Economist John B. Taylor reviews Reckless Endangerment by Gretchen Morgenson and Joshua Rosner:
The book focuses on two agencies of government, Fannie Mae and the Federal Reserve. The mutual support system is better explained and documented in the case of Fannie, the government-sponsored enterprise that supported the home mortgage market by buying mortgages and packaging them into marketable securities which it then guaranteed and sold to investors. The federal government supported Fannie Mae — and the other large government-sponsored enterprise, Freddie Mac — by implicitly backing up those guarantees and by providing favorable regulatory treatment and protection from competition. These benefits enabled Fannie to rake in excess profits — $2 billion in excess, according to a 1995 study by the Congressional Budget Office.
The book then gives examples where Fannie’s executives — Jim Johnson, CEO from 1991 to 1998 [and also top aide to Vice President Walter Mondale, campaign manager for Mondale, head of vice presidential selection for both John F. Kerry and Barack Obama, and chairman of both the Kennedy Center and the Brookings Institution], is singled out more than anyone else — used the excess profits to support government officials in a variety of ways with plenty left over for large bonuses: They got jobs for friends and relatives of elected officials, including Rep. Barney Frank, who is tagged as “a perpetual protector of Fannie,” and they set up partnership offices around the country which provided more jobs. They financed publications in which writers argued that Fannie’s role in promoting homeownership justified federal support. They commissioned work by famous economists, such as Nobel Prize-winner Joseph Stiglitz, which argued that Fannie was not a serious risk to the taxpayer, countering “critics who argued that both Fannie and Freddie posed significant risks to the taxpayer.” They made campaign contributions and charitable donations to co-opt groups like the community action organization ACORN, which “had been agitating for tighter regulations on Fannie Mae.” They persuaded executive branch officials — such as then Deputy Treasury Secretary Larry Summers — to ask their staffs to rewrite reports critical of Fannie. In the meantime, Countrywide, the mortgage firm led by Angelo Mozilo, partnered with Fannie in originating many of the mortgages Fannie packaged (26 percent in 2004) and gave “sweetheart” loans to politicians with power to affect Fannie, such as Sen. Chris Dodd of Connecticut. The authors write that “Countrywide and Fannie Mae were inextricably bound.”
But don't ignore the role of the Fed:
Early on the authors take on the Boston Fed, and in particular its research director Alicia Munnell, for using a study documenting racial discrimination in mortgage lending to justify the relaxation of credit standards, even though the study’s findings were found to be flawed by other researchers. And they criticize the very low interest rate set by the Fed when Alan Greenspan was chairman and Ben Bernanke was a Fed governor, saying it “contributed mightily to the mortgage lending craze,” adding that “with the Fed on a rate-cutting rampage, demand for adjustable-rate mortgages with relatively low initial interest costs had become incendiary.”
If you watched the HBO movie Too Big to Fail, you wouldn't get much sense that government actions -- easy money, the homeownership mania, HUD and Fannie's push to lend to non-creditworthy borrowers -- played a major role in the housing bubble and subsequent financial crisis. Sounds like this book would make good supplemental reading for viewers, along with Johan Norberg's Financial Fiasco.
When President Obama, following his midterm "shellacking" at the polls, announced his belated conversion to the cause of regulatory relief, I was skeptical. I noted that, despite the reputation of OIRA chief Cass Sunstein as a brilliant scholar with an openness to cost-benefit analysis rare on the Left, the first two years of the Obama administration had been marked by a tremendous ramping up of regulatory burdens on the economy, both in areas of new legislation (ObamaCare, Dodd-Frank) and in new agency rulemakings gearing up from the "ultras" — ardently pro-regulatory appointees like Margaret Hamburg at FDA, Lisa Jackson at EPA, and David Michaels at OSHA. I also observed that in boasting of its deregulatory accomplishments, the administration chose an exceedingly minor example (saccharin's reclassification as not being a hazardous waste) in which no one important seemed to have been pushing on the opposite side. That suggested that the Obama White House might lack the stomach to press deregulation when doing so might actually offend pro-regulation constituencies.
