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A Foreign Policy Report Card on the Clinton-Gore Administration

by Jonathan G. Clarke

Executive Summary

The foreign policy record of the Clinton-Gore administration deserves a less than stellar grade. At the end of the Cold War, there was an extraordinary opportunity to build a new relationship with a democratic Russia; restructure U.S. security policy in both Europe and East Asia to reduce America's burdens and risk exposure; and revisit intractable Cold War–era problems, such as the frosty relations with Cuba, Vietnam, and North Korea. The administration's performance must be judged within the context of such an unprecedented opportunity for constructive change.

The record is acutely disappointing. True, the administration has scored some successes: improving the negotiating climate in Northern Ireland and the Middle East, pushing for permanent normal trade relations with China, and normalizing relations with Vietnam. But the failures greatly outnumber the successes. The administration needlessly meddled in the complex disputes of the Balkans, leaving to its successor two U.S.-led NATO protectorates (Bosnia and Kosovo) and a colossal mess of a nation-building commitment with no end in sight. A similar morass is emerging in Colombia as a result of the administration's prosecution of the drug war.

U.S. policy toward long-time adversaries is on autopilot. The rote perpetuation of an economic embargo and occasional bombing attacks against Iraq have devastated the Iraqi people while barely bothering Saddam Hussein. Washington's policy toward Cuba is equally sterile and cruel.

Worst of all is the growing list of missed opportunities. Instead of integrating a newly democratic Russia into the West, the Clinton administration needlessly antagonized Russia by expanding NATO's membership and waging war against Moscow's long-time allies in the Balkans. Relations with China have been damaged by an inconsistent, at times nearly incoherent, U.S. policy. Instead of embracing efforts for greater military self-reliance on the part of our European allies, the administration has engaged in carping criticism and apparently views such initiatives as a threat to America's dominant position in the transatlantic relationship. Instead of viewing the end of the Cold War in East Asia as an opportunity to reduce America's security burdens in that region, the United States insists on keeping 100,000 troops deployed seemingly forever. Administration officials even reacted with ambivalence to the recent summit between North and South Korea and gave highest priority to retaining the U.S. troop presence on the Korean peninsula.

Given the number of botched opportunities, the administration's record merits a grade of D.

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The immediate post–Cold War period could and should have been filled with immense creativity.

Introduction

Although conventional wisdom suggests that foreign policy will not play a decisive role in the 2000 presidential campaign between Vice President Al Gore and Gov. George W. Bush of Texas, there are some signs that it will not be completely overlooked. National missile defense, military readiness, and trade have already become issues. Political calculations may also propel foreign policy closer to center stage. Advisers close to Gore put it this way: "If Bush has an Achilles heel, it's that he doesn't know much about international affairs. While Gore doesn't know everything, he is extremely confident in these areas. So he's got to really drive the knife in on foreign affairs, national security."[1]

This paper takes no side in the partisan debate but looks back on the Clinton-Gore administration's record and asks, to quote the question made famous in the 1980 presidential campaign, whether the nation "is better off" in terms of its major foreign policy interests than it was in January 1993. Key questions include the following:

- Is the nation on a clearer foreign policy track than in 1993? Have the nation's overseas goals been well defined and articulated, and have the necessary resources been assembled to meet them?
- Are relations with major democratic countries in Europe and Asia on a stronger footing than in 1993?
- Are relations with other key powers and potential adversaries, especially Russia and China, more stable than in 1993?
- Has our nation used the opportunities presented by the end of the Cold War to make progress on long-standing secondary problems such as Cuba, the Middle East, Iraq, and Iran?
- Has our nation embarked on any "slippery-slope" engagements?

Foreign policy professionals in both parties have had their say about the Clinton record.[2] Neither side generally awards high praise or deep condemnation. The debate tends to be about whether Clinton deserves a B or a C grade. But a key part of the case of those who award the higher grade is that, in effect, there was no alternative to Clinton's policies and that "his successor is likely to follow in his footsteps, no matter what is promised between now and January 2001, and no matter which party wins."[3] That is the argument from experience and continuity being championed by Gore.

The underlying premise of this paper is that the foreign policy of any great nation, let alone one like the United States, which in the administration's oft-repeated phrase touts itself as "indispensable," should be held to high standards. I do not accept the argument that, with the world enjoying a time of strategic peace, with the American people not following foreign affairs in great detail, and, some late-term flourishes aside, with the president relatively uninterested in foreign affairs, we should regard it as sufficient that we have escaped without disaster in major areas and to have made some progress on secondary issues like Northern Ireland.

That is not a satisfactory standard of measurement. The immediate post–Cold War period could and should have been filled with immense creativity. Those administering foreign policy since 1992 had what the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace described as "a rare opportunity, an open but fleeting moment in world history."[4] U.S. policymakers worked in a period when, the Korean peninsula aside, most of the classic, strategic-scale business—the demise of the Soviet Union and the reunification of Germany—had been handled. The Cold War's familiar but necessary drudgery was over.

New possibilities were open, preeminently that of building an international system based not on ideological and nuclear confrontation but on shared values and objectives. Breathless commentators spoke of a "unipolar moment." The transatlantic and East Asian security structures had triumphed but were not necessarily well suited to the

new circumstances; fresh possibilities for peace presented themselves in the Middle East; the emergence of India as a great power offered new challenges and opportunities in South Asia; and sterile quarrels with Iran and Cuba could be revisited. The importance of cementing the new Russia and the former East European Soviet satellites into the family of nations was equal to that of doing the same for Germany and Japan after World War II. China was serving notice that it was a rising power that would flex its muscles. The slow relaxation of the stranglehold of the Institutional Revolutionary Party in Mexico and the emergence of postmilitary democracies in Latin America gave new promise throughout the Western Hemisphere. Above and beyond all the regional challenges, the prospect of having the opportunity to define a new role for America in a world not marked by stark ideological conflict should have been dazzling.

In other words, the opportunity given to the Clinton-Gore administration was far from routine. The period in which that administration held office was not one of stasis, not one when holding the line was the prime requirement. Instead, it was a chance for foreign policy practitioners to display their craft in its highest and most creative sense. The judgments in this paper are reached against this background of high expectations. On that basis, the administration deserves a less than stellar grade.

The Opportunity for a New Vision

An appropriate point of departure is to ask whether, at the end of the first two-term presidency since the end of the Cold War, there is in place a coherent vision of the nation's foreign policy role and purposes. I do not mean an assemblage of catchall bromides. Such devices, as Secretary of State Madeleine Albright rightly observes, are easily concocted but rarely worth the paper on which they are written.[5] What is needed is some form of playbook. Otherwise events take over.

Even if perfect consistency in the playbook may be neither desirable nor attainable, there is purpose in asking whether some of the major events during the Clinton era—NATO enlargement and repeated deployments of U.S. military forces overseas, high (and now rising) defense appropriations, the enormous military effort in Kosovo followed by inattention to the civilian needs for reconstruction, budding military intervention in Colombia's civil war, the metamorphosis of China from an object of loathing to a probable beneficiary of permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) status and prospective "strategic partner"—took place in accordance with a considered rationale about American interests or whether they simply took place.

