At Politico Jeff Greenfield writes about "The Hollywood Hit Movie That Urged FDR to Become a Fascist." The movie was “Gabriel Over the White House” in 1933 and, Greenfield writes, "it was designed as a clear message to President Franklin Delano Roosevelt that he might need to embrace dictatorial powers to solve the crisis of the Great Depression." Greenfield assures us that FDR did not become a dictator, but he notes that "the impulse toward strongman rule" often stems from a sense of populist grievance, along with the scapegoating of "subversive enemies undermining the nation." Depending on the time and the strongman, those subversive enemies can be Jews, capitalists, Wall Street, the 1 percent, the homosexuals, or in some countries the Americans.
Gene Healy wrote about "Gabriel" 10 years ago in The Cult of the Presidency and in this column in 2012:
...many of us still believe in authoritarian powers for the president.
In a November 2011 column, the Washington Post's Dana Milbank offered "A Machiavellian model for Obama" in Jack Kennedy's "kneecapping" and "mob-style threats" against steel-company executives who'd dared to raise prices.
Despite the obligatory caveat: "President Obama doesn't need to sic the FBI on his opponents," Milbank observed that "the price increase was rolled back" only after "subpoenas flew [and] FBI agents marched into steel executives' offices": "Sometimes, that's how it must be. Can Obama understand that?"
Greenfield says "Gabriel" was both a commercial and critical hit, but "faded into obscurity, in large measure because the idea of a “benevolent dictatorship” seemed a lot less attractive after the degradation of Hitler, Mussolini and Stalin."
But that wasn't so obvious in 1933. As I wrote in a review of Three New Deals by Wolfgang Schivelbusch, there was a lot of enthusiasm in the United States for central planning and "Fascist means to gain liberal ends." Two months after Roosevelt's inauguration, the New York Times reporter Anne O’Hare McCormick wrote that the atmosphere in Washington was “strangely reminiscent of Rome in the first weeks after the march of the Blackshirts, of Moscow at the beginning of the Five-Year Plan.… America today literally asks for orders.”
And Roosevelt was prepared to give those orders. In his inaugural address he proclaimed:
If we are to go forward, we must move as a trained and loyal army willing to sacrifice for the good of a common discipline. We are, I know, ready and willing to submit our lives and property to such discipline, because it makes possible a leadership which aims at a larger good. I assume unhesitatingly the leadership of this great army.… I shall ask the Congress for the one remaining instrument to meet the crisis — broad executive power to wage a war against the emergency, as great as the power that would be given to me if we were in fact invaded by a foreign foe.
Fortunately, American institutions did not collapse. The Supreme Court declared some New Deal measures unconstitutional. Some business leaders resisted it. Intellectuals on both the right and the left, some of whom ended up in the early libertarian movement, railed against Roosevelt. Republican politicians (those were the days!) tended to oppose both the flow of power to Washington and the shift to executive authority. But we're being reminded again, in Washington as well as Moscow and Beijing and Budapest and Istanbul, that liberal institutions are always threatened by populism and authoritarianism and especially the combination of the two.
"Gabriel Over the White House" will air on TCM on April 27.
In their highly influential book describing behavioral economics, Nudge, Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sustein devote 2 pages to the notion of "bad nudges." They describe a "nudge" as any aspect of the choice architecture that alters people’s behavior in a predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly changing their economic incentives. The classic example of a nudge is the decision of an employer to "opt-in" or "opt-out" employees from a 401(k) plan while allowing the employee to reverse that choice; the empirical evidence strongly suggests that opting employees into such plans dramatically raises 401(k) participation. Many parts of the book advocate for more deliberate choice architecture on the part of the government in order to "nudge" individuals in the social planner's preferred direction.
Thaler and Sunstein provide short discussion and uncompelling examples of bad nudges. They correctly note "In offering supposedly helpful nudges, choice architects may have their own agendas. Those who favor one default rule over another may do so because their own economic interests are at stake." (p. 239) With respect to nudges by the government, their view is "One question is whether we should worry even more about public choice architects than private choice architects. Maybe so, but we worry about both. On the face of it, it is odd to say that the public architects are always more dangerous than the private ones. After all, managers in the public sector have to answer to voters, and managers in the private sector have as their mandate the job of maximizing profits and share prices, not consumer welfare."
