

The Evolution of Apartheid

South Africa is a beautiful country that occupies the southern portion of the African continent, from latitude 22°S to 35°S. To the east, west, and south, South Africa borders on the Indian and Atlantic oceans. To the north, it shares borders with Namibia, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Swaziland, and Mozambique. Completely enclosed by South Africa are the "independent" states of Transkei, Ciskei, Lesotho, Venda, and Bophuthatswana—parts of which share a border with Botswana.

South Africa is a country rich in mineral wealth. It possesses the world's largest known deposits of precious minerals such as gold, platinum, diamonds, and semiprecious gemstones. It also contains the world's largest deposits of strategic industrial minerals such as chromite, manganese, vanadium, fluorspar, and andalusite. Moreover, it is richly endowed with coal, iron ore, antimony, copper, titanium, uranium, zinc, nickel, lead, and phosphates. Most of these minerals are exported. In 1980, their export value was nearly 15 billion rand (at US\$ 0.76 = 1 rand; its value in U.S. dollars was over 11 billion).

South Africa's population of nearly 28 million lives within its four provinces: Natal, Cape, the Orange Free State, and the Transvaal. According to the 1985 census, that population consisted of roughly 19 million blacks, nearly 5 million whites, 2.8 million coloreds, and 861,000 Asians. As of 1985, 88 percent of whites, 91 percent of Asians, 77 percent of coloreds, and 38 percent of blacks were urbanized. None of these different racial groups are homogeneous; they are all distinguished within themselves by intraracial language and/or ethnic diversity.

While blacks are roughly 72 percent of the population, they actually consist of several major ethnic groups. The Zulus, estimated to number 6.4 million, are the largest single ethnic group—followed by 2.9 million Xhosas, 2.9 million Northern Sothos, 1.9 million Southern Sothos, 1.4 million Tswanas, and 1.1 million Tsonga. The balance are the Ndebeles, Swazis, and Vendas. The native language of the black population can be divided into four major language groups: Nguni, Sotho, Tsonga, and Venda. Nguni is by far the most prevalent language

and is spoken by at least 9 million blacks belonging mostly to Zulus and Xhosa. Sotho is the next largest spoken language, belonging to the Northern, Eastern, and Western Sotho. Despite the fact that black language can be broken down into four major groups, there are numerous dialects within each language group, such as Nguni spoken by the Ndebele and that spoken by the Zulu.

In 1985 the white population (4.9 million) was 18 percent of the total. Like the black population, it is ethnically diverse. The ethnic composition of Afrikaners—formerly called *Boers*, the Dutch term for farmers—is a mix of Dutch, German, French Huguenot, and English; and they are the largest component of the white population. South Africans of English ancestry are the second largest component. A negligible part of the white population consists of Jews (117,000), Italians (23,000), Germans (59,000), Greeks (23,000), French (11,000), Dutch (24,000), and Portuguese (56,000). Sixty percent of the white population identify themselves as Afrikaans speaking, while the remainder identify as English speaking.

Coloreds are roughly 10 percent of the total population. They are mixed-race people who find their antecedents among Malays from Indonesia, Cape Hottentots (Khoi-Khoi), Europeans of many nationalities, Bushmen, Indians, and Africans. The language of 90 percent of the coloreds is Afrikaans; the rest are English or Arabic speaking. There are about 150,000 coloreds who are Cape Malays, representing a mixture of Indians, Cingolese, Chinese, Indonesians, and Malagasy, and belonging to the Islamic faith.

Asians—numbering 861,000—are slightly more than 3 percent of the total population. Living mostly in Natal, Indians account for 99 percent of the Asian population. Chinese—numbering 9,000—are only about 1 percent of the Asian population. Within the Indian population there are significant ethnic/language/religious differences. The mix consists of combinations of Hindu, who are divided into four basic language groups, (Tamil, Telugu, Hindi, and Gujarati) and Muslim, who speak Urdu and Gujarati. In terms of religion, the Indians are Hindu, Muslim, Christian, and Zoroastrian. In 1985, eighty-one percent of Indians lived within 90 miles of South Africa's port city of Durban.

While it is true that South Africa of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has been home to a wide variety of languages, ethnic populations, and cultures, it was not so at the time of the first European contact. South Africa's Cape Province was discovered by a Portuguese maritime expedition headed by Bartholomew Diaz, who was searching for a sea route to the East. Diaz spent only a few days at Algoa Bay before returning to report to King John II of Portugal.

In July 7, 1497, King John dispatched a second expedition under Vasco da Gama. Da Gama rounded the Cape of Good Hope on November 22, 1498, and cast anchor in Mossel Bay. On reaching shore, the crew was greeted by friendly Khoi-Khoi natives (a Hamitic people who, along with Bushmen, were the original inhabitants of South Africa); they were willing to barter cattle for Western ornaments and trifles. After spending several days on shore, da Gama set sail and reached his ultimate destination—India—on May 16, 1498.

Once a sea route to the East had been established, the Portuguese lost interest in the Cape area of the continent. Instead they concentrated their interests in the gold-mining activities of the Makalanga Africans in what is now Zimbabwe and Mozambique, and then later in Angola in search of silver and slaves to send to South America. It was now up to Holland and England—which were in ascendancy—to settle Africa's Cape, through the Dutch East India Company and the English East India Company.

Jan van Riebeeck, a company official of the Dutch East India Company, established the first white settlement in the Cape on April 6, 1652. The natives that the whites encountered were the Khoi-Khoi and the Bushmen, whose estimated populations at that time were 15,000 and 10,000, respectively. The natives lived by hunting and raising large herds of cattle and sheep. The Dutch traded copper wire and beads with the natives, but disputes broke out over cattle stealing and land. The natives resented Dutch occupation of their grazing lands near Table Mountain. Reprisals, attacks, and theft led to the First Hottentot War in 1659. A peace treaty was reached the following year, with the indigenous people realizing that they were no match for the Europeans.