Yesterday the administration announced the results of its comprehensive review in which more than two dozen agencies looked at existing regulations to identify areas where burdens could be reduced [WaPo, AEI Enterprise, Wayne Crews/CEI]. As Cary Coglianese notes at the Penn Program on Regulation's RegBlog,
[M]any of the initial rules agencies have proposed to put under the microscope seem underwhelming. Frequently they are what might be considered “paperwork” rules, with agencies hoping to find ways to streamline reporting and make more information available online. The Treasury Department, for example, plans to review an Internal Revenue Service regulation so as to correct instructions about where to file for a tax refund or credit. The Commerce Department’s plan identifies, among other things, the rule governing the “application number” and “filing date” for patents.
There's nothing wrong with streamlining paperwork, of course, but it's a cause that even "ultras" can get behind. Indeed, one of the largest line-item claims of savings comes from an OSHA plan "to finalize a proposed rule that would harmonize U.S. hazard classifications and labels with those used by other nations, which is expected to result in an annualized $585 million in estimated savings for employers." As Coglianese notes, "few of the rules listed in the plans as targets for review are the salient regulatory issues of the day." Tellingly, one of the most significant retreats on a regulatory issue in recent weeks — the EPA's decision to pull back expensive new regulations on boiler emissions — is not boasted about, perhaps because the retreat is intended to be only temporary.
I do note with a ripple of "great minds think alike" satisfaction that Sunstein did advance, as one of his central examples of a new administration accomplishment, the EPA's very belated recognition that spills of milk on dairy farms are not "oil spills" requiring elaborate containment and remediation measures. I had been writing about that one in this space for a while, and had specifically cited it in January as an example of the sort of craziness the Obamanauts should be trying to address if they want to be taken seriously on the issue of deregulation.
Fifty-three elementary schools in the District of Columbia take part in the federal government's Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Program, a recently ramped-up federal initiative that dishes out millions to local schools to get them to use raw produce as snacks. According to the Washington Examiner, it was by inadvertence that students at Turner Elementary School were given raw green onions (scallions) as a snack the other day when they were supposed to be given zucchini slices instead. Children were observed making "yuck" faces before throwing the offerings in the trash or, in some cases, resourcefully tucking them into their bags to take home for their parents to cook.
Are we sure this is the best way to keep students from sneaking Doritos into the building?
On a less tear-inducing note, the school board in the town of Darien, Conn. has unanimously voted to pull out of the federal school lunch program. Finance director Richard Huot cited current and forthcoming federal mandates that, among other things, ban chocolate milk, discourage reliance on refillable sports water bottles, and require schools to push salads in preference to longtime favorites such as fruit. The regulations also drive up labor costs, Huot said, and make the lunch program more complex to run generally. “The children in this town are savvy consumers,” Huot said. “You put a lousy product on the table; they are not going to buy it."
As a famously affluent suburb, Darien can afford to turn down the bribes — sorry, subsidies — that come with doing it Washington's way. Isn't it a shame so many other communities feel they have no real financial choice but to go along?
The Patriot Act extension passed by Congress this week did not become the law of the land. It is void and without effect.
So may argue some future defendant whose conviction rests on evidence gotten under Patriot Act powers during the extended period Congress sought to establish in the bill it passed this week.
President Obama is at a meeting in Europe, so he had the bill signed by auto-pen. Representative Tom Graves (R-GA) has written a letter inquiring of the president whether he was presented the bill and truly intended to sign it.
Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution says:
Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the United States; If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it...
Is presentment and signing a quaint formality? Something to put aside in light of modern technology and time-constraints? Or is it an important step in the law-making process, to be executed quite literally without deviation from past practice?
The answer lies mostly in consideration of what a signature is, and what it does. I looked into signatures, among many other identifiers and security techniques in my book, Identity Crisis.
Wikipedia has a definition of "signature" that's good enough: "A signature is a handwritten (and sometimes stylized) depiction of someone's name, nickname, or even a simple 'X' that a person writes on documents as a proof of identity and intent." Key words: identity and intent.
In the world of identification and security, a signature is classed as a "behavioral biometric identifier." That is, it's a product of a given person's bodily action that is distinctive enough to create strong evidence of the person's presence.
A signature does many things, and inferences spill out from the presence of a mark on paper that is sufficiently similar to other marks made by a particular person. Because it's left on the paper, a signature indicates that the person was in the presence of the document. This means in most cases that he or she could review it and had the opportunity, barring some exigency, to affirm its accuracy and completeness. By long-standing custom, absent duress or fraud, the signature indicates the giving of one's assent or the placing of authority behind the content of the document. A signature supplies evidence---imperfect, to be sure---that a given person approved a given document.