An objective way of measuring the extent to which the Clinton-Gore administration succeeded in this quest is to analyze that administration's record in stating objectives and winning resources to implement them. The State Department has not been reticent in regard to objectives. In what it refers to as its "International Affairs Strategic Plan," presented to Congress in February 2000 and requesting $25 billion for fiscal year 2001 (beginning October 1, 2000), the following objectives are established:

- National Security: To protect vital interests and secure peace; deter aggression; prevent, defuse, and manage crises; halt the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and advance arms control and disarmament.
- Economic Prosperity: To expand exports, open markets, assist American business, foster economic growth, and promote sustainable development.
- American Citizens and U.S. Borders: To protect American citizens abroad and safeguard the borders of the United States.
- Law Enforcement: To combat international terrorism, crime, and narcotics trafficking.
- Democracy and Human Rights: To

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support establishment and consolidation of democracies and uphold human rights.

- Humanitarian Response: To provide humanitarian assistance to victims of crisis and disaster.
- Environment, Population, and Health: To improve the global environment, stabilize world population growth, and protect human health.[6]

That list of objectives may strike many people as reasonable, but the key deficiency is that it is just that: a list. It is a list that is built on sublists. For example, "vital interests" obviously needs spelling out. There are also plenty of potential conflicts between objectives: opening markets in China at the same time as exerting pressure for democracy; combating narcotics trafficking in Colombia while upholding human rights; and so on. Other points cry out for clarification. Why, for example, do humanitarian crises involving European deaths receive priority while those in Africa are shrugged aside?

Further questions concern bureaucratic encroachment by the foreign policy and national security apparatus. As a former career diplomat who believes that the irreducible function of foreign policy is to modulate relations between states, the author admits to a deep skepticism about the emergence of "global issues" on the national security agenda as the ingredients of diplomatic exchange.[7] There is no gainsaying that the environment and AIDS are issues of great importance, but the reason for subsuming them under "national security" seems to have more to do with jockeying for budgets than with intrinsic merits.[8] Should the State Department, for example, really be involved as a matter of foreign policy in stabilizing world population growth?

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The foreign affairs budget request seems to have begun with an arbitrary number; then the pieces that justify the request were assembled. Sadly, that cart-before-the-horse approach has been a consistent feature of the Clinton-Gore foreign policy management style.[9] Not surprisingly, the request has fared badly. Even before it reached Congress, the Office of Management and Budget pared it back to $22.8 billion. At the congressional committee stage, it was cut further to $20 billion.

Administration sympathizers will argue that the cuts merely reflect the stridently partisan nature of Congress.[10] There may be something to that. The defeat of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in October 1999 probably owed as much to domestic politics as to legitimate concerns about the treaty itself (although those were not insignificant). Partisan considerations were involved in the opposition to the Kosovo war in 1999—although once again politics was far from the only reason for opposition. Nonetheless, there are plenty of instances—the North American Free Trade Agreement, PNTR with China, Nunn-Lugar Act assistance for the decommissioning of nuclear weapons in Russia, NATO expansion, aid for Colombia, funding for the Bosnia and Kosovo peacekeeping missions—that show that bipartisan support has been available.[11]

The malaise in U.S. foreign policy cannot therefore be explained in terms of partisan politicking. It runs deeper. The reality is that there is simply no national consensus about the ends of American foreign policy in the new global circumstances. Foreign policy advisers to the Gore campaign admit as much by noting the need to "build a new national consensus."[12] Whose fault is it that no such consensus exists? Certainly the administration is not the only culprit. Republican foreign policy creativity has hardly been of the first order and congressional attitudes have not always been helpful. The American people, though they are not "isolationist" as some observers suggest, have not put their leaders under great pressure to perform in the foreign policy field. Finally, the foreign policy intellectual elite has not enjoyed its finest hour, coming up with such simplistic merchandising concepts as the "clash of civilizations" and the "new anarchy" and buying into weak slogans like "rogue

states."[13] Nonetheless, leadership on and ultimate responsibility for foreign policy rest firmly with the president.

The reason foreign affairs budgets are shrinking, treaties are failing, and military deployments attract significant opposition is that there is a deep concern in Congress and the country that the administration's strategic vision is not what it should be. With the Soviet Union in its grave for nearly 10 years, the Clinton-Gore team has bombarded the American people with multiple statements (some as long as 52 pages and containing the wish lists of each and every interest group with the remotest connection to foreign affairs). Those statements purport to chart the nation's new international role, but in terms of operational policy they have time and time again been deficient. (The exciting developments on the Korean peninsula this year, for example, seemed to catch the administration ill prepared.)[14] The statements simply list various areas of possible activity as a backdrop for the secretary of state's hyperactive travel schedule, as if miles traveled were a surrogate for tasks accomplished.

The effort to articulate a coherent set of priorities has been dismal. This is despite the fact that, under Secretary of State Albright, public outreach beyond the usual foreign policy elite through "town hall" meetings initially received an encouragingly high priority. That those meetings had minimal effect in preparing the American public for controversial foreign policy decisions, such as the administration's renewed bombing campaign against Iraq, was evident at the disastrous town hall meeting at Ohio State University in February 1998.[15] The town hall experiment then came to a prompt demise, and public support has become even more problematic.

The lack of intellectual rigor and the failure to build a public consensus are of much more than mere academic interest. In many cases the vagaries of the Clinton-Gore administration's policy will bequeath a series of unnecessarily acute problems to the incoming administration.

Relations with Allies

With the end of the Cold War and the demise of the overarching adversary, it should have been no surprise that Washington's main alliance relationships in Europe and East Asia would need major rethinking. Indeed, the opportunity should have been eagerly embraced. Security issues remained high on the agenda, but it was an open question whether the inherited structures, such as NATO, should survive intact. The size and mission of the U.S. forces in both regions were other obvious questions that needed to be addressed. Another major topic was whether, with the demise of the strategic threat, non-political-military issues, particularly trade, would come to dominate the relationships, possibly to the detriment of harmonious cooperation. In many ways those questions should have been an exciting opportunity for any ambitious strategist: how to take successful relationships and recraft them to fit new circumstances.

What has been the outcome? The path of least resistance. Intellectual inertia has won the day. Once again, the main conclusion is that the Clinton-Gore administration has devoted most of its energies to preservation rather than innovation. Despite the demise of communism, snapshots of U.S. policy in Europe and East Asia in 1992 and 2000 reveal broadly similar pictures. Gen. John Galvin, who retired as supreme allied commander in Europe in 1994, could return to the job today with minimal rebriefing. In Asia the same pattern emerges. Symptomatic was the U.S. response to the dramatic summit meeting between North and South Korea in June 2000—which led to a meeting between Secretary Albright and North Korean foreign minister Paek Nam Sun on July 28, 2000. Instead of seizing the moment (which was reinforced by the decision of the two Koreas to march as one team at the 2000 Olympic Games, to reopen border liaison offices, and to restore rail links) to establish a new platform for one of the United States'

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most troublesome relations, Albright emerged from the meeting emphasizing the continuing problems between the two countries. Naïve euphoria should of course be avoided, but the impression created was that the administration regarded the prospect of change as somehow intimidating and unwelcome. Earlier, the Pentagon had reacted with a similarly protective defense of its existing policy.[16] Spokesman Kenneth Bacon emphasized that "no U.S. troop reductions are planned in Korea."[17]

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Europe

When President Clinton visited Europe in May 2000, commentators drew attention to many of the similarities between his agenda and those of earlier Cold War presidents: defense and trade.[18] Part of the reason for that is the permanence of these issues in foreign policy in general and in the transatlantic relationship in particular. Periodic ups and downs in U.S.-European relations are to be expected and are of little concern. However, what is of concern is a chronic intellectual dithering in administration circles about how they view Europe.