In my recent work (with Jim Marton and Jeff Talbert), we show how bad nudges by public officials can work in practice through a compelling example from Kentucky. In 2012, Kentucky implemented Medicaid managed care statewide, auto-assigned enrollees to three plans, and allowed switching. This fits in with the "choice architecture" and "nudge" design described by Thaler and Sunstein. One of the three plans – called KY Spirit – was decidedly lower quality than the other two plans, especially in eastern Kentucky. For example, KY Spirit was not able to contract with the dominant health care provider in eastern Kentucky due to unsuccessful rate negotiations. KY Spirit’s difficulties in eastern Kentucky were widely reported in the press, so we would expect there to be greater awareness of differences in MCO provider network quality in that region.
Given the virtually identical and non-existent financial differences across the three Medicaid plans (they were essentially free to Medicaid clients), the standard economic framework with rational consumers and trivial transaction costs would predict all enrollees would switch out of lower quality plans. In this case, it would suggest mass defections from KY Spirit. In contrast, the “nudge” framework suggests enrollees would be for more likely to remain in inferior plans. The nudge – in this case a bad nudge – worked. In each of the other two plans – both of higher quality – approximately 95% of those assigned to those plans stayed in them. For KY Spirit, the percentage was lower, but very far from the prediction of full-scale exit. Specifically, 57% of those assigned to KY Spirit remained enrolled in the plan in 2012, despite its well-documented problems. For sicker individuals, 44% remained in KY Spirit, despite the serious problems in accessing healthcare providers. Very few individuals who opted out of their assigned health plan made the active choice to enroll in KY Spirit, consistent with the notion of its low quality. Of more than 37,000 individuals in eastern Kentucky assigned to the other two health plans, slightly more than 100 actively moved into KY Spirit.
Why would public officials assign Medicaid enrollees to a low quality health care plan? After all, virtually all examples of government nudges in the Thaler and Sunstein book portray officials as steering clients in the right direction. In the Kentucky context, the underlying motivation appears to be program costs. The state paid different reimbursement rates to each of the three health plans, and most of the time, KY Spirit was the "low cost, low quality” plan. In reality, this “bad nudge” – from the Medicaid enrollee’s perspective – was a cost saving from the taxpayer’s point of view. Compare to an objective of maximizing the quality of plans for Medicaid enrollees, the actual plan assignment which included some “bad nudges” reduced program costs by approximately 5%.
Although policymakers might be applauded in this case for reigning in program costs through behavioral economics, it is far from the optimistic framework portrayed in Thaler and Sunstein about maximizing client interest.
President Trump’s appointment of Gina Haspel as the new director of the Central Intelligence Agency has revived memories of the abuses the CIA committed during George W. Bush’s administration. The appointment is indeed deeply troubling, since Haspel ran one of the Agency’s infamous overseas “black sites” that featured “enhanced interrogation” techniques (a cynical euphemism for torture). But as I point out in a new National Interest Online article, Haspel’s conduct is the symptom of a much deeper problem. Both during the Cold War and the war on terror, too many U.S. officials have succumbed to the temptation to combat evil behavior with evil behavior. In the process, they have undermined and imperiled fundamental American values.
There is no question that communist powers and radical Islamic terrorists are morally odious adversaries. The United States rightly condemned Moscow’s subjugation of Eastern Europe and the Kremlin’s global subversion campaigns against other societies. But Washington’s conduct was hardly exemplary, and as the Cold War continued, U.S. behavior became increasingly questionable. Especially shameful were those cases in which Washington subverted and overthrew democratic governments to help install “friendly dictators.” There is now indisputable evidence that the United States was involved in such disreputable moves against elected governments in Iran, Guatemala, Chile, and other countries. Indeed, U.S. leaders seemed to prefer pliable autocrats to unpredictable pluralistic systems. When General Chun Doo-hwan overthrew an embryonic democratic government in South Korea, John Wickham, the commander of U.S. forces in that country, excused the seizure of power, saying that South Koreans were “lemming-like” and needed a strong leader.
