Cato Institute
Policy Analysis
<<  <  >  >>
country has to be regarded as one of the
Pakistan, in February 1999 and again in
strategic and economic losers in the interna-
Agra, India, last year.
tional system that has evolved since
The response from Musharraf's military-
September 11.
mosque nexus in Pakistan has been hostile
Yet the Bush administration and its
and violent. After the Lahore summit, the
Western allies have continued to portray
Pakistanis provided support to the insurgents
Islamabad as a "friend" and a "partner" of the
that crossed the line of control in Kashmir
United States, have hailed Musharraf as a
and attacked the Kargil region inside Indian-
"courageous" leader and a "reformist," and
controlled territory. And last October
have provided Islamabad with economic and
Pakistani-backed insurgents attacked the
military assistance on the basis of the promises
Jammu and Kashmir state legislature, an
by Pakistan to back the American anti-terror-
attack that was followed by several more ter-
ism efforts and to take the road toward politi-
rorist incidents in Indian-held Kashmir as
cal reform. "In the 1980s, Pakistan got a blank
well as inside India itself. Moreover,
check from the U.S. to combat the Russians,
Musharraf's insistence on placing Kashmir at
and spent much of the check in building up
the center of the negotiations between New
the Taliban," argues journalist Christopher
Delhi and Islamabad led to the collapse of the
Hitchens. "Now it is getting another check and
Agra talks last summer. Hence, while both
brand-new interest-free mortgage in order to
sides have legitimate interests in Kashmir, it is
pretend that the Taliban is its enemy. It doesn't
Pakistan's military-mosque nexus, in cooper-
get any better than this."60
ation with radical Islamic groups trained by
As noted, American policymakers, by
the Taliban and al-Qaeda, that has been try-
assigning the role of strategic ally to Pakistan
ing to destabilize the status quo and prevent a
during the Cold War (and especially during
resolution based on direct negotiations
the anti-Soviet insurgency in Afghanistan),
between India and Pakistan.
provided incentives to Pakistan through mil-
Musharraf, who in a major address to the
itary assistance and economic subsidies to
nation stressed that "Kashmir runs in our
abuse its position as a client state of the
blood," is interested in internationalizing the
United States and to adopt policies that ran
dispute and getting the United States and
contrary to core U.S. national interests. With
other countries, including other Muslim
the collapse of the Taliban regime and its ter-
states and China, involved in the negotia-
tions over Kashmir.61 Indeed, internationaliz-
rorist allies, the conflicting national interests
of Washington and Islamabad should
ing the Kashmir conflict is supposed to serve
Internationalizing
become more obvious.
as an "equalizer" for Pakistan, helping to
Although a full-blown war between India
counter India's enormous diplomatic power.
the Kashmir con-
and Pakistan may have been avoided (at least
Pakistani leaders and intellectuals, even
flict is supposed
for the moment), Kashmir remains a flash-
moderate ones, regard the future of Kashmir
point. Pakistan argues that Kashmir, with its
as a core national interest of Pakistan. "For
to serve as an
Muslim majority, should become part of
Pakistan, the belief that the province should
"equalizer" for
Muslim Pakistan, while India stresses that a
have been part of Pakistan at the time of par-
Pakistan, helping
Muslim Kashmir can and should remain
tition is as forcefully felt as the Palestinian
part of a secular and multiethnic India.
belief in its rightful ownership of Jerusalem,"
to counter India's
Although both countries have supported a
explained analyst David Rieff. "From the
enormous diplo-
negotiated solution to the conflict, the
Pakistani perspective, the Kashmiri fighters
Indian government under Prime Minister
are not terrorists, they are freedom fighters
matic power.
Atal Behari Vajpayee, resisting opposition
(echoes, again, of the Arab-Israeli conflict)
whose cause is sacrosanct."62
from the more nationalist forces in his coun-
try and party, initiated efforts to engage
Although that is the way many Pakistanis
Pakistan, first, during talks in Lahore,
relate to Kashmir, Pakistan's political, intel-
17