Pervasive corruption is contributing to illegitimacy, collapse of public confidence in the government, and to the resurgence of the Taliban. Reports that President Karzai's brother is taking payments from the CIA do not help. The U.S. government works at cross purposes when it attempts to install a "legitimate" centralized government, wags a sanctimonious finger when elections are riddled with pervasive levels of fraud and vote-fixing, and then goes behind the backs of millions of Afghans by having a close working relationship with the brother of the re-elected President.

Unfortunately, the U.S. has assisted and sponsored a corrupt, illegitimate, and slightly autocratic regime while purporting to advance the values of freedom and democracy. The entire rationale for the presence of the U.S. and its allies in Afghanistan rests on democracy, stability, and winning hearts and minds. These goals may not even be realistic, let alone achievable in the near future.

The Obama administration should keep in mind that defeating a large-scale insurgency and creating a legitimate central government in Kabul is not critical to keeping America safe. Counterinsurgency is both the most expensive option for the U.S. and the one least likely to succeed. Defeating al Qaeda is a must, but sending more troops to Afghanistan is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition to achieve that objective.

Long-term success in counterinsurgency--the current U.S. strategy--depends on the legitimacy of the host nation's government. But from the lowliest traffic policeman to the highest levels of parliament, Afghanistan is full of corruption and graft. This pervasive corruption is contributing to the collapse of public confidence in the government and to the resurgence of the Taliban.

Neither defeating a large-scale insurgency, nor creating a legitimate central government in Kabul, is critical to keeping America safe. Counterinsurgency is both the most expensive option for the U.S. and the one least likely to succeed, so it makes little sense for the Obama administration to continue on this path.

Proponents of counterinsurgency, many of whom support the infusion of 40,000 more U.S. troops to Afghanistan, need to come clean on the total cost of that strategy and start answering difficult questions. Is Afghanistan's corrupt central government worth fighting and dying for? How many hundreds of billions of dollars will America spend? How many U.S. and NATO soldiers will lose their lives? And is Afghanistan the most crucial place in the world for America to expend those resources?

Even if America were to commit several hundred thousand troops, decades of its time, and untold billions of dollars to Afghanistan, success would hardly be guaranteed and al Qaeda would simply shift its presence to other regions of the world. In this respect, it appears the current debate over Afghanistan has been an inadequate examination of core assumptions.

Many critics of the war are confusing the most important question when it comes to the eight-year campaign in Afghanistan: not whether the war is winnable, but whether the mission constitutes a vital national security interest. From that perspective the current open-ended strategy fails.

Success in Afghanistan would hardly be guaranteed even if President Obama were to commit several hundred thousand troops and decades of armed nation-building. And in the unlikely event that we forged a stable Afghanistan, al Qaeda might simply reposition its presence into other regions of the world. It is well past time for the United States to adapt means to ends. Rather than an indefinite military mission with large numbers of U.S. troops, U.S. strategy should focus on assisting and training Afghan forces in order to limit that country's future dependence on foreign troops for security.

Committing still more U.S. personnel to Afghanistan undermines the already weak authority of Afghan leaders, interferes with the ability to deal with other security challenges, and pulls the U.S. deeper into a bloody and protracted guerilla war with no end in sight.

The Senate hearings this week on Afghanistan are displaying the increased skepticism among many top lawmakers toward a war that is rapidly losing public support. At a Senate Armed Service Committee hearing, Graham asked Mullen, "Do you understand you've got one more shot back home?" alluding to polls showing most Americans oppose the war and oppose sending more troops. "Do you understand that?"

Sadly, a common view among policymakers and defense officials is that if America pours in enough time and resources--possibly hundreds of thousands of troops for another 12 to 14 years--Washington could really turn Afghanistan around.

But while military leaders like Gen. Stanley McChrystal say a new strategy must be forged to "earn the support of the [Afghan] people," Washington does not even have the support of the American people. The U.S. does not have the patience, cultural knowledge or legitimacy to transform what is a deeply divided, poverty-stricken, tribal-based society into a self-sufficient, non-corrupt, and stable electoral democracy. And even if Americans did commit several hundred thousand troops and pursued decades of armed nation-building, success would hardly be guaranteed, especially in a country notoriously suspicious of outsiders and largely devoid of central authority.

The U.S. and its allies must instead narrow their objectives. A long-term, large-scale presence is not necessary to disrupt al Qaeda, and going after the group does not require Washington to pacify the entire country. Denying a sanctuary to terrorists that seek to attack the U.S. can be done through aerial surveillance, retaining covert operatives for discrete operations against specific targets, and ongoing intelligence-sharing with countries in the region. Overall, remaining in Afghanistan is more likely to tarnish America's reputation and undermine U.S. security than would withdrawal.

Over the past year, the mission in Afghanistan has shifted from the limited goal of taking down al Qaeda to a much broader population-centric counterinsurgency approach. Now we are being told that America must protect the villages of Afghanistan. Why? Beltway orthodoxy tells us that because extremists will emerge in this ungoverned part of the world and attack the United States, America must forcibly stabilize, liberalize, and democratize Afghanistan.

