The new science fiction movie Downsizing with Matt Damon opens at theaters this week. Wiki provides a summary:
Downsizing imagines what might happen if, as a solution to over-population, Norwegian scientists discover how to shrink humans to 5 inches (13 cm) tall and propose a 200-year global transition from big to small, but with one catch: the procedure cannot be reversed. People soon realize how much further money goes in a miniaturized world, and with the promise of a better life, everyman Paul Safranek (Matt Damon) and wife Audrey (Kristen Wiig) decide to abandon their stressed lives in Omaha in order to become small and move to a new downsized community—a choice that triggers life-changing adventures. To Paul's horror and outrage, he finds out that Audrey backed out at the last second. After the couple understands that they do not have a future together, they divorce and Paul must now figure out how to start his life over in a completely different world.
That sounds interesting. But I think the following tweaks would have improved the plot:
Downsizing imagines what might happen if, as a solution to over-spending, Cato social scientists discover how to shrink the federal government to 5 percent of GDP and propose a 20-year transition from big to small, but with one advantage: the procedure cannot be reversed. People soon realize how much further money goes in a world with a miniaturized Washington, and with the promise of a better life, most Americans abandon their partisan acrimony and embrace their newly empowered local communities—a choice that triggers life-changing adventures. To widespread horror and outrage, Americans find that a few big government zealots try to sabotage the peaceful transition. After the zealots understand that Americans want freedom, they emigrate to a completely different world to impose their ideas, which are divorced from reality.
For this version, I would cast Vince Vaughn instead of Matt Damon and Julienne Davis instead of Kristen Wig.
Anyway, while we are waiting for Hollywood to make Downsizing 2 along these lines, we should ask policymakers to pursue real-life downsizing of the federal budget. The proposals here would chop spending from 23 percent of GDP to 18 percent. More cuts would be needed to reach 5 percent, but remember that defense is only 3 percent of GDP, and other spending is less important.
DownsizingGovernment.org discusses how to miniaturize federal agencies. Rather than shrinking bureaucrats to 5 inches tall, it proposes to eliminate their programs, allowing them to start over in the completely different world of the private sector.
Cato’s new E-book, Downsizing Federal Government Spending, includes essays by Cato scholars on how to divorce federal taxpayers from farm subsidies, infrastructure spending, and other programs that shrink their wallets.
The recently concluded tax reform conference report draft includes a one-percentage-point increase in the corporate tax rate above what both the House and the Senate passed, with some of the revenue savings being used to keep a portion of the deduction for state and local taxes as well as forego delaying its implementation until 2019, as the previous bills proposed. There remains a chance the rate may tick up yet again before negotiations are concluded, especially if other targeted tax breaks get some traction in the Congress over the next few days.
However, even this small diminution in the rate reduction is a mistake: while a one point increase may seem to be a trifle, each uptick in the corporate tax rate represents a large opportunity cost that Congress won’t be able to easily rectify in the future.
My former colleague Gordon Gray and I examined the tax code that emerged from the 1986 tax reform, as well as the various changes Congress made to the code in the subsequent thirty years, in a study published in Tax Notes, to see if we could discern some broad patterns regarding what sorts of changes proved ephemeral and which ended up being permanent.
As to the former, the list stretches a mile wide: Congress has changed the top personal tax rates four times since 1986 and seems poised to change it again. It has also tinkered with tax rates on dividends and capital gains numerous times. It has also inserted a litany of tax credits, subsidies and the like over that period as well, in order to encourage us to conserve energy, pollute less, or save more for retirement, or health care, education, or a funeral. A few years ago Rep. Thaddeus McCotter even proposed a tax break for pet expenses.
On the corporate side, Congress has done nearly as much tweaking. For instance, it tends to change the tax treatment of capital investment every business cycle, and a few years ago it created a special tax rate for manufacturers (and other industries with enough juice to be labeled as such). Congress has also modified how overseas income is taxed several times, and altered the code repeatedly to encourage environmentally sound behavior.
What hasn't changed over the last thirty years? The corporate tax rate. A mere one point increase in 1993 marks its only alteration since the 1986 reform. In the context of our government’s predilection to conduct a wide manner of economic policy through taxes, its stickiness is remarkable.
We suspect the durability of the corporate tax rate owes to the fact that the benefits to reducing the rate can be difficult for voters to comprehend. Opponents of tax reform can simply shout that it is nothing but a giveaway to big business and that has often proven to be enough to get congressmen to back away.
