The Cato Review of Business & Government

Readings

Party Line

The Fall of the Bell System, by Peter Temin, with Louis Galambos (Cambridge University Press, 1987), 378 pp.

Reviewed by Bruce M. Owen
Bruce M. Owen is President of Economists, Incorporated, Washington, DC.

The disintegration of the American Telephone & Telegraph Company on January 1, 1984, was the biggest antitrust outcome since the dissolution of the oil and tobacco trusts in 1910. Peter Temin, a world class economic historian, has written about the events leading to this breakup in The Fall of the Bell System, which was commissioned by AT&T. Temin assisted in preparing AT&T's defense in the government's antitrust lawsuit. I testified on behalf of the United States in the same lawsuit.

This is an important book both because of its author's credentials and because it is the first scholarly effort to chronicle in detail the breakup of the world's largest corporation. In a highly readable history of the rather dull industry, Temin takes us from the origins of telephone technology in the nineteenth century to the regulatory, technological, and antitrust battles following World War II. If viewed as a commissioned house history, the book is a pearl; but viewing the work in this way would be a disservice to Temin and his formidable talent and reputation. When viewed as scholarship in economic history, however, it is a disappointment.

Temin has written a history that is neither balanced nor economic. Thematically, the book is limited largely to AT&T's official points of view before the breakup. Moreover, the book provides a detailed chronology, but little economic analysis of events. Perhaps because there is no careful treatment of the evidence presented for and against AT&T, the implication is that the outcome of the trial was unrelated to the facts that convinced Judge Harold Greene that "the Bell System has violated the antitrust laws in a number of ways over a lengthy period of time." The book does not focus on the illegal behavior that was the proximate cause of AT&T's dissolution, or on whether the dissolution was responsive to the behavior; instead, it emphasizes AT&T's (now abandoned) legal and political challenges to the government's decisions to introduce competition into the telephone business.

The "bad acts" undertaken by AT&T against competitors were necessary but not sufficient for its fall. Judge Greene, and eventually AT&T itself, became convinced that such bad acts are motivated in this industry by a pernicious interaction of structure and regulation-induced incentives. This economic theory of Bell's disintegration prevailed at trial, and remains highly relevant in the post-divestiture regulation of the surviving regional telephone holding companies. However, it is characterized by Temin, without explanation, as "discredited." Indeed, one is two-thirds of the way through the book before one can find even a brief description on the government's economic theory of its case; nowhere is there any reference to the line of economic literature that led to that theory-a line that began with Harvey Averch and Leland L. Johson's classic 1962 article in the American Economic Review. Professor William Baxter's arrival on the scene in 1981 as the head of the Antitrust Division with his own new "ideological" economic theory of capitalist competition is treated by Temin as a deus ex machina. In fact, Baxter's economic theory of United States v. AT&T was the same theory espoused by Department of Justice economists before the complaint was filed in 1974, a theory with intellectual roots far older than that, and in no sense ideologically novel.

The perspective of AT&T's lawyers, largely adopted by Temin, was that a few misguided federal policy makers suddenly, quixotically-perhaps even with unsavory motives-changed the rules of the game, and introduced competition nearly a century of superior performance by the Bell System monopoly. The same or successor officials then handicapped AT&T's response to that change by, among other things, preventing AT&T from pricing competitively. Dedicated to the public interest, AT&T employees and managers gamely tried to keep up with the erratic policy shifts. If they occasionally failed and crushed a competitor, it was only because of their inability to shift course suddenly after a century of benevolent autocracy. In the end, the Bell System was disintegrated as a result of policy failure in the federal government: paralysis in Congress, inaction in the White House, random zealotry, and Baxter's peculiar ideology at the Department of Justice. Temin's explanation of the fall of the Bell System runs in terms of organizational failure mainly in the government, but also within AT&T's vast, rigid bureaucracy.

The government claimed that AT&T acted to suppress competition because of economic incentives created by Bell's vertical structure and rate-of-return regulation. The AT&T telephone equipment manufacturing and long-distance service subsidiaries, which faced new competition, were owned by the same parent as the local exchanges, which were bottleneck monopolies controlling access to the marketplace. Rate-of-return regulation, to the extent it was successful in constraining profits, created economic incentives for AT&T to engage in cross-subsidization of competitive services. Cross-subsidization can increase the apparent cost of a regulated service, and thus justify higher prices.

