|Cato Policy Analysis No. 201||January 12, 1994|
by Ian Vasquez
Ian Vsquez is assistant director of the Project on Global Economic Liberty at the Cato Institute.
Numerous U.S. commentators and policymakers have shown enthusiasm for promoting democracy in the Western Hemisphere--even as the justification for doing so has lost any national security rationale. Unfortunately, Washington's record of exporting democracy to the region has been dismal, and the renewed U.S. commitment to do so may prove similarly difficult to satisfy in the 1990s.
Washington's endorsement of a fortified Organization of American States as a vehicle for undertaking that mission hardly guarantees that U.S. goals will be met. Instead, a stronger OAS may pull the United States into an assortment of domestic conflicts impervious to solutions imposed from without.
Recent interruptions in the constitutional order of Haiti, Peru, and Guatemala, and bloody coup attempts in Venezuela, indicate that democracy has not securely taken root in many of the region's countries. And the democracy- promotion mission can cause far more harm than good. For example, embargoes imposed by the OAS and the United Nations on Haiti have worsened the harsh living conditions of the vast majority of Haitians. Regional peacekeeping operations run the risk of turning into open-ended military missions. The OAS, either impressed by democratic formalism or realizing the limits of its influence, may embrace as "democratic" leaders who are in fact authoritarian. Washington may also use the veil of promoting democracy to conceal items on its agenda that run contrary to the wishes of Latin American nations.
The most effective ways for the United States to encourage civil society and prosperity in Latin America are to open U.S. markets to the region's goods and to serve as an attractive example of limited constitutional government.
As market economies and democratic politics have spread throughout most of Latin America in recent years, Washington has sought to redefine its relationship with its hemispheric neighbors.(1) The United States has strengthened its economic ties to the region and welcomed the development of multi- party democracy. Many commentators and policymakers, eager to see hemispheric democracy prevail, want Washington to go further--to play a larger role in ensuring that outcome. As desirable as the democratic ideal may be, little, if any, consideration is given to Washington's ability to successfully "export" democracy. Humbling U.S. experiences on that score are ignored or forgotten, and there is hardly any discussion about whether Washington should become involved in democracy-promotion campaigns.
Whereas in the past regional instability was considered a U.S. security risk because of its potential to trigger the involvement of outside powers, today lack of democracy has, in itself, become a matter of major concern to U.S. policymakers. President Clinton is especially enthusiastic about Washington's role in exporting democracy, although he has displayed an inclination to rely on multilateral efforts to advance that mission. In remarks to Latin American leaders, for example, Clinton has emphasized the "commitment to mutual efforts among all of us in this hemisphere to promote democracy."(2)
Clinton's policy differs only marginally from that of George Bush. The president has even adopted the Bush administration's emphasis on working through the Organization of American States to defend democracy whenever it is threatened. But using the OAS as a vehicle for strengthening democracy has many pitfalls for the United States and provides very few, if any, real benefits.
That has become apparent over the past two years as the OAS and the United Nations, despite the full support of the United States, have been incapable of restoring democracy in Haiti following the overthrow of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. The collective response of the inter-American community has only served to make matters worse in Haiti, devastating that nation's economy and harming its poor. Even against the poorest nation in the hemisphere, the policies applied by the OAS, and endorsed by the United States, have proven ineffective.
If the United States insists on exporting democracy and backing OAS efforts in support of that goal, the entangle ments Washington will potentially face in Latin America will be virtually limitless. Domestic conflicts in many parts of the region--including bloody coup attempts in Venezuela, the abrogation of constitutional rule in Peru in 1992, and the suspension of democracy in Guatemala in 1993--suggest that stable democracies are far from firmly established in the hemisphere. Moreover, the complexity of the region's internal disputes is likely to pose far greater problems for outside promoters of democracy than has the ongoing Haitian quagmire. Before again thrusting itself upon the Latin American political stage, Washington must consider whether becoming involved in a host of democracy-promotion efforts would be prudent and whether those efforts would be likely to produce beneficial results.
Strengthening the OAS
In June 1991 the OAS established a new interventionist policy that requires the ministers of foreign affairs to meet within 10 days of "any event giving rise to the sudden or irregular interruption of the democratic political institutional process of legitimate exercise of power by the democratically elected government in any of the Organization's member states."(3) Furthermore, whenever constitutional government is suspended, the OAS is "to look into the events collectively and adopt any measures deemed appropriate" to restore democratic rule. The "Santiago Commitment to Democracy and Renewal of the Inter-American System" (Santiago Declaration) and the resolutions that accompanied it sought to revitalize the OAS and free the organization from its image of irrelevance.
Many observers were impressed with the Santiago Declaration. Nathaniel Nash wrote in the New York Times that "the much-maligned OAS appears to have transformed itself into the most promising hope for self-help that Latin America has, if it is to preserve its nascent democracies from a return to authoritarian rule."(4)
The passage of the declaration marked a significant change in the nature of inter-American relations. During the Cold War era, national sovereignty had been a particularly sensitive issue for Latin American countries. Given the record of U.S. military incursions and other interference in the internal affairs of Washington's neighbors, that preoccupation was not unjustified. Indeed, the OAS was founded in part to assure Latin American governments that the United States would not violate their sovereignty. In exchange, if an extrahemispheric power threatened the re gion's security, Latin American governments agreed to cooperate with Washington to defend the region. As it turned out, the OAS did not effectively serve either purpose. The end of superpower rivalry, moreover, eliminated any relevance that the inter-American security system might have had. New missions were needed to justify its existence.
In Washington the predominant argument was that the United States could finally devote its attention to building democratic institutions in the region without being preoccupied with containing communist influence. That belief, combined with an emphasis on collective approaches to the promotion of democracy, led the United States to support the fortification of the OAS. The Santiago Declaration, then, was meant to convert the OAS into a vibrant and functioning organization and to create the blueprint for a new era in inter-American relations, one in which all countries of the hemisphere would be collectively responsible for defending an ideal form of government.