That schizophrenia is most marked on defense and security issues. For decades American officials have complained about European defense inadequacy. The cliché has been that in a crisis the proliferation of European defense and security entities meant that the Americans did not know "whom to call." There is some justification for that claim, as many Europeans freely acknowledge. Their response has been to build an increasingly robust European defense "pillar."[19] This culminated in the decision of the European Union Council at its December 1999 meeting in Helsinki to establish a 60,000-strong mobile reaction force able to deal with crises outside the NATO framework.[20]

This was a potentially important milestone on the long and tortuous path of Europe's search for a viable defense capability able to take on missions outside the NATO framework. The search for a European Defense and Security Identity and efforts to achieve greater external political cohesion through the Common Foreign and Security Policy have taken many false turns. During the Cold War and its immediate aftermath, it encountered persistent American opposition. What marked the Helsinki decision as different was that, finally, the British and French (the two most assertive and self-confident members of the EU on foreign policy) were acting in concert following a bilateral agreement between Prime Minister Tony Blair and President Jacques Chirac in St. Malo in December 1998.[21]

That decision triggered an extraordinary round of thumb sucking in Washington. The administration backed away from looking with some benevolence on European efforts for independent defense, one of its more innovative positions introduced under Secretary Warren Christopher, and reverted to traditional Cold War suspicion. In June 2000 Secretary of Defense William Cohen epitomized that throwback approach, saying: "Once again, we have to emphasize that we do not want to see a division. We do not want to see a situation where it's an EU solution not a NATO solution."[22] It is hardly surprising that the Europeans are puzzled. Germany's ambassador to Washington, Jürgen Chrobog, expressed this well: "The US says it wants a clear phone number for a Europe with some real cohesion. But when we give it one, we have problems."[23]

Cohen's statement reflects a genuine concern: the United States sees little value in European defense structures that it fears will exist on paper only. It is concerned that the EU plan will weaken NATO without being able, as the Kosovo crisis demonstrated, to deliver a real punch. But the wider, and less publicly stated, question about the American position is whether, in their heart of hearts, American policymakers really want Europe to evolve beyond client status. The Kosovo crisis, and indeed the wars of the Yugoslav succession overall, crisply illustrated American technological supremacy and confirmed America's seigneury in Europe. Many people in Washington are content to keep things that

way. They regard Europe as the "springboard for U.S. global involvement, enabling America to play the decisive role of arbiter in Europe."[24] They do not welcome greater European capabilities that would force them to address the trickier question of whether bombing from 15,000 feet is the only—let alone the most appropriate—method of addressing likely problems on the European continent.

To be sure, the American ambivalence about European defense structures has long historical roots. The pity, though, is that during the Clinton-Gore administration the debate has failed to progress. If anything, it has slipped backward. Washington's rigid focus on a NATO-centric policy has obscured creative debate about a more active role for the EU's embryonic security capability, the larger Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, or any other alternatives. The past eight years have been sadly sterile on the issue of America's future security relationship with Europe.

East Asia

The end of the Cold War in East Asia did not follow a track entirely parallel to that followed in Europe. Some problems persist: the division of the Korean peninsula, North Korean nuclear experimentation, and unresolved territorial disputes between Russia and Japan. Furthermore, growing Chinese power and assertiveness were throwing a shadow across the region. In the late 1990s the Asian financial crisis preoccupied governments and reinforced their inherent reluctance to tamper with the status quo. It was not surprising that U.S. policy toward East Asia would develop more cautiously than U.S. policy toward Europe.

Nonetheless, with the exception of the normalization of relations with Vietnam (for which the administration is entitled to genuine credit in a classic example of setting an objective and following through with the necessary resources to realize it), it is striking how little has changed since 1992. U.S. troop levels remain about the same at approximately 100,000. Indeed, since the 1995 review by Assistant Secretary of Defense Joseph Nye, that figure has achieved almost canonical status.[25] Despite some encouraging upgrading of the Association of South East Asian Nations' Regional Forum, regional security integration outside the "hub-and-spoke" arrangement of U.S. bilateral security relationships with various allies and clients remains minimal. The high hopes for the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation initiative, fueled in the first instance in November 1993 by the Clinton administration's innovation of holding an annual APEC Heads of Government Meeting, have been allowed to founder. The result is that, in terms of maturity, the political and security relationships between the United States and East Asia lag well behind even the imperfect state of those between the United States and Europe.

Whether in these circumstances it was realistic to work for change is an open question. Unlike the European governments, East Asian governments are making few, if any, demands for change. (Asian public opinion, especially in such places as Japan and South Korea, is another matter.) Nevertheless, the administration can certainly be faulted for intellectual timidity and, following the Nye report, for being completely closed to new ideas.[26] (The damaging effect of that lack of innovation will become apparent in my discussion of China.) The absence of effective Asia-based mechanisms for multilateral consultation and mediation may cause very serious problems if the killing of Christians and Chinese in Indonesia intensifies.

What is clear, however, is that the incipient rapprochement between North and South Korea offers the prospect of exciting change, although that potential will likely not be fulfilled until well into the next presidency. This is where the question of flexibility becomes paramount. To date, the Clinton-Gore reaction has been one of extreme caution, stressing the work that lies ahead rather than the prospect of epoch-making progress and placing a troubling emphasis on perpetuating the U.S. troop presence at all costs.[27] By contrast, Governor Bush's foreign policy team includes

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several veterans of the reunification of East and West Germany. This is one of the most underrated triumphs of post–Cold War diplomacy, underrated because it was accomplished through creative, professionally serious diplomacy rather than hyperventilated rhetoric. There are many differences between the Korean peninsula and Germany, and policy by analogy is always dangerous, but there are also enticing similarities that beckon to anyone willing exploit them.

The Former Adversary: Russia

Consider the tale of three countries: Germany, Japan, and Russia. By autumn 1945 the former two lay devastated, one the victim of a double atomic attack. Eight years later, their political and economic recovery was not merely starting; it was an established, self-sustaining irreversible fact. Not only that. Both countries were enthusiastic partners of the very powers that had wreaked such devastation on them. The story is well-known. Two of the most dramatic and far-reaching transformations of history had taken place. Democracy had taken root in some rather unpromising soil. There was no question of turning back to totalitarianism or militarism. All this took place under the leadership of the United States.[28]

Turn now to Russia after the Cold War. The much more depressing verdict of one experienced observer is worth quoting at length.

