Cato Institute
Policy Analysis
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No. 450
August 28, 2002
Liberating Teachers
Toward Market Competition in Teacher Representation
by Myron Lieberman
Executive Summary
Since the emergence of teacher unionization in
tion, our educational system would include many
the 1960s, the National Education Association
options that are not yet available to K-12 students.
and the American Federation of Teachers have
The argument in this analysis is that for-profit
monopolized the market for teacher representa-
and nonprofit entities of all types should be autho-
tion services. In the 34 states that require school
rized to compete with membership organizations--
boards to bargain collectively, the NEA and AFT
that is, unions--for the right to serve as the exclusive
share almost 100 percent of the market for teacher
representative of teachers in collective bargaining.
representation services. Inasmuch as the two
Such reform would open up competition to non-
unions operate under a noncompete agreement,
membership organizations, solo entrepreneurs,
there is virtually no competition for the right to
negotiators, lawyers, and collective bargaining com-
serve as the exclusive representative of teachers at
panies. Teachers would retain the right to go with-
the local level.
out an exclusive representative, and each represen-
As is the case with monopolies generally, the
tation option would compete against all the others.
NEA/AFT monopoly over teacher representation
Teacher representation in the bargaining-law states
services has resulted in excessive costs and producer
would not be limited to unions as it is now.
domination of services affecting millions of teach-
Teachers could change their choice of representa-
ers and support personnel. In 2001, active teacher
tive periodically, perhaps every two or three years, or
membership in the two unions was about 2.7 mil-
at the expiration of their collective agreements.
lion out of a total membership of about 3.7 million.
The best way to end the NEA/AFT monopoly is
Their combined revenues (local, state, and national)
for states to enact legislation that (1) reduces the
probably exceeded $1.5 billion, not including their
minimum required showing of interest from 30 to
political action committees, foundations, and spe-
10 percent of the bargaining unit, (2) explicitly
cial purpose organizations.
allows individuals, nonprofit and for-profit orga-
Although teachers would be the primary direct
nizations, and membership organizations to com-
beneficiaries of competition against NEA/AFT, the
pete for the right to represent teachers, and (3)
school choice movement would be a major, indirect
enables all members in bargaining units to vote on
beneficiary. NEA and AFT are the primary opponents
the key decisions affecting their terms and condi-
of school choice. Were it not for their all-out opposi-
tions of employment.
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Myron Lieberman is a senior research scholar with the Social Philosophy and Policy Center, Bowling Green State
University, and author of several books about educational employment relations and school choice.