of
,
Director, Fiscal Policy Studies
Cato Institute
before the
Subcommittee on Social Security
Committee on Ways and Means
United States House of Representatives
February 14, 1995
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to discuss reform
of the $30 billion 1994 crime bill. Throughout 1994 the Cato Institute
was one of the major critics of this law which eventually was enacted
by Congress last August. We were critical of virtually every
provision of the bill: the pork-barrel nature of the $10 billion
of "prevention" programs in the crime bill, the gun control provisions,
which we regard as an affront to the second amendment, and the
efforts to "federalize crime."
What we discovered in our campaign to educate America about the
fraudulent nature of the crime bill, and what members of Congress
regrettably discovered too late, is that the public fully
understands that more spending on social welfare programs and
more gun control are federal strategies doomed to failure. They
will not get muggers, drug king pins, and sexual predators off of
our street corners.
For American taxpayers, to know the crime bill, is to hate it.
I will focus my remarks on the spending provisions of the bill
and the reform efforts before the House and Senate. I support the
GOP Contract with America provisions to fix the crime bill and
rid it of some of its most insidious and costliest features. But
I would ask members of Congress the same question that large
numbers of Americans are asking: what is the rationale for any
federal crime bill at all? It is understandable that Congress
wants to deal with the issue of crime--which is now rated by the
public as the "number one problem in America." Congress
feels compelled to "do something." But as every member
of this Committee knows well, law enforcement has always been,
and I would argue should continue to be, the exclusive domain of state
and local governments. If there is any remaining respect for the
principles of federalism left in this town, then it should be understood
why the best service that Congress could perform in the area of
crime prevention would be repeal the entire crime bill--every word
in each of the 1,100 pages of it.
One of the most remarkable moments during the Senate debate over
the crime bill occurred when Senator Russell Feingold, the
Wisconsin Democrat, eloquently explained that he was voting
against the bill because it was a violation of the federalist principles
upon which our Constitution is founded. We at Cato applaud that
view and wish that there were 99 other Senators who still
believed in the enumerated powers provision of the Constitution.
I will summarize in five points the case against the spending in
the crime bill:
1) The crime bill is packed with record amounts of pork barrel
projects and social welfare spending.
The 1994 crime bill is irrelevant to the growing scourge of crime
in America. From day one, the chief objective for this legislation
was never so much to fight crime, as it was to serve as a back
door method of channeling billions of federal tax dollars to
states, big city mayors, and special interest groups. The crime
bill was President Clinton's failed 1993 fiscal stimulus bill in
drag. One has to go back at least twenty years and five
presidencies, to the days when Richard Nixon invented revenue sharing
and started passing out free money to states and cities, to find
a more expensive federal slush fund. Why wouldn't big city Mayors
and many governors thunderously applaud this free money?
Yes, Virginia, California, New York, and Ohio, there is a Santa
Claus after all.
In the final version of the bill, roughly $8 - $10 billion of new
social welfare spending has been earmarked as crime "prevention."
Here is a brief list of what Congress thinks will
"prevent" crime:
* $1.8 billion for the local partnership act. The money under
this act is for education, self esteem programs, and social services.
This is federal revenue sharing--one of the few major federal
programs we've managed to rid ourselves of in the last fifteen
years--resurrected. In truth, it is worse than federal revenue
sharing, because part of the formula for distributing the cash is
based on local tax burdens; the more oppressive the local tax
regime, the more money the city gets from Uncle Sam. (This
rewards cities for high taxes.)
* Six new federal job training programs. America already has over
60 job training programs with an average cost of $20,000 per
client, or as much as it costs to send a student to Harvard.
* $100 million for John Conyer's "ounce of prevention
program." This is free money for mayors to spend on
virtually any purpose tangentially related to crime, including
the building of swimming pools. Only in Washington is $100
million considered "an ounce."
* $630 million for "child-centered activities." This is
money for arts and crafts, dance programs, recreational
activities, nutrition training, and so forth.
* $10 million for public housing. HUD already spends some $10
billion a year on low-income housing assistance.