Background to the Santiago Declaration
Several important events preceding the Santiago Declaration set the stage for a larger multilateral role in the internal affairs of the region's nations. The 1987 Central American peace plan (Esquipulas Accord) called for both the OAS and the United Nations to actively monitor the 1990 Nicaraguan elections. It would be the first time that the United Nations would undertake such a mission within a sovereign country, and the first time the OAS would be more than passively involved in observing elections.(5) That precedent led to OAS and UN monitoring missions in Haiti, Suriname, and El Salvador in the following years. The aborted May 1989 elections in Panama were another important factor behind the emergence of a renovated OAS. Although the organization refrained from taking punitive measures against Panama, it did condemn Gen. Manuel Noriega for election fraud and declared his rule unconstitutional.(6)
Bush administration initiatives to strengthen the OAS also predated the Santiago Declaration. In 1989 the White House appointed Luigi Einaudi U.S. ambassador to the OAS. Since Einaudi was the first Spanish-speaking Latin Americanist to represent the United States before the organization in recent times, his appointment was symbolic of Washington's renewed interest in the multilateral body. Furthermore, in 1990 the administration paid its OAS dues in full ($40 million)--the first time Washington had done so since 1982--and began paying back the $48 million it owed in dues.(7) The attention Bush gave the OAS differed markedly from the attitude of President Ronald Reagan, who largely ignored the organization and even left its dues unpaid during the final year of his presidency.
At the same time, aspirations to define a new and expanded OAS agenda were expressed by other hemispheric leaders. In addition to guaranteeing the inviolability of democratic rule, emerging priorities included an assortment of both traditional and unconventional issues ranging from drug trafficking and the environment to human rights and money laundering. An aggressively activist inter-American system was necessary to pursue those missions.
Undermining the Principle of Nonintervention
In the debate surrounding the relationship between the principle of nonintervention and the defense of democracy, many participants sought to deemphasize, and even warned against, relying on conventional concepts of political sovereignty.(8) President Carlos AndrĒs PĒrez of Venezuela advised that it was "critical to realize that through inaction or an outdated attachment to traditional perspectives on nonintervention we may sow the seeds of conflict."(9) The Chilean ambassador to the OAS, Heraldo Mu§oz, suggested that his government "could not accept the principle of nonintervention becoming a containment wall to impede respect for other key principles in the OAS charter."(10)
The desire to adopt a more interventionist role and perhaps even create a multinational peacekeeping force as a mechanism for defending democracy was expressed by Einaudi as well. "No society can work without a degree of coercion," he stated. "I think it is time that we figured out a way, somehow, to bring armed force and coercion in line with our democratic aspirations and, increasingly, our democratic behavior."(11)
Although the resolution passed in Santiago did not spell out precise measures to be taken in the event of a democratic crisis, it did pledge that the inter-American community would use tough action to uphold its new doctrine. But it was far from clear that the United States or the OAS had figured out an adequate way to "bring coercion in line" with the objective of guaranteeing hemispheric democracy. Broad statements about the need to achieve that goal, and the convergence of ideas regarding the proper role of the OAS, may have obscured the probable effects of embarking on the democracy mission. In Latin America, where the politi cal and social landscape is not always stable, the practical consequences could not remain obscured for long.
Portent in the Caribbean
On September 30, 1991, Haitian president Jean-Bertrand Aristide was ousted in a bloody coup that ended Haiti's brief experiment with democracy. The event provided the OAS with its first opportunity to act on its renewed commitment to protect democracy. The overthrow of Aristide was met with a swift condemnation by the inter-American system. Only one week after the coup, and following the collapse of negotiations to restore the president to power, members of the OAS voted unanimously to impose a hemispheric embargo on the island nation.
Consequences of the Haitian Embargo
Although the embargo against Haiti was intended to punish the leaders of the coup and the ruling elite that support them, the effects have been quite different.(12) The sanctions have devastated the Haitian economy and further impoverished the hemisphere's poorest nation. While that country's poor have been severely harmed by the embargo, the leaders of the coup have been able to circumvent the effects of the embargo and even profit from the crippled economy by selling smuggled goods. Worsening health conditions and accelerated environmental degradation have also resulted as destitute Haitians resort to crude scavenging to survive.
A flood of approximately 40,000 desperate Haitians set sail for Florida in an attempt to flee their country's life- threatening conditions. Faced with a situation that Bush described as "unmanageable," in May 1992 the United States initiated a policy of forcibly repatriating Haitian refugees intercepted on the high seas. By failing to determine the political status of the boat people and not allowing heaings on asylum claims, the United States has become a pas-sive perpetrator of human-rights abuses against Haitians. Indeed, various reports from credible human-rights organizations have documented increased political repression and abuses of human rights since the overthrow of Aristide.(13)
Calls for Greater Intervention
Despite the harsh consequences of its strategy, the OAS has yet to achieve its primary objectives--the reinstatement of Aristide as president and the restoration of democracy. Only reluctantly did the United Nations become involved in the crisis and deploy human-rights monitors in Haiti. Aristide's ouster also prompted calls for a range of more drastic measures. For example, Robert Pastor, a former director of Latin American and Caribbean affairs on the National Security Council, suggested that an OAS peacekeeping force might ultimately be needed to bring down the military regime in Haiti.(14) Newspapers, including the New York Times and the Los Angeles Times, expressed support for a multilateral military intervention in Haiti, and at least one columnist went so far as to advocate a full-scale occupation of Haiti so that it could "be in some creative way 'recolonized' for a time."(15)
The Bush-OAS strategy toward Haiti has been pursued even more aggressively by President Clinton. Although, as a candidate, he was extremely critical of the Bush policy toward Haitian refugees, since his election, Clinton has endorsed more restrictive measures. Shortly before his inauguration, for example, he decided that it was best that Haitians remain in their country to work for democracy. In close consultation with the Clinton transition team, Bush then ordered the dispatch of 22 Navy and Coast Guard ships and 12 aircraft to surround Haiti and monitor its coasts. Despite Clinton's claim that extension of the Haitian refugee policy would only be "temporary," its end is nowhere in sight.
Clinton worked closely with the United Nations and the OAS in their efforts to restore Aristide and send as many as 500 observers to the island nation. Those efforts met with little success, however, so Clinton supported a UN-backed worldwide embargo on oil to Haiti that took effect in June 1993. The following month, negotiations between the Haitian military and Aristide were held in which the coup leaders pledged to resign and allow the deposed president to return to Haiti. In exchange, the United Nations promised to end the embargo and agreed to a plan according to which the military would receive amnesty for crimes committed during Aristide's absence. The embargo was lifted in August after the conclusion of the Governors Island Agreement, and Aristide was to have returned to Haiti by the end of October.
