Vol. 28, No. 4, WInter 2005

Cover Story

Before KELO: Federal money's role in eminent domain abuse

Before KeloFederal grants encourage excessive use of eminent domain. By William A. Fischel (PDF, 4 pp, 287K )

Features

Banking & Finance

Why Do We Regulate Banks? Concerns that are used to justify government intervention can be addressed privately. By Peter J. Wallison (PDF, 6 pp, 332K )

Bankruptcy

Protection for Whom? Efficient liquidation benefits creditors as a group. By Stanley D. Longhofer and Stephen R. Peters (PDF, 6 pp, 185K )

Theory

The Perverse Effects of Predatory Pricing Law Even if predation is possible, does intense price competition harm consumers? By Daniel A. Crane (PDF, 6 pp, 237K )

Corporate Governance

Quack Corporate Governance Sarbanes-Oxley may have satisfied a political need, but it will do little to protect investors or strengthen the market. By Roberta Romano (PDF, 9 pp, 373K )

Can Fee Disclosure Be Trusted? Does Sarbanes-Oxley's disclosures produce useful information? By Terrance Skantz and Denise Dickins (PDF, 2 pp, 74K )

Mercatus Reports

Texas Telecom Legislation | Natural Gas Quality Standards | Orphan Works | Commentary: The Very Boring Reasons Behind High Gas Prices (PDF, 5 pp, 248K )

Briefly Noted

Do Consumers Value Fuel Economy?, by Molly Espey | What to Do about Bad Patents? by Mark Lemley, Doug Lichtman, and Bhaven Sampat (PDF, 5 pp, 268K )

In Review

The Market for Virtue, by David Vogel | In the Defense of the Economic Analysis of Regulation, by Robert Hahn (PDF, 6 pp, 152K )

The Final Word

Second Thoughts? By Marni Soupcoff (PDF, 1 pp, 77K )

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