For one thing, there's reason to doubt whether state failure or poor governance in itself poses a threat. For another, the United States does not have the resources or the legitimacy to transform what is a deeply divided, poverty–stricken, tribal-based society into a self-sufficient, non-corrupt, stable electoral democracy. Such an endeavor would require a multi-decade commitment—with no assurance of success—that could never be accomplished within costs acceptable to the American public.

The U.S. and NATO military presence will exceed 100,000 troops by this fall, which is more than enough troops to carry out the focused mission of training Afghan forces.

As the war in Afghanistan rages on, Obama should be skeptical of any suggestions that the defeat of Al Qaeda depends upon a massive troop presence. The majority of successes scored against Al Qaeda have not relied on large numbers of U.S. troops. Intelligence sharing and close cooperation with foreign law enforcement and intelligence agencies have done more to round up suspected terrorists than blunt military force.

Committing still more troops to Afghanistan would only weaken the authority of Afghan leaders, undermine our ability to deal with other security challenges, and pull us deeper into a bloody, protracted, and possibly unwinnable guerilla war.

Candidates are forging alliances with warlords; tribal elders are being offered jobs, territory, and forgiveness of past sins; and Taliban militants threaten to cut off fingers marked with purple ink used to indicate when someone casts a vote.

It is doubtful the Afghan elections will be a watershed moment for liberal democracy in a country that has never had a strong central government. Regardless of who wins, all politics is local in Afghanistan. Many Afghans feel alienated from the central government, particularly in the restive southern and eastern provinces, and some even believe that their next president has already been chosen by Washington.

Going forward, the biggest challenge for the Obama administration will be to reconcile the imbalance between what the country is—a complex tapestry of traditional tribal structures—and what the U.S. wants it to be—a burgeoning nation-state governed centrally from Kabul. It can't be both.

Three things:

First, Mehsud's death may or may not be a big blow to the TTP. Other deputies can easily take his place. In fact, shortly after Mehsud's death, the Taliban Shura (an advisory council meeting) convened to elect a new TTP chief. Among those being considered are Hakimullah Mehsud, Azmatullah Mehsud and Waliur Rehman Mehsud (Mehsud's successor might be announced after Friday evening prayers). Any of these new leaders could quickly pick up where Baitullah left off, which means that picking off high-value targets in any insurgency does not guarantee that jihadists will melt away. We can only hope that a leadership void creates a power struggle among rival factions of the group, but that seems unlikely.

Second, the drone operation shows improved coordination between the United States and Pakistan, which is welcome news. But the strike exemplifies the binary nature of the discussion surrounding the use of aerial drones: on the one hand, U.S. officials point to the successful killing of high-level al Qaeda militants, such as Abu Laith al-Libi in January 2008, and chemical weapons expert Abu Khabab al Masri in July 2008; on the other hand, drone strikes have triggered collective armed action throughout the tribal agencies and have added more fuel to violent religious radicalism in this unstable, nuclear-armed country. One U.S. military official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to McClatchy Newspaper correspondent Jonathan Landay, called drone operations "a recruiting windfall for the Pakistani Taliban."

Third, Pakistan might continue the same policy as before, differentiating between the "good Taliban," the ones who attack U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan, from the "bad Taliban," those who attack the Pakistani military and the government. At the strategic level, Pakistan and the United States are still not on the same page.

President Obama should resist the urge to increase America's military presence in Afghanistan beyond what he has already committed. Washington can continue to disrupt terrorist havens by monitoring the region with unmanned aerial vehicles, retaining advisers for training Afghan security forces, and using covert operatives for discrete operations against specific targets.

Overall, America's objective has been to eradicate the parties responsible for the atrocities committed on September 11th. The United States should not go beyond that objective by combating a regional insurgency or drifting into an open-ended occupation.

Moreover, the key to solving Afghanistan is Pakistan, and the key to understanding Pakistan is India. Without an appreciation for the region's interconnected nature, America's mission will remain locked in a perpetual political stalemate.

Going after al Qaeda does not require Washington to pacify the entire country or sustain a heavy-booted military presence in the region. After all, Central Asia holds no intrinsic strategic value to the United States, and America's security will not be endangered if an oppressive regime takes over a contiguous fraction of Afghan territory.

Ideally, the United States should have already reduced its visibility in the region. Denying a sanctuary to terrorists that seek to attack the United States can be done through aerial surveillance, retaining covert operatives for discrete operations against specific targets, and ongoing intelligence-sharing with the Afghan and Pakistani governments.

America's objective has been to eradicate the parties responsible for the atrocities committed on September 11th. The United States should not go beyond that objective by combating a regional insurgency or drifting into an open-ended occupation.

Since the raid by the Pakistani government on the Red Mosque (Lal Masjid) in Islamabad in July 2007, a wave of revenge attacks against the army and the government has been launched by loose networks of suicide bombers. It’s possible, depending on the culprit, that the recent attack in Peshawar might have been retribution for the Pakistan army’s month-long offensive against extremists in the country’s northwest districts.

While the United States hopes to eliminate the threat from extremists in Afghanistan and Pakistan, increased U.S.-NATO efforts to stabilize Afghanistan destabilize Pakistan. America’s presence in the region feeds Pakistan’s insurgency. If America’s interests lie in stabilizing Pakistan, and ensuring that the virus of anti-American radicalism does not infect the rest of the country, the fundamental objective should be to get out of Afghanistan in a reasonable time frame.