Of course, it is anything but a giveaway. During the three decades of U.S. corporate tax rate stasis, literally every country in the OECD has reduced its tax rate numerous times. In 1987 we had one of the lowest corporate tax rates amongst the group, but today we have the highest by far, which has made it more difficult for U.S. companies to compete against their foreign competitors. From 2000-2012, there were 85 different corporate rate tax reductions in the OECD, I found.
The high U.S. corporate tax rate is especially pernicious, because it is a lousy way to collect tax revenue. Since a good fraction of it is borne by the workers in the form of lower wages, it’s not nearly as progressive as most people assume, and it achieves that progressivity at an extremely high opportunity cost in terms of foregone economic growth. Nobel Laureate Robert Lucas once said that eliminating the corporate tax was the closest thing to a free lunch that he has ever observed in economics.
History has shown that many other changes in the tax reform plan may be unwound in the near future, no matter what the final legislation contains. For better or worse, Congress cannot tie the hands of a future congress. But whatever happens with the corporate tax rate in the final bill will likely remain the law for the foreseeable future, so above all else we should strive to get it right.
And the right rate is the lowest rate possible.
In their infinite wisdom, the Founding Fathers warned against the dangers of standing armies and determined that it should be civilians, not military leaders, who had final authority over the size, shape, and use of America’s armed forces. Their reasoning was simple. Without civilian control of the military there would be no bulwark against military coup or dictatorship.
But civilian control should not stop at simple control over the armed forces. Civilian officials must provide active leadership and management of the full spectrum of American foreign policy efforts, from intelligence gathering and alliance building to arms sales and crisis diplomacy and, most importantly, the decision to make war. The old chestnut that “War is too important to be left to the generals” is an old chestnut for a reason: It’s true.
Civilian leaders have institutional incentives to be responsive to the full range of considerations that must inform foreign policy. Military leaders, as well informed and dedicated as they may be, operate with too much occupational bias to be the only source of input to the foreign policy making process. Their input on military matters is critical – but not sufficient. Socialized to look at every mission in black and white military terms, military leaders are in fact poorly suited to exercise the kind of political judgment required in a liberal democracy.
And this is where we have a problem. Since taking office, Donald Trump has made it achingly clear that he has little or no respect for the concept of civilian control, and little interest in exercising the sort of political judgment necessary from the White House.
As a candidate Trump exhibited signs of militarism, but it was his appointment of several current and former generals that signaled the coming erosion of civilian leadership. McMaster, Kelly, and Mattis are all clever and competent people, but putting military leaders in charge of the Pentagon and the National Security Council began the tilting of the playing field, ensuring that Trump would get a larger dose of the military worldview in every conversation about world affairs.
The real proof of the loss of civilian control over foreign policy, however, has been Trump’s abandonment of diplomacy. First, Trump appointed Rex Tillerson, a man he had never met and whom he clearly did not really trust, as the Secretary of State. Then, he made sure that Tillerson’s main job would not be to act as the nation’s top diplomat and top foreign policy advisor to the president, but instead to perform radical surgery on the State Department. Tillerson’s plans to shrink and reorganize the State Department have already led a large percentage of the department’s most talented people to resign or retire. The failure to appoint new leaders for a vast number of top State Department jobs not only echoes Trump’s disinterest in diplomacy, but also undermines the broader concept of civilian control in foreign policy.
Of course, it’s not clear that Trump even thinks he needs a State Department. When Tillerson was trying to encourage North Korea to sit down for talks with the United States in late September, Trump hamstrung his efforts by issuing a contradictory pair of tweets: “I told Rex Tillerson, our wonderful Secretary of State, that he is wasting his time trying to negotiate with Little Rocket Man...” and then, “...Save your energy Rex, we'll do what has to be done!”
The implication is clear: not only aren’t Rex Tillerson and the State Department part of the solution, Trump doesn’t even think of Tillerson as being part of his national security leadership team in the first place. It’s hard to imagine any previous president saying “we” with respect to a foreign policy issue and the Secretary of State not being part of that “we.”
Beyond the loss of diplomatic influence and engagement it portends, Trump’s breathless militarism and the loss of civilian control also puts the nation at grave risk. Less than two weeks ago one of Trump’s generals, National Security Adviser Henry McMaster, warned that the potential for war with North Korea was increasing by the day and that there “isn’t much time left” to prevent it. Rather than working with a wide range of civilian and military leaders to figure out how to make diplomacy work in North Korea, it looks like Trump has already decided that the military option is the only one that matters.