Does a signature by auto-pen create the same inferences? Almost none of them. To know that President Obama indeed meant to affirm the bill, one would have to investigate how he was apprised of the bill's content. Were there security measures in place to ensure that the communication about the document and the giving of assent were not altered or forged in transit from Washington, D.C. to Europe? One would need assurance that the controller of the auto-pen applied its mark to the exact document that the president was apprised of, and that no substitute document was inserted. All these problems are solved by bringing the person with authority into the same room with the document to manually apply the signature.
I haven't a whiff of doubt that President Obama intended to sign the bill. The authority of the president and the gravity of bill-signing are such that I'm confident security measures were in place to control the security issues noted above.
But the question in a court case dealing with the presentment and signing requirement is not what happened with this particular bill. It is what should happen in all cases to help exclude the risks of fraud and duress in law-making---with much longer bills, for example, or some future circumstance when the president's whereabouts or capacity might be unknown.
The authority of the president and the gravity of bill-signing actually cuts the other direction: The president should be in the same room as the actual document, applying his genuine signature to the artifact of a United States public law's creation. It's that important a function of the presidency.
Until biometrics and encryption are good enough that we can sign our mortgages remotely, it's not too much to ask, having the president to sign legislation in person. If a criminal or two go free in the future because of the inadequacy of the process here, it will be worth it for the small security against fraudulent passage of legislation in a future full of uncertainties.
Barack Obama's AutoPen has signed another four-year extension of three Patriot Act powers, but one silver lining of this week's lopsided battle over the law is that mainstream papers like The New York Times have finally started to take note of the growing number of senators who have raised an alarm over a "secret interpretation" of Patriot's "business records" authority (aka Section 215). It would appear to be linked to a "sensitive collection program" referenced by a Justice Department official at hearings during the previous reauthorization debate—one that would be disrupted if 215 orders were restricted to the records of suspected terrorists, their associates, or their "activities" (e.g., large purchases of chemicals used to make bombs). Naturally, lots of people are starting to wonder just what this program, and the secret interpretation of the law that may be associated with it, are all about.
All we can do is speculate, of course: only a handful of legislators and people with top-secret clearances know for sure. But a few of us who closely monitor national security and surveillance issues have come to the same conclusion: it probably involves some form of cellular phone geolocation tracking, potentially on a large scale. The evidence for this is necessarily circumstantial, but I think it's fairly persuasive when you add it all up.
First, a bit of background. The recent fiery floor speeches from Sens. Wyden and Udall are the first time widespread attention has been drawn to this issue—but it was actually first broached over a year ago, by Sen. Richard Durbin and then-Sen. Russ Feingold, as I point out in my new paper on Patriot surveillance. Back in 2005, language that would have required Section 215 business record orders to pertain to terror suspects, or their associates, or the "activities" of a terror group won the unanimous support of the Senate Judiciary Committee, though was not ultimately included in the final reauthorization bill. Four years later, however, the Justice Department was warning that such a requirement would interfere with that "sensitive collection program." As Durbin complained at the time:
The real reason for resisting this obvious, common-sense modification of Section 215 is unfortunately cloaked in secrecy. Some day that cloak will be lifted, and future generations will ask whether our actions today meet the test of a democratic society: transparency, accountability, and fidelity to the rule of law and our Constitution.
Those are three pretty broad categories of information—and it should raise a few eyebrows to learn that the Justice Department believes it routinely needs to get information outside its scope for counterterror investigations. Currently, any record asserted to be "relevant" to an investigation (a standard so low it's barely a standard) is subject to Section 215, and records falling within those three categories enjoy a "presumption of relevance." That means the judges on the secret Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court lack discretion to evaluate for themselves whether such records are really relevant to an investigation; they must presume their relevance. With that in mind, consider that the most recent report to Congress on the use of these powers shows a record 96 uses of Section 215 in 2010, up from 22 the previous year. Perhaps most surprisingly though, the FISC saw fit to "modify" (which almost certainly means "narrow the scope of") 42 of those orders. Since the court's discretion is limited with respect to records of suspected terrorists and their associates, it seems probable that those "modifications" involved applications for orders that sweep more broadly. But why would such records be needed? Hold that thought.