The plan foresaw an aggressive nation-building scheme in which a 1,300-member military mission including 600 U.S. soldiers was to "professionalize" the Haitian armed forces, establish democratic institutions, and build infrastructure. That plan, however, was derailed in October after coup leaders refused to step down and a group of army-backed Haitians blocked the arrival of U.S. and Canadian peacekeeing troops. The incident eliminated any impression that Haiti's de facto regime was serious about negotiating Aristide's return. According to an adviser to the head of the Haitian military, the negotiations served merely as a smoke-screen. "We wanted to get the sanctions lifted. That's why we went along. But we never had any intention of really agreeing to Governors Island, as I'm sure everyone can now figure out for themselves."(16)
The United Nations responded by reimposing an embargo-- this time on arms and oil. To enforce the sanctions, Clinton ordered U.S. Navy ships to blockade the island nation. Those events prompted yet another call for more forceful initiatives, ranging from imposing a total trade and travel embargo to taking unilateral or multilateral military action. For example, Randall Robinson, executive director of TransAfrica, advised, "The military option must be kept under serious consideration."(17) Robert Rotberg, president of the World Peace Association, advocated a U.S. invasion of the Caribbean country and suggested that "Haiti should be another Grenada."(18)
A Century of Failed U.S. Efforts
The record of U.S. efforts to install democracy in Latin America should at least make policymakers skeptical about launching such missions today. U.S. programs aimed at bolstering the democratic process have been pursued at various times during this century in such countries as Mexico, Panama, Bolivia, Argentina, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Haiti, Peru, Chile, Ecuador, and Guatemala. The region's nations have been flooded with foreign aid, invaded, consulted, advised, coerced, sanctioned, praised, and denounced in pursuit of the democratic ideal. Latin America has witnessed an assortment of initiatives designed to advance democracy, ranging from Woodrow Wilson's nonrecognition of undemocratic governments and John F. Kennedy's Alliance for Progress to Jimmy Carter's human- rights crusade and the Reagan Doctrine of the 1980s.
Underlying U.S. Motives
Admittedly, although many of those efforts were couched in the rhetoric of democracy, they were equally, if not more, inspired by geopolitical concerns. U.S. support of the 45-year Somoza dictatorship in Nicaragua, for example, could hardly be considered a democracy-building policy. And despite Washington's backing of the Nicaraguan "freedom fighters" against the Sandinista government that took power after Somoza's fall in 1979, the principal U.S. interest in the conflict was strategic, not idealistic.
The same was true of a host of U.S. interventions in the region, including aid to the Salvadoran, Guatemalan, and Honduran militaries during the 1980s. Few observers of the U.S.-led 1983 invasion of Grenada (a military operation initially portrayed by the Reagan administration as a mission to safeguard the lives of U.S. citizens and restore democracy) would deny that the move was mostly an anti-communist operation. The ousted regime's principal offense was not being dictatorial but being pro-Soviet. Indeed, as the Boston Globe aptly pointed out, "Pretending that the United States has suddenly developed a lively interest in the democracy it has ignored in the rest of Latin America insults the world."(19) The promotion of democracy has nevertheless been among the primary stated goals of U.S. involvement in Latin America.
"Success" Due to Other Factors
Unfortunately, the U.S. record in promoting and consolidating democracy in Latin America is bleak. During the 1980s, for example, the United States actively supported those goals in Latin America with particular emphasis on Central America and the Caribbean. Although the Reagan administration was quick to take credit for the general trend toward democracy in the region during that decade, the trend could at best be attributed only marginally to U.S. policy.
Ten years of U.S. support and pressure on El Salvador's regime to institute reforms and strengthen democratic tradtions at a cost of $6 billion did not produce a just socety, as hoped.(20) The institutions strengthened by U.S. efforts, such as the judiciary and the legislature, have been used by right-wing elements to undermine the reforms considered essential by the United States. The United Nations' Truth Commission Report, released in March 1993, further revealed that the Salvadoran army, trained and financed by the United States, committed human-rights abuses on a wide scale throughout the 1980s, including the massacre of peasants, the killing of church leaders, and the murder and torture of thousands of civilians.(21) Only after a decade of Washington's efforts to bolster the Salvadoran government failed to win it popular support were peace negoti- ations with rebel forces initiated. Moreover, the end of the civil war in El Salvador is more a result of the country's diminished strategic importance to the United States in the post-Cold War era combined with the Marxist insurgency's loss of Soviet and Cuban patronage than of U.S. efforts at promoting democracy.
Similarly, the 1990 defeat of the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua was ultimately due to the collapse of the Soviet Union, not the years of U.S. aid to the Contra rebels and the imposition of an economic embargo. Indeed, the 1985 embargo against Nicaragua proved of little utility; that country responded by diversifying its trade and refusing to reverse militarization.
The economic sanctions imposed on Panama in 1987 in an attempt to bring about fair elections and a civilian-controlled government were even more futile. Instead of leading to democracy, the sanctions seriously damaged the economy--especially injuring the middle class and the anti-Noriega business sector. That failed policy finally led to a U.S. military invasion of Panama in December 1989 and the forcible removal of Noriega.
Kennedy and Latin America
Such frustrations represent only the latest installment in the long history of unfulfilled U.S. expectations. The limit of Washington's ability to orchestrate events was equally evident during the 1960s when President John F. Kennedy launched the Alliance for Progress, a broad-based program for fighting poverty and consolidating democracy in Latin America. Although the alliance spent $22.3 billion over 10 years,(22) a move toward constitutional, civilian-controlled governments was certainly not evident. In fact, during the first five years of the program, the militaries of the region initiated nine coups against civilian governments(23) and the United States found itself reluctantly endorsing many authoritarian regimes.