> The devastating effect of all this [Western reform efforts] in terms of values is that the majority of Russians, who a decade ago saw democracy and free markets as beacons of hope, now see before their eyes ugly perversions of these institutions and wonder if they just won't work in Russia. Opinion polls repeatedly show profound doubt and even despair about Russia's future. They also show that anti-Americanism has permeated the whole society and is now probably deeper than at any time in Russian history. A substantial majority believes that the United States and the West have weakened Russia deliberately in order to exploit and humiliate it.[29]

This account, gloomy though it is, may not capture the full negativism of the situation. The account is confined to the economic and cultural spheres and does not address the Russian resentment caused by the political and national security aspects of the expansion of NATO, the Kosovo war, and Washington's proposal to build a national missile defense system. None of those initiatives was undertaken with the goal of undermining or antagonizing Russia. NATO expansion was motivated principally by NATO's internally generated need to remain Europe's central security institution. The Kosovo war was also more connected with NATO's struggle for a new identity than with an anti–Orthodox Slav crusade. Missile defense is not aimed at Russia but at minor, so-called rogue states such as North Korea. Nonetheless, each of those initiatives encountered fierce Russian resistance. That resistance continues today. The criticism here is one of priorities. By pursuing and persisting with these policies, the United States signals to Russia that, unlike Germany and Japan after World War II, Russia's reintegration into the international mainstream does not take pride of place in American calculations. Russian paranoia is certainly a factor in the deterioration of relations, but the opportunity the United States missed may extract a significant penalty in terms of future strategic stability.

It is, of course, only fair to say that the parallels between the unconditionally defeated and occupied Germany and Japan and the "defeated" but still independent Russia are not perfect. Nor is this to suggest that Russian objections per se should constitute a veto on American decisionmaking. Nonetheless, there is little doubt that U.S. policy toward Russia

during the Clinton-Gore administration has been a colossal disappointment. How this happened and who was responsible (clearly the Russians themselves bear some responsibility) is already the subject of a lively, highly politicized and increasingly ugly exchange among academics, politicians, international bureaucrats, and journalists.[30]

Whatever the final apportionment of responsibility and however one analyzes the problem, the bottom line of eight years of the Clinton-Gore Russia policy (with which Vice President Gore has been intimately involved through the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission) is that Russia awaits the incoming administration not as a stable member of the international community but as a major problem Quite different from Germany and Japan after World War II, Russia is embittered by its experience with the West since the end of the Cold War. It may be retreating toward an authoritarianism that in Russian history has often been linked to a Slavocentric suspicion of the West.

From the point of view of American vital interests, this outcome is precisely the opposite of what is desirable. That this risk should be so grave is a very significant indictment both of the administration's foreign policy record and of its ability to set priorities. Claimed successes in Northern Ireland, Haiti, or Kosovo pale into insignificance against the nonsuccess of policy toward Russia. The *White House National Security Strategy for a New Century* identifies the enhancement of American security as one of its three core purposes. Failure to forge a cooperative relationship with Russia gravely undermines that objective.

A Potential New Adversary: China

In the 1992 presidential campaign, candidate Bill Clinton made effective use of the charge that the Bush administration had "coddled" the "butchers of Beijing." As political rhetoric, that strategy was effective. As a guide to practical policy, it has proved far less useful. Indeed, one of the great ironies of the Clinton presidency is that, having staked out a confrontational position as a candidate, Clinton has headed the most pro-Chinese presidency since Richard Nixon's. For example, in a confidential letter to Chinese president Jiang Zemin in August 1995, Clinton went further than any of his predecessors in endorsing the "three noes" about Taiwan favored by China. (No to two Chinas, no to Taiwanese independence, and no to Taiwanese membership in international organizations such as the United Nations for which statehood is a prerequisite.) In his speech in Shanghai in June 1998, Clinton adopted that position publicly.[31] The startling reversal of the initial policy toward China is not entirely bad, since such a confrontational approach would have produced serious tensions. The administration approaches the end of its term in office with a more sensible and realistic policy than it began with.[32]

Given that the administration has ended in (more or less) the right place, it may seem churlish to criticize the route by which it arrived at its present position. But constancy is important for Chinese perceptions of the relative weights of the various factors making up U.S. policy toward China. The difficulty arises from the administration's initial approach, which emphasized human rights concerns practically to the exclusion of all other considerations. When Secretary of State Christopher made his first visit to China in March 1994, it was billed as centering on human rights.[33] The Chinese reaction was blistering. As Christopher arrived in Beijing, the Chinese ostentatiously rounded up the major dissidents, causing the visit to proceed in the iciest of atmospheres. Diplomatic chill aside, however, there were no adverse repercussions for China. Quite the opposite. Six months later Christopher signed the State Department's recommendation that China be granted its annual approval for most-favored-nation trade status, the predecessor to PNTR. In his October 1997 meetings with Chinese president Jiang, Clinton repeated this pattern, preferring to nail down a $3 billion

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contract for 50 Boeing airplanes rather than to insist on his presummit condition of the release of prominent dissident Wei Jingsheng.

The Chinese impression was that, for the United States, business took precedence over values. The policy lesson they drew was that in tough situations the U.S. business lobby could deliver the administration.[34] On business issues this was undoubtedly true. But it will not necessarily be true on an emotional issue like Taiwan.

The administration is leaving some potentially dangerous unfinished business with China. The relationship with China is highly complex, yet it has come to be dominated by commercial considerations. That is unhealthy and leads back to the earlier criticism of lack of innovation on East Asian security issues. Had the United States put more energy into the search for new multilateral structures (perhaps modeled on the European Partnership for Peace), this would have provided more opportunities for dialogue with the Chinese on issues other than bilateral problems. North Korea may offer the catalyst for a new try. The United States already cooperates with Japan and South Korea on that issue. It may be a good idea to add China to the diplomatic mix.

The Rising Great Power: India

Before the testing of five nuclear devices by India in May 1998, the administration paid relatively little attention to that country.

Before the testing of five nuclear devices by India in May 1998, the administration paid relatively little attention to that country. As far as Washington was engaged at all, it was over the Kashmir issue and the debate about widening the permanent membership of the UN Security Council. That inattention must change. Encouragingly, in his November 19, 1999, foreign policy speech (the first of its kind in his campaign), Governor Bush explicitly recognized India's rising importance and undertook to "pay it more attention." President Clinton belatedly did the same during his visit to New Delhi in March 2000.[35]

The criticism here once again concerns priorities. India's nuclear capabilities have given relations with New Delhi a new salience, but otherwise India has not suddenly burst on the scene from nowhere. Sadly, the Clinton administration's neglect of India means that there is no depth or range in the relationship to be passed on to the incoming administration.[36]

Second-Tier Problems

I now turn to a series of regional problems of a secondary nature. Once again, the analysis is not intended to exhaust the range of options available. Instead, the intention is to review the efficacy of the Clinton administration's engagement in these issues with the objective of providing answers to the same question: Is the nation better off?

Cuba

East Timor, with a population of 600,000 on half of an island off the coast of Indonesia, received more creative thought from the Clinton administration than did Cuba. That may be a cheap point to make and it goes without saying that Cuba is sui generis. Nonetheless, the key feature of U.S. policy toward Cuba over the past eight years is an almost complete lack of productive change. This is an extraordinary state of affairs, given the monumental changes that have taken place in the global factors that constrained U.S. policy during the Cold War. The demise of the Soviet Union deprived Cuba of its main economic sponsor and nullified its potential as a Soviet surrogate in the Caribbean and Central America, let alone Africa. The failure of the economic embargo to bring about any meaningful change or weaken the Castro regime was manifest. Indeed, as successive analyses prepared by agencies such as Amnesty International described the unremitting harshness of the Castro regime, the embargo was as far away as ever from its ostensible objective of, in President Clinton's words, providing "the people of Cuba with hope in their struggle against a system that for four decades has

denied them even basic human rights."[37]

The end of the Cold War should have provided the impetus for a far-reaching review of policy toward Cuba. Nothing of the sort took place. Administration policy has been entirely reactive, whether in response to new waves of immigrants or to events like the February 1996 downing of two U.S. civilian planes in international air space. In such cases, as indicated by the administration's embrace of the 1996 Libertad Act, which imposed new economic sanctions, constructive policy has slipped backward.