Temin does not analyze and test these contrasting views. He simply and tacitly adopts the view AT&T held at the time, and in doing so abandons economic analysis. Rather than tackling the economic theory of the government's case, the book focuses on the arcane issue of "board-to-board versus 'station-to-station'" telephone cost accounting. As a consequence of the legal history of this issue, according to Temin, during the 1970s AT&T was required to send massive and increasing amounts of money to its local service subsidiaries in order to keep local rates down. This subsidy was paid for by keeping AT&T's long-distance rates well above the levels that would be implied by the cost accounting. New long-distance competitors, like MCI, were not required to pay such subsidies at first. Hence, Temin is convinced, they were engaging in "creamskimming," and enjoyed an unfair competitive advantage over AT&T.

There is little doubt that the changed accounting rules, ceteris paribus, did increase Bell's long-distance prices and lower local rates. This was one of their purposes. (The shift also increased AT&T's profits because the interstate jurisdiction had a higher permitted rate of return.) But the accounting standards were strange regulatory creatures; Temin errs in equating them with economic costs. Moreover, it is still unclear whether there was a net subsidy burden on AT&T. Although Temin has estimated some, he has not taken account of all of the financial and technical relationships working in the opposite direction. For example, he neglects the subsidy flowing from local service to long-distance service due to the revenue lost by the operating companies in the course of excluding some of their own potential customers-AT&T's would-be competitors-from the market. Except for their common ownership, the local companies had no incentive to pay this opportunity cost. Finally, the question of a net subsidy running to local service from long-distance service was only one part of the picture. Temin completely neglects the issue of whether monopoly long-distance services were subsidizing competitive (private line) long-distance services, an issue that was preeminent at the Federal Communications Commission and hotly disputed in the private AT&T litigation.

Government witnesses testified that it was unclear whether there was a cross-subsidy compared to the prices that would prevail in a competitive world. What was clear was that the Bell System had the opportunity (on account of its structure) and the incentive (on account of its regulation) to discriminate against competitors. The new competitors themselves argued that the quality of the interconnection service offered to them was so inferior that it offset whatever advantage they got from not having to subsidize local service. Temin ignores most of these complications. Furthermore, Temin's emphasis on creamskimming in long distance obscures the fact that similar anticompetitive responses by Bell were taking place in the equipment market, where no subsidy was alleged.
Whether there was a subsidy is irrelevant to the issue of AT&T's culpability for anticompetitive behavior. It was certainly no justification for AT&T's arrogant and lawless policy of self-help. At the trial AT&T's lawyers contended, "...modem Bell management accurately perceived the fact that the elimination of competition was an essential element of the creation of an efficient industry structure and necessary for the provision of efficient telephone service."

AT&T had no legal right to impose its own vision of a perfect telephone industry through actions that violated the antitrust laws- especially when that vision was so nakedly self-serving. There is, perhaps, no better illustration of the link between economic interest and -public policy "vision" than the complete reversal that has taken place in AT&T's official position since its disintegration. Today AT&T is composed almost entirely of businesses subject to competitive discipline. To justify restrictions that prevent -its progeny-the regional Bell holding companies that inherited the bottleneck local exchanges- from entering into competition with it, AT&T now -adopts the very government arguments that its lawyers once attacked as baseless and irresponsible. Temin does not mention this.

Temin's account is even stranger when viewed from an economic perspective. Completely sidestepping neoclassical economics, he accepts, without reservation, the public policy legitimacy of clearly inefficient pricing that is derived from regulatory cost accounting and rate averaging. The economic case for introducing competition into the telephone business was not -to reduce the power and influence of AT&T, but to force both AT&T and its regulators to improve -the efficiency of telephone pricing. Yet the reader of this book will certainly come away with the sense that this was simply an ideological struggle between contending political interests, one in which economists with their parochial concerns with efficiency played only a peripheral role. In a broad sense that is true, but it is a jaw-dropping experience to find a distinguished economist completely discounting his own discipline. Moreover, one cannot ignore a salient point: in the end, the economic view prevailed. In neglecting this view, Temin has not explained the fall of the -Bell System.

