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The perception

lectual, and military leaders should consider

nothing to do with any need to placate India

the current balance of power in South Asia

or pander to its domestic lobby in the United

that America has

and the world, including Pakistan's relation-

States. Nor would it stem from "anti-

embraced

ship with Washington. They need to realize

Pakistani" or "anti-Muslim" sentiments. It

Musharraf since

that continuing support by their country's

would reflect consideration of genuine

military-mosque nexus for anti-Indian ter-

American national interests at the end of the

September 11 has

rorism in Kashmir and elsewhere is going to

Cold War and in the aftermath of September

emboldened

weaken Pakistan's national security and

11. The United States has a clear interest in

economy and isolate it internationally and

establishing strong ties with India, one of the

Pakistani hawks

might even result in another military defeat

rising political, economic, and military pow-

to step up their

by India. Islamabad would be making a mis-

ers in Asia and a strategic counterbalance to

pressure in

China.64 India also happens to be the world's

take were it to count on its nuclear capability

or its ties with Washington to change such

largest democracy as well as an important

Kashmir.

calculations. To put it differently, the

emerging economy and an expanding market

Pakistanis have to realize that supporting the

for U.S. goods and investment.

so-called freedom fighters of Kashmir could

Moreover, secular and Westernized India

threaten their own survival as a nation.

is a reliable and important partner in the war

against terrorism. Pakistan, with its dictator-

The Right U.S. Response

ship, a failed economy, and an insecure

It is in this context that American policy

nuclear arsenal, is at best a reluctant sup-

toward Pakistan can make a difference.

porter of U.S. goals and at worst a potential

Indeed, the post­September 11 efforts by the

long-term adversary. It remains under the

Bush administration to get Pakistan to aban-

influence of radical Islamic forces hostile to

don its alliance with the Taliban should be

the United States. Although the United

regarded as nothing more than a play-it-by-

States should remain committed to a peace-

ear damage-control operation aimed at

ful, negotiated settlement of the Kashmir dis-

reversing U.S. policies (including support for

pute, and should not take steps that would

Pax Pakistana in Afghanistan) adopted dur-

be construed as support for the more hawk-

ing the 1980s and early 1990s. But if those

ish nationalist Hindu forces in New Delhi, it

efforts are understood as the beginning of

should recognize that triumph by radical

some sort of new, long-term strategic alliance

Muslim terrorists in Kashmir would amount

between  Washington  and  Islamabad,

to a defeat in the global war against terror-

Washington is sending the wrong signals to

ism. Hence, pressing the Indians to not

both Pakistan and India. Such a policy would

respond to terrorist acts and resisting Indian

strengthen the hands of the military-mosque

calls for America to condemn anti-Indian ter-

nexus in Pakistan by suggesting that

rorism in Kashmir reflect more than morally

Islamabad can count on the United States to

dubious "double standards." Such a policy

tilt the balance of power in its favor in its rela-

runs contrary to U.S. national interests and is

tionship with India.

just the latest demonstration of the way the

The perception that America has

Pakistani tail can wag the American dog.

embraced Musharraf since September 11 has

emboldened Pakistani hawks to step up their

Conclusion

pressure in Kashmir, according to a veteran

South Asia watcher, Selig Harrison. He sug-

gests that the United States should make it

The United States should take the oppor-

clear now that Washington regards India,

tunity offered by the changing international

some seven times bigger than Pakistan, "as

realities and the developments in Asia not

the focus of U.S. interests in South Asia."63

only to strengthen its ties with India but also

Such a statement of U.S. policy would have

to study the idea of "constructive disengage-

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