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tional educational firm Nintai, Japan's grow-

The need for an American military presence

ing self-reliance is indicative of resurgent

in Japan has been a foregone conclusion in both

nationalism. Matthews urges that U.S. policy

countries' military planning ever since, although

be directed at blocking such sentiments, or at

the troops themselves have often been a source

least attempting to channel them in a particu-

of controversy and have at times engendered

lar direction.3 But it is hardly unreasonable for

strong Japanese resentment. There were more

than 172,000 American military personnel sta-

Japan to seek some measure of independence

from the United States.4 A desire that one's

tioned in Japan in April 1952. The numbers have

come down over the years, but the presence was

country be capable of defending itself might

maintained throughout the Cold War in

be a sign of nationalism, but if it is, it is no dif-

response to the Soviet and Chinese threat in

ferent from the nationalism expressed by the

East Asia.6 In 1989, at the end of the Cold War,

United Kingdom and dozens of other coun-

tries that have maintained a robust defensive

more than 49,000 Americans were stationed on

capability in spite of security assurances from

bases in Japan, plus another 24,000 sailors with

the Seventh Fleet.7 But, even though the ration-

the United States.

Fortunately, the Bush administration has

ale for keeping U.S. forces in Japan changed in

encouraged a more assertive stance on the

the 1990s, the numbers remained quite high,

The United

part of the Japanese government, even at the

particularly relative to the overall reduction of

States and Japan

risk of arousing regional fears of a resurgent

uniformed military personnel that has occurred

Japan. Although such fears cannot be dis-

since the end of the Cold War. As of December

should continue

missed entirely, both the United States and

31, 2005, there were 35,050 U.S. troops in Japan.

their efforts to

Japan should continue their efforts to estab-

The Navy maintains bases in Sasebo and

establish Japan as

lish Japan as an independent pole of power in

Yokosuka, the headquarters of the U.S. Seventh

East Asia, a "normal country" that is no

Fleet, and the Yokota Air Base is the headquar-

an independent

longer dependent on a distant patron for its

ters of the U.S. Fifth Air Force. The more than

pole of power in

defense.

15,000 Marines stationed in Japan are concen-

trated on the island of Okinawa.8

East Asia.

The security guarantee afforded by those

The Evolution of the U.S-

troops, and enshrined in the 1960 treaty, does

Japan Strategic Relationship

not constitute an alliance in the traditional

sense, in that there is no presumption of reci-

procity on the part of the Japanese. From the

The United States has maintained a sizable

earliest days, many Japanese have contended

troop presence in Japan since the end of World

that Article 9 of their constitution bars them

War II. For most of that time the strategic rela-

from becoming involved militarily in regional

tionship has been shaped by an underlying

crises. The language of Article 9, which was

but pervasive lack of trust on the part of the

essentially imposed by U.S. occupation author-

United States. Although the military occupa-

ities, is quite explicit on that score: "Aspiring

tion officially ended with the signing of the

sincerely to an international peace based on

Mutual Security Treaty of September 8, 1951,

justice and order, the Japanese people forever

that treaty formalized a security bargain in

renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation

which Japan--explicitly proscribed from pos-

and the threat or use of force as means of set-

sessing a military under the language of

tling international disputes." Less clear is the

Article 9 of the Japanese constitution--was

extent to which Article 9 prevents Japan from

guaranteed U.S. protection and the United

defending itself when attacked. Part 2 of Article

States was allowed to maintain permanent

9 stipulates that "land, sea, and air forces, as

bases on Japanese soil. Less than 10 years later,

well as other war potential, will never be main-

the two countries reaffirmed that strategic

tained" and that "[t]he right of belligerency of

bargain with the 1960 Treaty of Mutual

Cooperation and Security.5

the state will not be recognized," but that lan-

3