Perhaps the earliest and most idealistic examples of U.S. efforts to promote democracy in Latin America came during Woodrow Wilson's presidency. Declaring that the United States would recognize only those Latin American regimes that respected an "orderly process of just government based upon law, not upon arbitrary or irregular force," and the "consent of the governed," Wilson sought to become the champion of constitutional governments in Latin America.(24)
In 1914 the policy of nonrecognition of undemocratic regimes led Wilson to dispatch U.S. forces to Veracruz, Mexico, in opposition to Gen. Victoriano Huerta, who had overthrown President Francisco Madero. The invasion did not provide an effective solution, however, because Mexico was still going through a complex and extremely violent revolution that had begun in 1910. Instead, Wilson's action was condemned by some Latin American nations and even Mexican enemies of Huerta (such as Emiliano Zapata and Venustiano Carranza) who viewed the U.S. intrusion as a form of Yankee imperialism. The U.S. presence in Mexico did help bring about the downfall of Huerta, although he was replaced in 1915 by Carranza, another unelected authoritarian leader. Wilson finally agreed to recognize Carranza, since it had become evident that the United States had few credible alternatives.(25)Despite the experience in Mexico, Wilson continued his
zealous campaign to manage the internal affairs of other Latin American nations. During his administration, the United States intervened militarily in or occupied Haiti (1915), the Dominican Republic (1916), and Nicaragua (initially invaded in 1912). The U.S. presence in those countries did not prove any less complex than had the previous military adventure in Mexico, nor did it provide the lasting solutions that Wilson envisioned. Indeed, the United States habitually underestimated the complexity of the social, political, and economic settings in those countries. The U.S. military's mission to restore order and democracy lasted 19 years in Haiti, 8 in the Dominican Republic, and 20 in Nicaragua. During that time the United States sought to strengthen democracy by creating impartial, professional police organizations to enforce law and order. In all of those countries, those organizations became the most essential elements for bolstering the authoritarian regimes that took power after the departure of U.S. forces.(26)
Whether relying on economic coercion, military invasion, or other means of exerting pressure on Latin American governments, U.S. policymakers have consistently overemphasized Washington's ability to determine the outcome of events in the region. More often than not, U.S. efforts at managing the affairs of Latin American nations have complicated U.S. relations with those nations over the long term and provided few lasting benefits. In reviewing the success of U.S. efforts to promote democracy in the Western Hemisphere, one scholar on inter-American affairs, Abraham F. Lowenthal, concluded:An examination of the record from the presidency of Woodrow Wilson to the present shows that despite official rhetoric, the United States has only occasionally really been active in promoting Latin American democracy, and that when United States officials have been active, their efforts have often been ineffective and occasionally counterproductive. The few successful instances of U.S. democracy promotion have rarely been sustained. In the very rare cases when United States efforts to promote Latin American democracy coincided with sustained democratic consolidation, there were many other reasons for the success, rendering unlikely the possibility that United States policy was decisive or determinative.(27)
Back to Wilsonian Crusades?
During his first term, Wilson tried to establish the Pan American Liberty Pact, an attempt to multilateralize his approach to promoting democracy in the hemisphere. Despite the interest of many Latin American nations, the president was unable to launch the proposal. Several key countries including Chile, Mexico, and Argentina remained opposed to the idea on the grounds that it would provide the United States with a vehicle for intervening in the affairs of Latin American nations.(28)
The hemispheric response to the overthrow of President Aristide of Haiti is a contemporary application of Wilson's pan-Americanist vision. Despite the multinational approach, which now includes UN mediation efforts as well as OAS actions, the inter-American community has so far not had any more success at restoring democracy than did Wilsonian policies earlier this century. Nevertheless, proposals to further strengthen the OAS and expand its authority to deal with any breakdown of democratic rule in the hemisphere have proliferated.(29)
The Attempted Coup in Venezuela
Enthusiasm for such schemes waxed when a failed coup attempt in Venezuela in February 1992 caught many observers of Latin American developments by surprise. Indeed, the occurrence of such an event in South America's most enduring democracy forced the unsettling realization that the region's constitutional governments were not as stable as presumed. Robert Pastor responded to the event by proposing a set of escalatory sanctions to be automatically applied by the OAS whenever the democratic process is interrupted. "The steps would be diplomatic isolation, cessation of bilateral and multilateral aid programs, the freezing of financial assets, a trade embargo enforced by the navies of OAS members, and finally, after an appropriate period of time, an inter-American peace force." In his view, "Democracy deserves no less."(30)
But the application of such a set of sanctions provides no guarantee that democracy will be restored. All those measures have been tried by the United States in the past without much lasting success. Furthermore, if Washington were willing to commit itself to such an aggressive proposal, Haiti and Venezuela would probably not be the only possible candidates for massive intervention. That point became apparent when Peruvian president Alberto Fujimori abrogated his country's constitution and dissolved the legislature in April 1992. His military-backed "auto-coup" provided the inter-American community yet another sobering opportunity to assess the complexity of the political and social landscape in Latin America.
Reality Intrudes: The Peruvian Coup
The situation in Peru proved considerably more daunting than the one in Haiti. Were the OAS to respond to Fujimori's de facto dictatorship in the same fashion it did to the coup in Haiti--by imposing a hemispheric embargo--the greatest benefit would most likely flow to the Maoist Shining Path guerrillas. Such a policy would further damage an already faltering economy and weaken the Fujimori regime-- outcomes that more properly belong on the insurgents' agenda. Furthermore, the isolation of South America's third largest country would prove even more difficult than that of Haiti, where soldiers and the elite have nevertheless continued to traffic in smuggled goods.
The presidential coup in Peru revealed the limits of the OAS's ability to defend or restore democracy in the hemisphere and exposed the problems that would accompany the implementation of stiff sanctions, much less an automatic set of escalatory measures. Further complicating matters for the OAS, the actions of President Fujimori were wildly popular with the Peruvian people; after the coup, Fujimori's approval ratings registered above 80 percent, and they remained as high as 60 percent through the end of 1993.(31) In contrast to its attempts to destabilize unpopular coup leaders in Haiti, the OAS found itself in the position of trying to reverse events that most Peruvians supported.(32)
Given the problems presented by the Peruvian crisis, the OAS refrained from initiating stiff measures against the Andean nation. Although the inter-American body harshly condemned the suspension of democracy, many of its members have conceded that Fujimori is not so bad after all and have decided to normalize relations. After the election of a constituent assembly in November 1992 (the election was boycotted by many of Peru's major parties), U.S. ambassador Einaudi announced that Fujimori's dictatorship "doesn't exist anymore now that a [new assembly] has been elected. . . . So, there are developments in the last few months in Peru which are positive."(33) Further legitimizing the Fujimori government, the United States backed a $2-billion bridge loan to Peru in response to what it perceived as progress on democracy and human rights. Yet despite Washington's attitude and the reacceptance of Fujimori into the hemispheric community, numerous reports have indicated that political persecution of journalists, intellectuals, human-rights workers, and major political leaders has escalated.(34)
The pattern of official condemnation, compromise, and acceptance of a less-than-democratic regime is familiar. That series of steps can be expected, especially when the OAS is faced with political and social conditions that offer little or no prospect for a better solution. Indeed, the chances are slim that OAS measures can be neatly applied to restore democracy in any Latin American country.
