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That would be beneficial to both the

evolution of the U.S.-Japan strategic relation-

United States and Japan. To be sure, an equi-

ship depends, therefore, on more than the

table strategic partnership could make

words and actions of a few individuals at the

things more difficult for U.S. policymakers in

top; one must consider broader Japanese and

certain instances, but that is a chance worth

American interests and domestic public opin-

taking in the interest of devolving security

ion in both countries.

responsibilities away from the United States

and lowering U.S. risk exposure. Reducing

Assessing Japanese

the global U.S. military presence is essential

Attitudes toward Future

to alleviating the considerable burdens on

U.S. taxpayers, who collectively spend more

Security Challenges

than 10 times as much on defense as do the

Japanese. U.S. policy should seek to acceler-

A U.S.-Japan strategic relationship that

ate Japan's emergence as a more effective mil-

more closely resembles an alliance in the tra-

itary ally in the region.

ditional sense of the term, as opposed to the

Within the context of a more equitable

current patron-client relationship, is likely to

U.S.-Japan alliance, if Japanese forces were

be an enduring model for U.S.-Japanese secu-

Japanese

deployed to any country far outside the East

rity cooperation in the future, especially if it

and American

Asian region, their dispatch would be depen-

is based on popular support. Fortunately,

dent on Tokyo's assessment of Japanese secu-

popular sentiment within Japan offers still

officials alike

rity interests and therefore would be far more

more clues about how the three cases dis-

have bent over

likely to enjoy the support of the Japanese

cussed above might play out in a future in

backwards to

public. Under the current patron-client rela-

which Japan behaves as a normal country,

tionship, Japanese and American officials alike

that is, as a country responsible for defending

place the small

have bent over backwards to place the small

its interests, and not dependent on the

number of SDF

number of SDF troops in a location where

United States.

they are unlikely to be exposed to harm; by

Of the three cases discussed above, popular

troops in Iraq in

extension, this small number of troops is not

support for an active role by Japanese military

a location where

measurably contributing to the completion of

forces is weakest with respect to Iraq. Japanese

they are unlikely

the mission in Iraq; nor are they substantially

elites place great importance on retaining the

reducing the threat to other Coalition forces.

favor of their security patron. It is unlikely that

to be exposed to

In short, their presence is almost entirely sym-

there would be Japanese forces operating in Iraq

harm.

bolic and has little, if any, strategic value.

today were it not for U.S. pressure, and the

Nonetheless, Prime Minister Koizumi

Japanese may be reluctant to become involved

risked some political capital, as well as time

in similar military missions in the future.

and attention, rallying a modicum of public

However, lingering anti-militarism within

support for an exceedingly modest, even

Japan does not proscribe the SDF from serving

token, military deployment. And while the

in the more ambiguous role of security provider

Japanese agonized over the dispatch of a few

in postconflict settings, with or without U.S.

hundred troops to a country thousands of

encouragement. If the pattern of SDF peace-

miles away, China ratcheted up its threats

keeping established in the 1990s were to con-

against a democratic entity a few hundred

tinue, or even expand, that should not be seen

miles away from Japan and North Korea con-

as a manifestation of resurgent Japanese mili-

tinued to process nuclear material. At best,

tarism. On the other hand, it seems more likely

Japan's conduct seems a case of misplaced pri-

that, in the absence of U.S. pressure to become

orities and confusion over Japan's strategic

more actively involved around the world, a

interests; at worst, Japan has subordinated its

more independent Japan would use its military

own interests to those of its distant patron.

forces to deal with issues more directly relevant

As noted above, the Japanese public

to its own national security.

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