Cato Institute
Policy Analysis
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bers of the EU by the numbers of new bureau-
a joint body of Estonian trade unions (EAKL)
crats those countries have employed. For
fears. According to Parnits, the EU labor legis-
example, the EU Commission commended
lation "costs," which is why she expects "some
the Hungarians for "boosting" their National
factories . . . to close down." Moreover, she
Labour Inspectorate by 80 new officials dur-
complains that "other safety improvements
will harm our possibilities of raising wages."48
ing 2002.52 The Czechs were compelled to
expand their Ministry of Labour and Social
I do not mean to dismiss concerns regard-
Affairs by an additional 450 staffers assigned
ing workers' safety and health but to point out
to the new Occupational Safety Office.53 But
how EU legislation impairs the productivity of
employers and employees alike. As the Centre
bureaucratization of economic life is precisely
for  Research  into  Post-Communist
what the CEECs tried to get away from by jet-
Economies argues, "Far from aiding competi-
tisoning communism in 1989. It is ironic that
tiveness . . . [the EU social legislation acts] to
more, not fewer, bureaucrats should charac-
discourage competition on costs, raise the bar-
terize the CEEC's entry into the EU.
rier to entry in many sectors, discourage firms
from taking on labor (and labor training) and
Environmental Regulations
promote the collective passing-on of the
EU environmental legislation covers envi-
EU members are
resulting higher costs in higher pricing--
ronmental quality protection, production
set on preventing
putting all EU manufacturers at an equal dis-
processes, and products. It sets air quality
advantage against foreign producers."49
standards; waste management procedures;
the countries in
water and nature protection measures; indus-
High unemployment in the EU is com-
CEE from imple-
trial pollution controls; regulations concern-
monly attributed to excessive social legislation
menting policies
ing chemicals and genetically modified organ-
on the national as well as the supranational
isms; and regulations regarding noise, nuclear
level, which makes it costly to hire and fire new
that would result
workers.50 Unfortunately, the EU members
safety, and radiation protection.54
in "too much"
with the most rigid labor markets are deter-
Specific regulations range from sensible
mining the EU's social agenda. What sense
ones concerned with transboundary transport
competition.
does it make to force the CEECs to adopt the
of nuclear waste to others that are far less sen-
sible.55 Those include decisions on ecological
same kind of failed social policies? It is appar-
ent that EU members that are incapable of
criteria for the award of the EU eco-label to
bed mattresses, dishwashers, and light bulbs.56
reforming their welfare states in the face of
opposition from deeply entrenched special
As benign as those regulations may seem, they
interests are set on preventing the countries in
should not be dismissed as insignificant.
CEE from implementing policies that would
Regulations increase bureaucratization of
result in "too much" competition.
economic life and bring about "public choice"
The EU has not evaluated the financial
dilemmas, such as rent seeking. The 2001 deci-
costs to the economies of CEE of the common
sion that granted Portugal "a derogation
employment and social policy. But the growth
regarding urban waste water treatment for the
of the bureaucracy responsible for enforce-
agglomeration of the Estoril coast" is instruc-
tive.57 In Brussels-speak, "derogation" is an
ment of the EU regulations can be used as an
indicator of rising costs. By the time of the
exception granted by the EU to a particular
CEEC's accession, the EU plans to hire an
regulation. Depending on the political weight
additional 5,161 bureaucrats to oversee the
of the member states and the compromises
new members' compliance with the acquis com-
they are willing to make in unrelated areas, the
munautaire.51 Of course, officialdom will
members can receive postponements of and
exceptions from costly regulations. Such prac-
expand in the individual nation-states as well.
tices, however, place disproportionate costs on
In fact, the EU Commission has repeatedly
less politically powerful states and skew the
evaluated the progress different countries
decisionmaking process.
have made on the way to becoming new mem-
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