrants as a proportion of their population, but only in one permutation and only at the 10 percent level. Although the theory that illegal immigrants commit crimes and then flee states seems plausible, we see no evidence of that in the aggregate clearance rates.

Fat Cats in the New Yorker

Fat Cats in the New Yorker

This cover image in the New Yorker, titled – obviously – “Fat Cats,” is brought to you by Gucci, Fidelity Investments, Gemfields, Northern Trust, Big Pharma, Mastercard Black Card, First Republic Private Wealth Management, Ocean Reef Club, Swann Auction Galleries, Suntrust Private Wealth Reserve, Ike Behar, Wells Fargo, and other purveyors of goods and services to … well, fat cats.

And most especially, on the flip side of this cartoon mocking rich men in suits, as economist Lawrence H. White noted on Facebook, is a two-page spread advertising made-to-measure suits from Giorgio Armani. 

Who was it who first said, “Think left, live right”?

 

 

Terminating the INF Treaty Makes No Sense

President Trump’s announcement that he plans to withdraw from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty is worrying news for U.S.-Russian relations and for the prospect of effective arms control moving forward.

The INF Treaty was negotiated by President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. Each party agreed to eliminate their nuclear and conventional ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges of 500 to 5,500 km. It was a quite successful arms control agreement, at least until recently. In the last few years, Moscow has tested and deployed cruise missiles that appear to violate INF limits.  

This is the Trump administration’s rationale for terminating the agreement. And the reasoning has a powerful logic. If Russia isn’t going to fully comply with the treaty, why should the United States?

The problem is that simply withdrawing is the most extreme option available and robs us of viable diplomatic solutions while doing nothing to pressure Russia to get back into compliance. Indeed, terminating the agreement is probably the option most likely to generate a new arms race. 

It is worth noting that the Russians claim we cheated first by deploying missile defense systems in Europe that, if used offensively, would violate the terms of the INF treaty. It’s a debatable accusation, but this mutual suspicion is resolvable over the negotiating table. Unfortunately, the Trump administration has barely made an effort to discuss it with Moscow.

The Jones Act Isn’t Working. Just Ask Its Supporters.

Although the Jones Act’s stated purpose is to ensure that the United States “shall have a merchant marine of the best equipped and most suitable types of vessels sufficient to carry the greater portion of its commerce and serve as a naval or military auxiliary in time of war or national emergency,” this plainly isn’t the case. But don’t take my word for it, just listen to ardent backers of the law such as Rep. John Garamendi (D-CA):

Our military relies on privately-owned sealift capacity and highly trained and credentialed merchant mariners to transport and sustain our armed forces when deployed overseas during times of conflict. But the number of ocean-going U.S.-flag vessels has dropped from 249 in the 1980s, to 106 in 2012, to at most 81 today.

The consequences of this steep decline are not just theoretical. Our military has had to turn to foreign-flagged vessels for sustainment in times of war, and experience shows that can have dangerous consequences. In the 1991 Gulf War, our armed forces relied on 192 foreign-flagged ships to carry cargo to the war zone. The foreign crews on thirteen vessels mutinied, forcing those ships to abandon their military mission. Would foreign flag carriers be any more reliable today, especially for a long-term deployment into active war zones?

But the number of ships is not the only issue: The U.S. Transportation Command and Federal Maritime Administration estimate that our country is now at least 1,800 mariners short of the minimum required for adequate military sealift, even with the Jones Act firmly in place. Without the Jones Act, our nation would be wholly unprepared to meet the labor demands of rapid, large-scale force projection for national security.

The House Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Subcommittee’s ranking member is absolutely correct about the sad state of the U.S. merchant fleet. Some of his numbers, however, are off the mark. The drop in the number of ocean-going U.S.-flag vessels is even more dramatic than what he states, declining from 737 in 1985 to a current figure of 180. Regarding the 1991 Gulf War, meanwhile, the actual number of foreign-flagged ships used as part of the U.S. sealift was 177 rather than 192. It’s also inaccurate to say that thirteen vessels were forced to abandon their military mission, with eight of those vessels ultimately delivering their cargo after initial hesitations. 

Although an article of faith in pro-Jones Act circles, the congressman’s claim that the United States would be in even more dire straits absent the law is open to question. The Jones Act’s domestic build requirement, for example, forces U.S. carriers to purchase vessels at vastly inflated prices compared to foreign shipyards (4x is a figure used by many observers while a 2017 Congressional Research Service report placed the U.S. price at 6-8x higher). Using basic microeconomics we can intuit that higher prices mean fewer ships, and thus fewer mariners to crew them. 

Linking to a Cato Institute analysis of the Jones Act, Garamendi then turns his attention to accusations that the law is an “outdated protectionist anachronism”:

Opponents of the Jones Act routinely claim that it is an outdated protectionist anachronism that does more harm than good, but nothing could be further from the truth. A comprehensive 2018 survey of seafaring and industrial nations around the world shows that cabotage laws such as the Jones Act, which provide for domestic preference for shipping policies, are the norm, not the exception. Ninety-one U.N. member states comprising 80 percent of the world’s coastlines have cabotage laws protecting domestic maritime trade. The conclusive fact from this survey is clear: seafaring nations understand the importance of their domestic maritime industries, and have laws on the books to safeguard them.

This misses the point. While cabotage laws are indeed common, the Jones Act’s stringent requirements—and in particular its mandate that ships must be built in the United States—place it well outside the mainstream. Indeed, the World Economic Forum calls the Jones Act the world’s “most restrictive example” of cabotage laws, noting that not even China has a domestic build requirement. 

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Bitcoin After 10 Years

The end of this month (31 October 2018) will mark the 10th anniversary of the online posting of the now-famous white paper by “Satoshi Nakamoto” outlining the concept of “Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System.” This is an opportune occasion to compare what Bitcoin has achieved with what Satoshi wanted to achieve. While Bitcoin’s rise to a market valuation of over $100 billion is certainly a remarkable accomplishment of one sort, the founder had other aims.

Three problems with the status quo

In announcing the new project in February 2009 Satoshi emphasized three institutional problems with the status quo payment system that Bitcoin would address. First, inflation from central banks that issue fiat money:

The root problem with conventional currency is all the trust that’s required to make it work. The central bank must be trusted not to debase the currency, but the history of fiat currencies is full of breaches of that trust.

Second, a lack of privacy and security from commercial banks:

We have to trust them with our privacy, trust them not to let identity thieves drain our accounts.

Third, the high cost of bank-mediated payments:

Their massive overhead costs make micropayments impossible.

How well has Bitcoin addressed these three problems?