When Trump took office, many people hoped that “responsible adults” might be able to moderate his foreign policies. Without greater civilian leadership, however, the prospects for sound foreign policy look grim.
As college students across the country begin their final exams, we are reminded of the unfortunate reality that much of what we learn in school or other parts of life will eventually be forgotten. Usually, this is more of a nuisance than a problem. A failure to recall the finer points of Shakespearean literature is unlikely to trouble most accountants, nor is a marketing specialist apt to lose sleep over the lost ability to define the Pythagorean Theorem. It’s a bigger problem, however, when the Secretary of Commerce forgets some basic lessons of international trade.
Appearing at an Atlantic Council event earlier this week, Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross argued that the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (KORUS) should address the U.S. trade in goods deficit with South Korea. Despite the fact that economists generally agree that the trade deficit is not a good indicator of a country’s economic performance—or as our colleague Dan Ikenson argues, is not a problem to solve—Secretary Ross thinks otherwise. In the context of president Trump’s recent visit to Asia, he stated the following:
President Trump…underscored the need to rebalance the KORUS free trade agreement to reduce the substantial trade deficit that we have with Korea. That deficit has nearly tripled to $27.7 billion since KORUS went into effect. Among the most important reasons for the increased deficit has been the imbalance between automotive imports and exports. Our automotive imports from Korea are almost nine times our exports of autos to them. And remarkable as it may sound, we export to Korea more dollars’ worth of corn and beef combined, than we do cars—seems strange for an industrialized economy.
The solution he offered to this “problem” was for South Korea to agree to purchase more liquefied natural gas, petroleum, food products, machinery and industrial equipment from the United States instead of other countries.
There are two basic things Secretary Ross gets wrong with this line of reasoning. First, he misunderstands the one true and nontrivial principle in the social sciences, which is Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage. Second, by focusing only on goods—and cars in particular—he ignores the diversity of the U.S. economy, and some of its greatest strengths, such as the services industry. We address both in turn.
David Ricardo clearly explained the theory of comparative advantage in On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation 200 years ago. He stated:
If Portugal had no commercial connexion with other countries, instead of employing a great part of her capital and industry in the production of wines, with which she purchases for her own use the cloth and hardware of other countries, she would be obliged to devote a part of that capital to the manufacture of those commodities, which she would thus obtain probably inferior in quality as well as quantity.
The quantity of wine which she shall give in exchange for the cloth of England, is not determined by the respective quantities of labour devoted to the production of each, as it would be, if both commodities were manufactured in England, or both in Portugal.
England may be so circumstanced, that to produce the cloth may require the labour of 100 men for one year; and if she attempted to make the wine, it might require the labour of 120 men for the same time. England would therefore find it her interest to import wine, and to purchase it by the exportation of cloth.
To produce the wine in Portugal, might require only the labour of 80 men for one year, and to produce the cloth in the same country, might require the labour of 90 men for the same time. It would therefore be advantageous for her to export wine in exchange for cloth. This exchange might even take place, notwithstanding that the commodity imported by Portugal could be produced there with less labour than in England. Though she could make the cloth with the labour of 90 men, she would import it from a country where it required the labour of 100 men to produce it, because it would be advantageous to her rather to employ her capital in the production of wine, for which she would obtain more cloth from England, than she could produce by diverting a portion of her capital from the cultivation of vines to the manufacture of cloth (para. 7.13-7.16).
This example highlights an important element of comparative advantage. First, even if one country is the best at everything (in other words, has an absolute advantage), it is still better served by focusing on what it produces best, and importing the remaining items. Why? Because an absolute advantage does not necessarily equal a comparative advantage, as the latter is based on the opportunity cost of making one thing over another. For instance, if planning a birthday party with a friend, and you’re better at both baking cakes and writing nice invitations but only slightly better at the invitations, it makes more sense for you to bake the cake and for your friend to send out the invites than for you to do both. It not only is more efficient, but it also spares up the time you would have spent writing those invitations to focus on making an even better cake. Essentially, comparative advantage allows for greater investment in the thing you are good at, and in turn, makes you better at it over time.