Indeed, in the name of waging the Cold War, U.S. officials flirted with utterly horrific options. During the Kennedy administration, the CIA concocted a scheme to stage false flag attacks, including blowing up civilian airliners, as a phony justification to invade Cuba and oust Fidel Castro. Fortunately, the White House rejected the scheme, but that supposedly ethical officials could even consider murdering innocent Americans as a geopolitical pretext illustrated just how much U.S. policymakers were beginning to emulate their immoral communist counterparts.
The casual willingness to cut moral corners is evident in the war on terror as well. In addition to the CIA’s own use of torture, Washington embraced the practice of rendition, whereby the United States sent accused terrorists to cooperative dictatorships renowned for using torture techniques that made even the U.S. conduct look mild. Those governments included Saudi Arabia’s brutal theocratic autocracy, Hosni Mubarak’s dictatorship in Egypt, and Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria. Outsourcing torture in that fashion, however, did nothing to dilute America’s responsibility for the resulting egregious human rights violations.
Washington’s overseas military conduct in the war on terror is equally troubling. The awful destruction that U.S. forces have visited on Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Syria has resulted in the deaths of hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians and turned millions of others into destitute refugees. In addition to the needless carnage that the U.S. military has inflicted directly, the United States is an active accomplice in Saudi Arabia’s atrocity-filled war in Yemen.
The German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche expressed the cautionary admonition: “Beware that, when fighting monsters, you yourself do not become a monster.” Too often, U.S. leaders have ignored that warning. In doing so, they have established disturbing, sometimes horrifying, precedents that betray the basic values of a liberal democracy.
Congress passed its first naturalization law 228 years ago on March 26, 1790. The Naturalization Act of 1790 was the most open naturalization law in the world at the time, allowing free white persons of good character to naturalize after two years of residence in the country and one year of residence in a particular state. Denying citizenship to American Indians, free blacks, indentured servants, and others who did not count as free white persons was a great injustice, but the 1790 Act was an improvement over other countries at the time that also limited naturalization based on gender, skill, or religion in addition to race. Although the Naturalization Act of 1790 did place some restrictions on who could become a citizen, it placed no restrictions on who could enter the United States. The Supreme Court largely corrected Congress’ error in 1898 in its United States v. Wong Kim Ark decision when it ruled that children of immigrants, including non-whites, were also citizens if they were born in the United States.
The Western world had a long legal, social, and ethical tradition of openness to immigrants and naturalization that culminated in some of the best portions of the American immigration system. Hillsdale College history professor Bradley J. Birzer wrote a wonderful essay for The American Conservative in January that showed that our civilizational heritage is replete with relatively open borders and the unencumbered movement of people across them with few practical restrictions, with the United States as a recent inheritor of such thought. Although Greeks and Romans both had liberal migration systems, there were important distinctions between Roman and Greek practices of naturalization and citizenship. The American Founding Fathers decidedly favored a model close to that of the Romans over that of the more restrictive Greeks.
Archaeologist John R. Hale of the University of Louisville wrote, “[u]nlike many of its neighbors, Athens eagerly welcomes foreigners from overseas, whether Greek or ‘barbarian,’ and encouraged them to settle down as residents. So tolerant did the Athenians become that they permitted foreign merchants to build shrines to their own gods within the walls of the Piraeus.” Resident foreigners in Athens were called metics and had to pay a special tax called a metoikion. Metics could not own real estate or participate in politics but they could work, amass wealth, and be productive members of the Athenian economy. Athens was the seat of ancient philosophy for several centuries, but many of its most famous philosophers were foreign-born including Aristotle, Anaxagoras, and Zeno. Aristotle and Cephalus, whose mansion Socrates visits at the beginning of The Republic, are two of the most famous metics.
The Athenian political leader Themistocles, whose policies were foremost responsible for Athenian wealth and power, convinced the city to create publicly-funded incentives to attract skilled craftsmen to the city. This is not too different from the mythological Theseus, the first king of Athens, who also encouraged the immigration of metics. After the defeat of Athens in the Social War, Xenophon suggested attracting more metics to the city to help rebuild its economy because they paid taxes but consumed few public benefits.
