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threat to Japan than he does to the United

exhibits a genuine sympathy for and interest

States.

in the plight of Taiwan, and the Taiwanese

The North Korean crisis may have provided

people harbor fewer resentments toward the

the catalyst for a fundamental shift in Japanese

Japanese than do other states in the region

strategy and policy, but it cannot be viewed in

that experienced Japanese colonialism first-

a vacuum. Although the steps thus far taken by

hand. Taiwan's continued relative autonomy

Koizumi against North Korea have not satis-

from China is of immediate strategic interest

fied a segment of the Japanese population,

for Japan. Over time, as Japan continues to

many of whom remain more concerned about

develop its military capabilities, China and

the emotional abductee issue than about the

other states in the region should not discount

objective security threat, China's rise poses a

the possibility that Japan would come to

more important challenge to Japan's security

Taiwan's assistance in the event that the PRC

over the medium to long term.93 For now,

made good on its threat to use "nonpeaceful

means" to reclaim the breakaway republic.

given the urgency of the North Korean threat

That does not mean that Tokyo wishes to

to Japan, and befitting Japan's emergence as a

antagonize Beijing. The Japanese clearly are

normal power, it would be natural for Japan to

concerned about recent Chinese pressure on

take a leading role in attempting to end North

Taiwan, but they have stopped short of pledg-

Korea's nuclear program.

ing to come to Taiwan's aid in the event of a

As other regional threats become more

conflict. Continued free and unfettered pas-

serious, however, many Japanese may come

sage through the sea-lanes that surround the

to resent U.S. policies that appear to impede

island is vital to Japanese interests; it is there-

their reasonable efforts to defend themselves.

fore implausible to assume that the Japanese

Continued strong opposition within Japan

would inevitably accede to PRC aggression

to the use of the military for offensive ends

against Taiwan. Taiwanese president Chen

suggests that unilateral preemptive action by

Shui-bian misconstrued Japanese pledges to

Japan against North Korea is highly unlikely.

Taiwan when he told the Washington Post's

On the other hand, it is unrealistic to expect

Anthony Faiola that "Japan has a requirement

that Tokyo would wait for U.S. permission to

and an obligation to come to the defense of

respond to a direct attack. It is only slightly

Taiwan."91 Nonetheless, even the mere possi-

more plausible that the Japanese would

refrain from using force in response to credi-

bility that China could face a retaliatory

ble evidence of an imminent threat.

response from either or both of two powerful

Military action against North Korea, even if

states, one of which is located only a few hun-

it were found to be a legitimate exercise of the

dred miles off the coast of China, might serve

As regional

right of self-defense, would certainly stir

as a more credible deterrent than that which is

regional animosity. That is a reflection of the

posed today solely by the United States, with

threats become

difficult balancing act that Japan must play

Japan serving in a supporting role.

more serious,

vis-à-vis other potential allies in the region,

Finally, with respect to the ongoing crisis on

many Japanese

chief among them South Korea. North and

the Korean peninsula, the danger of nuclear

South Koreans alike harbor deep resentment

proliferation in East Asia, combined with con-

may come to

toward the Japanese. Koreans were the victims

tinued ill-will engendered by the abductee con-

resent U.S.

of horrible crimes at the hands of the Japanese,

troversy, suggests that the Japanese would like-

of which the notorious abuses inflicted on

ly be dealing far more harshly with the North

policies that

Korean "comfort women" were only the most

Koreans than they are now were it not for the

appear to impede

infamous. Although U.S. policymakers should

United States. At least one recent poll suggest

their reasonable

rightly be concerned about regional hostility

that the Japanese are less concerned about the

toward Japan, such concerns are not more

threat posed by North Korea's nuclear weapons

efforts to defend

than are many Americans,92 but, objectively,

worrisome than the crisis in the here and now,

themselves.

when an impoverished and increasingly des-

Kim Jong-il does pose a more urgent security

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