This logic is easily applied to the bilateral trade relationship between the United States and South Korea. Endowed with vast amounts of land ideally suited both for cattle grazing and growing of corn, the United States enjoys a considerable comparative advantage in such products and is the world’s largest producer of both. Lacking such geographic advantages but possessing a highly-skilled workforce and some of the world’s leading manufacturing firms, South Koreans instead specialize in the production of cars. By focusing on what each country does best, and then engaging in trade, the citizens of both countries are made better off. Rather than building cars, Iowa corn farmers raise crops, harvest them, and then send them to foreign lands where in exchange they receive cars and other needed goods. To force South Korean autoworkers to grow their own corn or Iowa farmers to build their own cars would be to live in a less prosperous world.
Also overlooked by Secretary Ross is that a country as vast and economically developed as the United States is able to enjoy comparative advantages across multiple sectors and industries. In addition to being an agricultural juggernaut, the United States is—perhaps contra the popular narrative—a manufacturing powerhouse with output near record highs. While the United States does indeed send large amounts of beef, corn, and other agricultural products to South Korea—$6.2 billion worth in 2016—these are dwarfed by its manufacturing exports. Indeed, one category of manufacturing exports alone, machinery, saw exports ($6.1 billion) nearly equal to agricultural products in their entirety. The United States exported another $5.3 billion worth of electrical machinery, $5.2 billion in aircraft, and $2.9 billion worth of optical and medical instruments, in addition to vehicle sales of $2.2 billion.
Beyond its massive agricultural and manufacturing sectors, the United States—like most advanced economies—is also increasingly oriented towards the production of services where it possesses considerable expertise. Not mentioned by the Commerce Secretary is that the United States exported $21.6 billion in services to South Korea in 2016 and was left with a trade surplus in this sector of $10.7 billion.
Unlike the goods trade deficit, Secretary Ross has made no indication that he believes this particular trade surplus to be a problem or that he intends to pressure Americans into purchasing additional South Korean services to achieve balance. Nor should he. Rather, the citizens of both the United States and South Korea should be left to their own devices to purchase the products and services they desire and trade as they see fit with minimal interference. Instead of bemoaning a goods trade deficit that is more statistical quirk than indicator of economic vitality, or puzzling over why the United States does not export more of a particular good, Ross would do better to spend his time removing the remaining barriers to trade between the United States and South Korea and allowing the miracle of comparative advantage to work its magic.
It was reported last week that a Republican working group is considering a proposal to link spending caps to the growth of actual or potential GDP. This is encouraging, and much more economically sensible than rigid balanced budget legislation.
I’ll write about other countries’ experiences with backward-looking rules in the future. But one country which uses forward-looking estimates of potential GDP to determine overall government spending is Chile. Indeed, economists such as Jeffrey Frankel have previously written glowingly about Chile’s fiscal rule, which Frankel concluded had constrained government debt whilst being flexible enough to allow automatic stabilizers to operate.
First, some background: in 2000 the Chilean government voluntarily adopted a structural budget surplus rule of one percent of GDP each year. This was lowered to half a percent of GDP in 2007, and then to a simple balanced structural budget rule in 2009 once government debt had essentially been paid off.
What does this mean in practice? A committee of independent experts meets once a year to provide the government with estimates of potential GDP. A separate committee assesses whether copper prices (a key driver of revenues) are higher or lower than trend. These two opinions are put together to determine an estimate of government revenues for the year if the economy was operating at its potential with copper prices at their long-term level. This determines the total maximum spending level allowed in the budget plan for the year. In other words, spending is capped based upon an estimate of tax revenues if the economy was at potential.
Unlike strict balanced budget proposals, the Chilean rule allows automatic stabilizers to operate, and the overall budget balance to fluctuate with the state of the economy. The government runs a deficit if output and revenues are below potential, and run a surplus if output and revenues rise above potential. Debt therefore acts a shock absorber for unforeseen deviations in economic activity. Provided the potential of the economy is estimated accurately, this means a balanced budget over the economic cycle. With economic growth then, such a rule theoretically means the debt-to-GDP ratio should gradually fall.
Crucial to the rule’s success, then, is accurate and unbiased estimates of the economy’s potential. Chile’s independent committees are designed to mitigate against the politicization of these. It’s hoped they reduce the incentive to be overoptimistic about the economy’s potential to justify higher spending. Given this independence, under Chile’s rule there are no sanctions if within a year the structural balance requirement is breached, and no adjustment in future budgets required from worse-than-expected deficits.
How has this framework performed since implementation? Prior to the financial crisis, Chilean central government debt fell sharply as a result of running sustained structural surpluses, and Chile’s sovereign debt rating improved. In fact, even the announcement of the rule in 2000 improved Chile’s creditworthiness. Frankel shows public spending fluctuated much less than in previous decades and GDP volatility declined substantially between 2001 and 2005.