More recently, outside events, notably the Elian Gonzales case, and a new attitude in Congress and the U.S. business community toward the easing of sanctions seem likely to offer new possibilities to the incoming administration. To take advantage of this opportunity, the new foreign policy team will have to discard the features of the Clinton administration's approach as exemplified by its Cuba policy: lack of innovation, dominance by domestic interest groups, and subject to long spells of inattention.[38]

The Middle East Peace Process

The Middle East presents the opposite analytical problem. The administration, including President Clinton, has devoted significant time and energy to this issue. It has tried to take creative advantage of some of the new dynamics resulting from the demise of the Soviet Union and the changed status of former Soviet clients such as Syria. Secretary of State Christopher, for example, made more than 30 visits to Damascus in an attempt to coax Syria to negotiate with Israel. The Camp David initiative of July 2000—which in turn built on the January 2000 Shepardstown negotiations, the October 1998 Wye River meetings, and the September 1995 Oslo II summit—is another example of administration activism. Those efforts won consistently warm endorsements from successive Israeli governments and from the Palestinians. Even after the breakdown of the Camp David talks, enough momentum survived for the talks to continue on a bilateral basis, with both sides acknowledging that progress has been made.[39]

The complexities of the peace process make outside assessment without access to the full range of confidential exchanges uniquely hazardous. Deals may have been struck and private assurances received that are not available in the public domain. Nonetheless, nagging doubts persist about the administration's diplomatic technique with regard to preparation and response.

Before the talks, there were abundant signs from the Palestinians that they did not regard the timing as opportune. Views within the administration about the desirable course of action were not unanimous.[40] There are also few indications that, emergency telephone calls aside, the United States prepared the ground with key Palestinian backers in the Arab world, notably Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco. Their specific willingness to back Palestinian concessions on Jerusalem was a precondition for Arafat's Palestinian Authority's granting such concessions. After the talks, a U.S. envoy left for a tour of those countries, but by then the moment had passed. There must be questions, therefore, about whether the summit was adequately prepared for the immense challenge that it was addressing.

More pressing questions arise with regard to the administration's diplomatic professionalism in its reaction to the Camp David breakdown. No doubt the sense of exasperation was great. But the heat of the moment is never an auspicious time for major moves with long-term implications. Yet the administration took three such steps: by publicly blaming the Palestinians for the breakdown, it abandoned any pretense of being an honest broker; by interceding on behalf of Prime Minister Ehud Barak, it intervened in Israeli's political process, making U.S. policy dependent on an individual at precisely the time when political support was draining away—the same mistake that was made with Boris Yeltsin; by stating that he was reviewing his seven-year opposition to moving the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem, Clinton appeared to be acting out of pique rather than in

The end of the Cold War should have provided the impetus for a far-reaching review of policy toward Cuba.

response to a considered change of approach.

The result is that the incoming administration will inherit a peace process in which the U.S. position is beset by doubts on all sides. That is a disappointing harvest from nearly eight years of toil.

Iraq

The administration has justly claimed that the Iraq problem was not of its making. But neither has the situation improved under its stewardship. Indeed, the evidence points in the opposite direction. Iraq is probably stronger militarily and diplomatically at the end of the Clinton administration than it was at the beginning, and Saddam is, barring an unexpected coup, as firmly in place as ever.[41] U.S. policy toward Iraq is of special interest in light of Vice President Gore's active association with it. He has acted as the administration's senior figure in relations with the Iraqi opposition, meeting most recently with the Iraqi National Congress in June 2000.[42]

The Clinton administration's Iraq policy underscores a worrisome tendency in its foreign policy: when a problem becomes intellectually demanding, throw rhetorical bluster or bombs at it.

Critics have been stern. In Senate testimony on June 28, 2000, Richard Perle, a former assistant secretary of defense and now an adviser to Governor Bush's campaign, commented: "The word policy is probably an overstatement in describing the administration attitude toward Iraq. Paralysis is probably more appropriate."[43] Even pro-administration commentators, such as *Washington Post* columnist Jim Hoagland, have reached similar conclusions.[44] The administration has not been helped by unsteady leadership of the UN weapons inspection team. But its Iraq policy underscores a worrisome tendency in the Clinton administration's foreign policy: when a problem becomes intellectually demanding, throw rhetorical bluster or bombs at it.

An example of the first approach was the decision in August 2000 to charge Saddam with war crimes. While there is no doubt that Saddam amply deserves to stand in the dock (not just over Kuwait but for his actions during the Iran-Iraq war when he was a de facto Western surrogate), the timing of this announcement to coincide with the 10th anniversary of Iraq's invasion does not inspire confidence that the decision represents well-considered long-term policy. Indeed, there was a complete lack of diplomatic coordination with America's allies, and the move runs counter to broader U.S. efforts, within the context of UN Security Council resolution 1284 of December 1999, to fashion a new consensus on policy that would allow new arms inspections and more rational "food-for-oil" arrangements.

Similar reservations apply to the continuing bombing operations against Iraq by U.S. and British aircraft. Despite the claims made by U.S. commanders in the aftermath of the December 1998 Desert Fox operation that the operation had left Saddam "shaken and desperate," bombing raids continue today on an intermittent but regular basis.[45] The cost is some $2 billion annually to the United States and Britain and the infliction of harm on innocent Iraqis, many of whom probably loathe Saddam. The benefits to U.S. objectives are far from clear.

The criticism of U.S. policy here does not imply any disagreement with the approach of rejecting Saddam and all he stands for—any more than advocates of a fresh policy toward the Balkans and Cuba have a moment's sympathy for Castro or Milosevic. The criticism is of a policy on autopilot. This is not the mark of an administration committed to delivering the American people a first-rate foreign policy.

Iran

Rapprochement with Iran would be a major prize. Of course, rapprochement cannot be one-sided, and it is far from certain that the Iranians are ready for it.[46] But, displaying its usual timidity and caution in the face of domestically controversial foreign policy issues, the Clinton administration has made few moves even to crack open the door. In particular, it has done nothing to disentangle policy on Iran from the clutches of the Middle East peace process and the often-alarmist lobby for groups concerned about Iran's role in sponsoring terrorism. Furthermore, instead of seeing a way to use the recent discovery of Caspian oil reserves as a means of drawing

Iran into a more collaborative relationship with the West, the United States has cited unrelated and outdated reasons for remaining "opposed to investment in Iran's energy sector and to the construction and use of pipelines to, from, or through Iran."[47] As does its policy toward Cuba, Washington's policy toward Iran fairly cries out for significant change.