The victory established a permanent presence of Europeans to service the ships en route to India. Even with increased white settlement, which included the arrival of 200 French Huguenots between 1688 and 1700, there were not enough whites to raise vegetables, tend herds, erect buildings, and do all the other work. Numerous attempts to persuade the Hottentots and Bushmen to work for the Dutch East India Company failed. Therefore, van Riebeeck's attention turned to importing slaves from the eastern, northern, and central parts of Africa. Soon there were more slaves in the Cape than whites.

British involvement in South Africa resulted indirectly when France invaded Holland in order to help the Patriot party proclaim a republic. The prince of Orange, the ruler of Holland, fled to England. Believing his plight to be temporary, the prince asked the British government to take over Holland's colonial possessions until he could be restored to power.

In 1795, nine British warships sailed into Richard's Bay in the Cape of Good Hope. They encountered brief resistance from the governor and the colonists, who were already in rebellion against the Dutch East India Company. The governor surrendered, and the British occupation began. It lasted until France and Britain made peace by signing the Treaty of Amiens in 1802. The terms of the treaty required the transfer of the Cape to the Republic of Bavaria, which Holland was then to be called.

Peace in Europe did not last very long, and in 1803 war broke out between France and Britain. To protect its sea routes, England dispatched 63 ships with 7,000 soldiers on board to retake the Cape. A surrender was signed on January 10, 1806, making the Cape inhabitants once again subjects of the king of England. At the end of the war in Europe (1814), the Cape Province became a British colony by formal cession.

EARLY RACIAL PROBLEMS

Hottentots and Slaves

The Hottentots and Bushmen had little desire to work as laborers for the settlers. Van Riebeeck obtained permission from the Dutch East India Company to import slaves. The first slaves arrived from the west coast of Africa in 1658. More slaves were brought in from East Africa, the East Indies, and Madagascar. By the time slavery was abolished in 1834, there were nearly 30,000 of these imported peoples, who mixed with Hottentots and Europeans and became what is now known as the "Cape Coloureds." Relying on slaves for labor, the Dutch East India Company "pursued a policy of nonintercourse with the tribes in the hinterland."¹

In the early years of Dutch East India Company rule, under Christian influence, a baptized black had rights and privileges similar to the European. During the first 20 years of Dutch settlement (1652-72), 75 percent of children born to slaves had European fathers. Some of the "coloured" children who emerged from the Dutch/slave/Hottentot union were similar in appearance to southern Italians. In fact, there were also marriages between Europeans and Hottentots. With the increased use of slaves, such practice soon became disgraced; and in 1685, the marriage of Europeans with slaves of full color was banned. But European marriages to half-breeds were still permitted.

According to Neame, by the middle of the eighteenth century, whites in South Africa regarded color just like whites in America. Abraham Lincoln said, "What next? Free them and make them politically and socially our equals? My own feelings will not permit this. . . Whether this feeling accords with justice and sound judgment is not the whole question, if indeed it is any part of it. A universal feeling, whether well or ill-founded, cannot safely be disregarded. We cannot make them our equal."²

Modern South African racial policy saw its early beginnings soon after 1807 when the British outlawed slave trade in the colony and no more slaves could be brought to the Cape. Since Hottentots were not willing to work for the Europeans, a clamor for a replacement work force arose. The Earl of Caledon, the Cape's first civil governor, introduced a pass law for Hottentots, which held that all males not working for whites would be classified as vagrants. A Hottentot would be punished as a vagrant unless he was carrying a pass. The only way to obtain a pass was by entering into a labor agreement with a white employer. Hottentots without passes would be arrested and hired out to a farmer. The Cape's Council of Policy expressed a strong preference for colored labor—condemning white labor as lazy, incompetent, and much more expensive.

Discriminatory laws against the Hottentots drew strong protest from the missionary churches in the Cape. As a result, in 1828, the government passed Ordinance 50, which abolished its earlier restrictive laws against the Hottentots.

While Ordinance 50 did not apply to slaves, it applied to other nonwhites and read:

As it has been the custom of this colony for Hottentots and other free persons of colour to be subject to certain hindrances as to their place of living, way of life and employment, and to certain forced services which do not apply to other subjects of His Majesty, be it therefore made law that from and after the passing of this Ordinance no Hottentot or other free person of colour lawfully living in this colony shall be subject to any forced service which does not apply to others of His Majesty's subjects, nor to any hindrances, interference, fine or punishment of any kind whatever under the pretence that such person has been guilty of vagrancy or any other offence unless after trial in the due course of law, any custom or usage to the contrary notwithstanding.³

By 1834, slavery was abolished within the British Empire. By law all non-Europeans were then granted the same rights as Europeans.


European Contact with the Northern Natives

According to Fagan, "It was not til near the end of the eighteenth century [that] the European settlers came into contact with Bantu tribes."⁴ (See Map 1.) The Afrikaners had no desire to have anything to do with the Kaffirs (Bantu). "Governor van Plettenburg, in 1774, issued an edict threatening to fine, or even condemn to death, anyone who persisted in trafficking with the Natives."⁵ In 1788, the governor's Council of Policy ratified a treaty with the Xhosa to make a dividing line between the whites and the natives at the Fish River, some 600 miles away from Cape Town. The treaty was broken by Xhosa incursions across the Fish River—which led to no less than nine so-called Kaffir Wars until they were finally defeated in 1878.

The British broke the Dutch policy of nonintercourse with the Bantu, and by 1834 there were 17,000 Fingoes farming the area between the Fish and Kei rivers. The Dutch—resentful of British interference—began to move out of the Cape colony. Sir Benjamin D'Urban, governor of the Cape from 1834 to 1838, said that what came to be known as the "Great Trek" was caused by the "insecurity of life and property occasioned by the recent measures, inadequate [government] compensation for the loss of slaves, and despair of obtaining recompense for ruinous losses of the Kaffir invasion."⁶ One of the leaders of the Trek considered the chief reason for the exodus to be that slaves "were placed on an equal footing with Christians contrary to the laws of God and the natural distinction of race and colour, so that it was intolerable for any decent Christian to bow down beneath such a yoke; therefore we rather withdrew in order to preserve our doctrines in purity."⁷

Thus, some of the basis was laid for later British-Boer conflicts. The Boers, who settled in the interior, established republics and fashioned constitutions based on the notion of no equality between black and whites and, above all, resistance

Map 1
Early Migration Patterns



Adapted from Foreign Policy Study Foundation, Inc., *South Africa: Time Running Out* (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1981), p. 24

to British rule. The Cape that they left behind was at the same time repealing the color bar and giving nonwhites a voice in its political life.