The book offers no final judgment on the -wisdom of AT&T's disintegration. It acknowledges pros and cons, and leaves the task of weighing them to some future historian. But one cannot mistake the tone of sentimental regret for the passing of the Bell System that is present in Temin's book. We are told repeatedly that individual Bell System managers regularly put aside their own and their company's economic interests in order to emphasize an ideal of service to the public. Further, there is more than a hint of condemnation of the "ideological," "microeconomic adventure" that led to the breakup. If the book draws an unambiguous conclusion, it is that the application of neoclassical microeconomics to public policy has no special legitimacy.

In the year 1077, the Holy Roman Emperor Henry IV lost a political skirmish with Pope Gregory WI. A monkish chronicler tells us that Henry came before the Pope at Canossa, in North Italy, in the winter, where he stood barefoot in the snow for three days in penance for his defiance. This is a good reminder that all chronicles must be evaluated with common sense, and with an eye to the historian's institutional affiliation.

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Inclined Toward Reform

Braking the Special Interests: Trucking Deregulation and the Politics of Policy Reform,
by Dorothy Robyn (University of Chicago Press, 1987), 295 pp.

Reviewed by Andrew J. Strenio, Jr.
Andrew J. Strenio, Jr. is a commissioner at the Federal Trade Commission. He was a commissioner at the Interstate Commerce Commission from 1984 to 1985.

When President Carter signed the Motor Carrier Act of 1980 (MCA) on a bright July morning, he activated legislation that promised to save American consumers $8 billion and hundreds of millions of gallons of gasoline per year, and to throttle exhaustive federal regulation of a naturally competitive industry. This economically enlightened act enjoyed the support of a startlingly broad array of groups-such as the Consumer Federation of America, Common Cause, the National Association of Manufacturers, and the American Conservative Union-as well as President Carter's electoral rivals, Edward Kennedy and Ronald Reagan; Senators Howard Cannon and Robert Packwood; Alfred Kahn; and Ralph Nader.

Given the fundamental virtues of the MCA- the public benefits it would deliver at relatively low cost, and the diverse and enthusiastic coalition assembled on its behalf-the question for students of regulatory policy is this: how in the world did it ever pass? Strange as it may seem after eight generally successful years of operation, few individuals foresaw enactment of the MCA at the time. Not only did the legislation have to overcome the inertia that normally protects entrenched regulation, but it had to do so in the face of fierce opposition from two politically formidable groups, the American Trucking Association and the International Brotherhood of Teamsters.

Dorothy Robyn, assistant professor of public policy at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government, tells the enthralling talc of this triumph of the general interest over several significant special interests in Braking the Special Interests: Trucking Deregulation and the Politics of Policy Reform. She uses the disciplines of economics and political science to yield insights into the MCA battle that future reformers should be able to wield to telling effect.

Undoubtedly Professor Robyn's well-written narrative and skillful analysis profited from a timely move to Washington, DC. She arrived in December 1979 to study federal trucking deregulation just as the drama over the MCA was unfolding. With the benefit of a ringside seat, Robyn's "play-by-play" broadcast of the fight rings true. She accurately notes the presence of critical external factors that contributed to the reformers' victory. For instance, raging inflation, the emergence of intellectual support for marketplace mechanisms, and the vocal encouragement of consumer and business groups provided a ready-made rationale for trucking deregulation and an organizational framework for its proponents. The cause received another boost when both Senator Kennedy and President Carter found this proposal to be not only meritorious but also a useful counterweight to charges that they were excessively regulatory in a deregulatory time.

Of course, reformers cannot control exogenous forces in the short term, even though they can attempt to create a more favorable environment for reform in the long term. Robyn recognizes that the "macro factors" often must be taken as they are, and instead concentrates upon "what trucking reformers did-given a climate that was favorable to deregulation-to bring it about and what one can say about strategy more generally based on their experience."

From her review of the MCA campaign, Robyn detects the presence of four ingredients which were essential to the passage of the legislation: the strategic use of economic evidence and analysis to demonstrate the merits of the case for reform; the formation and maintenance of an ad hoc coalition to lobby actively; the use of transition strategies to soften the opposition to change; and strategic bargaining by the president
to gain sheer political leverage. Robyn devotes approximately half of the book to showing why each of these strategies was important to the passage of the MCA and suggesting why future reformers would be wise to emulate them.