Fast forward to this week. We hear Sen. Wyden warning that "When the American people find out how their government has secretly interpreted the Patriot Act, they will be stunned and they will be angry," a warning echoed by Sen. Udall. We know that this surprising and disturbing interpretation concerns one of the three provisions that had been slated for sunset. Lone Wolf remains unused, so that's out, leaving roving wiretaps and Section 215. In the context of remarks by Sens. Feingold and Durbin, and the emphasis recently placed on concerns about Section 215 by Sen. Udall, the business records provision seems like a safe bet. By its explicit terms, that authority is already quite broad: What strained secret interpretation of it could be surprising to both legislators and the general public, but also meet with the approval of the FISC and the Office of Legal Counsel?
For one possible answer, look to the criminal context, where the Department of Justice has developed a novel legal theory, known as the "hybrid theory," according to which law enforcement may do some types of geolocation tracking of suspects' cellular phones without obtaining a full-blown probable cause warrant. The "hybrid theory" involves fusing two very different types of surveillance authority. "Pen registers" allow the monitoring, in real time, of the communications "metadata" from phones or other communications devices (phone numbers dialed, IP addresses connected to). For cellular phones, that "metadata" would often make it possible to pinpoint at least approximately—and, increasingly, with a good deal of precision, especially in urban areas—the location of the user. Federal law, however, prohibits carriers from disclosing location information "solely" pursuant to a pen register order. Another type of authority, known as a 2703(d) order, is a bit like Patriot's business records authority (though only for telecommunications providers), and is used to compel the production of historical (as opposed to real-time/prospective) records, without any exclusion on location information. The Justice Department's novel theory—which I discussed at a recent Cato event with Sen. Wyden on geolocation tracking—is that by bundling these two authorities in a new kind of combination order, they can do real-time geolocation tracking without the need to obtain a full Fourth Amendment warrant based on probable cause. Many courts have been skeptical of this theory and rejected it—but at least some have gone along with this clever bit of legal origami. Using the broad business records power of Patriot's Section 215 in a similar way, to enable physical tracking of anyone with a cellphone, would seem to fit the bill, then: certainly surprising and counterintuitive, not what most people think of when we talk about "obtaining business records," but nevertheless a maneuver with a legal track record of convincing some courts.
Now, consider that Sen. Wyden has also recently developed a concern with the practice of mobile location tracking, which has become so popular that the U.S. Marshall Service, now the federal government's most prolific (known) user of pen register orders, of which it issued over 6,000 last year, employs the "hybrid theory" to obtain location information by default with each such order. Wyden has introduced legislation that would establish standards for mobile location tracking, which has two surprising and notable feature. First, while the location tracking known to the public all involves criminal investigations subject to the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), that's not where Wyden's bill makes its primary modifications. Instead, the key amendments are made directly to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act—which language is then incorporated by reference into ECPA. Second, even though one section establishes the "exclusive means" for geolocation tracking, the proposal goes out of its way to additionally modify the FISA pen register provision and the Section 215 business records provision to explicitly prohibit their use to obtain geolocation information—as though there is some special reason to worry about those provisions being used that way, requiring any possible ambiguity to be removed.
Sen. Udall, meanwhile, always uses the same two examples when he talks about his concerns regarding Section 215: he warns about "unfettered" government access to “business records ranging from a cell phone company's phone records to an individual's library history,” even when the records relate to people with no connection to terrorism. The reference to libraries is no surprise, because the specter of Section 215 being used to probe people's reading habits was raised so insistently by librarians that it became common to see it referenced as the "library provision." The other example is awfully specific though: he singles out cell phone records, even though many types of sensitive phone records can already be obtained without judicial oversight using National Security Letters. But he doesn't just say "phone records"—it's cell phone records he's especially concerned about. And where he talks about "an individual's" library records, he doesn't warn about access to "an individual's" cell phone records, but rather the company's records. As in, the lot of them.
Tracking the location of suspected terrorists, and perhaps their known associates, might not seem so objectionable—though one could argue whether Section 215's "relevance" standard was sufficient, or whether a full FISA electronic surveillance warrant (requiring a showing of probable cause) would be a more appropriate tool. But that kind of targeted tracking would not require broad access to records of people unconnected to terror suspects and their known associates, which is hinted at by both Sen. Udall's remarks and the high rate of modifications imposed on Section 215 orders by the FISA court. Why might that be needed in the course of a geolocation tracking program?