When the Boers established the Republic of Natal, its Volkraad (legislative assembly) ordered that all natives found in the Republic were to be removed as a measure to "avoid collisions of different races, which would inevitably result from the continued residence of themselves and the Natives."⁸ The order was set aside by the British secretary of state for the colonies, who declared that the Boers would be allowed to stay in Natal on condition "there shall not be in the eyes of the law any distinction of colour, origin, language or creed."⁹ Ultimately, in 1845 when the British annexed Natal, most of the Boers left for the Boer republics. By 1856, Natal had a legislative council to which twelve members were elected. Any person—irrespective of color—had the vote franchise. In 1865, this was changed; a new law excluded from the franchise all natives who were governed by special laws. While not disenfranchising Coloureds and other non-Europeans, the measure practically excluded all natives from voting.

Having trekked north, the Boers would have nothing to do with the liberal ideas of the Cape and Natal. When the Orange Free State was granted responsible government in 1854, it adopted a constitution giving the franchise to whites only. In addition, its laws declared: "No Arab, Chinaman or Coolie or other Asiatic Coloured person may settle in the State for longer than two months without permission."¹⁰ The Boers in the Transvaal adopted similar policy and a constitution that permitted no equality between Europeans and non-Europeans. Indians in Natal, who had migrated from Madras and southern India to work in the sugar and tea plantations, were cleverly denied the franchise by a law saying that people from countries without a parliamentary franchise would not be included on the voted roles.

The Indians who entered the Transvaal as merchants encountered resistance from the predominantly English chambers of commerce. White shopkeepers did not wish to face increased competition, and prevailed on President Paul Kruger to pass legislation halting the further infiltration of Indians. The Kruger government passed Law 3 of 1885, which made Asiatic registration compulsory, prohibited Asiatic land ownership except in certain designated places, and denied Asians the franchise. While Law 3 was in fact the law, it was never actually enforced. India itself joined South African Indians in protesting loudly against it.

While the treatment of non-Europeans was not the primary cause of the Boer War, it played an important role. In the Boer republics, Britain practiced intervention on behalf of the natives, seeking to secure them access to courts of law and freedom of movement. The more fundamental issue turned out to be the poor treatment of Englishmen in the Boer republics.

SOUTH AFRICAN THINKING ON RACE

Apartheid (pronounced "apart-hate") means literally "apart-ness"—the state of being apart—*'separateness,' or "separation." Use of the term did not appear

until relatively late in South Africa's racial history: in a lead article in *Die Burger* on March 26, 1943.¹¹

South Africa's apartheid contains some of the same features as U.S. segregationist history, but it also contains features that make it unique: A South African white could be an advocate of apartheid without also being a "racist" or "white supremacist," in the traditional usage of these terms.

There were indeed differences between Europeans and Africans. Often these differences were explained by racist theories referring to innate racial inferiority or by "enlightened" theories of cultural, historical, biological, and environmental differences. Dudley Kidd argued that initiation rites and the intensely sexual life in the Kraal (enclosed native village) distracted the African child.¹²

Charles Loram, Yale University's Sterling Professor of Education, and historian Edgar Brookes welcomed the segregationist program of South African Prime Minister James B. M. Hertzog and they helped him to draft speeches defending it. Both Loram and Brookes were acting as what might be called "humane paternalists," who—with positive motives—thought they were promoting the best interests of the black African.

This kind of segregationist differed from the many Christian missionaries who saw African customs and institutions as ignorant, superstitious, and evil. There were some missionaries, however, who revered and respected the African tradition.¹³ They were the people who originated the term "dual economy," which reflected their belief in a fundamental incompatibility between Western and African economies. Other church people sought to help the natives as reflected in a letter sent by the Church Council of Drakenstein in 1703 to the Convocation at Amsterdam, saying that it wanted to convert the Hottentots "so the children of Ham would no longer be servants of bondsmen."¹⁴

Inspired by this thinking, Bronislaw Malinowski and A. R. Radcliffe-Brown at the University of Cape Town argued that the institutions of a primitive society were fragile. If they were to come into contact with Western cultures, the native institutions would be shattered and subsumed by the stronger Western culture. Therefore, contact with the West had to be regulated and slowed down.

Whether these arguments had any factual basis or not, they were nonetheless used as a basis for colonist social engineering. In his book *The White Man's Task*, Jan Christiaan Smuts, attorney general of the Transvaal and later South Africa's prime minister (1919-24 and 1939-48) said:

Instead of mixing up white and black in the old haphazard way, which instead of lifting up the black degraded the white, we are now trying to lay down a policy of keeping them apart as much as possible in our institutions. In land ownership, settlement and forms of government we are trying to keep them apart, and in that way laying down in outline a general policy which it may take a hundred years to work out. . . You will have . . . large areas cultivated by blacks, where they will look after themselves in all forms of living and development, while in the rest of the country you will have your white communities which will govern themselves separately according to the accepted European principles. The natives will, of course, be free to go and work in the white areas, but as

far as possible the administration of white and black areas will be separated, and such that each will be satisfied and developed according to its own proper lines.¹⁵

Smuts's view was shared by President Theodore Roosevelt, who said that the British in Uganda "had been particularly well advised in trying to develop the Natives according to their own way of life, instead of trying to make Englishmen out of them."¹⁶

South Africa's John Cecil Rhodes—founder of the Rhodes scholarships—had another view:

Only one race approached God's ideal type, his own Anglo-Saxon race; God's purpose then was to make the Anglo-Saxon race predominant, and the best way to help on God's work and fulfill His purpose in the world was to contribute to the predominance of the Anglo-Saxon race and so bring nearer the reign of justice, liberty and peace.¹⁷

There were paternalistic segregationists who were prominent members of the South African Natives Commission, and their recommendations were crucial in the development of native policy in the twentieth century. Ironically, the predecessors to today's Cape Town liberals—the liberals of that day—drafted the first major foundation of apartheid: the Natives Land Act of 1913.