Unfortunately the book lacks any extensive discussion of the MCA's implementation and its effects. Any such assessment would have required Robyn to cover new material, but a 1987 "epilogue" on the struggles of 1980 would have provided a valuable perspective on what really was at stake. For example, Robyn gives a balanced treatment of the decisions by several of the key reformers in May and June of 1980 to settle for a compromise and accept a weaker version of the MCA than might have been obtained through a more protracted effort. Those decisions all may have reflected an astute recognition of political reality. The trade-offs may have secured as much economic deregulation as possible. Maybe.

But anyone relying solely upon Robyn's account would not be aware of the real costs that have been imposed-and will continue to be imposed for the foreseeable future-upon the American public because the MCA did not go far enough. Eight years after the passage of the MCA, the industry is still stalled by unnecessary and costly red tape that is dictated by laws remaining on the books. Despite repeated efforts, reformers have been unable to secure enactment of a useful sequel to the MCA. That makes an assessment of the road not taken in 1980-total economic deregulation of trucking-all the more intriguing.

Trucking regulation now exists in a bizarre twilight zone. The statutory requirements force the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) to exact compliance with mindless regulations and virtually preclude any further significant administrative deregulation. The requirements place an appreciable burden on consumers and shippers, yet suffice to confer only a taste of the protectionist "benefits" the industry received before deregulation.

To take a recent example, consider the case of the "XYZ', Trucking Company (a fictional name but a real situation). As I testified to the Surface Transportation Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation on September 27, 1985, its saga typifies the senselessness of the current system. Early in 1984, XYZ sought and received authority from the ICC to operate as a contract carrier for a publishing firm transporting printed matter and paper products between points in the 48 contiguous states. Unfortunately, when applying for authority, the trucking company had given the location of one of the publisher's divisions rather than its corporate headquarters as the publisher's domicile. As a result, the carrier was not allowed to serve the publisher's facilities at the other locations and had to go back to the ICC for permission to correct the innocuous error.

Employees of both the trucking firm and the publishing company had to devote time and effort to ironing out the problem. In addition the trucker incurred considerable legal expenses. ICC staffers- even commissioners-were involved in trying to straighten out the mess. But the largest part of the cost was probably the year-and-a-half of services the carrier wanted to provide and the shipper wanted to receive that were lost. No public interest was served by any of this. Nor is one served by the thousands of other motor carrier entry cases that still go before that ICC every year. Rod Serling, where are you?

Despite the fact that we are not brought up to date and apprised of costs, Robyn's book makes for lively reading and is a useful contribution to the literature-especially for those who are, or will be, practitioners of reform politics. We can only hope that those practitioners are numerous, dedicated, and skilled. Experience has shown that in the trucking industry the special interests have only been slowed, not stopped.

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Probing Pension Policies

Issues in Pension Economics, edited by Zvi Bodie, John B. Shoven, and David A. Wise
(University of Chicago Press, 1987), 376 pp.

Reviewed by Stuart Dorsey
Stuart Dorsey is associated professor of economics at West Virginia University

Issues in Pension Economics, edited by Zvi Bodie, John B. Shoven, and David A. Wise, is the third of four volumes produced by the National Bureau of Economic Research program on the economics of the U.S. pension system, and it shares the strengths and weaknesses of its predecessors. The papers cover a wide range of topics on the pension and social security systems without a unifying theme. On the other hand, each paper in the volume is well executed and can stand on its own. While it is unlikely that any will come to represent a seminal contribution, together the papers identify the complex theoretical and empirical issues that future pension research must explore. The success of the volume in charting future research is bolstered by the uniformly excellent commentaries that accompany each paper.

The book is really four volumes in one. The first section, on corporate pension funding policies, includes the volume's most stimulating papers: those by Zvi Bodie, Jay O. Litght, Randall Morck, and Robert A. Taggart, Jr.; by Alan J. Marcus; and by Jeremy I. Bulow, Randall Morck, and Lawrence Summers; with accompanying comments by Andre F. Perold; by William F. Sharpe: and by Myron S. Scholes. Bodie, et al., define a corporate financial perspective in which funding and pension investments are integrated with the overall financial strategy of the firm. They predict that pension investment are integrated with the overall financial strategy of the firm. They predict that pension plans will either be fully funded to at the minimum allowable level to maximize transfers from the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC). In contrast, under the "traditional" perspective, funding and investment decisions are made solely in the interest of plan beneficiaries. The authors' empirical results provide some evidence that pension decisions do indeed respond to the tax and insurance incentives, although not the point where all funds are driven to one or the other extreme.