* $200 million for assorted inner city youth activity programs.
* $6 million for urban parks and recreation.
* $270 million for schools. The money is to be used "to
improve the academic and social development of youths by
instituting a collaborative structure that trains and coordinates
efforts of social workers, teachers, and principles." Real
per capital spending on schools is twice as high as it was in
1970 and three times higher than in 1950--when crime was much
lower.
* $50 million for youth development for such activities as
"providing youth with life skills."
* $40 million for the much-publicized midnight basketball
leagues. For the basketball league, each team must have ten
players (from areas with high percentage of kids in public
housing and a high percentage of HIV positives in the population)
and each league must have eight teams. I believe that midnight basketball
is a promising private sector inner-city initiative--a recipient
of George Bush's "1,000 points of light" award. I fear
that a successful privately funded program will now be forever contaminated
by the lure of government money.
* $450 million for drug treatment programs in prisons. Last
summer, then congressman Tim Penny, the Minnesota Democrat, lamented:
"It's amazing the ideas that found their way into the crime
bill." We can only be thankful that Bill Clinton didn't have the
foresight to put his health care reform in the crime bill, or no
doubt that too would sail through Congress this week.
2) Social welfare spending is a proven failure at preventing
crime.
No matter how many times nor how aggressively congressional
supporters of the crime bill tried to justify this avalanche of new
social welfare spending, their efforts have proved futile: the
vast majority of Americans living outside of Washington, D.C.
simply don't believe that dance classes, arts and crafts programs,
more education spending, and olympic swimming-sized pools are
going to do much to prevent crime.
And they are right. The crime bill is anything but a bold new
federal direction in the war against crime. According to the Census
Bureau, in 1992 government at all levels devoted $1.01 trillion
to fight the crime problem via the "prevention" route. Table
1 shows that as federal domestic spending has soared, so has
inner city lawlessness. Since 1965 the federal government has
spent an estimated $2.5 trillion on the War on Poverty and urban
aid. This is the equivalent of 20 Marshall Plans in real dollars.
With $2.5 trillion Congress could purchase all of the farmland in
the United States plus all of the assets of the Fortune 100
companies.
If social welfare spending deterred crime, American cities would
have the safest streets in the world.
I am not a criminologist and I don't pretend to know what
strategies are most effective in preventing crime. But as a
budget analyst, I do know what doesn't prevent crime: more
federal social programs.
3) Cities with high crime rates already far out-spend the rest of
the nation.
A central premise of the crime bill is that cities are woefully
underfunded in the war against crime and need more money from Washington.
The premise is unarguably false. An expansion in a city's budget does
not lead to less crime. Table 2 compares the level of per capita
expenditures in the five cities with the highest violent crime
rate and those with the five lowest crime rates out of a sample
of the 75 largest cities in the United States. The five cities
with the highest crime rates--Atlanta, Miami, Las Vegas, Newark,
and Tampa--spend about $1,100 per resident. The five cities with
the lowest crime rates-- Indianapolis, San Jose, Louisville,
Omaha, and Anaheim--spend only $900 per resident.
In other words, the most dangerous cities already spend 22
percent more per person than do the least dangerous cities. Clearly,
expanding city budgets is not a very promising way to fight
crime.
Contrary to popular mythology, cities' budgets have not been
shrinking, they have been rapidly expanding for decades. Figure 1
shows that real per capita city spending escalated from $435 in 1950 to
$571 in 1965 to $1,004 in 1990. Yet violent crime rates doubled
over this period of bulging budgets.
New York City is a case in point. No one was a louder cheerleader
for the crime bill than New York Mayor Rudolph Giuliani. But New
York City's budget in real dollars has tripled from $13 billion
in 1965 to $37 billion in 1990. And yet the city has lost
one-half million residents since then. New York already spends
120 percent more per resident than the average city. New York's
main problem has been that the very high taxes that pay for the
cities' bloated budget are chasing families and businesses out of
the city. The crime bill, by rewarding cities like New York for
raising taxes further, will do positive harm to urban America.