Writing in 1960, Henry Allan Fagan, a liberal judge on South Africa's Appellate Court, said it cannot be overstressed that the early supporters of apartheid

neither intended nor saw in it any injustice towards the Bantu. On the contrary they honestly and positively believed that, while it was the only course which offered sure protection to the White minority, it was also the only way to save the Bantu from the frustration which would only block their progress in direct competition with the Europeans in a mixed society.¹⁸

Fagan added that apartheid is part of a very strong sense of Afrikaner nationalistic pride. Proud of their own distinctiveness, they are willing to concede the same to other groups. Fagan quoted General J. B. M. Hertzog (later prime minister) as wanting to separate the races "in a manner that will avoid causing ill-feeling or a sense of grievance, and will involve no greater discrimination than the necessities of the case require."¹⁹ Hertzog admonished, "Do not let us take the whole of the Union for ourselves. Let us divide it. Let us give one share to the Bantu, and let them develop there according to their own nature."²⁰

While not justifying apartheid laws, Fagan did insist, "I have no hesitation in stating it is my firm conviction that the Government, and also the European population in general, as the ruling group, feel their responsibility for the welfare and happiness of the Bantu people."²¹ Fagan accepted conventional and customary segregation, but did not think that government enforcement was justified. This ambivalence is reflected in his comment that:

On the one hand every restriction on a man's activities and on the use and development of his capabilities is unfair and frustrating to the individual concerned and, as regards

the community at large, it is economically unsound. On the other hand, people who have a high standard of life may require protection against others whose lower needs make competition unequal and threaten to have a detrimental effect on the way of life of the best portion of the population.²²

On the basis of protecting "the way of life of the best portion of the population," Fagan agreed that the "rate for the job and reservation was necessary to protect whites, coloured and Asiatics from Bantu."²³

Many high officials agonized over racial relationships in South Africa in ways that were uniquely different from racial conflict anywhere else. The most unique feature of this agony was the near absence of the racial bitterness and hostility seen elsewhere. Sir Alfred Milner, the British high commissioner for South Africa, in an April 1904 dispatch to Alfred Lyttlton, the British secretary of state of the colonies, wrote:

I think that to attempt to place Coloured people on an equality with Whites in South Africa is wholly impracticable and that moreover it is in principle wrong. But I hold also that when a Coloured man possesses a certain high grade of civilization he ought to obtain what I call 'White privileges' irrespective of his colour. I have on more than one occasion given expression to these views. They are very unpopular in the Transvaal at the present time, but I do not despair of their ultimately prevailing.²⁴

Milner's sympathetic view was tempered with political expediency: "I personally could win over the Dutch in the [Cape] Colony and indeed all of South Africa dominions in my term of office . . . without offending the English. You have only to sacrifice the 'nigger' absolutely and the game is easy."²⁵

Cape liberals championed a nonwhite policy different from most other Europeans. Liberals felt that the vote should be restricted to civilized men and that all men—regardless of color—should have the opportunity to become civilized. They made it clear, however, that they were not advocating social integration. In 1908, Lord William Selbourne, the South African high commissioner, wrote to Smuts that he accepted the idea of the franchise for those who "have really reached the average level of civilization of the white man," and that he rejected universal suffrage.²⁶

Lord Alexander Elgin, the secretary of state for India, told an Indian delegation that, while he opposed restrictions against Indians, "we have to recognize the fact that there are difficulties arising on the part of the White communities and we have to reckon with them."²⁷ Sir Godfrey Lagden, commissioner of native affairs, said, "I am convinced of the necessity of all Natives being compelled to carry passes as much for the security and protection of themselves as for the White people."²⁸

One of the best known missionaries, Reverend Charles Bourquin, saw separation as a way of reducing racial tension:

If we will avoid disaster I think, as many others, that the best thing for Black and White would be for the Natives to live as much as possible their own life, manage their own

affairs, and have their independent institutions under the guidance of sympathetic White administrators. . . But separation, if possible, if it is not too late, should not be carried out without consulting the Natives.²⁹

After the 1910 electoral success of Jan Smuts and Louis Botha, Botha recommended "placing of the Native question above party politics and the fair and sympathetic treatment of the Coloured races in a broad and liberal spirit." He correctly anticipated that the native question would become a source for political strife between the white parties.³⁰

While a member of Botha's cabinet, General Hertzog spoke to an English audience in 1917 on the subject of South Africa's native policy: "Instead of mixing up Black and White in the old way, confusing everything and not lifting up the Black but degrading the White, we are now trying to keep them apart as much as possible in our institutions."³¹ In 1913, the African National Congress presented a protest to Smuts, then acting prime minister, in regard to the pass laws and the new requirement that women carry them, saying they had been passed "for the purpose of slavery." Denying that this was so, Smuts insisted that the laws had been passed for the protection of uncivilized natives and added that he was in favor of granting exemptions to civilized natives.

The official paternalistic sentiments were also extended to Indians. This is seen in the Cape Town Agreement (1927) containing the famous "Uplift Clause," which read:

The Union Government firmly believes in and adheres to the principle that it is the duty of every civilized government to devise ways and means and to take all possible steps for the uplifting of every section of their permanent population to the full extent of their capacity and opportunities. The Union Government accepts the view that in the provision of education and other facilities, the considerable number of Indians who will remain part of the permanent population shall not be allowed to lag behind other sections of the people.³²

The Cape Town Agreement also provided for a scheme of voluntary emigration of Indians to India. The government offered a cash bonus of £20 (\$56) per adult and £10 (\$28) per child, in addition to free passage back to India. However, by 1940, only 17,542 Indians had left the country under this scheme.³³