Perhaps a more important result is that, as suggested by Perold, there is still much about funding policies that is unexplained. A promising approach is to integrate corporate financial and personnel decisions. Under competitive labor market conditions, pension funding decisions and personnel costs will interact, and the interests of the firm and its workers will converge. Firms will be forced to offer compensation packages that fully exploit pension investment and funding incentives. A labor market perspective on funding has been advanced by Richard A. Ippolito (in Pensions, Economics and Public Policy, Dow Jones-Irwin Press, 1986) who presents evidence consistent with the view that under funding is a means of bonding a union work force to the firm. (See "Pension Security" Has ERISA Had Any Effect?" Regulation, 1987 Number 2.) An integrated approach which focuses on the trade-off between the tax benefits of full funding and the labor productivity incentives of under funding may help to explain why most firms are at intermediate levels of funding.

Bulow, et al., consider whether under funded pension liabilities are reflected in lower stock prices. Their work represents an advance over previous empirical studies of this important issue. In particular, they are able to conduct a longitudinal test for the effect of changes in nominal interest rates (which alter the size of unfounded pension liabilities) on equity prices. They find support for the hypothesis that unfounded future claims are recognized by the market. The analysis, however, begs the question of how to value pension liabilities. Bulow, et al., define liabilities on a "quit" basis-the value of pension liabilities of each worker quit immediately. But as Bulow himself has shown in his seminal 1982 article, "What Are Corporate Pension Liabilities?" Quarterly Journal of Economics (August 1982), Pension liabilities depend upon the nature of the underlying labor contract. Many now regard the pension as an implicit contract under which workers expect continuous tenure with the firm; there fore pension liabilities should be indexed to reflect nominal wage growth. In this case, pension liabilities could be substantially greater than calculated in this paper. This is important, as Scholes points out, because stock prices react differently to liabilities of pension plans depending on the degree of under funding. Given that the appropriate valuation of liabilities remains unsettled, it would seem important to test the sensitivity of their results to different assumptions about the underlying labor contract.

It should be noted that the prediction of an effect of nominal interest rate changes on stock prices rests on the appropriateness of the quit valuation of pension liabilities. If there is an implicit contract, an increase in nominal interest rates (which reflects primarily higher anticipated inflation) will be accompanied by an increase in expected future wages, and therefore an increase in expected future benefits. There should be no net effect on the level of funding and hence on stock prices. Form the "contract" perspective, only real interest rate changes will alter the value of pension fund assets relative to pension liabilities. Since the adjustment of stock prices in the author's test appears to be much less than complete, their results could be interpreted as evidence that the market evaluates pension liabilities on a real, or implicit contract, basis.

Marcus's paper reports estimates of the value or PBGC insurance under different assumptions about funding strategies and different policies followed by the PBGC with respect to plan terminations. He finds that existing PBGC exposure results form a small number of firms with low equity-to-pension liability ratios.

Michael J. Boskin and John B. Shoven shift the focus to relative income in retirement. They present evidence form the Retirement History Survey that combined pension and social security benefits are quite high-approximately 88 percent of career average earnings for a middle-income married couple. This figure rises to more than 150 percent of career average earnings when adjustments are made for lower tax liabilities for the elderly, the costs of rising children, and reduced uncertainty of social security payments relative to wage earnings. Readers are likely to agree with the commentator, Alan L. Gustman, that the contribution of this paper is in advancing the methodology of calculating retirement income replacement rates; their particular calculations may be quite fragile.

One of the adjustments made by Boskin and Shoven involves raising the value of social security benefits to reflect their lower risk relative to wages. Ironically, the basis for the next paper by Robert C. Merton, Zvi Bodie, and Alan J. Marcus is that integration of pensions with social security shifts the risk of adverse changes in benefits from workers to their employers. Integration, a feature of about half of private pension plans, involves offsetting a portion of the pension on account of social security benefits. Since social security replaces a greater share of wages for low-wage earners, integration causes the share of pension benefits in total compensation to rise with earnings. The authors' principal finding is that integration fully shifts social security risk to employers for workers whose pension benefits. Alternative estimates are provided, depending upon whether pension liabilities are viewed as nominal or real.