Athens’ open migration system was in stark contrast to its burdensome citizenship system: Only those born to Athenian parents were citizens. The Assembly in Athens extended citizenship to metics and freed slaves during military emergencies or to larger groups of people for strategic advantage but mainly did so on an individual basis by a vote of the assembly, often after a foreigner served in the military and distinguished himself in battle.
Rome encouraged both immigration and naturalization. Whereas Athens allowed foreigners to live in the city, Rome actually extended citizenship to them and gradually to conquered peoples. It even allowed freed slaves to gain Roman citizenship which occurred in Athens only during military emergencies that required a levee en masse. These unique Roman policies created the most ethnically diverse polity prior to the modern world and allowed people to be citizens of their city of birth and of Rome. The immigration, citizenship, and manumission policies that created Rome are as ancient as the two mythical foundings of the state, according to historian Mary Beard.
The first myth was that of the Trojan refugee Aeneas who founded Rome after displacing the aborigines who originally inhabited the area. According to this tale, the Romans were always foreigners and had no immemorial tie to the land itself. The second myth is that Romulus, who, after founding the city, “declared Rome an asylum and encouraged the rabble and dispossessed of the rest of Italy to join him: runaway slaves, convicted criminals, exiles, and refugees. This produced plenty of men.” Those men then abducted and raped Sabine women in a horrific ruse that is part of the city’s foundation myth. As disgusting as half of that foundation myth is, Romans could never claim to have a blood-based identity due to the foreign origins of the original inhabitants of the city.
As Rome expanded, they gradually extended citizenship to both allies and conquered peoples as a means of increasing the manpower available for military service and rewarding loyalty. Indeed, later restrictions on the extension of Roman resulted in one of the strangest civil wars in history when allied cities rebelled in order to gain naturalization. Republican Rome tightened its citizenship rules after the Second Punic War ended in 202 BC and severely curtailed its previous open-door immigration and naturalization policy. The new restrictions led to an uprising in cities who wanted Roman citizenship. To quiet the unrest, Rome finally reinstated the older naturalization and immigration rules after punishing the ringleaders of the revolt.
A steady stream of immigrants arrived in Rome for centuries with the aid of some famous litigators like Cicero. Many famous Roman families were the descendants of immigrants, including the Julii from Alba Longa, the Coruncanii from Camerium, and the Porcii from Tusculum. Attius Clausus immigrated to Rome in 504 BC from Regillum, eventually becoming a senator and consul. His descendant was the famous Emperor Claudius, who extended Roman citizenship to many Gauls by appealing to the pro-citizenship and immigration mythology of the Roman foundation myth. As Claudius noted, “Our founder Romulus was so wise that he fought as enemies and then hailed as fellow-citizens several nations on the very same day.” In 212 AD, the emperor Caracalla extended citizenship to every free male inhabitant of the Roman Empire, erasing the legal differences between conquerors and conquered. Over the centuries, Roman emperors began to hail from outside of Italy. The emperor Septimus Severus was from Africa, Trajan and Hadrian were both from conservative Spain, Phillip was from Arabia, and almost 20 other Eastern and Western emperors were from the Balkans.
The Founders complained about King George III’s restrictions on naturalization and subsequently created the most liberal naturalization system in the world at the time, and understood that open immigration and liberal naturalization were enormously advantageous to the growing republic. Any comparison to the Classical world is strained but, to the extent which we can compare the current immigration and naturalization system of the United States to the past, the American government clearly borrowed more from the more open Roman system than from the more closed Athenians.
Congress has passed an omnibus appropriations bill that jacks up spending across the board. Projections from the Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget show that the federal river of red ink is fast becoming a flood.
The chart shows CRFB’s “alternative” projection, which is the likely budget path if policymakers do not make major reforms. Deficits are expected to rise relentlessly, topping $1 trillion next year and hitting $2.4 trillion by 2028. That means spending $2.4 trillion more than available revenue that year.
