<<  <  >  >>

U.S. and Japanese

theorized years ago that "alliances are typical-

perate North Korea might be tempted to sell

ly of temporary duration" because they rely on

nuclear materials to terrorists.

policymakers

a fragile "community of interests." The "tradi-

Short of offensive military operations

should seek to

tionally separate and frequently incompatible

against Pyongyang, Japan has other means for

craft a strategic

interests of the individual nations" tend to

defending itself from North Korean nuclear

erode support for the alliance over time.95 But

weapons independent of the United States.

partnership that

Japan has cooperated with the United States

such arguments do not account for the possi-

will endure long

in the construction of an anti-ballistic missile

bility that states, particularly states that share

system, but the further development and

a commitment to political and economic lib-

after Koizumi

deployment of such a system need not depend

eralism, might similarly share a broad concep-

and Bush have

on U.S. support. If active countermeasures for

tion of common strategic interests.

passed from the

dealing with regional security threats were

Today, Japan and the United States certain-

deemed insufficient, the Japanese might even

ly do share many common interests, and it is

scene.

take the fateful step of developing their own

worth pausing briefly to marvel at this

nuclear deterrent.94

remarkable transformation over the past 60

years. President Bush is particularly effusive in

In short, a Japanese military, operating

his praise of Prime Minister Koizumi. The two

independent of the United States but still con-

men share a genuine friendship, but U.S. and

strained by the pacifist impulses of the Jap-

Japanese policymakers should seek to craft a

anese public, could prove a credible deterrent

strategic partnership that will endure long

to offensive actions by North Korea against

after Koizumi and Bush have passed from the

Japan proper and might also succeed in con-

scene. Under the current arrangement, the

vincing the DPRK to abandon its nuclear

United States pledges to defend Japan in

ambitions, in contrast to U.S. economic and

exchange for basing rights. In addition, how-

diplomatic pressure, which has been complete-

ever, Japan's security dependence has led the

ly ineffective. Beyond the North Korean crisis,

Japanese to defer to the United States on

Japanese military power might prove instru-

regional security issues. More recently, Japan

mental for dealing with future serious chal-

has sent a token force to a far-off land in order

lenges to the regional security order.

to curry favor with its benevolent patron, but

not necessarily out of a sense of shared strate-

Conclusion

gic objectives. This is not a sustainable model

over the long term.

The decades-long U.S.-Japan strategic part-

Defending Japan with Japanese Forces

nership is changing. Americans are becoming

The Bush administration is contemplating

increasingly anxious about the costs and risks

a shift in the U.S. military's global posture in

of our permanent global military presence and

many other places around the globe, including

are looking for ways to devolve security respon-

Europe and South Korea. Those changes are

sibilities and reduce our risk exposure. The

long overdue, and they should be accelerated.

Japanese, although retaining a strong anti-mili-

The presence of U.S. troops in stable, demo-

tarist disposition, are willing to play a more

cratic countries that are capable of playing a

assertive role. The Japanese SDF is already high-

larger regional role might inhibit such coun-

ly capable, and Japanese military capabilities

tries from assuming responsibilities commen-

could quickly expand if the security environ-

surate with their political, military, and eco-

ment grows more threatening.

nomic strength. Although the United States

Americans and Japanese should welcome a

spends far more on its military than any other

transition from a patron-client relationship to

country in the world, policymakers must still

one of mutual trust and understanding based

make difficult choices about where U.S. forces

on shared interests. The renowned interna-

should or should not be deployed. But the

tional relations scholar Hans Morgenthau

19