For a possible answer, turn to the "LocInt" or "Location Intelligence" services marketed to U.S. law enforcement and national security clients by the firm TruePosition. Among the capabilities the company boasts for its software (drawn from both its site and a 2008 white paper the company sponsored) are:
● the ability to analyze location intelligence to detect suspicious behavioral patterns,
● the ability to mine historical mobile phone data to detect relationships between people, locations, and events,
● TruePosition LOCINT can mine location data to find out if the geoprofile of a prepaid phone matches the geoprofile of a potential threat and identify it as such, and
● leveraging location intelligence, officials can identify mobile phones of interest that frequently communicate with each other, or are within close proximity, making it easier to identify criminals and their associates. [Emphasis added.]
Certainly one can see how these functions might be useful: terrorists trained in counterintelligence tactics might seek to avoid surveillance, or identification of co-conspirators, by communicating only in person. Calling records would be useless for revealing physical meetings—but location records are another story. What these functions have in common, however, is that like any kind of data mining, they require access to a large pool of data, not just the records of a known suspect. You can find out who your suspect is phoning by looking at his phone records. But if you want to know who he's in close physical proximity to—with unusual frequency, and most likely alone—you need to sift through everyone's phone location records, or at any rate a whole lot of them. The interesting thing is, it’s not obvious there’s any legal way to actually do all that: full-fledged electronic surveillance warrants would be a non-starter, since they require probable cause for each target. But clearly the company expects to be able to sell these capabilities to some government entity. The obvious candidate is the FBI, availing itself of the broad authority of Section 215—perhaps in combination with FISA pen registers when the tracking needs to happen in real time.
As a final note of interest, the Office of the Inspector Generals' reports on National Security Letter contain numerous oblique references to “community of interest [REDACTED]” requests. Traditional "community of interest" analysis means looking at the pattern of communications of not just the primary suspect of an investigation, but their whole social circle—the people the suspect communicates with, and perhaps the people they in turn communicate with, and so on. Apparently the fact that the FBI does this sort of traditional CoI analysis is not considered secret, because that phrase remains unredacted. What, then, could that single omitted word be? One candidate that would fit in the available space is "location" or “geolocation”—meaning either location tracking of people called by the suspect or perhaps the use of location records to build a suspect's "community of interest" by "identify[ing] mobile phones...within close proximity" to the suspects. The Inspector General reports cover the first few years following passage of the Patriot Act, before an opinion from the Office of Legal Counsel held that NSLs could not properly be used to obtain the full range of communications metadata the FBI had been getting under them. If NSLs had been used for location-tracking information prior to that 2008 opinion, it would likely have been necessary to rely on Section 215 past that point, which would fit the timeline.
Is all of that conclusive? Of course not; again, this is speculation. But a lot of data points fit, and it would be quite surprising if the geolocation capabilities increasingly being called upon for criminal investigations were not being used for intelligence purposes. If they are, Section 215 is the natural mechanism.
Even if I'm completely wrong, however, the larger point remains: while intelligence operations must remain secret, a free and democratic society is not supposed to be governed by secret laws—and substantive judicial interpretations are no less a part of "the law" than the text of statutes. Whatever power the government has arrogated to itself by an "innovative" interpretation of the Patriot Act, it should be up to a free citizenry to consider the case for it, determine whether it is so vital to security to justify the intrusion on privacy, and hold their representatives accountable accordingly. Instead, Congress has essential voted blind—reauthorizing powers that even legislators, let alone the public, do not truly understand. Whether it's location tracking or something else, this is fundamentally incompatible with the preconditions of both democracy and a free society.
It's hard to pin down what's more frustrating about Michael Petrilli's response to my recent NRO op-ed on national standards: the rhetorical obfuscation about what Fordham and other national-standardizers really want, or the grade-school effort to escape discipline by saying that, hey, some kids are even worse!
Let's start with the source of aggravation that by now must seem very old to regular Cato@Liberty readers, but that has to be constantly revisited because national standardizers are so darned disciplined about their message: The national-standards drive is absolutely not "state led and voluntary," and by all indications this is totally intentional. Federal arm-twisting hasn't just been the result of "unforced errors," as Petrilli suggests, but is part of a conscious strategy.