Africa

To its credit, the Clinton administration has sought to give a higher profile to Africa. The president's visits there in March 1998 and August 2000 brought hopes of, in Clinton's own words, a "renaissance." Richard Holbrooke, U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, as attentive as ever to the direction of the political winds, christened his month of January 2000 as UN Security Council president as the "month of Africa." A national summit on Africa followed in February. The administration steadfastly championed the African Growth and Opportunity Act, which passed the House in May 2000. Follow-up has been patchy, but there have been plenty of ministerial exchanges, ambassadorial visits, and U.S. participation in development initiatives. Of course, many observers think that the administration's concern with Africa comes late in the day. The African Crisis Response Initiative launched in 1996 has been ineffective. When help was desperately needed in Rwanda in 1994, the United States deliberately stymied its dispatch—even though U.S. troops would not have been involved.[48]

Nowhere is the divergence between talk and reality greater than in Sierra Leone. The civil war there, the dates of which have almost overlapped those of the Clinton administration, has claimed up to 50,000 lives and inflicted up to 100,000 casualties. U.S. policy, however, has followed the trajectory of an errant missile. In early 1999 Special Presidential Emissary Jesse Jackson played a pivotal role in setting up the July 1999 Lomé agreement, the crucial element of which was to bring Revolutionary United Front leader Foday Sankoh into the government. A disgruntled U.S. government official commented that "the message we have sent is that you can terrorize your way to power."[49] In October 1999 Secretary Albright met with Sankoh during her visit to Sierra Leone.

A year later this approach was in ruins. In July 2000 a new RUF onslaught was under way. The United States was urging the UN to press war crimes charges against Sankoh (who was in custody) and was weaving a messy series of sanctions against states (notably Liberia and Burkina Faso) suspected of bankrolling the RUF. A small number of American military trainers were on their way to West Africa to train African peacekeepers. Sierra Leone is far from a shining example of the Clinton administration's commitment to Africa.[50]

The Clinton administration's policy toward Africa has reflected a high degree of "capture" by domestic interests. That does Africa no good—any more than it helps any other aspect of American foreign policy. Africa cannot emerge as a mainstream topic while it is seen as the purview of a particular domestic constituency. The Clinton approach simply solidified that concern.

Creating Dangerous Entanglements for the Next Administration

The Balkans: The Ongoing Entanglement

There is widespread agreement among both advocates and opponents of the Kosovo war that it was a strange affair.[51] Though deliberately provoked by Albright's all-or-nothing tactics at the February 1999 Rambouillet conference and trumpeted as the action that defined America's post–Cold War international role, the war was fought on the basis of an ill-prepared, seat-of-the-pants strategy that clearly did not anticipate Serbia's prolonged refusal to capitulate.

Strangest of all, once the military victory had been achieved, the administration began to lose interest in Kosovo—much as it lost interest in the aftermath of the intervention in Haiti. Kosovo policy has been consigned to

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third-rank status within the State Department and the UN. The humanitarian goals of rolling back ethnic cleansing and religious discrimination and preventing atrocities, on which the Kosovo intervention was predicated, have been abandoned as though they were mere gossamer slogans. Confronted with the lawlessness in Kosovo and responding to the massive reverse ethnic cleansing suffered by the Serbs and other nationalities under UN and NATO administration of the territory, the UN coordinator for humanitarian relief commented, "This is not why we fought the war."[52] Serb democrats who visit Washington hoping for support in their struggle to overturn Slobodan Milosevic and restore democracy to Serbia are sent away with their pleas unanswered. The Kosovo war was not a defining event in U.S. diplomacy; the chief champions of the intervention now go to great lengths to explain how exceptional the circumstances were. Anyone, particularly in Africa, seeking to quote the humanitarian principles of Kosovo as a precedent is given short shrift. Indeed, an Organization of African Unity report on U.S. policy described American policy on Africa as "an almost incomprehensible scar of shame."[53]

This is not the place to debate the immense complexities of the Balkans. There is a case to be made that, had the wars of the Yugoslav succession taken place in any period other than the immediate post–Cold War years, they would have received very different, less emotional, and more intelligent treatment. Had Europe's security future been more stable, for example, it is likely that those crises would not have been seen as a test of NATO's credibility.

The salient point, however, is that the Clinton administration deliberately made the Balkans its own issue. In the 1992 campaign, candidate Clinton attacked the Bush administration for inaction on Bosnia. In office, the Clinton administration wrested leadership on Balkan policy from the EU and the UN.[54] It is fair to note that the Balkan problem was not an inherited or accidental problem such as the Middle East or East Timor but was a challenge eagerly sought out by the Clinton administration. The Balkans were regarded as home turf. Judgments should be made in that light.

The main judgment must be that, in terms of the territory itself, the incoming administration will inherit an open-ended commitment of U.S. forces to Kosovo as a place of lawlessness, criminality, and unsure political status. In terms of Milosevic, whose continued presence in Belgrade poses a major obstacle to regional stability, the inheritance will be a sterile policy of quarantine à la Iraq and Cuba. In terms of precedent, the legacy will be a confused and contradictory jumble of statements, some justifying, others excusing, intervention. In terms of diplomacy, the legacy will be legitimization of military intervention by great powers, outside the UN Security Council purview, a gift Russian president Vladimir Putin is already exploiting for his sanguinary purposes in Chechnya. The one silver lining is that U.S. interventions of this sort in Europe are unlikely to recur in the future, especially given the hostility in Congress and the ambivalence of the American people. Nevertheless, the Clinton administration has bequeathed a thoroughgoing mess in the Balkans to its successor.

Colombia: The Looming Entanglement

For anyone who is concerned about the alleged lack of bipartisan agreement on Capitol Hill, the impending U.S. intervention in Colombia's civil war should send a loud warning signal about the opposite problem. Just as the Gulf of Tonkin resolution passed the Senate with but two dissenting votes in 1964 and went on to become the founding text of the Vietnam War, so the unanimous voice vote in the Senate on June 30, 2000, approving $1.3 billion in aid for Colombia, may come to be seen as this generation's misapplication of bipartisan solidarity. A healthy debate, even if it reveals partisan differences, is preferable to sheeplike unanimity.

The overwhelming bulk of the funds goes for military countermeasures such as advanced weapons procurement, training counternarcotics battalions and intelligence

activities in Colombia, and establishing three forward operation locations. Those locations will provide U.S. surveillance aircraft support for Pentagon and multiagency counterdrug operations in the Caribbean, South America, and the Eastern Pacific. These funds are the first down payment on a longer-term $7 billion "Plan Colombia" in which the European Union will also participate.

The open question is whether the latter two activities will come to involve U.S. military personnel in Colombia's ongoing three-sided civil war, which, although financed by drug money, is more about power than about cocaine. Two separate left-wing guerrilla forces are warring with government forces and right-wing paramilitaries. All sides benefit from drug money. What is certain is that the United States stands on the brink of a major and extraordinarily hazardous foreign engagement. Both the administration and Congress are guilty of not bringing the facts before the American people.[55]

A more general concern about administration policy toward Latin America is that it has come to be dominated by a single issue—drug interdiction.[5 6] In the case of the closer states, the issue of immigration is added. This narrowing of the U.S. focus onto one or one and a half issues has resulted in grave distortion and misanalysis of Latin America. That narcotics addiction is a problem of enormous magnitude is common knowledge, but the best approach to narcotics policy is a matter of much controversy in the United States. Whatever approach is preferred, it is clear that addiction is primarily a domestic problem. Exporting its intractable frustrations into the foreign policy arena, let alone allowing it to preempt the U.S. approach to an entire country, needs urgent rethinking.

