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The United States, reflecting the realities

decision on whether to leave U.S. forces in

of a new relationship predicated on equity

Japan should be an easy one.

and trust, should not presume to dictate to

Under the terms of the current security

Japan what it should or should not do in

treaty, Japanese forces have primary responsibil-

order to safeguard its security. The proper

ity for defending Japan. Those forces, although

U.S. policy is one of studied ambivalence. The

configured for self-defense, also possess the

Armitage Report specifically held out the

capability to play a wider role in the region, but

U.S.-U.K. relationship as a model for the U.S.-

they have been discouraged from doing so by

Japan alliance. But just as U.S. policymakers

the presence of U.S. forces in the region, partic-

do not presume to dictate to the United

ularly on the island of Okinawa. Accordingly,

Kingdom how it should structure its defense,

the Bush administration should clearly outline

they should not expect to do so with respect

U.S. plans for shifting security responsibilities

to Japan. U.S. policymakers should make

to the Japanese, a process that would culminate

clear that the United States will neither offer

with the removal of U.S. forces from Japan. The

the protection of our extended nuclear deter-

announcement that 8,000 Marines will be

rent indefinitely nor object to a Japanese

moved from Okinawa to Guam by 2012 does

not go nearly far enough fast enough96 and

decision to develop a deterrent force. Like-

The United

wise, while many in Washington believe that

implies that U.S. forces will forever remain on

States should

a revision to Article 9 of the Japanese consti-

Japanese soil in some capacity. Instead of

tution is long overdue, that decision should

assuming an indefinite troop presence, the final

not presume to

and must be left exclusively to the Japanese

security agreements between the two countries

dictate to Japan

people.

should include provisions for port access for

what it should or

the United States, and the agreements might

Addressing Regional Concerns

also include some prepositioning of heavy

should not do

Americans and East Asians alike must

equipment, in the event that other U.S. facilities

in order to

overcome their latent fears of Japan, albeit

in the western Pacific (for example at Guam,

perhaps for different reasons. Americans

Hawaii, and Wake Island) prove inadequate to

safeguard its

deal with future security emergencies.97

must appreciate that a commitment to the

security.

status quo, which has the effect of inhibiting

Continued consultations would allow the

the emergence of independent Japanese mili-

Japanese to take prudent steps to address their

tary power, unnecessarily increases America's

own security needs and possibly also to

own security burdens in the present and well

assume broader security responsibilities in

into the future. On a deeper level, however,

East Asia. But consultations might not be

people in the United States who remain unal-

enough to assuage Japanese concerns about

terably opposed to a fundamental reorienta-

their security over the long term. The Japanese

tion of the current U.S.-Japan relationship

are already considering changes to their con-

must understand that reflexive obstruction-

stitution, most important Article 9, and the

ism could do irreparable harm to the rela-

push for such modifications may take on

tionship of trust and cooperation so careful-

added urgency as the U.S.-Japan security rela-

ly cultivated since the end of World War II.

tionship changes. The Japanese might also

Obstruction implies mistrust, and it is hard

contemplate the need for an indigenous

to envision how the entire range of U.S.-

nuclear deterrent. Japan has long possessed

Japanese relationships, military and diplo-

the ability to develop nuclear weapons. It is

matic as well as political and economic, could

unrealistic to expect that Japan would perma-

continue to flourish in such an environment.

nently eschew such weapons if, in the end,

Meanwhile, Japan's neighbors should wel-

they were seen as essential for Japanese securi-

come a potential counterweight to a rising

ty, but there are many reasons to believe that

China. Many already do. Attitudes toward

the Japanese will weigh such considerations

Japan vary widely, with Taiwanese, Singapore-

very carefully.

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