Soon after assuming the office of prime minister, General Hertzog explained what he saw as the right native policy. Natives should have their own areas. Recognizing the indispensability of black labor, Hertzog declared that natives who wished to work in white areas should be allowed to do so as long as they obeyed the white man's laws. In order to prevent interracial sexual relationships, whites should be kept out of black areas, and vice versa. If there were not enough land for the natives, the government ought to buy more. As it happened, a local outbreak of violence allowed Hertzog to spell out in detail his views on native policy:

We are dealing here with the place of the Native, not in Native territory, but in the land of the White Man where the white man shall rule and have the right to live safely and

peacefully. Nobody compels the Native to settle in this territory, but if he does so it is demanded from him that he shall respect the White man and obey the laws of the country . . . I would again like to assure the native that the White man entertains for him the greatest goodwill and the friendliest feelings, and that the White man is determined to carry out faithfully that fatherly care which he has promised to the Native ever since the foundation of the White man's settlement in South Africa... I would however warn him at the same time that the White man is just as determined as in the days of the pioneers that the control of the country shall be held by the Europeans under the influence of European civilization and that just as little the father in his own house would allow a minor to rule the house, would the white man of the Union allow the government of the Union and its people to be held by the Native, or would the Native be given authority within or over the government of the country. I wish to warn the Natives that whoever is so presumptuous as to claim equal authority with the White man will experience the greatest disappointment and failure.³⁴

The Afrikaner mentality is rooted in strong nationalist instincts. In at least this one respect, the Afrikaner is a supporter of black nationalism: Nationalism for the Afrikaner is an exclusive concept, where for the British it is inclusive. Thus, the Afrikaner sees perfect justice and no contradiction in excluding blacks from white society, and granting blacks the same right to exclude whites.

THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONALIST RACIAL POLICY

When Prime Minister Smuts called for South Africa to enter World War II on the side of the Allies, his appearance of being pro-British and against the long-run interests of South Africa, along with his "liberal" ideas on race and native policy, cost the United party and his heir apparent, Jan H. Hofmeyr, the elections in 1948. Daniel Francois Malan's campaign consisted of brutal attacks on the Smuts government. Malan whipped up South African fears concerning the black nationalism that was beginning to sweep the continent, and the spreading communist influence. Europeans in South Africa felt that their supremacy was being threatened, and believed that strong steps ought to be taken to defend it. Dr. Malan was their man.

For more than 30 years, South Africa's native policy had variously borne such names as "segregation" or "separation." It was Malan who—in outlining the National party's native policy—popularized its new name: apartheid. This policy, Malan urged, was to be based on separation and trusteeship:

This means in no way the oppression of the Non-Europeans but the elimination of racial friction through acknowledgment of their right of existence, freedom of development, coupled with the cultivation among them of a spirit of self-respect and self-reliance and the provision to them of the necessary help, but everything in their own sphere and under the sovereignty and leadership of the Europeans. Apartheid must as far as possible also be applied and maintained between the three sections of the Non-Europeans—Coloured, Native and Indian.³⁵

The National party's 1948 victory was complete. Malan's cabinet consisted entirely of men who were Afrikaner in descent. When a deputation of 12 blacks presented an address of loyalty to him in October 1948 after his election, Malan said:

I regard the Bantu not as strangers and not as a menace to the white people, but as our children for whose welfare we are responsible, and as an asset to the country. My Government has no intention of depriving you of your rights or oppressing you. Nothing will be taken from you without giving you something better in its place. . . . What you want is a rehabilitation of your own national life, and not competition and intermixture and equality with the white man in his particular part of the country.³⁶

In 1950, Malan appointed Dr. H. F. Verwoerd—an academic and a brilliantly articulate rhetorician—to be Minister of Native Affairs. Verwoerd agreed that apartheid was not a policy of oppression, but a means for allowing the natives to keep their culture and traditions and to govern themselves to the greatest extent possible. See Appendix 1.A of this chapter for Malan's statement on his government's apartheid policy.

While South Africa's apartheid policy faced bitter criticism overseas, it won acceptance among whites at home. At a 1950 conference held in Bloemfontein, the Action Committee of the Dutch Reformed Churches declared that equality in the economic and political spheres would submerge whites. Europeans could not continue to hire blacks in low-skilled jobs while restricting them from higher skilled jobs. The church prophesied that sooner or later blacks would demand a say in the conduct of affairs. Therefore, the only long-run alternative was to separate the native completely from the white population.

The Nationalist-formed South African Bureau of Race Relations announced that separation and reducing black urbanization, combined with the development of native reserves, needed to be started before it was too late and before trends toward integration could become irreversible.

Addressing the criticisms of his apartheid policy, Malan argued that differences between the European and the non-European populations went beyond color. Color, he asserted, was merely the physical manifestation of two irreconcilable ways of life: barbarism and Christianity. There was also the overwhelming numerical inferiority of the Europeans. Malan added,

May I emphasize, that to consider only the rights of Blacks would be precisely as immoral as to have regard only for the rights of the Whites. I must ask you to give White South Africans credit for not being a nation of scheming reactionaries imbued with base and inhuman motives, nor a nation of fools blind to the gravity of their vital problem To them millions of semi-barbarous Blacks look for guidance, justice and the Christian way of life. Here a tremendous experiment is being tried—not that fraught with the bloodshed of annihilation, nor that coloured with assimilation, but that inspired by a belief in the logical differentiation with the acceptance of the basic human rights and responsibilities.³⁷

Malan's reference to the absence of bloodshed may have been meant as a slap in the face to the Western nations who were criticizing South Africa's racial policy. South Africans—unlike colonists in America, Australia, and other places—had not decimated the native population.

Professor Nellie I. Olivier, head of the Department of Bantu Studies at Stellenbosch University, saw the sharp U.S. criticism of South Africa as stemming from an invalid comparison between blacks in South Africa and blacks in the United States. According to Olivier, there is no comparison. Black Americans are American; they have no culture and language of their own, she said. Discrimination against them has been solely on the grounds of color. It is different in South Africa, where blacks and whites are of different cultures. Moreover—Olivier argued—in the United States, whites are numerically superior and have no fear of domination, while the opposite has been the case in South Africa.³⁸

Strijdom's Vision of Apartheid

In 1954 when Malan resigned, the National party chose Johannes Gerhardus Strijdom as the new prime minister. Malan's attitude toward apartheid had been nurtured in the more liberal atmosphere of the Cape. By contrast, Strijdom was the leader of the extreme right wing of the Transvaal Nationalists—which was to be seen in his ruthless pursuit of a perfect apartheid.