The situations in both Peru and Haiti also demonstrate that even "duly elected" leaders are frequently less than paragons of democracy. Fujimori's autocratic tendencies are obvious. Aristide, whose reinstatement the Clinton administration supports, has been accused of encouraging mob violence, creating a personal militia, bypassing the legislature, and intimidating political opponents. The 1991 U.S. Department of State's human-rights report notes, for example, that during its short term in office, Aristide's administration "repeatedly attempted to interfere with the judicial process or usurp it through `mob justice.'"(35) And the Central Intelligence Agency has produced a profile of the Haitian president that indicates that he is mentally unstable and reportedly links him to gang violence and political murder.(36) Even though Aristide's supporters have disputed the CIA report, accounts of Aristide's undemocratic tendencies should not be dismissed lightly, as the Clinton administration has done.
Other elected regimes are at best quasi-democratic, yet the U.S. Department of State has readily recognized their legitimacy. In Nicaragua and El Salvador, for example, the militaries have for years had a powerful, if not dominant, influence on national politics. Despite official U.S. pretensions that would suggest otherwise, there is often no clean choice between "good democrats" and "bad dictators." It has become clear that the Latin American political scene will not always be able to produce candidates who embody democratic principles.
As a result of the difficulties that the OAS has encountered as guarantor of hemispheric democracy, new and revised proposals for that mission have emerged. The Inter- American Dialogue, for instance, issued a more cautious plan than Pastor's. The group recommended that the OAS not apply a "predetermined solution following a democratic breakdown" and warned against "automaticity regarding the selection, sequencing or escalation of sanctions."(37) Nevertheless, the collective defense of democracy remained a top priority for the Inter-American Dialogue. For his part, OAS assistant secretary general Christopher Thomas recommended that the organization incorporate into its charter representative democracy as a fundamental right. That action would "create a duty on the part of the member states to protect and consolidate representative democracy."(38)
Both Thomas and the Inter-American Dialogue agreed that collective action would require different solutions depending on the circumstances of democratic crises. That capricious recipe for democratic restoration is filled with problems, however. Holding countries to different standards may be viewed with skepticism and resentment by the various political factions. And since politically neutral interventions may be impossible (as the OAS has slowly discovered), the "democracy promoters" may be drawn into the middle of internecine power struggles. By normalizing relations with Fujimori, for example, the OAS has already alienated many actors along the Peruvian political spectrum; the organization has also been accused of becoming a participant in, not an impartial mediator of, national politics. The measures taken by the OAS have been contrary to the expectations of many prominent Peruvians who believe that the organization should treat the Fujimori regime the same way it has the leaders of the Haitian coup.(39)
Possible Hidden Agendas
Another problem ignored by many advocates of promotion of democracy is that Washington may use a fortified OAS to pursue goals not necessarily on the agendas of other member countries. Those objectives might be concealed by the guise of "defending democracy." Unfortunately, that tendency was displayed by former secretary of state James A. Baker III when he proclaimed that drug trafficking was the most ruthless enemy that democracy in this hemisphere had ever faced.(40) Similarly, Robert Pastor has advocated the creation of an OAS drug force and recommended that the organization consider military options against drug traffickers.(41)
The illicit drug industry may well be a threat to the democracies of Latin America. But the question of how to deal with the problem has long been a source of friction between Latin American nations and the United States. Using the OAS as a vehicle for attacking the drug industry may quickly provoke complaints from sovereign governments that consider the focus of the drug war misplaced and prefer to deal with the narcotics trade in their own ways. Colombia's quarrels with the United States over the extradition of accused drug lords have plagued relations between the two countries. Washington's relations with Mexico have been similarly disrupted by disputes over extradition. And former Bolivian president Jaime Paz Zamora complained that, in its efforts to prosecute the drug war, the United States had become overly powerful in influencing, if not determining, political outcomes in Bolivia.(42)
A strengthened OAS will only intensify Washington's proclivity to manipulate Latin American domestic affairs. U.S. objectives, particularly in connection with the drug war, may be more easily pursued if obscured behind the veil of "democracy protection." Indeed, if a narcotics-trafficking government emerged in the hemisphere, as occurred in Bolivia during the early 1980s, Washington would be positioned to respond through aggressive intervention, promoting national leaders and parties of its liking.
But even strong actions against "narcocracies" would not guarantee that U.S. objectives would be met. The 1989 U.S. invasion of Panama, for instance, had as its goals the restoration of democracy and the termination of government involvement in drug trafficking. Nevertheless, drugs continue to flow unchecked through Panama, government corruption remains high, U.S.-installed President Guillermo Endara enjoys the support of less than 10 percent of the population, and the country's attorney general was suspended because of alleged links with Colombian drug lords.(43) In Panama neither democracy nor the anti-narcotics campaign has gained ground.
The U.S. tendency to manipulate Latin American political affairs is not confined to drug-related issues. In 1992, for example, Washington became irritated with the democratically elected government of Nicaragua that it had once endorsed. Displeased about President Violeta Chamorro's political alliance with the Sandinistas, the United States temporarily suspended $104 million in aid in an effort to, among other objectives, pressure Chamorro to replace key officials with non-Sandinista appointees. While the removal of Sandinistas from government positions may be beneficial to Nicaraguan democracy, Nicaraguans have yet to achieve a consensus on that point. U.S. policymakers have provided little explanation of what, if any, vital U.S. interests are at stake in Nicaragua to justify meddling in the country's political affairs now that the Cold War is over.
Latin American countries have reason to be suspicious of U.S. motives should Washington begin displaying a desire to micromanage their domestic affairs. The United States has in the past hidden less savory causes and objectives behind the rhetoric of promotion of democracy. Today that danger still exists and may expand with a fortified OAS.