Bulow makes several noteworthy observations on this paper in his short commentary. First, since integration is a common feature of defined benefit pensions, one cannot value pension liabilities, either on a nominal or real basis, without making projections about future social security benefits. One implication is that a future cut in social security benefits to avert a funding crisis might simply shift the crisis to the PBGC. Liabilities would rise unexpectedly for integrated plans, causing some of these plans to become insolvent, with their liabilities transferred to the PBGC. Second, the desire to scale pension benefits to earnings, consistent with the greater tax benefits for higher-wage employees, in probably a stronger motive for integrating private pension plans than risk-sharing. Tax incentives are a primary motivation for deferred pension compensation: pensions allow workers to defer taxable income and earn tax-free interest on pensions fund contributions. Integration achieves this desired result without violating the nondiscrimination provisions in the Internal Revenue Code, which limit the ability of firms to directly skew benefits to highly paid employees.

Attention next shifts to the impact of social security on national savings. Previous research has focused on the possibility that an unfunded public pension system may reduce savings and therefore the nation's capital stock. The papers by R. Glenn Hubbard, and by Laurence J. Kotlikoff, John B. Shoven, and Avia Spivak focus on the possibility that perfect annuity insurance, what amounts to a fully funded public pension system, may have the same effect. The starting point is the assumption that the market does not provide actuarially fair retirement annuities-either due to a problem of adverse selection or to incomplete risk-sharing within the family. In such a setting, savings are higher than they otherwise would be to guard against longevity risk, and unintended bequests result. Both papers demonstrate that the introduction of a fully funded public pension system can, by pooling longevity risks and offering actuarially fair annuities, reduce national savings substantially-by 35 percent to 60 percent of what it would have been in the absence of the system.

The paper by B. Douglas Bernheim considers whether the elderly typically continue to save after retirement. Previous studies have produced no clear-cut answer. As Bernheim notes, the issue is important because the rate at which bequeathable wealth declines in retirement (if at all) determines the size of intergenerational wealth transfers and affects the personal distribution of wealth. His review of the problems associated with previous cross-section tests is instructive, and he presents longitudinal evidence that bequeathable wealth of retired families does decline with age.

Kotlikoff and Wise continue in this volume their study of the labor force participation incentives conveyed by private pension plans. The authors have merged earnings profiles with a sample of pension plan characteristics to compare age-pension wealth accumulation profiles across plans. It should be noted that pension wealth is defined on a "quit" basis. While this is appropriate for examining the potential loss in pension benefits due to an immediate quit, the resulting profiles do not reflect the true path of pension wealth accumulation if workers expect to stay with the firm. The estimated profiles generally reveal substantial penalties for quitting "too early" or "too late"-that is, outside the retirement window defined by the early and normal retirement ages. Another major finding is that there is wide variation among plans in incentives at different ages.

Through the work of Kotlikoff and Wise, and earlier work by Edward P. Lazear, it is now well established that pension plans carry strong incentives for separating from employment neither too early nor too late. However, none of the papers in this volume provide a clue as to why such incentives are created. An obvious extension of this research is to use the variations in incentives conveyed by defined-benefit plans (and the absence of such by firms providing either defined-contribution plans or no pension) to investigate the underlying economic rationale for these incentives.

Finally, Lazear and Sherwin Rosen assess whether pensions exacerbate differences in total compensation between black and whites, and between males and females. Read Sylvester J. Schiever's comments on the difficulty of obtaining reliable estimates of pension compensation in the absence of data on actual individual earnings profiles. I would add only a minor point. Throughout the paper the authors seem to imply that the existence of pensions may cause more inequality. But surely they mean that focusing only on wages may understate measured compensation inequality. That is, if Congress eliminated incentives for private pensions, higher wages would substitute for pension coverage. There would be a reduction in after-tax inequality. That is, if Congress eliminated incentives for private pensions, higher wages would substitute for pension coverage. There would be a reduction in after-tax inequality, but only because pension tax incentives are regressive.

This volume contains some important ideas, and the commentators have done a fine job of evaluating the papers within a broader perspective for the general interest reader. Unfortunately, the papers are rather loosely connected, making it difficult to recommend the entire volume as "must reading" for any particular audience.

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