There was, of course, Benchmarking for Success: Ensuring Students Receive a World-class Education, the 2008 joint publication of Achieve, Inc., the National Governors Association, and the Council of Chief State School Officers that called for Washington to implement "tiered incentives" to push states to adopt "common core" standards. Once those organizations formed the Common Core State Standards Initiative they reissued that appeal while simultaneously — and laughably — stating that "the federal government has had no role in the development of the common core state standards and will not have a role in their implementation [italics added]."
Soon after formation of the CCSSI, the Obama administration created the "Race to the Top," a $4.35-billion program that in accordance with the CCSSI's request — as opposed to its hollow no-Feds "promise" — went ahead and required states to adopt national standards to be fully competitive for taxpayer dough.
The carnival of convenient contradiction has continued, and Fordham — despite Petrilli's assertion that "nobody is proposing" that "federal funding" be linked "to state adoption of the common core standards and tests" — has been running it. Indeed, just like President Obama's "blueprint" for reauthorizing the Elementary and Secondary Education Act — better known as No Child Left Behind — Fordham's ESEA "Briefing Book" proposes (see page 11) that states either adopt the Common Core or have some other federally sanctioned body certify a state's standards as just as good in order to get federal money. So there would be an "option" for states, but it would be six of one, half-dozen of the other, and the Feds would definitely link taxpayer dough to adoption of Common Core standards and tests.
Frankly, there's probably no one who knows about these proposals who doesn't think that the options exist exclusively to let national-standards proponents say the Feds wouldn't technically "require" adoption of the Common Core. But even if the options were meaningful alternatives, does anyone think they wouldn't be eliminated in subsequent legislation?
Of course, the problem is that most people don't know what has actually been proposed — who outside of education-wonk circles has time to follow all of this? — which is what national-standards advocates are almost certainly counting on.
But suppose Fordham and company really don't want federal compulsion? They could put concerns to rest by doing just one thing: loudly and publicly condemning all federal funding, incentivizing, or any other federal involvement whatsoever in national standards. Indeed, I proposed this a few months ago. And just a couple of weeks ago, Petrilli and Fordham President Chester Finn rejected that call, saying that they "have no particular concern with the federal government … helping to pay” for the creation of curricular guides and other material and activities to go with national standards.
So, Fordham, you are proposing that federal funding be linked to adoption of common standards and tests, and denying it is becoming almost comical. At least, comical to people who are familiar with all of this. But as long as the public doesn't know, the deception ends up being anything but funny.
Maybe, though, Fordham is getting nervous, at least over the possibility that engaged conservatives are on to them. Why do I think that? Because in addition to belching out the standard rhetorical smoke screen, Petrilli is now employing the' "look over there — that guy's really bad" gambit to get the heat off. Indeed, after ticking off some odious NCLB reauthorization proposals from other groups, Petrilli concludes his piece with the following appeal to lay off Fordham and go after people all conservatives can dislike:
We might never see eye to eye with all conservatives about national standards and tests. But we should be able to agree about reining in Washington’s involvement in other aspects of education. How about we drop the infighting and spend some of our energy working together on that?
Nice try, but sorry. While I can't speak for conservatives, those of us at Cato who handle education have certainly addressed all sorts of problems with federal intervention in our schools. But right now in education there is no greater threat to the Constitution, nor our children's learning, than the unprecedented, deception-drenched drive to empower the federal government to dictate curricular terms to every public school — and every public-school child — in America. And the harder you try to hide the truth, the more clear that becomes.
If Senate leaders believed that expiring portions of the Patriot Act constituted an immediate increase in the risk of terrorism, it's amazing that they waited until now to even nod toward debating the law's renewal. A few thoughts from Cato Research Fellow Julian Sanchez on the current Patriot Act debate ripped from today's podcast:
... Democrats have had no interest in pointing out how closely President Obama has followed the playbook written by George (W.) Bush. And of course Republicans are the ones who helped write that playbook, so they don't have much interest in revisiting it.
On Section 215 of the Patriot Act:
It seems extremely likely from what we know so far that this business records authority has been transformed into a large-scale people-tracking authority. ... It strikes me as extraordinarily subject to abuse. It strikes me as a dangerous power to grant, even in this most vital task.