The virtues of such a rule really became apparent though just before the financial crisis. President Michele Bachelet was pressured to substantially increase government spending given sustained strong GDP growth and a high world price of copper. Yet unlike the US in the early 2000s, IMF data shows that in 2007 Chile resisted these pressures and ran an overall budget surplus of 7.9 percent of GDP, with the independent experts judging most of the strong budget performance as resulting from the economy running above its potential.
This proved prescient. By 2009, the budget had swung to a 4.2 percent deficit as the global recession hit. General government debt increased again due to this large borrowing, but Chile had been so fiscally prudent prior to the crash that even today the IMF believes general government debt is only 21.3 percent of GDP, and net debt just 1 percent of GDP.
More recently, however, some of the difficulties of the rule have been in evidence. Chile raised its corporate income tax rate from 17 to 20 percent under President Sebastian Pinera in 2011, and has since raised the rate further to 25.5 percent under President Bachelet, with the intention to provide revenues for education and social spending. But during this period of higher taxes and steep spending increases (overall spending has increased by 3.8 percentage points of GDP since 2011), annual real GDP growth has performed consistently below expectations, and copper prices have been low. The result has been unforeseen structural deficits, with gross government debt near-doubling between 2013 and 2017, and net debt drifting back into positive territory, despite a pick up in global growth.
This highlights a key challenge of linking spending to potential GDP: it can be inherently difficult to assess, particularly when major supply-side policy changes occur. Calculating “cyclically-adjusted revenues” to determine spending caps requires accurate assessment of a) the health of the economy in real time, b) the “output gap” – i.e. how far the economy is away from its potential, c) how moving to potential affects revenues. All are highly uncertain and difficult to calculate.
Despite the existence of Chile’s fiscal rule then, and previous commitments to it, slower than expected growth after the crisis saw President Sebastian Pinera downgrade its stringency – aiming to hit a target of a 1 percent of GDP structural deficit by 2014. President Bachelet, in the face of sluggish growth and structural deficits being revised upwards, then began basing fiscal targets on a trajectory for the structural deficit (which should fall by 0.25 percent of GDP per year) rather than specific levels. The IMF now believes that Chile’s slow growth reflects lower potential GDP, and that the country was running a structural deficit of 2.2 percent of GDP in 2016. S&P this year downgraded Chile’s credit rating.
Chile’s experience then clearly the strengths and weaknesses of fiscal rules based upon potential GDP. In theory, and when potential GDP is estimated accurately, a structural balance rule delivers counter-cyclical fiscal policy (the correlation between Chile’s budget surplus and real GDP growth since 2007 is 0.65, see the chart below), balances budgets over the economic cycle and leads to a gradual reduction in the debt-to-GDP ratio. Independent committees, in Chile’s case, likewise help to mitigate against politicians spending near-term budget windfalls or using them to justify more optimistic forecasts.
Chile’s Counter-Cyclical Fiscal Policy
Source: International Monetary Fund Fiscal Monitor October 2017
But potential GDP is tough to measure. Under Chile’s rule, no additional constraints are placed on government spending to correct for mistakes. Ultimately, when potential GDP was revised down, and structural deficits up, successive governments chose not to adjust spending accordingly, but aimed to return to something closer to structural balance over a longer period. This highlights the limits of fiscal rules in general, and the need for political will in ensuring they are not abandoned.
The implications of letting bygones be bygones in this way and only adjusting spending decisions on a forward-looking basis might not be significant for a country starting with low levels of government debt, such as Chile. But a rule which allowed such mistakes without consequence could cause considerably more damage for a country with already high debt-to-GDP levels, such as the US.
Rules based on potential GDP are theoretically appealing and work well if estimates of potential are accurate. But that’s a big if.
All I want for Christmas is for the U.S. to only fight the wars it has to and to stay out of all the others. The lives of young Americans are too high a price to pay for wars driven by threat inflation, ego, or fool-hardy social experiments.
First, we’re Americans. Enough of the hand wringing. Islamist-inspired terrorists do not hide around every corner. Instead, we have been and continue to be quite safe. The threat from groups operating within failed states like Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and so on pales in comparison to Hitler’s armies marching across Europe and our nuclear Cold War with the Soviet Union, despite President Trump's attempts to equate the three.