In both its idealism and its potential results, today's democracy-strengthening mission differs little from Woodrow Wilson's efforts to impose democratic systems. Even if there were a consensus among hemispheric nations about that mission, the difficulties of exporting democracy would not be lessened. The OAS's neo-Wilsonian policies in Haiti and Peru have shown that to be the case. Even worse, insistence on pursuing a democracy-building agenda can lead to an assortment of high-cost interventions throughout the region that will not necessarily have any long-term benefits. For the United States, such a prospect should be especially unappealing, given that such risky interventions are not justified by national security concerns.
Multinational Peacekeeping and U.S. National Security
The desire to defend democracy wherever it is threatened in the Americas offers a potentially unlimited number of opportunities for OAS intervention. Worse, if OAS member nations are willing to implement that doctrine through military force, Washington could soon find itself risking American lives in parochial struggles that are at best only peripheral to U.S. security interests. Avid interventionists would see no end to the hemispheric "threats" that could be resolved by military responses. And proponents of a multinational peacekeeping force for the Americas would see no end to the good that such an institution could do throughout the hemisphere.
In light of Haiti's drawn-out crisis, some prominent Democrats have displayed such aspirations--and the OAS is not the only proposed vehicle. Rep. David R. Obey (D-Wis.), for instance, expressed his desire to send a UN mission to Haiti to restore order and establish a constitutional government, as the UN mission attempted to do Somalia.(44) Other Democrats have also urged a larger UN role. The UN peacekeeping operation in Cambodia has been mentioned as a possible model.(45) The difficulties the United Nations has encountered in Somalia and Cambodia make such suggestions extremely dubious.
President Clinton should reject such advice and resist any temptation to enlist in multilateral military initiatives. The United States has no vital interest in the domestic affairs of Haiti, for example. In fact, in the absence of a powerful challenger from outside the hemisphere, the security risk posed by disruption in the internal affairs of Latin American nations has practically vanished. Washington should concern itself, not with the makeup of Latin American regimes, but with legitimate U.S. security interests.(46) If the United States does not follow a policy guided by clear standards of national security, it is likely to be drawn into more and more interventions.
Unfortunately, Clinton's "democracy-preserving" rhetoric has been at least as expansive as Bush's. It is worrisome to note, for example, that Clinton prepared to send up to 600 U.S. soldiers to Haiti's insecure and violent environment as part of a UN effort to enforce peace. Just as worrisome is Clinton's decision to use six U.S. warships to help blockade that island nation. The administration's readiness to involve U.S. military forces in what are seemingly well-intentioned operations places the United States in danger of being dragged into yet another foreign policy quagmire. It is bad enough that Washington's policy of exporting democracy compels the U.S. government to support foreign politicians solely because they were chosen by the electorates of their countries; it would be a tragedy if Washington risked the lives of U.S. soldiers for the same reason.
Support for multinational peacekeeping initiatives increases the risk of becoming entangled in a host of domestic disputes. That possibility was confirmed by two more failed military coups in November 1992. Once again, the fragility of Venezuela's democracy was tested by a bloody army rebellion in Caracas. And in Peru a group of former military leaders was foiled in its attempt to overthrow Fujimori. Those events raise disturbing questions. What would the OAS response have been had a military coup in Lima successfully overthrown the Fujimori regime? In the event that the leaders of the coup were not cooperative with OAS initiatives, would there have been pressure to commit U.S. soldiers to an operation in Peru? Alternately, if the Shining Path were to overthrow the government or were close to usurping control, should U.S. policymakers engage U.S. forces in what would undoubtedly result in an Andean version of Vietnam merely to "restore democracy"?
The militaries of various Latin American countries still hold considerable political power and are not entirely committed to upholding their nations' constitutional orders. Discontent in the Peruvian armed forces was evident once again in April 1993 when tanks were deployed in the streets of Lima to intimidate the newly elected congress that had been investigating the army's human-rights abuses. In May 1993 Guatemalan president Jorge Serrano El°as suspended constitutional rights and dissolved the congress with the army's support, much as Fujimori had done in Peru the year before. Although the military withdrew its support of Serrano days after the self-coup and proclaimed its commitment to returning the country to democracy, it had already displayed its willingness to disrupt the constitutional form of government. In other countries, such as Brazil and Venezuela, the militaries are becoming restive about the inability of the democratic system to deal with ongoing political and economic problems. Those conditions, combined with Washington's apparent zeal for micromanaging the affairs of the region's countries, offer ample opportunity for dangerous and futile crusades.
A Worthwhile U.S. Role in Consolidating Democracy
The end of the superpower rivalry has once again allowed the dream of hemispheric democracy to emerge. Cetainly, an American hemisphere characterized by democratic capitalist countries is a goal worth embracing. Unfortunately, experience has shown that outside interventions to promote that goal rarely produce the desired results. Even by creating a multilateral basis for such initiatives in a fortified OAS, the United States is unlikely to achieve its stated objectives. The end of the Cold War finally provides Latin American countries an opportunity to resolve their own conflicts without the overbearing interference of a major outside power; Washington should not disrupt that favorable climate.
But if the United States is not to endorse the latest demands of interventionists that it actively defend democracy in the Americas, can this country do anything to advance that goal? Fortunately, Washington can rely on the two most powerful means of promoting democracy--establishing free trade with Latin American nations and serving as an example of democracy for the hemisphere.
A Free-Trade Agenda
The United States can help Latin American countries promote market economies and, by extension, democracy by lowering its tariffs and other barriers to trade. The establishment of free-trade agreements can be useful in this regard. If the United States is indeed interested in expanding economic and political liberty, the most effective approach would be to encourage economic reform in Latin America. As British economist Peter Bauer has noted, "Historical experience suggests . . . that democracy is more likely to grow out of the market than the market out of democracy."(47) The evidence in the Americas seems to bear that out. Both Chile and Mexico have instituted market reforms while under authoritative regimes. Only since economic liberalizations were implemented have those countries begun the process of democratization. By contrast, Latin American democracies such as Brazil and Venezuela have had a much more difficult time implementing economic liberalization.
The United States, which buys more than 40 percent of Latin America's exports, remains the region's largest export market. By lowering its trade barriers to Latin American products, Washington can help improve the living standards of the hemisphere's citizens. On the other hand, imposing sanctions on undemocratic nations, such as those placed on Haiti, can be extremely detrimental to the economies and citizens of the target countries. If proponents of democracy-defending missions wish to promote civil and stable societies, they must realize that functioning economies are critical to achieving that end.
