Cato Institute
Policy Analysis
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The message is
ed to unions as it is now. Teachers could
Introduction
change their choice of representative periodi-
clear enough: the
cally, perhaps every two or three years or at
state teacher bar-
Teacher unions are providers of teacher rep-
the expiration of a collective agreement.3
gaining laws have
resentation services and teachers are consumers
NEA and AFT assert that their tenure as
of them. In the 34 states that require school
exclusive representatives demonstrates teacher
resulted in a
boards to bargain collectively, the National
satisfaction with their services. As we shall
monopoly in
Education Association and American Federation
see, however, it demonstrates only the enor-
teacher represen-
of Teachers share almost 100 percent of the mar-
mous legal and practical obstacles facing
ket for teacher representation services. Inasmuch
teachers who prefer a different exclusive rep-
tation services.
as the two unions have merged in Minnesota,
resentative or none at all.
Montana, and Florida, and operate under a non-
compete agreement in other states, there is virtu-
Basic Concepts
ally no competition for the right to serve as an
exclusive representative of teachers at the local
level. In addition, NEA and AFT affiliates bargain
The proposed reforms require an under-
collectively in many school districts in seven
standing of two basic terms of art in U.S.
states in which teacher collective bargaining is
labor law: "exclusive representation" and
allowed but not required.1
"bargaining unit."
In contrast, in nine states that have not
Under "exclusive representation," the cer-
enacted teacher bargaining laws, there is real
tified representative--that is, the union--has
competition to represent teachers. For example,
the exclusive right to bargain on terms and
in three states without bargaining laws
conditions of employment for all of the
(Georgia, Missouri, Texas), independent
employees in the bargaining unit. Individual
teacher organizations enroll more members
employees or groups of employees in the bar-
than NEA or AFT affiliates.2 The message is
gaining unit do not have the right to repre-
clear enough: the state teacher bargaining laws
sent themselves or to negotiate their own
have resulted in a monopoly in teacher repre-
terms and conditions of employment.
sentation services. As will be evident, this
The "bargaining unit" consists of the
monopoly has had the same outcome as
positions that are grouped together for bar-
monopolies have generally: excessive costs for
gaining purposes. The union bargains for
services geared to the welfare of the producers.
teachers who hold those positions, which
What must be done to introduce competi-
may or may not include part-time teachers,
tion to represent teachers in states that
substitute teachers, teachers on leave, or
require school boards to bargain collectively
librarians. The scope of the bargaining unit
with teacher unions? The solution proposed
determines which positions are covered by
herein is to allow for-profit and nonprofit
the contract negotiated between the exclusive
entities of all types to compete with unions
representative and the school board.
for the right to serve as exclusive representa-
tives of teachers in collective bargaining. This
Freedom of Choice in
reform would open competition to non-
Representation
membership organizations, solo entrepre-
neurs, negotiators, lawyers, and collective
bargaining companies, to cite just a few.
A large body of scholarship demonstrates
Teachers would retain the right to go with-
that consumers are generally better served by
out an exclusive representative, and each rep-
competitive industries than by noncompeti-
resentation option would compete against
tive ones. For this reason, the burden of proof
all the others. Teacher representation in the
should be on the defenders of the status quo
34 bargaining law states would not be limit-
to explain why teacher representation should
2