For more details on the true state of city finances are covered
in detail in a Cato study by Dean Stansel and myself entitled: "The
Myth of America's Underfunded Cities."
4) There is no justification for the federal government building
prisons for states or paying for city police.
A case might be made that states need more prison cells and
cities need more cops; but no constitutional or fiscal case can
be made that the federal government needs to pay for them. After
all, the money that Congress seems so eager to dole out to the residents
of states and cities on their behalf comes from the taxpayers of
states and cities in the first place. As New York Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan
has argued correctly on many occasions, federal aid is a zero-sum
game: some states win, some states lose. If every state could be
a winner, why not pass a $300-billion crime bill?
Last Fall, the Cato Institute compared the state by state
location of the earmarked spending in the crime bill, versus the
tax payments that are made by residents of each state to finance
that spending. We made an intriguing discovery: the biggest losers
in the crime bill are the very states reporting the worst crime problems.
The ten biggest fiscal losers from the crime bill were:
1. New Jersey $280 million
2. New York $203 million
3. Pennsylvania $180 million
4. California $151 million
5. Illinois $122 million
6. Connecticut $108 million
7. Massachusetts $103 million
8. Virginia $90 million
9. Ohio $73 million
10. Washington $70 million
Other big fiscal losers from the crime bill included
Maryland, Michigan, and Wisconsin.
Why does the federal government need to be in the business of
spending $22 billion to build prisons for the states and pay for
cops in cities? The states spent upwards of $600 billion in
1993. Since 1980 most states have seen their budgets double and
even triple in size. Many states have nearly doubled prison
capacity. If they need more cops and more prisons, they clearly
have the budgets to pay for them.
The federal government does not have extra money to
generously share with state and local governments for crime
prevention. The federal government is broke. It should
vigorously pursue every conceivable avenue for saving money, not
spending it. While the federal government ran a $200 billion
deficit last year, states and localities ran net surpluses. The
idea of the feds giving money to states and cities for crime
prevention is as nonsensical as asking debt-ridden Mexico to make
economic-development loans to Japan.
For all these reasons, the nearly $30 billion of spending in
the crime bill should be repealed. But if this cannot be
accomplished then the following steps should be taken:
1) Eliminate all prevention programs. Don't block grant
social spending, zero it out.
2) If prison and police spending is block granted, funding
should be cut in half, and no strings should be attached.
If America is going to win the war against violent crime, it
is going to be won in the trenches on the neighborhood level,
where citizens band together with police and prosecutors to
literally take back their streets, block by block. The good news
is, this is already happening all over the nation through
initiatives such as neighborhood watch programs, community
policing, and the election of toughminded prosecutors.
Washington is at best a distraction from these efforts.
The net effect of the 1994 crime bill is to make taxpayers
poorer, not safer.
Table 1
SOCIAL SPENDING UP, CRIME UP
Crime Rate Domestic Federal Spending
(Per 10,000) (Billions 1987 Dollars)
1960 189 $150
1965 250 $210
1970 399 $290
1975 460 $470
1980 595 $570
1985 521 $605
1990 582 $680
1992 566 $720
Source: William Bennett, Index of Leading Cultural Indicators,
1994; and Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal 1995.
Table 2
BIG CITY BUDGETS, HIGH CRIME
Crime Rate Per Capita Spending
Five Highest Crime Cities
Atlanta 192 $1,410
Miami 190 867
Las Vegas 170 806
Newark 162 1,242
Tampa 159 1,214
-----------------------------------------------------
Average 175 $1,108
-----------------------------------------------------
Five Lowest Crime Cities
Indianapolis 45 $1,019
San Jose 49 $854
Louisville 64 $849
Omaha 71 $635
Anaheim 72 1,136
-------------------------------------------------------
Average 60 $899
--------------------------------------------------------
Notes: Crime Data: Refers to number of offenses known to the
police per 1,000 residents; Per Capita City Spending: Excludes
spending on education, health, and welfare.
Source: U.S. Department of Justice and U.S. Census Bureau,
1990.