Setting a Good Example
The second way in which the United States can promote democracy is by being an example for the hemisphere. Freedom lovers in all parts of the world--including this hemisphere--look to the world's oldest democracy for inspiration. The United States must avoid any temptation to betray its democratic principles by becoming involved in missions that could serve as a facade for less-than-democratic causes. An activist crusade for hemispheric democracy offers numerous opportunities for such cynical maneuvers.
The consolidation of the democratic process and its institutions is by no means an easy goal. Washington's part in promoting that process should be limited by consideration of the proper role of the U.S. government and what it can effectively accomplish. In that regard, John Quincy Adams's advice is still relevant today. The United States, he said, "goes not abroad in search of monsters to destroy. She is the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all. She is the champion and vindicator only of her own."
The Clinton administration can still reverse the crusading policy initiatives introduced by the Bush administration. By doing so, it will diminish the potential for unnecessarily risking U.S. lives, aggravating domestic conflicts, impoverishing countless numbers of people, producing counterproductive results, and entangling this country in endless conflicts throughout the Americas. And while commitment to democratic principles and the pursuit of free trade may not guarantee democracy in Latin America, a new noninterventionist policy based on peaceful commerce is likely to produce more favorable long-term results.
(1) As used in this paper, the term Latin America includes both Latin America and the Caribbean.
(2) Office of the President-Elect and Vice President-Elect, transcript of "Remarks of President-Elect Bill Clinton to the Annual Conference on Trade, Investment and Development in the Caribbean Basin in Miami, Florida," December 2, 1992; see also Douglas Jehl, "Clinton Reassures Latin Heads on Ties to Region," Los Angeles Times, December 2, 1992, p. A5; and "Excerpts from Clinton's Foreign Policy Speech: U.S. Is `World's Best Hope,'" New York Times, August 14, 1992, p. A15. See also John M. Goshko, "Clinton to Stress Democ racy, Human Rights in Latin American Policy," Washington Post, May 4, 1993, p. A15 for remarks by Deputy Secretary of State Clifton R. Wharton, Jr., on the administration's commitment to "engage with Latin America and the Caribbean to strengthen democracy."
(3) OAS General Assembly Resolution 1080, U.S. Department of State Dispatch, October 7, 1991, p. 750.
(4) Nathaniel Nash, "Latin Nations Get a Firmer Grip on Destiny," New York Times, June 9, 1991, sec. 4, p. 2.
(5) Robert A. Pastor, Whirlpool: U.S. Foreign Policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 239.
(6) Later that year, when U.S. forces invaded Panama and captured Noriega, the OAS denounced the military interven tion, but the experience in Panama showed that OAS initia tives to dislodge Noriega had been as unsuccessful as the preinvasion efforts of the United States.
(7) Clara Germani, "OAS Displays New Vitality in Bid to Restore Haiti's Ousted Leader," Christian Science Monitor, November 20, 1991, p. 2.
(8) Article 15 of the original OAS charter is explicit about this principle and was originally included at the insistence of Latin American governments. It read: "No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirect ly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State. The foregoing principle prohib its not only armed force but also any other form of inter ference or attempted threat against the personality of the State or against its political, economic and cultural ele ments." OAS, Charter of the Organization of American States (Washington: OAS, 1948), p. 4.
(9) Carlos Andrs Prez, "OAS Opportunities," Foreign Policy 80 (Fall 1990): 55.
(10) Heraldo Muoz, "The Organization of American States and the Potential for Reform," in The Future of the Organization of American States and Hemispheric Security (Washington: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and OAS, April 15, 1991), p. 25.
(11) Luigi Einaudi, "The United States, the Organization of American States and the New Definition of Hemispheric Secu rity," in The Future of the Organization of American States, p. 18. Others have not only advocated the creation of a multinational police force for the Americas but have suggested that NATO consider as a new mission the defense of democracy in the Third World. See George W. Landau, Julio Feo, and Akio Hosono, Latin America at a Crossroads: The Challenge to the Trilateral Countries (New York: Trilateral Commission, 1990), p. 52.
(12) For a more complete discussion of the effects of the embargo against Haiti, see Ian Vsquez, "Doing What We Can for Haiti," Cato Institute Policy Analysis no. 183, November 5, 1992.
(13) See, for example, "Report Decries Haitian Abuses, U.S. Policies," Washington Post, August 21, 1992, p. A21; and Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, "Haiti: A Human Rights Nightmare," cited in William Raspberry, "Nightmare in Hai ti," Washington Post, September 4, 1992, p. A25.
(14) Robert A. Pastor, "Haiti Is Not Alone," New York Times, October 4, 1991, p. A31.
(15) "Backing Up Principle with Justified Muscle," Los Angel es Times, October 3, 1991, p. B10; "Save Haiti from Its Army," New York Times, February 19, 1992, p. A20; "Pro- Democracy? Start with Haiti," New York Times, February 6, 1993, p. A20; and Georgie Anne Geyer, "Without a Helping Hand," Washington Times, November 22, 1991, p. F1.
(16) Jill Smolowe, "With Friends Like These," Time, November 8, 1993, p. 44.
(17) John M. Goshko, "Blacks Criticize Clinton on Haiti," Washington Post, November 11, 1993, p. A46.
(18) Robert I. Rotberg, "U.S. Needs to Take Control of Haiti Disaster," Christian Science Monitor, October 29, 1993, p. 19. For other examples of calls to increase pressure on Haiti, see "Tighten the Sanctions on Haiti," New York Times, Editorial, October 29, 1993, p. A28; and "Showdown in Hai ti," Editorial, Washington Times, October 14, 1993, p. A16. Peter Hakim, president of the Inter-American Dialogue, advises the Clinton administration to maintain the pressure on Haiti and to be prepared to send U.S. military forces for a future peacekeeping mission there; see "U.S.: Stay the Course in Haiti," Christian Science Monitor, October 28, 1993, p. 18.
(19) Boston Globe, October 27, 1983, cited in Terry Nardin and Kathleen D. Pritchard, "Ethics and Intervention: The United States in Grenada, 1983," Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs, New York, 1990, p. 19.
(20) See Benjamin C. Schwarz, American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and El Salvador: The Frustrations of Reform and the Illusions of Nation Building (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 1991); see also David Asman, "El Salvador Still Digging Its Way Out of the Aid Trap," Wall Street Journal, May 14, 1993, p. A11.