The next president will come into office in early 2021, and the nation will be facing the most dangerous budget situation in peacetime history. If policies are not changed between now and then, he or she will be looking at 10-year deficits of $20 trillion or more. If you think Washington is a dysfunctional mess now with members at each other’s throats, I am guessing that today is a picnic compared to federal policymaking down the road.
E-Verify is a federal government program that allows businesses to check the identities of new hires against federal databases to judge whether they are eligible to legally work in the United States. The goal of the program is to deny illegal immigrants work in the United States. E-Verify has serious problems as it misidentifies a small portion of legal workers as illegal immigrants, imposes a serious regulatory burden on employers and employees, increases employee turnover costs, is expensive, stimulates black market document forging and identity theft, might increase crime, and fails in its primary function of turning off the wage magnet.
Despite all of those problems, the best thing about E-Verify is that many employers do not use it in states where it is mandated and workers have many ways to get around the system, reducing the cost of the mandate. Government data on the number of E-Verify checks that run in each state are sketchy and seem to change with each new FOIA but the most recent one I received from the Department of Homeland Security revealed that my previous work likely overestimated the rates of E-Verify compliance in South Carolina.
South Carolina mandated E-Verify for all employers in 2011 but delayed the start date until January 1, 2012, because (surprise) the system was more complicated than its proponents claimed and the state government did not want to punish every small employer in the state for noncompliance. Despite that, proponents of mandatory E-Verify point to South Carolina as a model system because the state Department of Labor, Licensing, and Regulation (DLLR) conducts random audits of employers to guarantee that they use the system for all new hires.
South Carolina E-Verify Compliance
Sources: Department of Homeland Security and Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics Survey.
South Carolina is the only state that audits employers and punishes them with extra regulatory burdens if they fail to E-Verify all of their new employees but it hasn't resulted in more compliance. South Carolina’s E-Verify mandate has probably not reduced the state’s already low illegal immigrant population and failed to dim the wage and employment magnet that attracted illegal immigrants in the first place. In exchange, the mandate imposed greater regulatory costs on employers and made the state government appear to be a harsh enforcer of immigration laws. That is a bad tradeoff for South Carolina.
If the federal government ever mandates E-Verify, it should follow South Carolina’s example of looking tough but ignoring inconsistencies in the system that point to its ineffectiveness. Regarding E-Verify, the best action for South Carolina and the United States is to drop the charade by canceling the program so Americans can continue to benefit from employing illegal immigrants without E-Verify’s extra regulatory burdens that only help a few South Carolina politicians look tough.
Note: The author made some updates to the statistics and graphs in this post on April 26, 2018 as the result of further federal government data.
ObamaCare turns eight years old today. Some opponents had hoped to mark the occasion by giving supporters the birthday gift they’ve always wanted: a GOP-sponsored bailout of ObamaCare-participating private insurance companies. Fortunately, a dispute over subsidies for abortion providers killed what could have been the first of many GOP ObamaCare bailouts.
ObamaCare premiums have been skyrocketing. All indications are this will continue in 2019, with insurers announcing premium increases up to 32 percent or more just before this year’s mid-term elections. Some Republicans fear voters will punish them for the effects of a law every Republican opposed and most still want to repeal.
Senate health committee chairman Lamar Alexander (R-TN), Sen. Susan Collins (R-ME), and House Energy & Commerce Committee chairman Greg Walden (R-OR) hope to avert calamity by expanding on a proven failure. For months, they have been pushing legislation that would resurrect ObamaCare’s expired “reinsurance” program with $30 billion of new funding.
ObamaCare’s architects knew the law's preexisting-conditions provisions would effectively destroy the individual health insurance market. They added the reinsurance program in an attempt to put Humpty Dumpty back together again.
ObamaCare’s preexisting-conditions provisions both increase health-insurance premiums and reduce health-insurance quality. They achieve the former, first, by requiring insurers to cover patients with uninsurable preexisting conditions, and again by unleashing adverse selection. Those factors in turn reduce quality by literally punishing insurers who offer high-quality coverage for the sick.
