Cato Policy Report, July/August 1996
Cato Books
Time to Withdraw from Korea
In his new Cato book, Tripwire: Korea and U.S. Foreign Policy in a Changed World, Cato senior fellow and syndicated columnist Doug Bandow presents a comprehensive review of the history of U.S. military involvement in South Korea and argues that it is time to recognize that South Korea is capable of defending itself and bring American troops home.
Bandow contends that military activism abroad may have been justified at one time to contain the hegemonic threat posed by the Soviet Union and its clients. However, with the Cold War behind us, there is no longer any need for U.S. tripwires around the world. Such a tripwire is especially inappropriate on the Korean peninsula. "In 1953 the ROK was a wreck--impoverished, war ravaged, and ruled by an unloved autocrat whose belligerence had helped plunge his country into a disastrous war. Without an American security guarantee, South Korea would not have long survived. But four-plus decades later the South is prosperous and democratic while its adversary is ruled by an autocrat who lacks both charisma and international friends. North Korea talks of avoiding absorption by Seoul, not of conquest."
Washington's military commitment to South Korea has outlived its usefulness. While South Koreans undoubtedly appreciate the protection, there is no compelling reason for the forward deployment of U.S. troops and the corresponding risk to American lives. South Koreans "will probably still want the United States to be prepared to fight to the last American for them," Bandow writes, "but their wishes should not matter. Washington should risk the lives and wealth of its citizens only when something fundamental is at stake for their own political community. U.S. soldiers' lives are not gambit pawns to be sacrificed in some global chess game."
Bandow builds his case by carefully examining the history of the U.S. involvement in South Korea and its relation to America's changing international role. He notes that the United States "emerged from World War II as the leader of the 'free world' and the only power strong enough to contain a seemingly aggressive and threatening Soviet Union. Between 1950 and 1953 America essentially adopted as its responsibility the defense of the entire globe." South Korea was merely one front in the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union.
When the worldwide Soviet threat disintegrated, any need for a strong U.S. presence in South Korea went with it. However, instead of gradually disengaging itself, the United States has pursued a strategy of expanded involvement under the pretext of maintaining regional stability. Bandow examines the various justifications for continued involvement and concludes that the "chimera of stability is likely to lead Washington to risk thousands of lives day in and day out, and to spend tens of billions of dollars year after year, in hopes of preventing events that are not only purely speculative but also tangential to U.S. security."
In the book's final chapter, "A New Foreign Policy for a Changed World," Bandow eloquently makes the case that it is time to return to the American tradition of individual liberty at home and nonintervention abroad.
This article originally appeared in the July/August 1996 edition of Cato Policy Report.