(21) Tim Golden, "U.N. Report Urges Sweeping Changes in Salvador Army," New York Times, March 16, 1993, p. A1.
(22) Tony Smith, "The Alliance for Progress: The 1960s," in Exporting Democracy: The United States and Latin America, ed. Abraham F. Lowenthal (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Universi ty Press, 1991), p. 72.
(23) Ibid., pp. 77-78.
(24) Walter LaFeber, Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America (New York: W. W. Norton, 1984), pp. 50-51.
(25) Paul W. Drake, "From Good Men to Good Neighbors: 1912- 1932," in Exporting Democracy, pp. 15-16; and Mark T. Gil derhus, Pan American Visions: Woodrow Wilson in the Western Hemisphere 1913-1921 (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1986), pp. 30-32.
(26) Drake, pp. 14-15.
(27) Abraham F. Lowenthal, "Can Democracy Be Exported?" in Setting the North-South Agenda: United States-Latin American Relations in the 1990's, ed. Henry Hamman (Coral Gables, Fla.: University of Miami North-South Center, 1991), p. 66.
(28) Drake, p. 16.
(29) See "A Military Force for the Americas," New York Times, March 24, 1992, p. A20; David J. Scheffer, "Toward a Modern Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention," University of Toledo Law Review 23 (Winter 1992): 292; and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace National Commission, Changing Our Ways: America and the New World (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1992), p. 69.
(30) Pastor, Whirlpool, p. 283; and Robert A. Pastor, "Estab lish a Collective Defense of Democracy," Miami Herald, Feb- ruary 9, 1992, p. C1.
(31) Nathaniel Nash, "Rebel's Capture Gives Big Push to Fujimori's Political Fortunes," New York Times, September 18, 1992, p. A8; Thomas Kamm, "Peru Strives to Turn Its Fortune Around with Terrorist's Arrest," Wall Street Jour nal, September 25, 1992, p. A1; Brook Larmer, "Emperor of Peru," Newsweek, May 10, 1993, p. 11; and Don Podesta, "After Shining Path, a Shinier Image: Fujimori's Peru Pulls in Investors," Washington Post, December 8, 1993, p. A28.
(32) One poll in early 1993 asked Peruvians to order the top 22 problems facing their country. Fujimori's disruption of the constitutional process ranked last. See Larmer, p. 13.
(33) Gustavo Gorriti, "America's Dance with a Dictator," New York Times, December 27, 1992, p. E11.
(34) Ibid. Americas Watch has also stated that "freedom of the press in Peru is steadily eroding in what appears to be a broad campaign by the Fujimori Government to intimidate or silence critics and political opponents." Quoted in Brooke, "Peru's Leader Clears a Path with Sharp Elbows," p. A3; for a review of President Fujimori's authoritarian style, see Gustavo Gorriti, "The Unshining Path," New Republic, Febru ary 8, 1993, pp. 19-23; for an account of the growing ties between the military and drug traffickers in Peru since Fujimori's presidential coup, see Francisco Reyes, "Peru's Deadly Drug Habit," Washington Post, February 28, 1993, p. C4; see also Nathaniel C. Nash, "Fugitive General Accuses Peruvian Army, Saying Officers Run Hit Squad," New York Times, May 12, 1993, p. A10.
(35) Quoted in Robert D. Novak, "Why So Hard on Haiti's Military?" Washington Post, October 21, 1993, p. A31.
(36) R. Jeffrey Smith and John M. Goshko, "CIA's Profile Spurs Hill Concern," Washington Post, October 22, 1993, p. A26.
(37) Inter-American Dialogue, Convergence and Community: The Americas in 1993 (Washington: Inter-American Dialogue, 1992), pp. 35, 37.
(38) Christopher Thomas, "Democracy and the Multilateral Mediation Process," Speech delivered to the conference on "Haitian and Caribbean Challenges," organized by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, Decem ber 8, 1992,
(39) See, for example, Gorriti, "The Unshining Path"; Mario Vargas Llosa, "The Road to Barbarism," New York Times, April 12, 1992, p. E21; and Mario Vargas Llosa, El Pez en el Agua (Barcelona: Editorial Seix Barral, 1993), pp. 535-36.
(40) James A. Baker III, "The OAS: Realizing a Vision of Democracy," Current Policy no. 1224, U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, November 1989, p. 2.
(41) Robert A. Pastor, "The Latin American Option," Foreign Policy 88 (Fall 1992): 113.
(42) Paz Zamora expressed his feelings in an interview with ABC News journalist Peter Jennings: Jennings: Does the American ambassador in Bolivia have the power to make or break police officers, military officers, even politicians? Paz Zamora: Without a doubt. Jennings: Does this mean that if the U.S. ambassa dor doesn't like a man you've appointed to govern ment, he can ask you to get rid of him? Paz Zamora: Yes, in practice it works that way. . . . It is frustrating. . . . That is the least that can be said.
Transcript of "Peter Jennings Reporting: The Cocaine War, Lost in Bolivia," ABC News, December 28, 1992, p. 10.
(43) Tod Robberson, "Panama Court Negates Top Aides' House Arrest," Miami Herald, December 31, 1992, p. A3, inter national edition.
(44) "A Few in Congress Advising Caution, or Vote, on Soma lia," New York Times, December 7, 1992, p. A13.
(45) John M. Goshko, "Clinton Urged to Signal Strong Inten tions on Haiti," Washington Post, December 20, 1992, p. A12; and Mary McGrory, "Finally, Movement on Haiti," Washington Post, January 5, 1993, p. A2.
(46) Even during the latter stages of the Cold War, Alan Tonelson, a project director of the Twentieth Century Fund, made the point that "Washington should abandon the utopian strategy of linking its security to a wholesale transforma tion of this chronically misruled region and should end its obsession with the nature of the domestic economies and societies of local states--which in themselves have no effect on America's security." Tonelson, "A New Central American and Caribbean Strategy," in An American Vision: Policies for the '90s, ed. Edward H. Crane and David Boaz (Washington: Cato Institute, 1989), pp. 184-85.
(47) Peter Bauer, "Transition in the East: Democracy and Market," Cato Policy Report 14, no. 2 (March-April 1992): 10.
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