Cato Institute
Policy Analysis
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A regulation that
that result from imposing this $6.3 billion
ers have been required as a condition of
hidden tax on the private sector. We treat this
Medicaid coverage to provide rebates of at
is apparently ben-
cost shift as the equivalent of an excise tax
least 15.1 percent (or their "best" price offered
eficial on a small
since such costs effectively raise the pharma-
to any other purchaser, whichever is lower) to
scale might
ceutical industry's cost of doing business and
state Medicaid programs for outpatient drugs.
would have the same theoretical impact as an
Another condition, imposed in 1992, requires
become quite
excise tax, including lower output. The MEB
manufacturers to list their brand name drugs
costly on a larger
was, therefore, employed for output taxes
on the Federal Supply Schedule, thereby
(such as excise or sales taxes), which is 20.9
extending these Medicaid discounts to other
scale.
percent.35 Thus the further cost of imposing
major federal purchasers of pharmaceuticals,
including the Department of Veterans Affairs
this $6.3 billion hidden tax on the pharma-
and the Department of Defense. However, a
ceutical industry is roughly $1.3 billion. The
careful study of the impact of the Medicaid
different MEB figures applied to the benefits
Drug Rebate Program found that these
realized by the public sector and the costs
"most-favored-nation" provisions had no
borne by the private sector produces the
detectable effect on the rate of inflation for
entire $2.0 billion net benefit of these phar-
prescription drugs, implying that any savings
maceutical price regulations. These regula-
enjoyed by Medicaid and other public payers
tions, then, produce a net benefit that is whol-
effectively was being shifted to other payers,
ly due to the reduced level of economic ineffi-
leaving average prices unaffected.33 Thus, for
ciency that results from the reallocation of a
small tax burden--not a reduction in average
the most part, any benefits enjoyed by the
prices for pharmaceuticals.
public sector apparently are offset by equiva-
Moreover, it is important to recognize
lent increases in costs in the private sector.
that the federal rebates are relatively small in
However, these regulations are expected to
the overall scheme of things; $6.3 billion in
result in a net benefit to society solely due to
public savings for Medicaid, VA, and DOD
the efficiency gains--or more precisely, the
combined is less than 4 percent of the $162.4
reduced efficiency losses--that result from
billion spent on pharmaceuticals in 2002.36
financing a small share of overall pharmaceu-
tical consumption through hidden taxes on
At such small volumes, these discounts are
industry rather than income taxes. These effi-
roughly equivalent to the limited number of
ciency gains should disappear were the scope
deeply discounted seats available on an air-
of these regulations to widen.
line. Were all seats subject to such a discount,
As suggested above, the $6.3 billion bene-
the plane could not fly, as its average revenue
fit to the public sector also imposes a $6.3 bil-
would not exceed the costs of getting the
lion cost on the private sector. Yet because the
plane to its destination. In the same fashion,
gross public savings are $6.3 billion annually,
cross-national comparisons suggest that if
society saves the marginal cost of collecting
the entire U.S. market was to enjoy compara-
that $6.3 billion in taxes. Those would-be
ble discounts, that might result in a pre-
marginal costs are estimated to be 52.5 per-
dictable decline in research, development,
and innovation.37 Thus a regulation that is
cent of revenues collected. This includes
administrative costs (0.5 percent), taxpayer
apparently beneficial on a small scale might
compliance costs (12.0 percent), and the MEB
become quite costly on a larger scale.
of the input taxes (e.g., income taxes) that
likely would finance this would-be expendi-
Quality-Related Facilities Regulations
ture (40.0 percent).34 Thus the further benefit
Quality related includes hospital accredita-
tion and licensure, which includes Medicare
of not having to collect the $6.3 billion in
conditions of participation (COPs, which have
taxes is roughly $3.3 billion. However, when
many purposes, but quality is arguably the
estimating the costs of these regulations, we
central one) and state accreditation and licen-
likewise must account for the efficiency losses
9