Cato Institute
Policy Analysis
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for employers who presumably have to track
full year. In fact, nearly 45 percent will regain
insurance within four months.23 Therefore,
how much to withhold on the basis of a work-
er's marital status and number of children. (To
many people who lack health insurance at
be fair the penalty would have to vary with
some point in the year will be insured at the
family size.) If the penalty was a flat rate rather
time they file their taxes. Presumably, the
than based on income as are other taxes, that
"proof of insurance" could include the length
would raise other issues for employers such as
of time that the person was insured, but that
how to handle workers with more than one
would raise the complexity of compliance pro-
job. Should they pay twice?
cedures considerably. It would also increase
Moreover, withholding would do nothing
the incentive to lie.
to collect from the unemployed. Yet we know
If the government were able to determine
that one reason many people lack health
that someone had not purchased health insur-
insurance for part of a year is that they are
ance, what penalty would apply? Ideas have
unemployed. Thus, withholding would penal-
been suggested ranging from loss of drivers'
ize millions of workers with insurance but
licenses to direct fines. However, some sort of
miss millions without.
tax penalty is the most common approach.
Therefore Steuerle and others suggest
But that is much easier said than done. As
some form of carrot-and-stick approach,
Gene Steuerle of the Urban Institute has
whereby the penalty would be offset, at least
noted, the administrative and enforcement
in part, by some form of advance subsidy.26
costs of collecting the penalty would be enor-
mous. The IRS relies largely on voluntary
However, as discussed below, that has its own
compliance backed up by a slow and cumber-
set of difficulties.
some legal process to collect taxes. And it does
Finally, some people suggest that rather
not require those with very small amounts of
than impose penalties on individuals who
income to file. Even so, as noted above, mil-
fail to insure themselves, the government
lions of Americans cheat or fail to file. Collect-
simply insure them by assigning them at ran-
ing a penalty for failure to insure would be
dom to either an insurer or a regional insur-
much more difficult. "The [IRS] is simply
ance pool (see below). The insurer would
incapable of going to millions of households,
then be responsible for ensuring payment
many of modest means, and collecting signifi-
through normal collection methods. But, as
cant penalties at the end of the year," Steuerle
we've seen, a large number of the uninsured
warns.24
lack insurance for only a short period of time.
If the government
In many cases they would become insured
Moreover, many of those who fail to com-
were able to
again during the time it would take to identi-
ply with the mandate will be low-income
determine that
fy, assign, and process them.
Americans. Nearly one-quarter of those with-
States are likely to have an even harder time
out health insurance today have household
someone had not
incomes of less than $25,000 per year.25
enforcing a mandate, since they lack both a
purchased health
tracking infrastructure and the ability to
Those individuals will almost certainly lack
impose large tax penalties. Of course, theoret-
the resources to pay any penalty, particularly
insurance, what
ically states could use their income tax systems
a lump-sum penalty assessed at year's end.
penalty would
to levy penalties, but given lower state tax
As an alternative, therefore, some observers
apply? Ideas have
rates, the penalty would be huge compared to
have suggested that the penalty be withheld in
the amount of taxes otherwise due. That
advance, as part of income tax withholding,
been suggested
would make the penalty a difficult proposi-
then refunded to individuals who provide
ranging from
tion politically.
proof of insurance. However, there is an inher-
loss of drivers'
Governor Romney has suggested that
ent unfairness to an approach that would
Massachusetts withhold state income tax
impose lower take home pay on Americans
licenses to direct
refunds for those without insurance. He
regardless of whether they have health insur-
fines.
would redirect the refund into an escrow
ance. It would also increase compliance costs
4