Second, the unseemly traits of ego, vanity, and hubris should not push us to fight when we don’t have to. Teddy Roosevelt had it right: Walk softly and carry a big stick.
Third, American lives and financial treasure should not be spent on cool sounding social experiments like, “democracy will flourish in Muslim-majority states in response to U.S. invasions.” Since 9/11, though, all three U.S. administrations have referred to Afghan and Iraqi leaders as “reliable partners” at one time or another, while extolling democratic progress in both countries.
The data, however, provide no support for those claims. As of today, Freedom House gives both countries it’s lowest rating—“not free.” And, in terms of corruption, Iraq and Afghanistan’s governments rank worse than 94 and 96 percent of all governments worldwide.
All war is darkness. My Opa spoke those words to me 40 years ago. I remember it vividly because as he shared that one sentence, he pointed to the bullet hole in his shoulder and the shrapnel scar on his neck. He had barely survived the war as an enlisted man in the German army; and when the war ended, he found his home country had become East Germany. Three years later, he took my Oma and (then) three year old dad and they escaped to the west. Eventually, they made it to America.
My war experiences have been much briefer than my Opa’s, but I get his point. All war is darkness, so for the sake of those sent to do the fighting, the war has to be a necessary one. And our war on terror isn’t.
Let’s bring America’s sons and daughters home for the holidays. We’ll all be the better for it.
On December 4, 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court allowed the third version of the President's travel ban, which limits the entry of citizens from eight countries, to go into effect. The White House claimed the Supreme Court decision as a victory, with spokesman Hogan Gidley saying, “The proclamation is lawful and essential to protecting our homeland. We look forward to presenting a fuller defense of the proclamation as the pending cases work their way through the courts.”
While the domestic implications of the Supreme Court’s decision will unfold in the next few weeks, the foreign policy implications will be widespread, and potentially damaging to U.S. interests and reputation.
Before delving into the foreign policy implications, however, it is important to note two important aspects of the U.S. Supreme Court that determine the impact of its decisions on U.S. foreign policy. First, even though the judiciary is constitutionally designed to check against executive power expansion, past administrations, along with the Court itself, have taken a narrow view of the Court's authority when it comes to interpreting international laws and foreign policy. Second, and most importantly, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Case or Controversy Clause of Article III of the Constitution in a way that prohibits the courts from issuing advisory opinions. The Court’s decision on the travel ban, however, is to stay the district court’s preliminary injunction, which is a temporary maintenance of the status quo. The Court has decided to the let the ban be implemented while the merits of the ban continued to be argued in lower courts.
Yet, even though the Court’s decision does not necessarily mean that the ban will ultimately be upheld, the decision has had three immediate—and negative—foreign policy implications.
The first, and most obvious, implication is the sustainment of the faulty link between immigration and terrorism. Cato’s Alex Nowrasteh and David Bier have written extensively on the flawed logic and harmful effects of the travel ban on immigration to the United States. One of the unintended consequences of the Court’s decision was a reinforcement of President Trump’s troublesome rhetoric on immigration, highlighted when the president commented on the most recent failed terrorist attack in New York City. President Trump argued that the current immigration system is, “incompatible with national security” and that Congress must end “chain migration,” which refers to the ability of U.S. citizens to sponsor their siblings for U.S. visas, even though there is little evidence indicating that such a measure will make America safer.
The second implication of the Supreme Court decision is connected to the growing anti-Muslim sentiment within the United States, which has entered the Trump administration’s foreign policy in the form of the travel ban and policy on refugees. Six out of the eight banned countries are Muslim-majority (Chad, Iran, Libya, Syria, Somalia, and Yemen) and the president has often referred to the ban as the “Muslim Ban.” Similarly, the president has stated that his administration will prioritize Christian refugees. While the Supreme Court decision is not a final ruling on the merits, the Trump administration has called it a victory. Thus, the Trump administration appears to have taken the Court’s decision as a signal that its third attempt at a travel ban will ultimately survive judicial review.
The third, and final, implication of the Court decision is the worsening of U.S. relations with both Iran and North Korea at a time when tensions are already high. Anti-Americanism is steadily on the rise in Iran, while relations with North Korea have been escalating to a point where some analysts fear an onset of a nuclear war.
So for Christmas, if I could have one wish granted, it would be to end the travel ban in its entirety. Not only is the ban based on a false narrative and poor empirical analyses, but it also fails to make the United States more secure. Furthermore, it constantly undermines U.S. interests abroad.