Strijdom's first order of business—where Malan had failed—was to remove colored voters from the common rolls in the Cape. Strijdom achieved this goal by circumventing the constitution: He packed both the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court (adding five more judges) and the Senate (adding 41 more senators) with loyal Nationalists. Through the power of a packed Senate, Strijdom was able to secure the necessary two-thirds vote required to amend the constitution; and when the measure was taken before the packed Appellate Court in 1955, a majority in the court—10-1—held that the Separate Representation of Voters Act was valid. As a result, 30,000 coloreds, in the Cape, lost their right to vote in Parliamentary elections. Strijdom explained his non-European policy thus:

Call it paramountcy, baaskap or what you will, it is still domination. I am being as blunt as I can. I am making no excuses. Either the White man dominates or the Black man will take over. I say that the Non-European will not accept leadership—if he has a choice. The only way the Europeans can maintain supremacy is by domination . . . And the only way they can maintain domination is by withholding the vote from the Non-Europeans.³⁹

In a December 1955 speech, Strijdom said,

In our actions towards the Non-Whites in the application of our traditional policy of separation we shall have to act in such a way as to give proof that we are not hostile towards the Non-Whites; that separation is in the interests of both colour groups; and

with this policy clashes and friction are eliminated and coexistence, but not integration, is assured.⁴⁰

Reaffirming South African paternalism, the prime minister said:

The purpose of the apartheid policy is that, by separating the races in every field in so far as it is practically possible, one can prevent clashes and frictions between Whites and non-Whites. At the same time, in fairness to the non-Whites, they must be given the opportunity of developing in their own areas and in accordance with their own nature and abilities under the guardianship of the whites; and, insofar as they develop in accordance with the systems which are best adapted to their nature and traditions, to govern themselves there and serve their community at all the various levels of their national life.⁴¹

Strijdom's "white baaskap" policy was not without white opposition. J. G. N. Strauss, speaking for the United party, criticized the prime minister for seeing native policy as either baaskap or equality: "As far as this party is concerned, if 'baaskap' means suppression, then we do not stand for 'baaskap.' That kind of 'baaskap' we reject completely. If the Prime Minister means by this 'baaskap' that the non-Europeans, whatever their merits, will always, in all circumstances, be excluded from a share of control of the affairs of this country simply on the basis of their colour, then the United Party rejects that kind of 'baaskap.' " Strauss went on to deny that the United party stood for equality, but maintained "that a door must be left open to the non-Europeans."⁴²

Verwoerd's Vision of Apartheid

On the death of Strijdom in 1958, Dr. Hendrick Frensch Verwoerd became prime minister. During his reign, he lived through one unsuccessful assassination attempt, but was stabbed to death on September 6, 1966. Verwoerd had served as minister of native affairs under both the Malan and Strijdom governments. When he assumed the duties of prime minister, Verwoerd made his native policy clear:

Dr. Malan said it, and Mr. Strijdom said it, and I have said it repeatedly and I want to say it again: The policy of Apartheid moves consistently in the direction of more and more separate development with the ideal of total separation in all spheres.⁴³

Apartheid rhetoric was one thing, but harsh economic realities made implementation quite another. This was a constant source of frustration, which in turn led to a constant redefinition of apartheid goals. In 1956, Dr. Verwoerd had said,

Apartheid is something which has to be brought about gradually in all spheres of life. . . The idea of total apartheid gives one something to aim at. . . Everyone realizes

that such a thing cannot be attained within the space of a few years, nor even for a long time to come and that South Africa cannot attain that ultimate objective in the near future.⁴⁴

Verwoerd pushed through Parliament a bill that he thought would help to speed up the development of apartheid: the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Bill (1959). Under its provisions, the government would create eight separate main homelands on the basis of language and culture. In these homelands, administrative authorities (chiefs and headmen) would be based on the tribal system. Gradually, all European administrative officials, judges, and teachers would be replaced by competent natives. Verwoerd saw these homelands as becoming a community of interests—somewhat like the European Common Market—with white South Africa. No whites would be permitted to live, invest, or do business in black homelands. To facilitate homeland development, the government formed the Bantu Investment Corporation with an initial capitalization of £500,000 (\$1,400,000).

The opposition in Parliament and in the public derisively called these homelands *Bantustans*. Verwoerd responded to the criticism by saying that the South African government—like the British government—was training its natives for home rule. Moreover, he said, South Africa was doing it better. In Basutoland (later Lesotho), where Britain was preparing the natives for home rule, whites were allowed to remain in the country—and possibly exploit the natives. Verwoerd said that, if he had his way—like in his South Africa scheme—no whites would be allowed to remain and conduct business that might otherwise be conducted by the natives for their own benefit. At any rate, the Transkei—with about one and a half million natives—was proclaimed the first independent homeland. The territory of the Transkei includes several white towns with numerous white businesses. While promising these businessmen that they could remain as long as they liked, Verwoerd declared that the "white spots" would ultimately have to go. In a London speech (March 1961), Verwoerd described the apartheid policy as follows:

We want each of our population groups to control and govern itself as in the case with other nations. Then all can co-operate as in a Commonwealth—in an economic association with the republic and with each other. . . South Africa will proceed in all honesty and fairness to secure peace, prosperity and justice for all by means of political independence coupled with economic inter-dependence.⁴⁵

Before the House of Assembly in January 1963, Verwoerd elaborated on his vision of grand apartheid:

Reduced to its simplest form the problem is nothing else than this: We want to keep South Africa White. . . "Keeping it White" can only mean one thing, namely White domination, not "leadership," not "guidance," but "control," "supremacy." If we are agreed that it is the desire of the people that the White man should be able to continue

to protect himself by retaining White domination, we say that it can be achieved by separate development.⁴⁶

However, Verwoerd did think that whites should be helped in ways not hurtful to the natives.⁴⁷ Afrikaner paternalism toward blacks was just the opposite of its antagonism toward Indians, as reflected in the common Afrikaner expression, *Kaffer op sy plek en koelie uit die land*—which translates: "Kaffir in his place and coolie [Indian] out of the country."