Mexico

The election of National Action Party leader Vicente Fox as Mexico's president in July 2000 marks a particularly important opportunity to recast U.S. relations with Mexico. Just as the anguish and hypocrisy involved in the annual certification of China for trade purposes eventually prompted the transition to more rational arrangements under PNTR, so the annual mechanism of certifying Mexico on narcotics cooperation is overdue for review. This will require hard bargaining between the new administration and the new Congress. For this to happen successfully the next secretary of state will need to reverse the present ordering of priorities under which Montenegro and Macedonia receive much more attention than does Mexico.

Conclusion

This paper has held the Clinton administration to a high standard and reached some harsh judgments. True, no outright disasters have taken place (although one may be brewing in Colombia), and when severe setbacks have occurred, for example the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, they have been relatively short-lived. Moreover, here and there—Northern Ireland, PNTR for China, détente on the Korean peninsula, fostering rapprochement between Greece and Turkey—some progress has been made.

That is the modestly positive side. On the negative side, success on even the secondary issues has been elusive. Even on the claimed successes of Northern Ireland and the Middle East the clinching deal has yet to be sealed. Haiti is a political and economic debacle. Kosovo is turning into a disaster for which the next administration will curse its predecessor. But the greatest indictment is one of lost opportunity. The last decade of the 20th century provided the stage for a display of creative energy unseen since 1945. Instead, we were given an alternating diet of overheated rhetoric, inattention, and, if the going got tough, bombs.

Uncertain relations with Russia and China may be the next administration's most troublesome legacy. Conceptually, an even more grievous loss may be that of the national interest as a unifying concept. Under the Clinton administration, foreign policy has been portioned out to

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single-issue interest groups: Colombia to the Drug Enforcement Administration, Cuba to South Florida, NATO expansion and humanitarian intervention to East European ethnic lobbies, the Middle East to agitators on the terrorism issue, Russian policy to the Harvard developmentalists, trade to the Fortune 500 companies, and so on. The evidence is in the encyclopedic lists purporting to be statements of national strategy. When the president travels, he does so surrounded by vast entourages of "ethnic" Americans hailing from the countries he is visiting. The State Department itself has been allowed to degenerate into a seething mass of semiautonomous regional and functional fiefdoms whose allegiance to the secretary of state is at best tenuous. The idea that there is a national interest transcending departmental mission or ethnic heritage may be difficult to recapture.

A record based solely on the avoidance of spectacular failures is not sufficient to warrant a stellar or even an adequate grade. The Clinton administration's performance deserves nothing better than a D—and even that is on a generous curve.

People seeking guidance for the 2000 presidential campaign may wish to ponder their answers to the questions asked at the beginning of this paper. The lesson is clear: there is no record of success conferring on Vice President Gore an advantage "to drive the knife in," and Governor Bush derives no disadvantage from being a fresh face. The only emphatic conclusion is that, for the good of both the United States and the rest of the world, the U.S. foreign policy performance over the next four years needs to be far better than it has been during the last eight.

Notes

1. Quoted in James Fallows, "An Acquired Taste," *Atlantic Monthly,* July 2000, p. 52.

2. See, for example, Stephen M. Walt, "Two Cheers for Clinton's Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs* 79, no. 2 (March–April 2000): 63–79; and Richard N. Haass, "The Squandered Presidency," *Foreign Affairs* 79, no. 3 (May–June 2000): 136–40.

3. Walt, p. 79.

4. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, *Changing Our Ways* (Washington: Carnegie Corporation, 1992), p. 1.

5. Madeleine Albright, "The Testing of American Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs* 77, no. 6 (November–December 1998): 50–64. Albright's struggles with fashioning a cohesive message are chronicled in Thomas W. Lippman, *Madeleine Albright and the New American Diplomacy* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 2000), p. 274.

6. U.S. Department of State, "International Affairs Fiscal Year 2001 Budget Request—Summary and Highlights State Department Fact Sheet," February 7, 2000, http://www.state.gov/www/budget/fy2001/fs-fy2001_budget_000207.html.

7. The salience of policy imperatives in the ecology debate is ably presented in J. R. McNeil, *Something New under the Sun: An Environmental History of the 20th Century* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2000). For foreign policy purposes, however, the interactions of nation-states will continue to constitute the stuff of diplomacy. See Robert A. Pastor, ed., *A Century's Journey: How the Great Powers Shape the World* (New York: Basic Books, 1999).

8. For a discussion of the amorphous nature of some of the new "national security" issues, see Paul Benjamin, "Green Wars: Making Environmental Degradation a National Security Issue Puts Peace and Security at Risk," Cato Institute Policy Analysis no. 369, April 21, 2000.

9. See Jonathan Clarke and James Clad, *After the Crusade: American Foreign Policy for the Post-Superpower World* (New York: Madison Books, 1995), pp. 15–22.

10. This case is made in Thomas S. Foley, "A Second American Century," in *At the End of the American Century: America's Role in the Post–Cold War*, ed. Robert L. Hutchings (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998), pp. ix–xvi; and Sebastian Mallaby, "The Bullied Pulpit," *Foreign Affairs* 79, no. 1 (January–February 2000): 2–9.

11. Approval of bipartisan action does not imply approval of the positions taken on foreign policy issues. On NATO expansion, for example, Cato scholars have argued that expansion in strongly counter to American interests, and on Colombia, some of the same scholars believe that the deeper American involvement in Colombia's civil war is highly inadvisable.

12. Richard N. Gardner, "The One Percent Solution: Shrinking the Cost of World Leadership," *Foreign Affairs* 79, no.4 (July–August 2000): 2.

13. The unreadiness of much of the foreign policy community to take full advantage of the opportunities inherent in the end of the Cold War is foreshadowed with remarkable prescience in Ted Galen Carpenter, *A Search for Enemies: America's Alliances after the Cold War* (Washington: Cato Institute, 1992).

14. See "A National Security Strategy for a New Century," White House, January 5, 2000, http://www.whitehouse.gov/WH/EOP/NSC/html/documents/nssr-1299.pdf. This 52-page document reads like a comprehensive compilation of interest-group demands.

15. James Bennet, "Standoff with Iraq: Bad Vibes from the Heartland Launch Fleet of Finger-Pointing," *New York Times*, February 18, 1998, p. A10.

16. Doug Struck, "U.S. Hustling to a New Beat in Asia," *Washington Post*, July 28, 2000, p. A1; and Statement of the Department of Defense Spokesman, June 19, 2000, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2000/n06192000_20006192.html.

17. Ibid. See also Doug Bandow, "Korean Détente: A Threat to Washington's Anachronistic Military Presence?" Cato Institute Foreign Policy Briefing no. 59, August 17, 2000.

18. Elaine Sciolino, "Clinton Visits Europe with the Same Baggage, Trade and Missiles, That Reagan Carried," *New York Times*, May 31, 2000, p. A10.

19. For an account of the latest European initiatives on defense, see Jonathan Clarke, "Kosovo's Silver Lining," in *NATO's Empty Victory: A Postmortem on the Balkan War*, ed. Ted Galen Carpenter (Washington: Cato Institute, 2000), pp. 155–69.

