In August 1945 Japan was disarmed and occupied. Article 9 of the U.S.-drafted constitution even barred creation of a military. The unstated political corollary was that Washington would be responsible for Japan’s defense.

But this arrangement quickly became obsolete as the Cold War deepened. Despite sustained U.S. pressure, punctuated by growing fear of China and North Korea, Tokyo has only modestly increased its support for U.S. military operations and allowed Japanese defense spending to languish.

The DJP advocates a more “independent” international course and a more “equal” alliance. What that means in practice is unclear, but the new government likely will be less willing to back U.S. military operations and more determined to revise the status of forces agreement and adjust American deployments in Okinawa. More dramatic changes are possible.

U.S. government officials still hope to preserve the status quo. However, it is time for Washington to initiate changes in the relationship. Marginal adjustments are not nearly enough. Japan possesses the world’s second largest economy and should take over responsibility for its own defense, as well as promoting stability throughout the region.

Washington should begin a phased withdrawal of its 47,000 military personnel stationed in Japan, while negotiating to replace the existing formal security guarantee with an agreement for less formal security cooperation, including intelligence sharing and emergency base access. The U.S. also should press Tokyo and other democratic states in the region to work through the lingering issues growing out of World War II and create a cooperative framework to promote peace and stability throughout East Asia.

The dramatic DJP victory in Sunday’s election is an opportunity as well as a challenge for the U.S. Washington should take the lead in revising a defense relationship created in a different age and made obsolete by the end of the Cold War.

While South Korea should welcome the reduction in tensions, it ought to respond with caution. Seoul should reward the North for better behavior, but must calibrate benefits to the value of the reforms adopted. Humanitarian and development aid should be offered only sparingly unless Pyongyang consistently moves in a reform direction.

The U.S. should consult with the Republic of Korea and Japan to develop a common approach, developing a positive package to reward North Korea if the latter agree to abandon its hostile policy and limit its nuclear program. These three nations also should attempt to convince China to take a more active role in pressuring Pyongyang to abandon its confrontational course.

No strategy towards North Korea has much likelihood of success. The North is a difficult actor heading towards a possible leadership crisis. Nevertheless, the Obama administration should take advantage of any opportunity, no matter how small, to press Pyongyang towards a peaceful settlement of the nuclear crisis.

President Clinton's first responsibility is to address the journalists' imprisonment; he should urge their release on humanitarian grounds, rather than treat the two as bargaining chips for which U.S. concessions must be provided. At the same time, the Obama administration should use his visit to encourage Pyongyang to return to the Six-Party nuclear talks as well as engage in bilateral discussions with the U.S. over the full range of issues between Washington and North Korea. The administration should indicate its willingness to treat the North with respect--by, for instance, sending a former president and husband of the current Secretary of State to Pyongyang--but insist that it will expect the U.S. to be treated with respect in return.

At the same time, Washington must refashion its strategy towards North Korea. The U.S. must make cooperation with the North's neighbors, particularly South Korea and China, a priority. China has the greatest influence in Pyongyang, followed by the South. The Obama administration should promote a common strategy that mixes the threat of serious pressure with the promise of positive rewards for the North's cooperation. China should be privately encouraged to consider using its power to promote regime change if North Korea fails to respond appropriately.

President Clinton's visit to the North is a positive development, so long as expectations are kept low. There is no guarantee that Pyongyang will ever agree to yield up its nuclear weapons. But U.S. engagement with North Korea is an important part of any strategy of dealing with the North, especially one directed at more effectively enlisting China's assistance in promoting a stable and nuclear-free Korean peninsula.

U.S. policymakers should resist the temptation to be overly encouraged by a Mousavi victory. They must keep in mind that the Iranian president’s power is limited; he does not, in fact, control the security forces or the nuclear program. Moreover, it is not only Islamic radicals who might believe that Iran should develop a nuclear weapon. What position a President Mousavi would take on Iran’s nuclear aspirations is unknown.

Still, a victory by Mr. Mousavi would certainly encourage dialogue between the U.S. and Iran. He has indicated his willingness to engage Washington, and his almost dull moderation stands in sharp contrast to the extreme and confrontational sentiments regularly espoused by President Ahmadinejad.

The people of Iran deserve to be free. If Mr. Mousavi triumphs, they will have taken an important though small step towards a more democratic and open society. The Obama administration should respond positively, even while recognizing the limits on Mr. Mousavi’s power and thus the impact of his victory, if that is the result.

However, if enforced, the toughened sanctions should cause greater pain for the regime in Pyongyang by limiting its ability to engage in arms sales and finance its operations. As always, the most important player is China. If Beijing is willing to limit assistance and commerce with the North, then the Kim Jong-il regime will be under far greater pressure to adopt a policy of cooperation rather than confrontation.

Washington should engage in a concerted diplomatic effort to convince the People’s Republic of China that pressuring the North and even changing the North Korean regime would be in its interest, as well as the interest of the rest of the international community. In particular, the U.S. government should promise that it would not take geopolitical advantage of such a Chinese effort.

In the case of a reunified Korea, Washington would withdraw its troops rather than maintain military forces near China’s border. In the case of a flood of refugees northward after the collapse of the Kim regime, the U.S. would assist in humanitarian efforts. The benefits to the region and world would be obvious. The PRC would gain as well, reinforcing its claim to global leadership and its promise of a “peaceful rise.”

Enhanced United Nations sanctions against North Korea are but a small step forward. Winning Beijing’s assent for a much more active Chinese role is far more important. This should become a top priority for the Obama administration.

Unfortunately, tensions between Washington and the North are higher today. With the U.S. and United Nations Security Council considering additional sanctions in response to Pyongyang’s recent nuclear and missile tests, resolution of the case is not likely to come so easily. Washington should publicly downplay the controversy and present the issue to the Kim regime as a humanitarian matter. The Obama administration should indicate its willingness to open a broader dialogue with North Korea, but indicate that positive results will be possible only if Pyongyang responds with cooperation instead of confrontation. Releasing the two journalists obviously would provide evidence of the former.

Regrettably, Laura Ling and Euna Lee are political pawns. As such, Washington’s best strategy to achieve their release is to simultaneously reduce their perceived value to Pyongyang and ease tensions between the U.S. and North Korea. Patience may be the Obama administration’s highest virtue and Ling’s and Lee’s greatest hope.

Although the nuclear test reinforces the North's irresponsible reputation, the blast has little practical importance. North Korea has long been known to be a nuclear state and tested a smaller nuclear device more than two years ago. The regime's missile capabilities also are well-known.

Washington should treat the North's latest offense as an opportunity to reprogram the latter's negotiating formula. The U.S. should not reward "Dear Leader" Kim Jong-il with a plethora of statements beseeching the regime to cooperate and threatening dire consequences for its bad behavior. Rather, the Obama administration should explain, perhaps through China, that the U.S. is interested in forging a more positive relationship with North, but that no improvement will be possible so long as North Korea acts provocatively. Washington should encourage South Korea and Japan to take a similar stance.

Moreover, the U.S. should step back and suggest that Beijing, Seoul and Tokyo take the lead in dealing with Pyongyang. North Korea's activities more threaten its neighbors than America. Even Beijing, the North's long-time ally, long ago lost patience with Kim's belligerent behavior and might be willing to support tougher sanctions. Washington should offer to support this or other efforts to transform North Korean policy.

Pyongyang's latest nuclear test further demonstrates that North Korea is a problem likely to be long with us. The administration should recognize the limitations inherent to any policy towards the North. Washington should offer the prospect of improved relations as a reward for improved North Korean behavior, but should let the North's neighbors, most notably China, take the lead in managing this most difficult of states.