The Vorster Vision of Apartheid

Prime Minister Balthazar Johannes Vorster—elected after the assassination of Dr. Verwoerd, who was killed by a mentally ill white messenger on September 6, 1966—explained his own vision of native policy, which differed little from his predecessors:

I believe in the policy of separate development, not only as a philosophy but also as the only practical solution in the interest of everyone to eliminate frictions, and to do justice to every population group as well as every individual. I say to the coloured people, as well as to the Indians and the Bantu, that the policy of separate development is not a policy which rests upon jealousy, fear or hatred. It is not a denial of the human dignity of anyone, nor is it so intended. On the contrary, it gives the opportunity to every individual, within his own sphere, not only to be a man or woman in every sense, but it also creates the opportunity for them to develop and advance without restriction or frustration as circumstances justify, and in accordance with the demands of development achieved.⁴⁸

Vorster served as prime minister until 1978, and then briefly as president—but resigned in 1979 during a scandal involving the misuse of government funds.

The Botha Vision of Apartheid

Addressing the opening of the South African Parliament on January 31, 1986, State President Pieter Willem Botha said, "We believe that the human dignity, life, liberty and property of all must be protected, regardless of colour, race, creed or religion."⁴⁹ In the rest of his speech President Botha—who has been in office since 1978—stressed that the South African government is committed to *one* citizenship for all South Africans, within an *undivided* country. Such a statement represents a significant—if not complete—break with the apartheid ideology of the former chief executives of South Africa.

The initial theme of Botha's tenure in office was "adapt or die," meaning that the visions of Malan and Verwoerd were no longer relevant to the realities of South Africa. Botha's initial reform strategy focused on political accommodation for the Coloured and Indian populations—leading to the new constitution

of 1983, which was endorsed by two-thirds of the white voters in a countrywide referendum.

When Botha was reelected to office on September 14, 1984, he announced a new cabinet that—for the first time in South African history—would include a Coloured minister and an Indian minister. In 1985, a new three-chamber Parliament—the House of Assembly (whites), the House of Representatives (Coloureds), and the House of Delegates (Indians)—met for its first full session. Among Indians and Coloureds, the new dispensation found only a tepid reception; but among blacks, who were left out of the new dispensation, it helped to trigger the longest period of sustained unrest in South African history. As such, it served notice on Botha that South Africa's major political issue of black representation remained an unsolved problem.

SUMMARY

South Africa's racial policy differs from those in many other places. It is full of contrasts and contradictions. Paternalism toward blacks—considered to be several steps behind Europeans in evolution—has been a dominant feature, rivaled by economics (as we will see in later chapters). While no less offensive to the basic principles of human rights, this paternalism nonetheless produced a racial climate markedly different from the racism of postslavery United States—where hate and violence in the form of lynchings, castration and tar-and-feathering were all-too-common features. For example, the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* reports that, between 1882 and 1951, there were 4,730 lynchings in the United States: 1,293 white persons, and 3,437 blacks. In South Africa, there has been no known case of lynching since 1858 when 42 Bantu prisoners of war were lynched.

South African whites almost boast when they say that their racial problems of today reflect what they see as their humanity in the past: They are quick to claim that—unlike other whites who have come into contact with native populations—they did not exterminate the native blacks. In support of this claim, South Africans point to the white settlers in America who massacred the Indians, and the British in Australia and New Zealand who massacred the Tasmanians and Maori—in some cases for sport.⁵⁰

This brief sketch of South African history should give pause to the erroneous comparison between the situations of blacks in South Africa and blacks in the United States. Culturally, U.S. blacks are identical to the white population. They have no religion or language of their own. This is not the case in South Africa. The black population there—even today, except in urban areas—has a different culture from the white population. For those who seek a comparison between what exists in South Africa and in the United States, it is more appropriate to compare South African blacks to the American Indians. American Indians are a race of peoples on whom an alien European culture was imposed. Official U.S. policy toward them had some of the paternalistic features of South Africa's

policy toward its native population—for example, the separation into reservations and homelands. The closest South African equivalent to U.S. blacks are the Coloureds, who are essentially European in culture.

APPENDIX 1.A: MALAN'S APARTHEID POLICY

THE NATIVES

(1) The Native Reserves must be retained and made suitable for carrying a larger population by protecting the soil against erosion and over-cropping and by teaching the Native to make the best use of his soil by applying better agricultural methods. Possible additions must only take place in judicious fashion and after thorough investigation.

(2) In urban areas inside the European areas Natives must be domiciled in their own residential areas with proper attention to good housing and other healthy accommodation conditions. Only Natives who have been assured of work will be admitted, and the detribalized one among them will at all times receive preference. Newcomers from the Native areas or from the European platteland must be regarded as temporary workers and those in excess must be repatriated.

(3) In view of their possession of their own national home in the Reserves, Natives in the European areas can make no claim to political rights. The present representation of Natives in Parliament and in the Cape Provincial Council must therefore be abolished. Representation in the Senate must however continue by the election of three European Senators by different Native councils and further through three others nominated by the Government because of their particular knowledge of Native affairs, as is now the case. These representatives must form a standing and permanent committee on Native Affairs. They must however have no vote on questions of confidence, or on the declaration of war or on measures affecting the political rights of non-Europeans. The present existing Native Affairs Commission must give way to a more effective commission of experts.

(4) The present existing Native Advisory Council must be abolished and in its place a system of self-government on the first-rate and well-tried example of the Transkei Bunga called into being—a system which will keep proper account of the natural groupings among the Natives themselves based on the territorial, historical, racial and linguistic differences between them. This will give to the Natives that opportunity of living out their own aspirations which under the present system are being withheld from them and which in their dissatisfaction makes them willing prey of the Communist agitator.

(5) For higher education separate provision must be made for Natives and their admission to European institutions together with European students must end.