From 2014 until it expired at the end of 2016, ObamaCare’s reinsurance program gave participating insurers extra taxpayer subsidies to cover the claims of high-cost patients whom its preexisting-conditions provisions require them to cover at a loss. The extra subsidies were supposed to reduce premiums, and prevent a race to the bottom fueled by ObamaCare’s penalties on quality coverage.
If ObamaCare’s reinsurance program was supposed to keep premiums from skyrocketing, it was an utter failure. Premiums increased 18-25 percent per year from 2013 through 2016, well above the trend of 3-4 percent from 2008 to 2013. By 2017, premiums had doubled—a cumulative increase of 99 percent or 105 percent, depending on the source—from pre-ObamaCare levels. ObamaCare’s preexisting-conditions provisions were the driving force behind these premium increases.
Likewise, ObamaCare's reinsurance program failed to prevent its preexisting-conditions provisions from triggering a race to the bottom on health-insurance quality. Research indicates the penalties those provisions impose on high-quality coverage are indeed making coverage increasingly worse for patients with multiple sclerosis and other high-cost conditions, with no end in sight. All the king’s reinsurance and all the king’s men cannot put Humpty together again.
At this point, ObamaCare supporters might object that premiums would have risen even more without the reinsurance program in place. But this is false. Reinsurance programs do not reduce premiums at all.
To illustrate, take Sen. Collins’ claim that $30 billion in reinsurance subsidies would reduce ObamaCare premiums 40 percent. The claim is complete nonsense. Giving insurance companies $30 billion of taxpayer money would not magically make them 40 percent more efficient. If that were true, a $75 billion bailout would make ObamaCare totally free.
ObamaCare’s reinsurance program did not reduce premiums by a single penny, and neither would a Republican reinsurance program, because government subsidies do not reduce premiums. Giving taxpayer dollars to private insurance companies merely shifts part of the premium from enrollees to taxpayers. If a $30 billion insurance-industry bailout causes the amount ObamaCare enrollees pay for their coverage to fall 40 percent, it is because that 40 percent is being shifted to someone else—i.e., you. (If anything, government subsidies increase premiums through moral hazard.)
Nevertheless, the idea that subsidies reduce premiums is the kind of falsehood Washington will forever exclaim as gospel because it serves the economic interests of insurance companies, and the political interests of politicians who want to be seen as Doing Something, without actually solving anything.
The only thing reinsurance subsidies are guaranteed to do is hand even more taxpayer dollars to private insurance companies. ObamaCare already hands more than $50 billion in explicit government subsidies to participating insurance companies each year. It hands insurers billions more by forcing healthy enrollees to overpay for health insurance. If the first $50 billion didn’t solve the problem, why should we expect another $30 billion would? And if it doesn’t, how much more good money will Congress throw after bad?
Fortunately, a dispute over whether these subsidies could go to insurers that cover abortion prevented the Alexander-Collins-Walden bailout from passing as part of the massive $1.3 trillion spending bill Congress passed to avert a government shutdown today.
Alexander, Collins, and Walden should take the hint and stop trying to bail out ObamaCare, which would just double (or triple, or quadruple) down on a failed system. If Congress is unwilling to repeal and replace ObamaCare yet, opponents should be pushing states to allow individuals and employers to purchase health insurance licensed by U.S. territories, which are exempt from ObamaCare’s costliest regulations, and pushing HHS to reverse its administrative ban on “renewal guarantees” in short term plans. These steps would provide relief for the vast majority of those in the individual market, before the mid-term elections, and disproportionately in areas where the GOP is defending congressional seats. They would also give ObamaCare opponents greater leverage in Congress, and even force supporters to the negotiating table.
If instead Alexander, Collins, and Walden succeed in delivering an ObamaCare bailout, it would mark a stunning reversal for the GOP. Republicans spent seven years promising to repeal ObamaCare and one year trying to replace it, while supporters of the law refused to help—or even to acknowledge ObamaCare’s fundamental flaws. A bailout would hand supporters what they have always wanted but Republicans have heretofore refused to give: more government spending, zero reform, and a bipartisan imprimatur on ObamaCare. One thing is certain: the GOP's first ObamaCare bailout would not be their last.