20. The text of the Helsinki declaration may be found at http://ue.eu.int/newsroom/main.cfm?LANG=1.

21. Details may be found at http://www.fcogov.uk/news/newstext.asp?1788.

22. Full text of Secretary Cohen's address may be found at http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/pol.htm.

23. Quoted in Roger Cohen, "The German Complaint," *New York Times*, June 1, 2000, p. A1.

24. Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Living with a New Europe," *National Interest*, no. 60 (Summer 2000): 17–29. The American attachment to a land role in Europe is illustrated in Richard Holbrooke, "America: A European Power," *Foreign Affairs* 74, no. 2 (March–April 1995): 38–52.

25. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of International Security Affairs, *United States Security for the East Asia–Pacific Region* (Washington: U.S. Department of Defense, February 1995).

26. Cato Institute scholars Doug Bandow and Ted Galen Carpenter have proposed several new approaches. See Doug Bandow, "Old Wine in New Bottles: The Pentagon's East Asia Security Strategy Report," Cato Institute Policy Analysis no. 344, May 18, 1999; Ted Galen Carpenter, "Paternalism and Dependence: The U.S.-Japanese Security Relationship," Cato Institute Policy Analysis no. 244, November 1, 1995; and Ted Galen Carpenter, "Washington's Smothering Strategy: American Interests in East Asia," *World Policy Journal* 14, no. 4 (Winter 1997–98): 20–31.

27. Steven Mufson, "U.S. Lauds Korean Talks, Says More Work Ahead," *Washington Post*, June 16, 2000, p. A25.

28. The U.S. role in Europe needs no amplification, but U.S. efforts in Japan are less accessible to the general reader. This deficiency is rectified in John Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1999).

29. Peter Reddaway, writing in "Tainted Transactions: An Exchange," *National Interest*, no. 60 (Summer 2000): 103.

30. The "Who Lost Russia?" debate is blossoming into a cottage industry. Congressional hearings were held in September 1999. On certain economic aspects see "Tainted Transactions: An Exchange," pp. 98–110. See also Janine R. Wedel, "U.S. Assistance for Market Reforms: Foreign Aid Failures in Russia and the Former Soviet Bloc," Cato Institute Policy Analysis no. 338, March 22, 1999.

31. That incident and the other vicissitudes of the Clinton approach to China are well described in James Mann, *About Face: A History of America's Curious Relationship with China from Nixon to Clinton* (New York: Knopf, 1999).

32. The President's June 29, 1998, speech at Beijing University is a model of balance. The text is available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/WH/EOP/NSC/html/documents/nssr-1299.pdf. Another good example is his speech after the House approved PNTR on May 24, 2000. The text is available at http://www.pub.whitehouse.gov/uri-res/I2R?urn:pdi://oma.eop.gov.us/2000/5/25/3.text.1.

33. Elaine Sciolino, "U.S. Showing Frustration over China's Human Rights Policy," *New York Times*, March 9, 1994, p. A11.

34. An excellent example of this is the op-ed by U.S. Chamber of Commerce president Thomas J. Donohue, "A Counterproductive Approach to China," *Washington Post*, July 10, 2000, p. A19.

35. George W. Bush, "A Distinctly American Internationalism," Speech at Ronald Reagan Library, Simi, California, November 19, 1999, http://www.georgewbush.com/speeches/foreignpolicy/foreignpolicy.asp. See also President Clinton's address to a joint session of the Indian parliament on March 22, 2000, http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/nea /mena/india8.htm.

36. See Victor M. Gobarev, "India as a World Power: Changing Washington's Myopic Policy," Cato Institute Policy Analysis no. 381, September 11, 2000.

37. Bill Clinton, Speech of March 20, 1998, http://www.state.gov/www/regions/wha/cuba/policy.html.

38. The options regarding the embargo are discussed in William Ratliff and Roger Fontaine, *A Strategic Flip-Flop in the Caribbean: Lift the Embargo on Cuba* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2000).

39. Saeb Erakat, "Camp David: A Success Story," *Washington Post*, August 5, 2000, p. A19.

40. Jane Perlez, "Albright Says Time Is Not Right for Mideast Summit," *New York Times*, June 30, 2000, p. A1.

41. For an assessment of Iraq's weapons holdings, see Scott Ritter, "Redefining Iraq's Obligation: The case for Qualitative Disarmament of Iraq," *Arms Control Today*, June 2000. An analysis of Saddam's political position may be found in Ofra Bengio, "How Does Saddam Hold On?" *Foreign Affairs* 79, no. 4 (July–August 2000): 90–103.

42. Details of this meeting may be found at http://www.state.gov/www/regions/nea/000626_gore_iraq.html.

43. Quoted in Steven Lee Myers, "Flight Tests Show Iraq Has Restarted a Missile Program," *New York Times*, July 1, 2000, p. C11.

44. Jim Hoagland, "'Pretend' Iraq Policy," *Washington Post*, July 2, 2000, p. B7; and Myers, p. A1.

45. See statement of Gen. Anthony Zinni, January 8, 1999, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan1999/n01121999_9901121.html.

46. An interesting account of the new stirrings in Iranian society may be found in Robin Wright, "Iran's New Revolution," *Foreign Affairs* 79, no. 1 (January–February 2000): 133–45.

47. John S. Wolf, U.S. coordinator for Caspian energy issues, Speech at London Oil and Gas Seminar, London, May 31, 2000, http://www.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/2000/000531_wolf_oilgas.html.

48. Evidence may be found in Philip Gourevitch, *We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our Families* (New York: Farrar, Strauss & Giroux, 1998), pp. 151–58.

49. Ryan Lizza, "Where Angels Fear to Tread," *New Republic*, July 10, 2000, p. 3.

50. Norimitsu Onishi and Jane Perlez, "How U.S. and Left Sierra Leone Tangled in a Curious Web," *New York Times*, June 4, 2000, p. A14.

51. Compare, for example, Christopher Layne and Benjamin Schwarz, "Dubious Anniversary: Kosovo One Year Later," Cato Institute Policy Analysis no. 373, June 10, 2000; and Ivo H. Daalder and Michael O'Hanlon, *Winning Ugly: NATO's War to Save Kosovo* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 2000). The two works disagree fundamentally about initiation of the war itself, but they present many of the same criticisms of the Clinton administration.

52. Quoted in Steven Erlanger, "UN Official Warns of Losing the Peace in Kosovo," *New York Times*, July 3, 2000, p. A10.

53. Quoted in Stephen Lewis, "After Rwanda, the World Doesn't Look the Same," *International Herald Tribune*, July 10, 2000, p. 16. Lewis, a former Canadian ambassador to the United Nations, led the International Panel of Eminent Personalities that investigated the 1994 genocide in Rwanda and the surrounding events.

54. For an account of how this happened, see David Owen, *Balkan Odyssey* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1995).

55. Further detail may be found in Rafael Pardo, "Colombia's Two-Front War," *Foreign Affairs* 79, no. 4 (July–August 2000): 64–73; and Steven Dudly, "U.S. Aid Plan Heats Up Colombia's War," *Washington Post*, August 4, 2000, p. A24.

56. On the militarizing effects of the "drug wars" in Central America, see Juanita Darling, "A New Battlefield in Central America," *Los Angeles Times*, July 9, 2000, p. A1.