(6) Administratively all Native interests including education must rest with the department of Native Affairs and the necessary sub-departments.

THE COLOURED PEOPLE

(1) The party bases its policy on the fact that the Coloured people form their own separate group between on the one side the Europeans, with whom they share the same

Source: Cited in L. E. Neame, *The History of Apartheid: The Story of the Colour War in South Africa* (New York: London House and Maxwell, 1963), pp. 74-77.

language and cultural interests, and on the other side the Natives, from whom they differ in race, language and standard of civilization and above whom they must hold a privileged position in the European areas.

(2) As against the Europeans the principle of Apartheid must be applied in respect of residential areas, which can only be brought about gradually, and in public transport, recreational areas and as far as possible also in work places. Further in urban areas, as well as in the platteland, provision must be made with Government support for better housing for Coloured people, special attention being paid to the requirements of the more civilized ones among them, but in any case separately and at a distance from Native locations.

(3) In territories where the Coloured population is largely resident, their interests, particularly in regard to the provision of employment, must be protected against those of Natives flowing in.

(4) In Coloured residential areas Coloured people must as far as possible be appointed for public positions, and preference must be given to them in granting of business licences.

(5) In the provision of educational facilities for Coloured people special account must be taken of their prospects in the service of their own racial group, as well as in connection with the provision of employment in general. Technical education must be provided for them in accordance with their requirements and they must have their own separate university institutions.

(6) A State department for specially furthering the interests of Coloured people must be called into being in which Coloured people will also serve as civil servants. In this connection a Coloured Advisory Council must also exist, the members of which, apart from a few Government nominees, must be elected by qualified Coloured voters themselves and on the basis of constituencies. The present Coloured Advisory Council, nominated by the Government and dependent on it, must disappear.

(7) In place of their vote as at present exercised—which makes them the playball of the political parties—special representation must be given to the Coloured people in Parliament through a Senator nominated by the Government because of his special knowledge of Coloured affairs, three members of Parliament chosen by the Coloured Advisory Council, and three members of the Cape Provincial Council chosen on the same basis as those in Parliament. The representatives must be Europeans.

THE INDIANS

(1) The party will strive to repatriate or remove elsewhere as many Indians as possible with the co-operation of India and other countries.

(2) The present ban on Indian immigration, inter-provincial movement and penetration must remain and be more stringently maintained.

(3) The Indian must not be allowed to reside among other racial groups.

(4) Trading licences to Indians outside their own residential areas must be reduced.

(5) Family allowances to Indians must be abolished.

NOTES

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5. Neame, *History of Apartheid*, p. 14.
6. Ibid., p. 19.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid., p. 20.
9. Ibid.
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11. Brian Bunting, "The Origins of Apartheid," in *Apartheid*, edited by Alex LaGuma (New York: International Publishers, 1971), p. 23.
12. John W. Cell, *The Highest Stage of White Supremacy: The Origins of Segregation in South Africa and the American South* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. 221.
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14. F. A. van Jaarsveld, *The Afrikaner's Interpretation of South African History* (Cape Town: Simondium Publishers, 1964), p. 6.
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17. van Jaarsveld, *Afrikaners' Interpretation*, p. 4.
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19. Ibid., p. 43.
20. Giniewski, p. 123.
21. Fagan, *Our Responsibility*, p. 35.
22. Ibid., p. 75.
23. Ibid.
24. Neame, *History of Apartheid*, p. 30.
25. Janet Robertson, *Liberalism in South Africa: 1948-1963* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), p. 1.
26. Ibid., pp. 4-5.
27. Neame, *History of Apartheid*, p. 30.
28. Ibid., p. 31.
29. Ibid., p. 32.
30. Robertson, *Liberalism in South Africa*, pp. 7-8.
31. Neame, *History of Apartheid*, p. 40.
32. Ibid., pp. 52-53.
33. Gavin Maasdorp and Nesen Pillay, "Indians in the Political Economy of South Africa," in *South Africa's Indians: The Evolution of a Minority*, edited by Bridglal Pachi (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1979), p. 301.
34. Neame, *History of Apartheid*, pp 53-54.
35. Ibid., p. 74.
36. Eugene P. Dvorin, *Racial Separation in South Africa: An Analysis of Apartheid Theory* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952), p. 95.
37. Neame, *History of Apartheid*, p. 81.
38. Ibid., p. 80-83.
39. Ibid., p. 131.

40. Ibid., p. 132.
41. Bunting, "Origins of Apartheid," pp. 25-26.
42. Henry John May, *The South African Constitution* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1970), p. 154.
43. Neame, *History of Apartheid*, p. 157.
44. Fagan, *Our Responsibility*, pp. 41-42.
45. Bunting, "Origins of Apartheid," p. 36.
46. Ibid., p. 28.
47. Alexander Hepple, *Verwoerd* (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1967), p. 30.
48. Bunting, "Origins of Apartheid," p. 26.
49. Leon Louw and Frances Kendall, *South Africa: The Solution* (Bisho, Ciskei: Amagi Publications, 1986), pp. xv and 50.
50. There are numerous accounts of murders and massacres reported in A. Grenfell Price, *White Settlers and Native Peoples* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1972); "In California the whites killed Indians as 'a sport to enliven Sundays and holidays' " (p. 17). "In Oregon the legislature, politicians, subordinate Indian agents and even Methodist clergy participated in massacres" (p. 17). "In 1871 the kindly Kingsley wrote that he had to use his 38 calibre revolver to shoot children as his 56 calibre rifle 'tore them up so bad' " (p. 17). In Australia, eyewitness accounts reported "the wounded were brained; the infant cast into flames; the bayonet was driven into quivering flesh; the social fire around which the natives gathered to slumber became before morning their funeral pile" (p. 109). Governor Brisbane (1821-25) "proclaimed martial law in the colony west of Cape York and natives were shot like wild beast" (p. 107). In New Zealand, one-third of an estimated 200,000-300,000 Maori died in skirmishes with the white settlers (p. 151). No doubt a large part of the ruthlessness in Australia and New Zealand was due to their use as Britain's criminal colony.