Cato Institute
Policy Analysis
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of the FMA. For example, there is nothing
not avoid that prohibition simply by the ruse
akin to "Neither the United States nor any State
of calling its fleet an "armada" instead of a
"navy."65 Similarly, a person could not be con-
shall recognize any marriage other than the
union of one man and one woman." On its
victed of treason on the testimony of one wit-
face, the FMA appears to forbid both public
ness, rather than the constitutionally required
and private recognition of same-sex marriages.
two witnesses, simply by calling the same
At the extreme, it could be interpreted to pro-
offense "Schmeason." Even some drafters of
hibit religious denominations from recogniz-
the FMA have argued that the limitation of
ing same-sex marriages, as some now do. More
"marriage" to "a man and a woman" prohibits
both same-sex marriage and civil unions.66
likely, it could be interpreted to prohibit pri-
vate employers from making benefits available
Since the first sentences of all versions of the
on an equal basis to married employees and
proposed FMA are substantively identical, any
employees with same-sex partners. At the very
of them might be held to prohibit legislatively
least, it could be interpreted to prohibit courts
created civil unions.
from deciding disputes over private benefits
While it is not a foregone conclusion that
accorded same-sex couples because to do so
the first sentence of the various versions will
might mean granting same-sex couples "the
prohibit the legislative enactment of civil
If the purpose
legal incidents" of marriage.
unions and domestic partnerships, there will
of the second
The application of the FMA to private
certainly be a reasonable constitutional argu-
action is not an inevitable interpretation; sup-
ment to that effect. If the purpose of the sec-
sentence in the
porters deny that they intend such an interpre-
ond sentence in the Senate version is to make
Senate version is
tation. But their intent will not decide the issue
it clear that legislatures (but not courts or
to make it clear
when it reaches federal courts; the text of the
executives) may grant same-sex couples "the
amendment itself will be the main basis for any
legal incidents" of marriage, it does not clear-
that legislatures
decision. The issue will have to be litigated, and
ly accomplish that goal. Why not make leg-
(but not courts or
the uncertainty thus created may delay or com-
islative power over civil unions and domestic
pletely prevent the adoption of private-employ-
partnerships explicit rather than a negative
executives) may
er domestic partnership policies.
implication?
grant same-sex
Other difficult issues, such as the defini-
Moreover, this very uncertainty about the
couples "the
tion of "the legal incidents" of marriage, will
constitutionality of civil unions and domestic
also generate considerable litigation. Up to
partnerships will be used in state legislatures
legal incidents"
now, these matters have been left largely to the
as an argument against creating them to begin
of marriage, it
states. Now federal judges will be called upon
with. State legislators will be wary of acting in
does not clearly
to decide them. It is ironic that an amendment
an unconstitutional fashion and will be espe-
designed to avoid judicial activism in family
cially wary of creating a status full of entitle-
accomplish that
law will invite much more of it.
ments and responsibilities for same-sex cou-
goal.
ples only to have that status stripped away in
Particular Overbreadth Problems with
subsequent litigation. Thus, even if the revised
the Senate Version of the FMA
amendment is ultimately interpreted to allow
Sponsors of the Senate version claim that it
the legislative creation of civil unions and
clarifies their intention to allow state legisla-
domestic partnerships, it will have delayed and
tures to authorize "civil unions" and "domes-
deformed democratic debate on the issue.
tic partnerships."67 That, however, is not clear
All versions of the FMA suffer another
potential overbreadth problem. Almost every
in the Senate version, which nowhere actually
provision in our Constitution contains a state
states that intention. By striking the reference
action requirement. (The only relevant excep-
to "federal or state law" contained in the
tion is the Thirteenth Amendment, which for-
Musgrave version, the second sentence of the
bids slavery.) Yet there is no explicit state
Senate version seems to leave more room for
action element in any of the pending versions
the statutory recognition of civil unions and
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